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2ABSTRACT OF THESIS
In this thesis I address a seeming component of objectivity in our experience 
of moral demands. I try to describe that experience as accurately as possible, and in 
order to do so employ a phenomenological mode of presentation. I especially look 
to see whether such demands are taken by us as emanating from an objectively 
prescriptive value realm, as some moral philosophers think that we do. My 
contention throughout the thesis is that no such signalling is given, either in 
immediate experience or on reflection on the experience’s impress on one. Further 
work on my part goes on to see whether some sense of independence of the 
experience from the subject is necessaiy for it to be had at all by her.
In the first chapter I set out the reasons for taking there to be an issue worth 
studying, and show how some representations of the demand experience leave open 
a number of interesting questions. I follow that with two methodological chapters in 
which the subject area is also refined and prepared: chapter 2 being concerned to 
elucidate the relevance of Husserl's 'formal' version of phenomenology to my area 
of study, and chapter 3 directed to what I call the ‘informal’ approach, as 
phenomenology is generally used in the ordinary run of Anglo-American 
philosophy.
In chapter 4 I describe the strength and quality of the moral demand 
experience as it strikes one and compare it with other, non-moral demand 
experiences to find out if there is anything special about the former. Chapter 5 
continues that comparative approach, arguing that the experience should not be seen 
as of objectively prescriptive values, but that it does include some objectivity 
component. In chapter 6 1 then identify different configurations of the experience in 
terms of 'self and 'not-self in order to check on the kind of independence felt by 
us to be possessed by the not-self element to the experience. And in the final 
chapter I cover certain reflective appraisals of putative necessary features of our 
moral demand experience, contending that these are not taken by us as involving an 
objective value realm.
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9Preface to thesis
My interest in the subject matter of this thesis came about in the course of 
researching into issues pertaining to moral realism, its supporters and opponents. 
As I became acquainted with the disputes that go on in that area I began to feel that 
the debate was resting on certain assumptions not made fully explicit or that it was 
leaving aside important questions about quite what was being argued about. This 
feeling grew, and time and again I wondered, on looking at the reasoning about 
moral truth and its validating characteristics, exactly what kinds of consideration, 
perhaps unrevealed, motivated the debate.
A straightforward way of characterizing the genesis of the debate would be 
to point out the apparent realist commitments of moral language. But I thought that 
that was all very well - why did the language appear in that fashion? In order that I 
might address that question I took a step away from the linguistic current of debate 
and into the experiential nature of its background.
It seemed to me that where the debate got its impetus was in a certain 
experience or cluster of experiences which we have concerning morality. The ways 
in which morality often forces itself upon us as prohibiting or prescribing certain 
courses of action; as it signals itself by less determinate, though often piercing, 
sensations of unease, pressure and inescapability on the subject; and as such affects 
of the apprehension of a moral dimension to a state of affairs seem in some way 
independent of the subject who has that apprehension: - these all seemed to me the 
concrete ground of experience from which talk of the truth-making characteristics of 
moral discourse ultimately flowed. A large part of moral experience consists, that 
is, in feelings of constraint and pressure upon the subject as if  an external reality 
were impinging upon her. This led my thought to the specific, albeit quite wide, 
area of the experience of moral demands.
It is from the apprehension of moral demands in particular that I felt the 
debates concerning moral realism to be taking much of their initial point. As a thesis 
about the meaning of moral utterances, moral realism is often represented by a
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Tarski biconditional linking moral judgement with a moral state of affairs that 
makes it true. Now interpretation of this can vary between moral claims as they use 
the language of 'goodness’, 'value', 'courage', 'wickedness', and so on. But the 
general question with which I found myself most intrigued was the way in which 
the right hand side of the biconditional was taken to be the truth-making 
characteristic (taken, that is, both by moral philosophers and allegedly by the 
community of moral subjects). The position of Mackie in chapter 1 of his Ethics 
struck me as a good way of entering this debate via discussion of what I call the 
'phenomenology' of moral demand experience. He thinks that in experiencing 
moral demands we take ourselves to be apprehending the imperative force of a 
special objective realm of values upon us, reference to such values being part of our 
moral discourse. I took this to be one position of interest that also seemed to be held 
both by some moral realists and their anti-realist opponents when their discussions 
turned to the stuff of our moral experience, and a position therefore worth exploring 
in greater depth.
The particular issues which I felt needed further investigation included the 
precise nature of our experience of moral demands as they strike us, especially as 
they may or may not include apparent contact with some moral reality; how much 
their force on us varies and whether such variety is given proper attention by moral 
philosophers; and how later reflection by subjects on their presence in 
consciousness regarded them. Thus I came to look directly at this class of 
experience and to employ certain phenomenological procedures of inquiry into the 
experience and how an objectivity component could best be characterized. It is one 
which I soon felt had not been given all that much attention in the literature. The 
influence of my initial interest in moral realism became really rather vestigial in this 
thesis, then, though the reader will see it occasionally cropping up in the main text 
and in my footnote references. My prime concern now lay with this 
phenomenological mode of investigation.
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The notion of one's being in the presence of some kind of objective value(s) 
is not, of course, isolated to descriptions from moral experience. Two areas which 
seemed to me roughly correspondent in terms of the alleged access to values 
through our experience are those of the religious and the aesthetic. (In the former 
case there being also often the claim that a special kind of person is the determinate 
object of religious experience). Time and again I found myself curious as to the 
precise nature of the experiences being presented and their content. A good example 
from the field of religious experience, and one which typifies the often vague claims 
to which I constantly refer in this thesis, occurs in these words from a religious 
group:
Some people will have a profound sense of awe and wonder 
because they know that god is present. Others...may only be able to 
hold onto a dim awareness that the values they experience in life 
point beyond themselves to a greater whole.1 
And from aesthetic experience, I have taken this passage from the American nature 
writer Annie Dillard to typify a certain experientially-based report. Since this 
overlaps with the area of the values allegedly inherent in the natural environment, it 
is perhaps an apposite one, given the current trend of public concern in that area. 
Relating how she was struck by the plummet and floated landing of a mockingbird, 
she says,
The fact of his free fall was like the old philosophical conundrum 
about the tree that falls in the forest The answer must be, I think, 
that beauty and grace are performed whether or not we will or sense 
them. The least we can do is try to be there.2
1 From a Quaker pamphlet, Your First Time in a Quaker Meeting? London: Quaker 
Home Service, 1987.
2 A .Dillard, 1976, p.21.
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In order to undertake a structured research into these matters I decided to 
follow a phenomenological mode of exposition. This itself, however, required a 
further decision on just what kind of phenomenological method was to be pursued, 
for the term 'phenomenology* and its cognates are bandied about with remarkable 
variety in journals and textbooks of philosophy. Seeing the attractions in the 
promised rigour of an Husserlian approach, but unmoved by the reality of its often 
cumbersome practice, I chose to adopt a via media in presentation of it by means of 
the far more accessible usage of phenomenological talk in general Anglo-American 
philosophy. Part of my claim to an original content to this thesis is just that I have 
brought together these generally separate strands of a phenomenological description 
of a subject matter. Taken together, I use them in the exposition to come as tools by 
which to lay bare the experience of the moral demand, particularly with respect to 
the relation that it might be held to present to an objective, prescriptive realm of 
values. In order best to facilitate my account I have tried to give as much space as 
possible to the descriptive tasks at hand - that is, the attempted accurate presentation 
of a certain range of experience and thought on it - and leaned heavily on the 
footnotes to expound positions and cite support from other writings which might 
otherwise clutter the main text.
In looking into the moral demand experience and possible kinds of 
reflection by the subject on it, I have found many times that the actual data of our 
experience seems not at all well captured by the ways in which one usually sees it 
characterized in moral philosophical texts. That is one of the specific claims I make 
for there being some interest and innovation in the work of this thesis. Another is 
that when attention is re-drawn to the nature of this experience as we do have it one 
finds that certain theories in moral philosophy about the relationships between 
experience, world and self also take on a questionable guise. My intention, then, is 
directed both in a negative fashion against what I believe to be inaccurate or one­
sided representations of 'our' experience and its putative objects, as well as having 
a reformative, positive aspect in presenting the data as it actually is had, from which
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further philosophical discussion can then take place. I hope to take readers along 
with me as I perform this work, drawing on their own awareness of that class of 
experience and on the validity of the descriptive exegesis I give it.
As to acknowledgements, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my supervisor at 
Glasgow, Paul Brownsey. Over the almost four years of this thesis I have benefited 
greatly from his critical eye and probing questions, and many of the ideas contained 
in this work have come out of our discussions. Above all, I feel privileged to have 
had the opportunity to learn the practices of philosophy from him.
Numerous friends have also helped me to get through the sheer hard work 
of research. Foremost amongst them, in no particular order, are Hugh Pyper, Tom 
Magill, Gordon Matheson, and Dr. John Durkan. And Sal Rebekah and Callum 
made it all worthwhile.
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CHAPTER ONE
The civilized origin of the notion of independent existence is the 
tendency of sensitive people, when they experience some factor of 
value on its noblest side, to feel that they are enjoying some ultimate 
essence of the Universe, and that therefore its existence must include 
an absolute independence of all inferior types.
A.N.Whitehead1
It is surely a strange reversal of the natural order of thought to say 
that our admiring an action either is, or what necessitates, its being 
good. We think of its goodness as what we admire in it, and as 
something it would have even if no one admired it, something that it 
has in itself.
W.D.Ross2
Introduction
In this chapter the area of research is set out and analysis of it begun. The 
specific subject matter is a supposed experience of objectivity in the moral demand. 
Description of such putative experience is common in moral philosophical literature. 
Starting with one representation of this, and the discourse that goes with it, a series 
of problems are brought into focus concerning the nature of this experience. While I 
claim that the description of the experience in terms of a moral reality making claims 
on the agent may seem a quite fair one on initial survey, I also make suggestions 
concerning clarification of the experience and its implications. This involves both 
specific exploration of experiential content as well as considerations arising from 
agents' thought on their experience, and the position that experience occupies with 
respect to the prohibitions and pressures on the agent which any community
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enshrines. The thread running through the discussion is that of the agent's relation 
to her moral experience.
Section One: Moral demands and values 'out there'
I will introduce matters by reference to some thoughts of a philosopher 
whose line of argument initially set up my interest in the particular area of research 
which this thesis represents. That philosopher is J.L.Mackie. And by the way of 
his presentation of a series of problems concerning the nature of moral demands 
and moral value I will indicate both the content of that area and the genesis of the 
problems it raises in the general run of moral philosophy.
l.i - Experience of the moral demand
In chapter one of his Ethics, Mackie considers a particular view of moral 
values which he believes to be both a naturally held and widely held one. It is the 
view that in experiencing the imperative force of a moral demand one is somehow 
experiencing, and responding to, objective moral values, as if from 'out there'.3 I 
will canvass more fully in section 3 the notion of objectivity to which my concern 
will be primarily directed, but for the time being it has the meaning here of agent- 
independence; of standing outside the agent's control; of a form of being in the 
nature of the world. Mackie thinks that we all experience this aspect of the moral 
demand and that it feels to us that such values are 'something in the fabric of the 
world.'4 If he is correct as to the way we do experience moral value then we would 
seem to be committed to a belief in an 'axiological layer to reality'5, where at least 
one kind of value - moral value - is to be found. Such values allegedly have a 
'pulling power'6 on us: to experience them is to be moved to act on them.
l.ii - Use of moral language
So ingrained is some such belief that Mackie takes a reference to objective 
values to be part of the meaning of moral language.7 These objective values are
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thought by us to guide and constrain our moral judgements. If one tries to excise 
this reference and replace it by a notion of choice or decision on the part of the 
agent, then,
It is a very natural reaction to [that kind of] analysis of ethical terms 
to protest that there is more to ethics than this, something more 
external to the maker of moral judgements, more authoritative over 
both him and and those of us to whom he speaks...Ethics, we are 
inclined to believe, is more a matter of knowledge and less a matter 
of decision... 8
Mackie does not inquire deeply into the relation between language and experience: 
whether, that is, certain moral practices have given rise to the experience in question 
or whether a certain experience - perhaps of constraint and awe, for instance - 
precedes and forms the language. But it is his contention that moral philosophy 
would do best to leave our language practices intact and question the metaphysics 
behind it.9 For the reference he discerns in the language is thought by agents to be 
secured through the awareness of a realm of objective values which underpins it. 
Hence linguistic practice and experience go together.
l.iii - Reflection on experience and practice
In the quoted passage from Mackie immediately above is to be found a 
consideration arising from reflection on experience and language. That is to say, 
support for those ongoing experiences and practices is derived from thought in the 
'cool hour'10 on them. In some fashion yet to be explicated,11 the reflection that 
'this cannot be the case' is taken as damaging to one way of looking at our moral 
demand experience. If one does tiy to drop the notion of objective moral value from 
an account of one's experience in this area, together with the practices of searching, 
discovery, and unwilled confrontation with value12 attendant on it, then (so this 
argument goes) one cannot assent to that notion at a reflective level. It strikes one as 
too awry to be adequate explanation of the facts of experience and practice: it cannot
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be the case. Should there be only one viable alternative way of looking at these 
facts, it will be given added credence - both by default, in the light of the rejection 
of the other, and positively, if it itself finds reflective assent when considered in like 
manner.
This kind of position is acknowledged by Mackie both in his Ethics and 
elsewhere. In a later work, for example, he puts the matter thus. On discussing the 
notion of a benevolent response in agents to others as similar to the nature of pain, 
rather than representative of any property in the object, he says,
If we follow the subjective interpretation, we have to say that, from 
a reflective point of view, the moral force in favour of benevolence 
must be recognised as a contingent fact about ourselves (...[though] 
a pretty powerful fact...). But must we not admit, on reflection, that 
it does not seem to be so. We have some tendency to feel that the 
moral wrongness of a proposed act is an externally authoritative 
feature which tells us not to do this...The objectivist interpretation... 
has an element of truth at least as a description of what seems to be 
going on when we respond to the morally relevant features of 
voluntary actions: moral approval and disapproval seem to reflect 
objective features in a way that the feeling of pain does not.13
l.iv - Summary of points outstanding
It seems to me that the upshot of Mackie's discussion is this. He is pointing 
to some experience we think ourselves to have of moral values in the world which 
issue forth demands on one - 'out there', so to speak. Those moral values motivate 
one to act on them when they are apprehended. Our moral discourse makes 
reference to them. And the notion of an objective moral reality making demands on 
one is so wedded in these ways to our thought that it strikes one as unacceptable on 
reflection that the world not be so constituted.
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At one level of description, then, the agent is presented - again, according to 
Mackie - in her experience with moral values as part of the 'fabric of the world'. 
Moral values, as one writer on the general subject puts it, 'are experienced as 
objects of awareness originating from outside one's own consciousness'.14 (And 
as to its motivational impact, in the words of Richard Price, 'The knowledge of 
what is right, without any approbation of it, is not conceivable or possible.'15). 
Deriving from linguistic practice and reflection on the status of these moral values is 
another level which mirrors this kind of experience: the notion that judgements of 
value are similar to judgements of fact (both in the belief with which moral language 
is used - as being world-guided - and in that which one acquires on reflection, as 
being representative of, or answerable to, a value-realm). In each case of judgement 
in moral and factual contexts,16
our sense of the truth of the judgement is bound up with a 
conception of an external locus of truth; and...just as a factual 
assertion and its contradiction would be equally gratuitous in the 
absence of this touchstone in re, competing moral assertions are felt 
to require a comparable extralinguistic backstop if they are to be 
generally authoritative.17 
So here (that is, in the last few quotations) I have presented the reader with 
a series of related 'reports' from the moral consciousness of agents. I will give rein 
to Mackie's rejoinder to this in the next sub-section. Taken together they form a 
picture of people's moral experience and practice being determined on an axis 
travelling from the world to the agent. The world, that is, contains moral values and 
they make demands on one.18 Experience and reflection on it do not correspond at 
all well to the notion that these values are put there by oneself through either desire 
or volition.19
And here are some questions which arise from that discussion:
i) How accurate in detail is the description of the agent's experience of 
moral demands? To anwer this question one would need to study the precise nature
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of the alleged apprehension of a value realm given in such experience. One could 
include in that investigation an attempt to uncover the degree to which such values 
are said to motivate the agent as part and parcel of such apprehension.
ii) Is moral language to be construed:
as making claim to an underpinning by objective moral values? 
as requiring that kind of underpinning to retain certain distinctive 
features?
Mackie, for instance, answers in the affirmative to the first question.20 On the 
second he is equivocal: he does not think there is any such underpinning21, but 
does suggest a need to think there are objective values if the practice is to go on.22 
A moral philosopher such as R.M.Hare23 would answer negatively to both 
questions.
iii) Does reflection on moral demand experience give support to the notion 
of objective moral values? This needs careful scrutiny of the assent or denial 
registered with respect to certain thoughts on the nature of moral value when it is 
given up to reflective assay. One should also inquire into the relation between moral 
experience and reflection on it - the extent, that is, to which one tends to support or 
usurp the other. Over-arching all that is the question of the point of bringing 
arguments to bear from reflection; in what way some reflective failure to endorse a 
particular notion of moral value is taken to be relevant to investigation into the 
nature of such value.
iv) Is the question of objective moral values to be viewed not as a matter of 
what there is or is not in the world, but as one of what is or is not needed to be 
thought of by moral agents in order for there to be certain experiences and 
practices? Moreover, do they need to be experienced as special objective entities of 
a 'queer' sort or, minimally, as simply independent of one in some indeterminate 
way? The study would then be into the necessary conditions of moral experience 
and the nature of the moral agent. It would inquire into the 'regulative'24 function 
of the notion at hand and see whether that function met certain needs of society or
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the individual agent. Mackie himself makes a point germane to this consideration. 
Later on in Ethics he talks of the possibility of the objectivity feel being a 'useful 
fiction'.25 Of course, this form of argument need not be regarded as deflationary, 
somehow putting into the agent what was thought to be 'out there'. To delineate 
necessary features if that experience is to be had at all is to present a weighty 
philosophical argument.26
v) What is the relationship between the importance of morality in our lives 
and the experience of objectivity? To a great extent this question will be brought out 
in looking at i. and iv., but it bears separate mention. Whatever view of the nature 
of moral value one takes, no-one will deny the social significance of a moral system 
and the seriousness of failure to protect certain universal human needs.27 Is it likely 
that some experiential counterpart involving objectivity to this thought is necessarily 
encountered? Do moral demands coalesce with deep interests of the self, or are they 
peripheral or even threatening to one? There are feelings of shock and repulsion 
involved in much of moral experience; of the overriding urgency and importance of 
moral demands. And this seriousness may itself bring with it an objectivity feel - 
perhaps because serious matters are engendered as 'other' to the agent by moral 
education. Or it could lend weight to reflective thought on the experience, to the 
effect that the seriousness of matters cannot simply be due to personal commitment 
but to the way in which the world works. These are just two tentative suggestions. 
They indicate an area of interest which comes out of the discussion of Mackie and 
which stands implicit in some of the other analyses canvassed.
As for the direction of this thesis, points i. and iii. form the bulk of chapters 
4,5, and 6; point iv. and, to a lesser extent, point v., receive fullest attention in 
chapters 5 and 7; and point ii. is raised in various places, though it does not form 
the main proposed subject matter. The way in which Mackie's position has been 
canvassed is intended by me to show one fashion by which a particular area of 
interest naturally comes to the fore on considering the moral consciousness of 
agents. That area consists in an analysis of moral demand experience and the
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presuppositions that underlie it. Chapters 2 and 3 will expand on this notion and 
make determinate the nature of the analysis. They will make clear the sense in 
which this study can be called 'phenomenological'.
l.v  - Mackie's response
It is worth covering briefly one kind of reaction to the picture of objective 
values which seems to be given in moral demand experience. That of Mackie (and 
like-minded philosophers) is of interest on its own account and serves well also to 
bring into further relief the subject area of discussion.
The short response from Mackie is that moral values 'are not objective, are 
not part of the fabric of the world.'28 His analysis 'says what there isn't.'29 
Something that is not objective, involving the affective nature of the agent, must be 
a necessary part of the input to a moral judgement.30 He gives a number of reasons 
(five in all)31 for adopting this position. The two he takes to be most important are 
'the arguments from relativity and queemess'. 32 The former argument takes the 
wide divergence in moral judgement between both agents and collectives and its 
'apparent dependence on actual ways of life' 33 to be good reason for thinking 
moral value to be socially created and not objective in the way experience might take 
it to be. Since this kind of disagreement is not unique to morals, the 'argument from 
queerness' is the more powerful criticism - for it states, quite straightforwardly, 
that,
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or 
qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from 
anything else in the universe. 34 
Mackie finds especially queer the notion of a moral value with a 'to-be-pursuedness 
somehow built into it'.35 The point is put succinctly by a philosopher writing in 
Mackie's vein as,
Chapter One 22
Moral facts are not just unusual in the way in that facts about quarks 
and black holes are unusual, they are unusual in an unusual way - 
they demand, 36
where the 'facts' in question are taken to refer to that realm of moral value of which 
experience is said to appraise one. More tersely still, Strawson thinks that the 
apparent metaphysics of ordinary moral language is 'a fairy-tale'.37 William James 
noted that we have 'an inevitable tendency' to 'imagine an abstract moral order in 
which the objective truth resides'38 but added that this is a 'superstitious view’.39 
In addition, R.M.Hare does not think that the notion of objectivity here makes any 
sense; 40 that it can be adequately viewed as a conceptual problem of moral 
language rather than about the contents of the universe; 41 and that, even if the 
question made sense, no difference in our practices and experience would result no 
matter what answer was given.42
The general position sketched above is relevant in two ways. Firstly, there 
is a shared image of moral experience and the presuppositions of moral language, to 
the effect that some kind of objective order is being claimed by agents to be 
signalled in them.43 And secondly, there is occurring a refusal to take this to be 
sufficient warrant to establish that there is such an order. Among other reasons for 
this refusal is an interesting counterpart of the kind of reflective thought mentioned 
earlier. The thought that something could not be the case (say, that moral value is 
created by desires) was represented as giving at least some fair reason for taking it 
not actually to be the case. Here one finds that a similar move is being worked 
against the thought that people experience a realm of objective values which guide 
and prompt them. For this thought strikes those referred to above as 'queer’ or 
absurd or just very unlikely to be correct. The alternative thought that there are no 
objective values and that there are other ways of accounting for certain features of 
moral experience and commitments of moral language does not strike them as 
nearly as absurd. Properly understood, they are quite plausible, according to these 
authors.44
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Section Two: The impress of moral demands on one
2.i - Preliminary note
I take it that people are acquainted with the experience of a moral demand. 
This claim is based partly on personal experience and largely on knowledge of other 
people's reports of their experience. That there is such an experience available for 
research is presupposed by the literature of moral philosophy, as those writers cited 
previously evince. In somewhat similar manner to that which Hume employs,45 I 
invite the reader to consider whether the various claims as they are made by me in 
this thesis align with the experience of the demand in his/her own consciousness. 
These words of Gabriel Marcel at the beginning of one of his essays sum up aptly 
my point here:
In a study such as the one I am here undertaking there can be no 
question of starting from a particular definition and endeavouring to 
explain its content progressively; I propose rather to appeal to a 
special experience which it must be supposed you have.46 
Where divergent modes of experience47 do not allow a single description and 
appraisal, the text will indicate that that is what is happening.
2.ii - General demand experience
The experience of a demand of some sort on one is an ordinary and 
everyday business.48 Take, for instance, the demand felt to correct a painting that 
has been poorly hung on the wall; the demand to get the week's shopping done this 
afternoon; the demand to give one's time to helping a child learn some new activity. 
All of these are standardly recognised and referred to as demands on one. The 
experience of the moral demand would seem to be included in this broad category. 
It too tells one to think and/or do something with respect to a particular object state 
of affairs. Sometimes it represents itself below that determinate level and simply 
exerts a diffuse, apparently undirected pressure on one. Further exploration by
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oneself may be required to discover the demand's object. And it arrives 
unannounced, like other demands, seeming to come from outside the agent's willed 
control. Some demands may be apprehended by one yet without appearing as 
demands on oneself. To that extent the general run of demand experience shares a 
certain exteriority by which it is signalled to consciousness.
When one comes to look more closely at this grouping, however, the 
question of the nature of the demandingness stands to the fore. That is to say, if 
moral demand experience is of objective values, other areas do not look so. If there 
is a realm of values 'out there' making demands on one, there is no live sense of 
corresponding realms concerning other kinds of demand.49 And reflection on the 
demands one experiences in daily life links them easily to the prior establishment of 
one's interests and desires and the expectations others have of one. This suggests 
at least that a similar story might be available for moral demands - and conversely 
that this is just to make out a special case for the nature of the moral demand and the 
realm it inhabits. Gamer finds it 'hard to believe' in these objective moral values 
because,
it is hard to make sense of a demand without a demander, and hard 
to find a place for demands or demanders apart from human interests 
and conventions. We know what it is for our friends, our job, and 
our projects to make demands on us, but we do not know what it is 
for reality to do so. 50 
While another writer on the subject thinks the converse, that,
...it is simply natural to think of... values as "objects" which make 
demands on us. 51
Hence it needs determining how similar the experience of the moral demand 
is to that of other demand-types, and how it diverges from them.
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2.iii - The moral demand as signalling a presence
It will have become apparent from my discussion of Mackie that experience 
of the moral demand is thought - by him and others on our behalf - to point to the 
presence of some special kind of reality. Jung captures one aspect of this sensation 
when he says of conscience that it 'is a demand that asserts itself in spite of the 
subject, or at any rate causes him considerable difficulties...', going on to remark 
that, 'the vox Dei hypothesis is [a] subjective exclamation, whose purpose is to 
underline the numinous character of the moral reaction.' 52 There is, then, a sense 
of something exterior to the agent herself pressing on her when she experiences 
moral demands. And this something may or may not be identified with a realm of 
moral values consisting in some degree of independence of agent reactions.
The thought at large here is a quite natural one.53 Mill recognizes it as such 
and as a problem for his own moral theory when, in the first paragraph of Chapter 
Five of Utilitarianism, he admits that,
In all ages of speculation, one of the strongest obstacles to the 
reception of the doctrine that Utility or Happiness is the criterion of 
right and wrong, has been drawn from the idea of Justice. The 
powerful sentiment, and apparently clear perception, which that 
word recalls with a rapidity and certainty resembling an instinct, 
have seemed to the majority of thinkers to point to an inherent 
quality in things; to show that the just must have an existence in 
Nature as something absolute... 54 
He then continues with the thought and inquires as to the strength with which such 
a presumption should be held:
Mankind are always predisposed to believe that any subjective 
feeling, not otherwise accounted for, is a revelation of some 
objective reality. Our present object is to determine whether the 
reality, to which the feeling of justice corresponds, is one which 
needs any such special revelation; whether the justice or injustice of
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an action is a thing intrinsically peculiar, and distinct from all its 
other qualities, or only a combination of certain of those qualities, 
presented under a peculiar aspect. 55 
Mill has his own notion concerning the genesis and grounding of such a 
feeling, and it is one which does away with the need for the presumption of an 
axiological reality. 56
Now the description of this experience varies widely. On the one hand there is 
Jung's use of the term 'numinous character', and Whitehead's talk of 'some 
ultimate essence of the Universe' at the head of this chapter; and on the other a 
concentration on the fashion by which a moral demand is given in terms of 
'irksomeness', 57 as something which appears fundamentally 'external to us' and 
which 'seem[s] to constrain us'.58 One writer mixes both descriptions of the 
experience. Maclagan reports that in the experience of moral obligation,
there is the assumption of what may be called, loosely and vaguely 
but still, I think, quite properly and intelligibly, an objective "order 
of values"...; 59
while also stating quite simply that the experience is 'like having a disagreeable 
time.'60 So there may be differences in the experience of moral agents between a 
feeling of something 'out there'; determinate description of the object; and the kind 
of force it exerts on her. These can conceivably be facets of a single experience; or 
they may represent separate strands of agents' experience (both within and between 
agents, that is).
2.iv - The question of motivation
Mackie thinks the notion of objective moral values queer because they 
demand. And demandingness is not something he can make sense of as inhering 
'out there'. It is just too queer, and an explanation in terms of one's affective nature 
and its inculcation far more plausible an alternative to hold. This problem would 
seem to come under a general pair of headings in moral philosophy. If one thinks
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that to apprehend a moral value - be it called property, fact or entity - is to be 
motivated to act in the light of it, then one is embracing internalism on the matter. 
And if one allows for the possibility of apprehension and motivation being separate, 
one is holding to an externalist approach.61 Taken in the light of the foregoing 
discussion of the moral demand, the following passage represents a broad 
characterization of how this philosophical question bears on the nature of the moral 
agent. In facing the question, 'Why be moral?', Graham states his belief that,
the problem involves the idea of something external which we feel 
may make some kind of legitimate demand on the individual. But at 
the same time that demand is felt in some sense irksome, since it 
may serve to hinder the individual in plans which he or she wishes 
to formulate or realize. The problem is then a motivational one. 
Metaphorically expressed, it is commonly seen as the problem how 
to get the external considerations into the agent and thus get him or 
her moving around in the appropriate way. 62 
This quoted passage illustrates the problem in a number of ways. It acknowledges 
the feel a moral system at times has for the agent: one of a pressure on her. It sees 
the main difficulty a moral system encounters as one of agent identification with 
certain demands: so that they motivate her. And it registers the genesis of the 
demand as outwith the agent: it seems to call her to court. More interestingly, there 
is a subtle play between the externality of the demand, its irksomeness, and the 
motivational force a moral system needs to instill it with for the agent. That play 
between the features suggests that one can be appraised of a moral value without 
being inclined to act in any particular way by it. Such a possibility is thought to be 
that of the amoralist, 63 and it may even be that of most of us some of the time. It 
raises the further questions of the extent to which it can be said that an agent has 
apprehended a moral value in the absence of any motivational tendency on her part 
toward action as a result; together with the extent to which also any queemess has 
not been simply moved back onto the reasons-giving nature of moral value
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apprehension from its motivational impact.64 Moreover, whether moral demands 
arise from queer entities in queer fashion or not, the relation in experience between 
knowledge and action in moral states of affairs (and the possible cleavage thereof) 
remains itself problematic.65
2.v - Seriousness of moral affairs
Lying close alongside the considerations so far considered is the matter of 
the quality of the experienced force of the moral demand. From the literature of 
moral philosophy one is presented with the notion of 'seriousness' - both by the 
way of an ultimate importance felt to attach to moral matters, and of an allied sense 
of the sheer felt severity or horror of a particular moral situation.66 Midgeley, for 
instance, thinks that, 'moral is simply the superlative of serious'; 67 another 
philosopher that,
It is the peculiarity of a [moral] feeling that, while and insofar as we 
are feeling it, it seems to carry a more immediate sense of its own 
importance than any rival form of experience can boast. 68 
These two thoughts represent a general trend in moral philosophical literature 
concerning description of the moral demand experience. They point to one way in 
which the moral demand carries with it some special experiential charge. To the 
notion of this seriousness I shall be arraying both descriptive analysis - whether it 
accompanies all moral demands, how it transpires on reflection - as well as a 
measure of conceptual thought, that is, in what fashion such experience and thought 
serves to delineate the nature of the moral.
Seriousness could be connected with the objective nature of the moral 
demand in the following way. If agents see moral matters in such a light that they 
do indeed possess for them an importance of a great or even overriding nature, then 
a natural tendency may be to think of matters as being that way because of an 
objective basis. Foot maintains that,
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When we say that something "just is" right or wrong we want to 
give the impression of some kind of fact or authority standing 
behind our words...69 
This need involve no deliberate fiction; it can be a necessary way of taking 
importance to be grounded.70 Foot herself thinks that no such foundation is 
providing support and that we are hence 'maintaining the trappings of objectivity 
[when] the substance is not there.'71 But this would be to miss the point if the 
objectivity-thought performs a 'regulative function'. While, on the other hand, if 
there are moral values 'out there' in whatever fashion, then one might expect the 
sense of seriousness attached to them to be present in tandem with their 
demandingness. A reality which incorporates 'a hidden reef of necessity in 
values',72 which one encounters experientially, would restrict the agent's freedom 
in such a way as naturally to give rise to a feeling of seriousness about them, 
whether on encounter or on reflection.
These four preceding points develop further the nature of the problems 
which have been arising. It is important to note that they press upon one for 
investigation so soon as certain assumptions concerning moral experience are 
entertained. My introduction by way of Mackie served to outline the particular area, 
but the concerns themselves - particularly about the idea of some objective, 
demanding sphere of moral value - are ingrained in the most cursory glance at one's 
experience. It is to the fixing of the putative experience of objectivity that I now turn 
my attention.
Section Three: Objectivity in morals
3.i - General review
'Objectivity' is used in a number of different ways in moral philosophy. 
These range from: the notion that there is some sphere of values 'out there' by
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which the agent is guided;73 relatedly, that there is in the nature of things a moral 
order to be discerned;74 the formal requirement that moral judgement be couched in 
a certain way after certain operations have been performed;75 the hope that 
something less arbitrary than mere personal whim form the basis of moral 
judgement if an attempt is made to prescind from the individual or cultural or the 
particular.76 I do not intend this list to be an exhaustive one with respect to the 
notion of objectivity, but only to sketch out a general band of philosophical usage 
for the reader's consideration.
What all these positions capture is the authority of morality. They each bring 
to the fore a notion of the independence of morality from individual agent 
choosing.77 As one moves to the latter pair of expressions quoted under note 76 
one finds a greater emphasis on the agent, but there is still also emphasized a basic 
fashion in which objectivity implies restriction on the agent's thought and way of 
going on, be it by the impact of moral values from a realm 'out there' or by the 
force exerted by the 'counsel of cogent reasons'.78 One primary sense by which the 
moral demand and objectivity are linked is that one mentioned above, the seeming 
independence of the moral demand experience from individual agent choice. This is 
expressed well by Hook:
Now what is the test of the independence of objects? Roughly 
speaking, the specific compulsions objects exercise upon us.
Certain modes of behaviour are extracted from us by the very nature 
of the physical world and our bodily organization. In a sense ethical 
values also exercise a compulsion upon us.79 
How independent from the agent and her social milieu such a compulsion might be 
is a matter for investigation, which involves analysis of the felt character of the 
moral demand as well as the logical nature of its seeming independence.
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3.ii - Experience of objectivity
In this thesis I will be concerning myself with the experience the agent has 
of that 'compulsion' and independence which moral demands seem to possess with 
respect to her. Of especial interest is the analysis of the independence, of whether 
value realms or something else are taken by the agent to be responsible for it (as 
well as going 'behind' the feel to account for it in ways perhaps not clearly given to 
the agent herself in the immediate experience, but which she might discern on 
greater reflection on that). Between impartiality and ontology lies this independence: 
that is, the independence-of-agent ranges from some appeal to impersonal factors in 
morals through to the nature of a value reality. This range itself could exert 
compulsion on one as a matter of either some built-in demandingness or because of 
certain facts about human nature which account for a response to apprehension of 
the relevant moral facts.80 Hence one is faced again with the need to assess the 
nature of this demandingness in subjects' consciousness, its motivational impact, 
and how that concerns some percieved independence of the demand.
In order further to delineate my understanding of objectivity for this 
experiential analysis, the reader can view matters like this. If the agent has a feeling 
of a moral value 'out there' making demands on her, then the converse of this 
feeling is that of 'it's just me'. Feeling a demand to be put upon one can invoke the 
question as to whether there is some property or fact of rightness/wrongness/&c. to 
the matter. This is usually subject to public debate and hence there is the thought at 
large that the agent's perception of matters is subject to conditions extraneous to the 
fact of the agent's having the perception itself. That is, a public reality of some sort 
outwith the agent's own breast enters into the conditions for making such 
assertions.
Now Hare states simply that,
I do not understand what is meant by the "objectivity of values" and 
have not met anybody who does.81
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For the purposes of research the phrase is being taken initially by me in the sense in 
which Mackie entertains it - as referring to agent-independent moral states of affairs 
which make demands on one. Such things signal themselves in experience 
(according to Mackie's portrayal of how matters stand with us) and retain a power 
over moral discourse as guiding and validating it.
3.iii - Degrees of independence
A. Inner and outer
The distinction 'out there/just me' is a very stark one. An accompanying 
notion of 'us' needs accommodation. And this could be attached to either pole of 
the distinction according to the analysis one favours. 'Us' might be thought to 
consist of a whole lot of 'just me's' and could thus be labelled itself 'just us'. It 
could remain in distinction from what is 'out there' - though it would have the extra 
virtue of some kind of communal agreement. On the other hand, for the 'me' that is 
experiencing and thinking on experience, the 'us' is quite clearly 'out there', 
consisting as it does in a community of others. (For certain philosophical systems 
also,82 the 'out there' is determined by the agreement of the 'us' in use of 
language). The experience of moral demands in which the objectivity-feel is given 
to the agent requires, therefore, attention with respect to the nature of the distinction 
being lit. A developed notion of the differences between the 'me', the 'us', and the 
world 'out there' in the experience in question is of fundamental interest.83
A relevant analogue of the experiential feel at large can be taken from the 
notion of objectivity in moral judgement, where truth-conditions can be discerned to 
vary in accordance with degree of agent-independence. Sayre-McCord, for 
instance, sums up the distinctions briefly as,
What separates objectivist, intersubjectivist [the us], and 
subjectivist [the me] accounts of...disputed [moral] claims is 
whether and how people figure in the truth-conditions for the 
claims. Truth-conditions are"subjectivist".. if they make essential
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reference to an individual; "intersubjectivist" if they make essential 
reference to the capacities, conventions, or practices, of groups of 
people; and "objectivist" if they make no reference at all to people, 
their capacities, practices, or conventions. 84 
Whether the definition he gives of 'objectivist' should be so cleaved from the 
'intersubjectivist’ one in morals is a disputed matter.85 But the quoted passage 
serves to highlight the experiential counterparts. They are: the experience of the 
moral demand as invested with its qualities by one's own decision, or by its arising 
from one's own breast; as being such and such a way because of one's culture and 
upbringing; or as being determined by the way moral reality is. These need not, of 
course, be entirely separate: one can experience a demand as seeming to arise 
externally to oneself but know its origin to lie within oneself, as it were.86 But the 
differences, as given in the phenomena of direct experience or rendered up to one 
by later reflection, are ones that I shall address in this thesis. They call for a 
presentation that shows how the relevant experiences are given to one as involving 
the self, and how they seem to be made up by that which is other to the self.
B. Experience and reflection
In using Mackie to introduce matters I made a distinction between 
experience and reflection on it. Such a distinction will receive greater explication in 
the next two chapters. I will suggest there that these represent two species of 
experience for analysis. For the present, however, the labelling in terms of 
'experience' and 'reflection on it' will be maintained.
The distinction at hand runs this way. In experiencing a moral demand there 
is an alleged objectivity-feel. I proposed that that feel may be best placed (initially) 
in general terms under the aegis, 'out there', 'independent of me'. Now at this level 
any number of descriptions from agent experience might accord with that feel in 
terms of its object. But there is an additional - or higher 87 - level at which this 
experiential content is re-assessed. We do not just have experiences; we think about
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our experience, in formal or informal manner; and these reflections often involve 
further experience which can be described. On reflection, one is presented with the 
content of the immediate experience (and alternatives) under the aspects ' It cannot 
be this way V It must be this way This brings in a complex of reflective 
weighings on the tenability, credibility, and practicability (and their contraries) of 
taking the content of the experience to be veridical. It is a kind of assessment that 
need not be going on in a specially philosophical mode of thought. A reflection to 
the effect that a value realm is 'queer', or that the notion of desire creating value 
'just doesn't chime right' are such thoughts - though they can, of course, be 
couched in a philosophical framework and may rely on implicit philosophical 
outlooks for the particular way in which they occupy one's thoughts.
Two interesting examples serve to make the point with regard to each level. 
One denies the independence feel, the other endorses it. Here is the first:
[M]oral judgements...are pure expressions of feeling.88 
And the second is from a philosopher strongly associated with a position on moral 
reality akin to that of Mackie, who nevertheless gives this partial representation of 
the matter:
Suppose, for example, that someone were to advocate the 
introduction of bullfighting in this country. In opposing this 
proposal, I should feel, not only that I was expressing my desires, 
but that my desires in the matter are right, whatever that may 
mean.89
Lying somewhere mid-way between the analyses is this passage:
Enquire, then, first, where is that matter of fact which we here call 
crime', point it out; determine the time of its existence; describe its 
essence or nature; explain the sense or faculty to which it discovers 
itself.90
In this passage Hume is using reflection as a means of 'unpacking' the original 
experience and sorting out its contents. If one does so carefully and without
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prejudice, his claim runs, then the source of any moral properties apparently ’out 
there' will be tracked down to oneself.91
A picture of moral experience and the reflective feel it possesses for agents 
will be presented, then, by the way of that dual-level analysis. This picture may not 
be a totally integrated one. The levels may clash. But the picture itself is worth 
trying to view.
Concluding comments to chapter one
This chapter has developed a theme taken from a particular view of moral 
experience and discourse. The theme derives from the objectivity-feel agents have 
in the experience of the moral demand. One construal of this experience is that it is 
involved with a realm of moral values 'out there'. This construal was introduced by 
following the thought of a particular philosopher (Mackie) who happens to think 
this an accurate description of experience. He, however, thinks also that moral 
experience and the commitments of moral language are misleading and fallacious - 
for there is nothing like a value reality out there. I made suggestions for a 
thoroughgoing analysis of the moral experience, together with reflective appraisal 
of it. And in these suggestions I also called into question the accuracy of a 'value- 
realm' report of moral experience. The notion of a 'regulative' function to the 
experience of objective moral demands with respect to self and society was also 
canvassed.
Taken together these considerations have an overall purpose. It is this. A 
particular subject matter that is of interest, thought-provoking, and somewhat 
under-researched in moral philosophy will be getting explored. The experience of 
the moral demand, thought on that experience, and the place that experience plays in 
the functioning of both the self and a working morality form this subject matter. 
And as to the method by which this can be most clearly explored, I believe it is best 
called 'phenomenological'. Chapters 2 and 3 explain the nature of that method and 
continue with concentration on the particular subject area.
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CHAPTER TWO
[P]henomenology involves the description of things as one 
experiences them, or of one's experience of things...
M.Hammond et al.1
All phenomenology takes its start from the phenomena. A 
phenomenon is essentially whatever appears to someone...
H. Spiegel berg2
Introduction
In chapter two I introduce the notion of a phenomenological analysis of 
experience. Together with the one following it, this chapter constitutes the main 
expository material on the form of investigation being maintained in the thesis. I 
give a general account in Section 1 of the method and tasks of phenomenology. In 
the next section I then address the methodology of that school of thought which has 
taken the title 'phenomenology' to itself. That school is the one which follows the 
philosophical work of Edmund Husserl. Having made plain my intentions with 
respect to the employment of this approach, I go on to appraise those areas of 
Husserl's phenomenological method which I believe will aid research into the moral 
demand experience. Six such areas are mentioned and their criteria for adoption 
discussed. The penultimate sub-section acknowledges the persistence of modes of 
phenomenological research which I believe not to be of great utility in the 
investigation at hand.
The aim of this chapter is to begin to build up a unified picture of a 
particular philosophical tool for the performing of particular philosophical tasks. It 
constitutes, with the next chapter, an approach to the analysis of the moral demand 
experience which was highlighted in chapter 1 above. As component parts of 
Husserl's system of thought are discussed, their viability and applicability to this
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kind of concern of investigation are also made clear according to my view of them. 
Some material on the philosophical genesis of Husserlian phenomenology and its 
assumptions is provided in the main text, detailed discussion of the nature of the 
methodology being kept to the footnotes.
Section 1: What is phenomenology?
I stated my belief in the previous chapter that the nature of the experience of 
the moral demand was something best approached through phenomenological 
analysis. In this chapter I shall be concerned with defining phenomenology with 
respect to the investigation of that experience. Areas of phenomenological research 
that I do not feel should be followed will also be mentioned and the specific 
application of the analysis to the subject matter thus made clear.
Firstly, however, I want to turn to a general appraisal of phenomenology as 
philosophical investigation. Phenomenology purports to be a method of describing 
experience and uncovering implicit or hidden elements and structures to it.3 
'Experience' here could be construed very widely indeed, to include anything that 
comes before consciousness. In one fashion this is indeed the ambit of 
phenomenology.4 It represents the attempt to explore rigorously the contents of 
consciousness.5 But one can make distinctions within this ambit of research that 
serve to express the different routes by which the method is applied. They run in 
this way. Phenomenological analysis is undertaken when one explores the data 
given to the subject both as she directly encounters a particular experience and as 
such an experience is given as the object of a more reflective datum for 
investigation.6 This latter involves the attempt to make explicit the general structure 
of an experience-class and the way in which it is invariantly given in 
consciousness. Both involve one in looking at the data of consciousness in a 
reflective mode. Farber, for instance, puts the point that,
The method of inquiry in pure phenomenology is reflective 
throughout. The descriptive analysis of the stream of consciousness
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is accomplished by means of acts of reflection that also belong to the 
stream of experience, and these acts in turn can become objects of 
analysis for another level of reflection.7 
But there is a difference as reflection on experience between the attempt to return 
for study experience in its immediacy without subsequent interpretation of it and the 
reflection that goes on in a more analytical frame of mind as to essential features of 
the experience and how it stands in consciousness with other groups of experience. 
This is a distinction of which I shall make more in the next chapter. Husserl thought 
the former level of reflection a starting point for deeper investigation into the nature 
of the experience.8 For my own part, I will regard these as first and second order 
reflections on the experience, retaining in the next chapter a terminological 
distinction between 'direct' and 'reflective' ways of looking at experience in the 
light of this explanation, even though the former is also of a reflective nature.
The analysis begins from a particular view of consciousness. And this is of 
consciousness as having a defining feature of 'intentionality',9 the view that the 
contents of consciousness (thoughts, emotions, volitions, etc.) take objects.10 
These objects (and reflections on them in which the complete conscious datum is 
itself then taken as object of a reflective thought)11 are available for descriptive 
analysis. This is something called 'phenomenological intuition',12 which is the 
bringing to clarity of a particular experience or class of experience. It involves no 
initial commitment either way as to the marking of experience as being of inner or 
outer objects.13 It simply describes their appearance in the consciousness of 
subjects. This will include phenomenological data of the seeming inner or outer 
reality of the object, but that is something that gets described rather than getting 
affirmed by the phenomenologist. Indeed, this is one of the advantages of 
employing phenomenological method: one can look at the appearance of intentional 
objects without commitment to particular philosophical views of their location in 
world or mind. An example here is of the description of the presented world - a 
landscape, say - and of the presented feeling of the agent - awe, say. Further
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description and unfolding of the experience then tries to make more explicit its 
contents - whether, that is, landscape 'out there' and feeling 'in here' are so clearly 
demarcated as the original wording suggested. And whether there is such a 
demarcation or not, phenomenology attempts to give fully to one the 
characterization of the experience in question.
The higher reflective purchase on our experience is given in two 
fundamental ways, I believe. One is that which I represented above as the attempt to 
give accurate description of the experience a subject is immediately given. And there 
is also a phenomenological analysis of the agent's grasp of the concepts she 
employs in describing such presented data. This involves investigation both of her 
linguistic understanding and of the situation various elements occupy in the overall 
economy of her experience. J.L.Austin talks of a 'linguistic phenomenology' as a 
means of making clear one's 'awareness' of the words we use and our 'perception 
of [the] phenomena' the words are about.14 R.M.Hare makes a similar point with 
respect to our linguistic intuition15 as determining one's analysis of a particular 
subject-matter. This approach seems to rest on uncovering the kind of 'grasp' or 
'feel' a subject has for the concepts she employs: when they fit and when they do 
not, when a particular way of thought applies and when it breaks down.16
So if the mode of phenomenological analysis described in the previous 
paragraphs above gives one description of a particular experience, both as it is 
presented to the agent and as implicit features of it are uncovered, this approach to 
the experience is giving one a wider picture of its implications for the general 
conceptual framework by which the subject has an overall grasp of the significance 
of her life and experience. That is, if one application of the analysis describes 
experiential content, as it is given in immediacy and without further thought on it, 
this one explores the experience as being the content itself of the subject's higher 
reflective attention.17 In this way her own perspective on the experience is 
described as well as the (perhaps unnoticed) place it occupies in her general 
experience mapped. The two are not isolated types of research for Husserl. For he
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believes the direct experience to contain suppositions and implicit data that are 
revealed on greater reflection and which thereby move one up to a higher mode of 
analysis. This process I hope to show through my discussion in section 2 of typical 
steps of phenomenological method as I see them to be connected.
Now such a method might be criticized for looking to be a method of 
subjective introspection. If phenomenology did come down to a matter of 
describing the inner feelings of individual subjects then it would indeed sit uneasily 
as philosophical investigation. It would look to be following a path akin to an 
empiricist theory of meaning - which is that theory which takes language to be 
determined for the subject by reference to certain logically private inner experiences, 
and to which there are compelling objections.18 But this is not the case. In 
attempting both to uncover and describe experience, phenomenological analysis is 
going on within a public domain in which its claims are open to confirmation (or its 
converse) in the light of the hold agents share on their experience. To the extent, 
then, that phenomenology employs introspection, it is with great care and with 
attention paid to the publicity of its findings. At this point I think it worthwhile to 
quote at length the assessment given by a phenomenologist of the method with 
particular respect to its application in the field of moral philosophy. Hans Reiner 
states that:
Of course, the supposition on which phenomenologists propose 
such theses, viz. that there are universal and unchanging basic 
contents and structures of the human consciousness], is not wholly 
unjustified. From our ordinary personal experience in associating 
intelligently with our fellow men we know of such basic contents 
and structures. But this gives at best some measure of probability to 
the phenomenologist-moral philosopher's assertions...[What 
happens is that] descriptions and analyses of essences through 
phenomenological reflection are put forward for consideration 
without its being asserted at once that the general validity of the
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findings is certain, but merely as the first step in a sociological 
research procedure in which further steps follow. The rest of the 
procedure consists in launching , so to speak, into the world of 
readers and ...other scientists the descriptions and analyses which 
are the phenomenological researcher's results, as propositions 
presented to a number of others to be checked against their own 
(moral) consciousnesses, and then in the propositions' being either 
confirmed and borne out or falsified by an experienced voice's 
contradiction and the exhibition of different findings.19 
The method itself does not make any presumption to the effect that its remit is 
based simply on reporting the nature of the inner experience - primarily because 
experience does not in the main strike subjects as being 'merely' inner (see my 
example of the landscape-viewing as indicating the difficulty of viewing a particular 
experience as being presented simply as an inner phenomenon). It is in this respect 
that Spiegelberg notes,
There is a widespread belief that phenomenology consists essentially 
in a study of merely subjective or private phenomena, and that it 
constitutes nothing but a return to a subjective psychology, if not a 
relapse into introspectionism... [However,] its descriptions deal not 
only with the subject's side of experience,...but at least as much 
with...[that] which confronts him as the objects of his 
experience...Thus [for example] colours, melodies, and specifically 
those "forces" which we experience in our own lived body appear, 
as it were, in front of us. No particular direction, inward or 
outward, is prescribed by the essential nature of phenomenological 
intuiting.20
The proper role of phenomenology is to present before one the stuff of experience. 
That this is generally not attended to and is left unclarified in one's everyday living 
is good reason to attempt accurate presentation. Philosophical problems may arise
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from inadequate portrayal of experience; and apparent philosophical solutions may 
rest on insufficient examination of that experience. In all this, though it tries to 
make explicit that which is not initially apparent in experience, phenomenology is 
tied to description of what is there to be found in experience. For, Husserl claims, 
this cannot be emphasized enough - phenomenological explication 
does nothing but explicate the sense this world has for us all, prior 
to any philosophizing...a sense which philosophy can uncover but 
never alter...21
Section Two: Husserlian phenomenology
One encounters the term 'phenomenology' under slightly different guises in 
philosophical literature. I wish to do two things in this section and in the third 
chapter. One is to indicate the content and claims of two types of phenomenological 
method which I identify. The other is to suggest ways in which the pair can be 
fruitfully combined and employed.
The first kind of phenomenology on which I am now going to fix my 
attention is that of Edmund Husserl and the school of phenomenological method 
which has followed inter alia his notion of philosophical research. Rather than 
become trapped in discourse on methodology, I shall point out important areas of 
that research which I take to be worth following for investigation into the data of 
our moral consciousness. I will also point out briefly certain other areas which 
Husserl regarded as necessary to his project but which I feel do not require 
adherence for adequate analysis to be undertaken or which involve one in a 
problematic metaphysics. I should make plain that my purpose is to use this kind of 
method as I think research will be facilitated by it. My interest is in analyzing moral 
experience rather than in that of a particular philosophical standpoint which is then 
applied to a particular subject matter.
There are a number of ways in which Husserlian phenomenology can be of 
use.22 One writer has listed 27 points of Husserl's investigations which he thinks
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stand 'as contributions to psychology and philosophy in the usual sense.'23 (And 
he also omits some claims which Husserl himself regarded as the most important 
ones arising from his work).24 As for myself, I would single out the following:-
i) Presuppositionlessness. Husserl reiterates throughout his work 
the need to take experience on its own terms, as it were, and to leave behind the 
philosophical grids which one might wish to fit over the data given by experience. 
This is eminently sensible and should be a postulate of all philosophical research 
anyway. As a kind of initial propaedeutic to exploring the moral demand experience 
it enjoins one not to entertain matters already convinced of a particular interpretation 
of, say, where moral value resides ('out there' or in one's volitional or emotive 
nature).
As I move through these points I will try to illustrate them in descriptive 
practice with a concrete example. It would seem to me the most efficient use of 
space to remain in the general area of experience with which our interest is lying. I 
shall take, then, as an example that of the phenomenon of guilt, which is one that 
seems to me similar to the kind of demand experience of which I have talked.
One must attempt, then, in the light of this point, to describe a subject's 
experience as it concerns the apprehension of this phenomenon, irrespective of 
whether it seems to oneself to be strange or unlikely to have objective correlates 
over and above the very fact of its appearing before a subject or the physical 
properties of the situation to which it may refer; or, conversely, irrespective of any 
prior disposition to deny that the experience might reside purely in the apprehension 
by the subject of her emotive constitution welling in consciousness. Such 
presuppositions one must jettison in favour of reporting the givenness of the 
experience to the subject. And the same must go for a report of a higher reflective 
view of that type of experience: one must not take it beforehand either, say, that a 
certain attitude of scepticism (as with Mackie) ensues in the 'cool hour' toward 
certain apparent features of the experience in immediacy or, say, that a subject
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'needs' to think of guilt in a certain fashion (as connected with a divine law that has 
been transgressed, for instance) in order to have that kind of experience.
ii) Description of appearances. Following on - as I see it - from the 
previous point is the attempt to give accurate portrayal of the way in which 
experience is presented to the subject. That is to say, one does not import any 
theory as to what she should be experiencing or how it should affect her: one 
simply describes its appearing to her. And the describing of appearances is a matter 
of viewing the phenomena under different perspectives and degrees of clarity.25 
The purpose of this device is to allow the experience to be described without 
interference from the investigator's own prior notions of its contents,26 as well as 
to draw out the variety of ways in which a particular object of experience can be 
given. The relevance of this point to moral philosophy is clear enough: to try to 
present experience as subjects actually encounter it is an important preliminary to 
any discussion by a philosopher of how 'we' are said to think or feel on a particular 
moral issue or how the categories of moral thought are understood.
To my specific example this point enjoins that the experience be given due 
descriptive justice as it is presented to the subject's consciousness. The 
phenomenon of guilt may be experienced in a fashion sharing universal features for 
subjects. Or it may enter consciousness by different routes and with different 
contents and qualitative tone as it concerns the same situation, both between 
subjects or at different times for the same subject. It may appear as making a 
specific call on the subject with respect to a particular past event or as a rather 
inchoate pressure on her for which she needs to give some thought if she is to 
discover its source. Whatever the case may be, it is important that the 
phenomenologist describes the appearance of the experience to consciousness in as 
accurate a manner as possible and with care given to capturing the precise meaning 
it carries for the subject. When the appearances are altered - for instance, when a 
subject re-encounters the experience or is presented with the phenomenon under 
new circumstances or when the subject merely thinks on the matter - once again the
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phenomenologist tries to represent each time the shifting patterns of the experience 
of guilt as they play in the consciousness of subjects.
iii) Imaginative variation. The penultimate sentence above leads my 
discussion on to Husserl's principle of the imaginative altering of experiential 
content in search of essential elements to the experience.27 Husserl claims that we 
can vary a particular perception 'with a completely free optionalness' and 'shift the 
actual perception...into the realm of non-actualities, the realm of the as-if, which 
supplies us with "pure" possibilities.'28 To any particular intentional object one can 
try, that is, to subtract or add or replace various traits.29 For Husserl this leads one 
on to a disclosure of the essence of the object - which I address in the next point 
below - but there is another fashion by which this process can be described. That is 
one familiar to analytic philosophy as the use of counter-examples to test the 
adequacy of one's idea of a particular concept with which one describes one's 
experience - this seeming to rest itself on particular experiences of satisfactoriness 
or unsatisfactoriness as the different possibilities are considered (a matter about 
which I say more in the section on 'sensefulness' in the next chapter). The way by 
which this is carried out is the grasp one has on the concept being tested through the 
variations so that what is being done is the drawing out of one's own understanding 
as well as a discovery of what the concept contains, its fuller content not previously 
having been perspicacious to one. Similarly, here, it is one's grasp on the nature of 
the experience and the terms with which one records it that is exploited through this 
kind of phenomenological procedure. Hume applies a similar technique in his moral 
philosophy when, in talking of justice as arising from utility, he states that,
The more we vary our views of human life, and the newer and more 
unusual the lights are in which we survey it, the more shall we be 
convinced, that the origin here assigned for the virtue of justice is 
real and satisfactory.30
Concerning the phenomenon of guilt, this methodological maneouvre 
involves the attempt to view features of the experience as it is considered in
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different lights from those in which it is ordinarily encountered. One could heighten 
a particular experiential trait - of its felt pressure on one, say - while excising 
another one - any link to an infringement of some law, for instance - and report on 
how such a possible experience strikes oneself as subject.
Another and highly important feature which one could test for by the use of 
this method is that of the link which exists in a subject's consciousness between the 
experience and moral states of affairs. Whether the phenomenon of guilt would be 
recognized as such outwith the subject's notion of the 'moral' - experiencing it, 
say, in circumstances as arising with respect to one's preference for a certain 
unhealthy food - would be a matter for investigation in this fashion.
If the resulting image no longer appears as that phenomenon which we call 
'guilt' then the reflection on that experience has shown to the phenomenologist 
conditions under which features of it cannot be removed or replaced. This is a 
procedure which I will address again in the next chapter under the heading of 
'reflective phenomenology'.
iv) Discovering essences. From the use of imaginative variation one 
is supposed to be appraised of the essential nature of a particular intentional object. 
Husserl discusses this part of his philosophy quite extensively.31 Generally, it is 
referred to by Husserlian phenomenologists as 'essential' or 'eidetic' intuition. It 
can be called the goal of his phenomenology. But it is a controversial matter, and its 
mode of operation not certain. Husserl thinks that one is presented with the essence 
of an intentional object (and essential relations with other objects) after rigorous 
application of imaginative variation has allowed one to be sure32 of essential and 
non-essential elements within it. That essence or 'eidos' is a universal which has 
ideal being 33 Another member of the phenomenological school which is associated 
with Husserl, Max Scheler, believes that essences can be reached much more 
directly by a special ability of essential intuition.34 To be sure, both routes lead to 
the same destination. The problem with this part of phenomenology is not so much 
concerning method as whether there is any such goal to be reached. For the notion
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of some kind of special beholding of a universal with ideal being has seemed odd to 
many philosophers. Indeed, even some supporters of phenomenology have been 
inclined to drop this part from it, one calling it 'a phantom',35 another labelling it a 
'chimera'.36
It seems to me that this part of Husserlian phenomenology can be usefully 
retained so long as one does not expect as much of it as is expressed above. Taken 
in the sense of a systematic and intensive search for the defining features of an 
experience class - those ways without which it ceases to be experienced as that kind 
of thing it is - it clearly has valid application in philosophical research 37 One is 
enjoined to consider a particular object in different and unusual lights in order that 
one's understanding of it be made explicit and deepened in the process. To that 
effect, it is quite proper to claim that one is investigating the essential or necessary 
features of the object. Hume looks to be performing a similar kind of operation in 
the quotation above from him, and with respect to the subject matter of this thesis 
one would be trying to discover whether an essential feature of the moral demand 
was some objectivity element and what characterization most adequately described 
that.
An essential feature to the experience of guilt which is often claimed to be 
discerned by people both within and outside of academic philosophy is an intrinsic 
link to a divine lawgiver. The procedure I outlined above would make clear whether 
that really does give itself as the case on closer inspection, in tandem with the first 
step above of dropping any presuppositions about the 'proper' ambit of the guilt 
experience. Directing one's closest attention to the experience in a particularly sharp 
form of reflection, one would attempt to see whether that experience discloses 
features without which it cannot be held as that kind of experience before one's 
view.
This method seems to me to rest itself on a particular experience or group of 
experiences with which the subject responds to the form of reflection she 
undertakes. It relies on a certain type of experience of dissatisfaction, unease, or
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breakdown in 'making sense' of matters which ensues on considering the 
experience shorn of particular features or with others added. The converse 
experience to which the subject is party is one of satisfaction, of matters standing 
aright, of their 'making sense' as she fixes the experience before her reflection. 
This is a phenomenon to which I shall return in the next chapter, and at length in the 
final one.
So far as my example is concerned, this method would involve such 
experiences of ease and dissatisfaction as the connections of guilt with, say, a 
divine lawgiver, or with one's childhood conditioning, or with the survey of one's 
own behaviour before an apparent inner court are successively brought to mind. 
The essence of the phenomenon is reached through imaginative variation and in 
coming to a point at which the clarity and certainty with which one is placed toward 
the experience is at its height. One can then be said to have discerned the essential 
feature(s) of the phenomenon in question.
v) The horizon. Husserl discusses in a number of places38 the 
notion of the 'horizon' to a particular intention.39 This consists in a working 
postulate that experience is richer than appearances suggest and that there are 
implicit elements to experience available for investigation as one moves out to the 
implicit or unnoticed features of the intention. Husserl often uses the example of a 
die, claiming that the unseen faces behind the ones immediately present to one are 
somehow 'co-present' or 'co-intended'.40 'What is actually perceived,' Husserl 
says, 'and what is more or less clearly co-present and determinate (to some extent at 
least), is partly pervaded, partly girt about with a dimly apprehended depth or fringe 
of indeterminate reality. I can pierce it with rays from the illuminating focus of 
attention with varying success.' 41 It is easy to see how this investigation links with 
the discovery of essences. One explores the horizon, or implicit content, of an 
intention partly by heightened attentiveness to it and also through the use of 
imaginative variation by which features not otherwise presented to one are brought 
to light.42 In doing so one is thereby working through to an apprehension of those
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features which are seen to be essential. Recalling, then, the second-noted feature of 
phenomenological research above concerning appearances, this move both employs 
the appearances - the different possible modes in which the object is directly 
experienced - as well as it goes beyond the appearances to elements not normally 
given on the surface of experience. Such features are those which the subject 
herself brings up to consciousness in later reflection on her experience, as elements 
to it unnoticed in immediacy are considered and as further reflective thought on the 
general nature of the experience class is entertained. It thus calls one, as with the 
second point above, to give attention to the business of accurate depiction of a 
subject's moral experience and then to move out to a deeper perspective on that 
experience and the network by which it is surrounded (much as, for instance, one 
does in finding out what factors of racial belief and its relation to upbringing stand 
behind a person's moral perception of events with regard to different groups).
Now this seems to me to have two rather distinct applications so far as it is 
directed to my particular example. The first one is this. When a subject reflects on 
some experience of guilt which she has had or is having she will often reveal to 
herself aspects of the experience which were previously either unnoticed or 
unacknowledged by her. At a minimum, this may involve such a realization as that 
it is a precise act, such as an unkind word to a friend in need, that is responsible for 
the particular hue of the experience by which she is assailed. And at the extreme the 
reflection on the experience may end up in her admitting to herself that it is not (or 
was not) so much guilt which she feels as a kind of crude pressure on her, an 
unease resulting from a fear of how her own acts might appear to others.
The second way in which this step can operate, as I see it, is as a reflection 
with a wider remit, as it were, on the nature of the experience in question. From 
this kind of reflective standpoint the subject can attempt to look into the general 
nature of the experience as such. By consideration of the phenomenon of guilt as a 
kind of experience with which she is acquainted, she can attempt to explore the 
general grounds on which it is founded in her experience; how it coheres with other
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classes of experience; its relation to beliefs which she may hold about her nature as 
an agent and about the nature of the world. This is a step which can be undertaken 
both in order to discern essential features of an experience class (along with the use 
of imaginative variation) as well as to lead one into a further inspection of the 
experience, its constitution in consciousness, and the connections it possesses with 
respect to other areas of experience and belief. For the experience of guilt in 
particular one would be looking into matters such as the relation to other 
experiences (shame, for instance), the degree to which it enters into notions of 
responsibility, or the more basic fear of being caught and punished for one's 
behaviour. At its most general, one would wish to be appraised of the kind of 
background, and often implicit, experiences and beliefs with which the subject and 
her community approach their world. This leads on my discussion to the final 
element of Husserl's phenomenology which I take to be of use.
vi) The life-world. To explore the horizon of a particular experience 
will often involve entering into not only the implicit features directly related to the 
intentional object, but also into the implicit background to it. Such a background 
could involve the ways in which the particular experience coheres with others and 
how its place in the subject's understanding rests on certain assumptions about 
herself and reality. Ultimately one is led to a general picture of the subject in the 
environment (both physical and social) which forms that implicit background. 
Husserl's own thought seems to have moved this way from the notion of the 
horizon,43 and the label he gave this ultimate background was 'life-world'.44 It has 
been called 'one of the most fertile ideas in the history of phenomenology...' 45 
This kind of investigation gives one the widest interpretation of the implicit 
background to experience and allows one to see its placing in the social and 
historical context of a shared community existence. And although Husserl changed 
the emphasis of the notion in his final works,46 moving from a pluralist conception 
of different cultural life-worlds to one of the invariant structure of a life-world for 
all subjects, 47 one can get on with investigating this very general grounding
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without committing oneself to either interpretation. An example from moral 
philosophy of a similar approach is Ladd's notion of a 'ground motive', the basic 
actuating belief (or set of beliefs) at the foundation of a community's moral life.48 
He believes this to consist in a cognitive element, namely, 'existential' beliefs about 
the kind of world one inhabits. 'Insufficient attention has been paid in recent 
ethics,' he claims, 'to this phenomenon of the existential ground of morality. This 
ground consists of significant beliefs about life in general (a Weltanschauung) - 
hence the term "existential"... [For example] the belief that the universe is put 
together in a certain way cannot fail to have an influence upon which motive is to be 
regarded as paramount.' 49 While this does propose one way of viewing as 
important the life-world of a community, it may be that a unitary picture will not be 
given to one - many different elements enter into the matrix of fundamental beliefs 
and ways of living which communities evince, some of them undoubtedly clashing 
with one another in ways that are not (at least cognitively) resolved. But the point is 
clear enough concerning the horizonal movement of interpretation leading to the 
life-world. It is that one's investigation into moral experience should take account 
of the shared and implicit assumptions and picture(s) of the world which lie at the 
base of subjects' moral experience.
For the experience of guilt it seems obvious that one feature which calls for 
especial attention is its putative connection with beliefs concerning a divine law or a 
law that is present in the nature of the cosmos. Such a belief may form a kind of 
basic view of their life and the world in which they live for some people and 
groups. Historically this may well have been the case for medieval Europe. And 
one interesting phenomenological investigation which can be undertaken in this area 
concerns the possibility of some content to the experience of the guilt as if related 
to breach of a divine or cosmic law which is yet unaccompanied by the actual 
phenomenological fact of a basic belief in or experience of a divine reality. Some 
such disengagement of immediate and background experiences is held to be the case
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of our own moral consciousness by the likes of Anscombe (1958) and MacIntyre 
(1981).
Section Three: Shaping the methodology
This completes my appraisal of what I regard as workable points of method 
from Husserlian phenomenology. For the sake of convenience I shall term this 
formal phenomenology in order to distinguish it from the stuff of the next chapter 
which I am calling informal phenomenology. I do not believe all that much need 
separate them, suitably understood, except for a certain rigour to be found in the 
former and a developed vocabulary of methodological steps. For the present 
moment, however, I shall make some brief comments on those parts of formal 
phenomenology which I am expressly eschewing.
My interpretation given to eidetic intuition has already been tempered in the 
light of problems with Husserl's placing of it (sub-section 2.iv.). Subsequently the 
part it will play concerns the investigation of necessary features of m oral 
experience: to that extent one can be said to be exploring the essence of a particular 
area of experience, but not in the exact way in which Husserl would have stated the 
matter. He particularly emphasized the use of a device called 'phenomenological 
reduction' or 'bracketing',50 by which to arrive at essential insights and to prepare 
the subject matter for investigation. This involves a deliberate suspension of belief 
in the external world in order putatively to focus as closely as possible on the nature 
of the pure experience. That in itself need not cause any problem. But I think the 
process of attempting to drop presuppositions and to describe experience with as 
much justice to its appearances as possible has been adequately covered in my 
points i and ii above. I do not think that care to avoid prior assumptions about the 
nature of the moral experience requires this move - the difficulties involved in quite 
what realm of phenomenological fact one is thereby led into being unhelpful for this 
inquiry. For Husserl's seems to have regarded this 'pure experience' as bound up 
with the life of a 'transcendental ego' which generates the meaning of the
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phenomena. This is not a form of understanding which I find helpful or germane. It 
is my intention to employ Husserl's methods of inquiry as I take them to be fitting 
routes into the data of our moral experience. Such methods enter also into areas of 
philosophical speculation which represent general background matters rather than 
ones which can be directed to the specific subject matter; over those elements of the 
methodology I shall, as it were, draw a veil. They would take the proposed 
investigation away from its object and too far into a circuitous, prolonged 
methodological preamble.
As for Husserl, his later thought is largely bound up with his notion of the 
'transcendental ego'.51 For him this represents the constituting centre of all 
intentional acts of consciousness and that which bestows meaning on intentional 
objects. 52 It is reached through the application of the phenomenological reduction 
to the contents of consciousness.53 I will not employ this notion for three reasons. 
Firstly, it requires metaphysical commitment to a philosophical object of a 
questionable sort. Secondly, there does not appear to be any need to posit it in order 
to conduct research into experience. And thirdly, the notion seems to me to stem 
from a way of viewing experience which one can best do without. This is Husserl's 
belief that the data of phenomenology, having been 'bracketed' and analyzed 
therein, are not to be thought of as a psychological matter,54 but as a special kind of 
fact (generated by the transcendental ego). I think that one can avoid this 
awkwardness concerning the nature of the subject matter, while retaining its 
impetus against taking experience as 'merely' about psychological facts. That is to 
say, careful attention to the phenomena of experience will lead one to description of 
it without prior disposition to classify it immediately into neutral world and agent 
reaction. But as to the idea of a special realm of phenomenological fact, I think this 
can be left aside.
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A final note on Husserlian phenomenology and its 
relevance to this study
I shall now sum up my attitude to Husserl's philosophical system and say 
how I take it to be relevant to the subject matter at hand. It provides one, I believe, 
with an approach to the stuff of experience, together with more and less definite 
tools by which to implement that. By enjoining certain careful procedures through 
which to present accurate description of how experience enters subjects' 
consciousness and how it is subsequently viewed in the light of further kinds of 
reflection, it attempts to give to the researcher the best possible purchase on her 
own experience and the means by which to record it for the consideration of others. 
And through doing so, Husserlian phenomenology purports to lead one on to see 
the essential features which a particular class of experience must retain if it is to be 
that class at all.
In one respect this all sounds dauntingly technical and esoteric. And yet in 
another it is rather unremarkable. For what is being proposed is that an attempt be 
made to reveal to ourselves as fully as possible experience as we have it and as we 
think on it. That seems to me an extremely worthwhile philosophical project as well 
as a sensible personal one. I have no advance reasons for taking it to be either a 
simple or difficult affair to execute. In the next chapter especially I will be 
maintaining that this can serve a vital function in philosophical debate where 
different descriptions of experience are contended with one another by proponents 
of different theories. And it will become apparent throughout this thesis that I use 
this descriptive procedure particularly to direct my argument against portrayals of 
moral experience that are shared by different philosophers.
The experience to which I will be especially directing my attention is, of 
course, that of the moral demand. I think that, for the reasons given generally in 
this chapter, a phenomenological approach to the data of the experience class is as 
applicable to that as it is anywhere else. This is particularly so, I believe, where the 
precise nature of a putative apprehension of moral demands arising from demanders
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or values 'out there' is concerned. The kind of phenomenological procedure I have 
outlined here, as it is put into practice in the light of my commentary in the next 
chapter, should present the reader with as accurate as possible a description of that 
experience. Included in that description will be the extent to which the demand is 
experienced as arriving in consciousness from 'out there’, and how the nature of 
the 'out there' component is discerned by the agent, both in the thick of the 
immediate experience and on later, greater reflection on it.
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CHAPTER THREE
In unreflected experience value appears to be in the object of value.
B.Tapper1
[When we] turn round upon ourselves...man discovers that value 
has its seat in his feelings, that the stuff of which the idea of value is 
composed is his reaction, that there is no such thing as intrinsic 
value in the object of his thought.
D.S.Miller2
Introduction
In this chapter I will represent the way in which the term ’phenomenology' 
and arguments using it are employed in a philosophical tradition outwith the 
Husserlian one. I would broadly characterize this as the Anglo-American tradition, 
and its general use of phenomenology is of a fashion such that I will be calling it 
'informal'. That is, it does not take its lead from the strictures and rigour of that 
school of philosophy which identifies itself by the label 'phenomenological'; 
instead, its use of the term (and of phenomenological considerations) rests on a 
more loose understanding of it as concerned with a general analysis of experience 
and reflection on it. With respect to this attempt on my part to find useful 
rapprochement between the two brands of phenomenological approach to a subject 
matter, one writer on the general topic has put his view in words which sum up 
well my own attitude. He says this:
Our method of examination will be phenomenological, a standpoint 
elaborated if not discovered by Edmund Husserl. The ins and outs 
of this method are a matter of infinite technical discussion; I shall 
use of it only this: the attempt to reflect radically upon experience as 
that experience presents itself to the experiencer. It will be the mind
i
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reflecting upon itself, without presupposition, in an effort to discern 
explicitly what the structure and content of that experience is. This 
reflection from first to last will try to confine itself to experience as it 
offers itself without presupposing from the start what reality "must" 
be, what the ego experiencing "must" be, notions drawn from 
sources external to that experience itself...Phenomenology thus 
understood is nothing but an attempt to make clear to oneself the 
phenomenon of any experience whatsoever just as it offers itself to 
the mind reflecting.3
I will subdivide this discussion in between two modes of 'doing' 
phenomenology which have already been mentioned in part in section 1 of the 
previous chapter. These modes are, respectively, the direct and reflective analyses 
of experience. It is by means of them that I will be undertaking investigation of 
moral experience in the chapters to follow. During this chapter and at the end of it I 
will indicate how I take both formal and informal phenomenology to be related and 
how they can be fruitfully employed in tandem.
Initial note
In this chapter and in the ones that follow I will often talk of a subject's 
'feel', both for the application of terms to describe her experience and also as an 
awareness (more and less determinate) of what it is that is going to constitute her 
experience. I realize that this may sound a rather colloquial description. But I think 
no other one of equal brevity and general applicability captures the matters to which 
I wish repeatedly to direct the reader's attention.
In Section 4 of this chapter I will offer my understanding of different uses 
of the term 'sense' as I see it to be relevant to the study. As I do that I cover also at 
length how 'feel' can be construed in the thesis. Initially, I would characterize the 
matter in two ways. One concerns the 'feel' a subject has for expressions that fit or 
jar with her experience. This I take to be a kind of experience of the satisfactory or
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unsatisfactory use of expressions in that way with which we are all familiar, both as 
we spontaneously describe our experience or as we attempt to grasp the most 
adequate terms for it. The other way in which I shall be using ’feel' is one which 
the reader will come across quite extensively. It is to give description of an 
awareness on the subject's part - sometimes hazy and without a specific object, 
sometimes clear and determinate - of what it is with which she is interacting to give 
her a particular experience or class of experience. In the former, rough fashion it is 
like that inexplicit judgement which we sometimes make of our awareness of a 
situation 'being dangerous' - without being able to pin down the precise factors 
giving rise to the awareness. And in the latter, specific circumstance a particular 
object - such as a prowler - is part of the awareness of the danger. It is of Mackie's 
alleged moral values 'out there' that I shall be asking whether such a 'feel' or 
apprehension on our part is vague or determinate or non-existent in the moral 
demand experience.
Section One: Phenomenologies of direct and reflective
experience
At this point it is best to make plain a distinction to which I have alluded 
already in the previous chapter. It is that between descriptive reports of 'direct' and 
'reflective' levels of experience. In the former case I shall be attempting to present 
the stuff of the moral demand experience as it is immediately given to a subject's 
consciousness; in the latter, it is with a more deliberate investigation into the nature 
of the experience by the subject that I shall be interested.
Now this distinction is a rather fluid one. Prima facie, any description of 
our experience is in some sense reflective. Even in describing 'immediate' 
experience, one is usually bringing back to mind a particular experience in order to 
present it for consideration. The difference lies, I believe, between the attempt to 
describe immediate experience as it was had and the further adumbration of it as 
one thinks more deeply on it. In the former case one merely describes the
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experience; in the latter, one analyses it in greater depth, though attempting still to 
give description of the experiences that go on as one does that. As to this latter case 
itself, I will further distinguish my understanding of reflection and use of that term 
in the relevant section (section 4) of this chapter. I see that matter essentially as sub­
divided between reflection as serious thought on one's experience and as that which 
takes the self and its experiences as objects of thought. It is especially to the latter 
form of reflection that I believe phenomenological arguments are directed in moral 
philosophical literature.
Here, then, is the distinction between direct and reflective levels as I see it. 
In the case of direct experience one is giving a description of the experience which 
seeks to present or characterize that experience precisely as it was had ; which is to 
present in words no more and no less than the experience in its original impact on 
the subject. And at the reflective level one is attempting an exploration of the 
experience as recollected, one which might disclose aspects of it not noticed at the 
time. Such aspects might lead one to contradict the original report of the experience. 
Should that be the case, then one also describes the experience of the subject as 
such realization strikes her; or one can describe her experience simply on thinking 
on the possibility of different aspects being added to or subtracted from her initial 
experience. And further to that, there is also a phenomenological description of her 
experience as the subject reflects on the experience as a general class and how it 
stands in her life as a whole.
I shall illustrate these distinctions with a sample experience of which 
phenomenological description can be made. Let us take, say, the experience of a 
climber suddenly reaching the summit of a mountain and beholding the scene about 
her. In describing the immediate impress of an experience upon her she may talk of 
being taken aback, standing in awe before the majesty of raw nature. She may 
describe only a crude feeling of astonishment filling her senses as the salient feature 
of her impressions at the time. On later reflection she may unpick more finely the 
threads of her experience: seeing that it was the particular way that the sun struck
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the snow-capped peaks that primarily held her attention; how the keen air at the 
summit caught her breath and enlivened her whole self; and how her own 
expectations of the scene, formed from her viewing filmed images, had built into 
her anticipations and final encounter. Further reflection by her might be into the role 
she takes an accord with nature to play in the life of an individual; or the value of an 
involved contemplation and appreciation of the wonder of the natural environment. 
She may even wonder, in a more philosophical frame of mind, on the stark beauty 
of the mountain range that she beheld enduring before and beyond the fact of 
anyone's actually perceiving it. Her experience - if any - on inquiring in that way 
can be recorded.4 Or she may reflect simply that she is the kind of person who 
reacts in that kind of way to certain presented scenes. As to values 'out there', I 
have juxtaposed in the case of the headline quotations to this chapter one putative 
report from direct experience which sees value as given in that exterior fashion with 
one that rejects such a report on reflection. I will, of course, be pursuing both 
contentions in this thesis to see if either accurately reflects the data of our 
experience.
I realise that in my mountain-summit example above the demarcation 
between 'direct' and 'reflective' descriptions of experience and thought on it are not 
always precise. But I think that my distinction is illustrated there. The difference 
between a subject's attempt at giving only the experience as it struck her and 
additional investigation into that experience and its general nature is one which I 
wish to maintain. In this thesis, then, I shall be marking this difference by use of 
the terms 'direct' or 'immediate' and 'reflective', understood in the ways in which I 
have noted them. Sometimes also I will talk of a 'more reflective' purchase which 
the subject might have or attempt to attain on her experience, meaning by this to 
signal that spectrum of reflective stances which she can take with respect to her 
experience and which I have discussed in the paragraphs above. At times I shall 
reiterate these matters, or explain exactly what kind or degree of 'reflection' is
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going on as I see it, in order that the reader might be made sure of how I take 
myself to be presenting the phenomenology.
Section Two: Direct experience
Informal phenomenology is to be found in philosophical literature in the 
presentation of experience as it strikes the subject. That level of experiential analysis 
which deals with direct experience occurs in describing a particular example from 
an experience-class as it occurs in immediacy. A good way of putting the matter is 
in the terms of 'appearing* as it occurred in the previous chapter (sub-section 2.ii.). 
A phenomenology of direct experience deals with the way in which an experience 
appears to the subject at the time of its occurrence.
Two roughly analogous areas of experience with the moral one, by which to 
illustrate this point, are the aesthetic and the religious. (I am regarding them as 
analogous because there are shared questions which spontaneously arise on 
considering the experiences which they classify: primarily about the kind of status 
to be assigned to the objects of that experience). C.I.Lewis, for example, describes 
the concern of part of his work as being with 'what might be called the 
phenomenology of the aesthetic; with the nature and conditions of the aesthetic in 
experience.'5 As a sample of the employment of informal phenomenology, that of 
Lewis is illuminating. He uses an analysis of the direct phenomenology to see 
whether any elements can be discerned in the experience which might serve to 
differentiate it from other classes of experience with which it is congruent. 
Maintaining that the analysis does not provide such evidence, he states that,
Aesthetic values are not distinguished from others by any peculiar 
quality or givenness of the experience with which the aesthetic 
object greets us...there is no purely representational quality which, 
for example, is sufficient to distinguish genuinely aesthetic 
experience from the non-aesthetic satisfaction of an appetite, or the
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child's satisfaction in some novel and intriguing noise, or the 
writer's satisfaction in seeing his name in print.6 
Having tested a direct phenomenology and found it wanting, he turns to one's 
reflective notion of the nature of the experience7 for a measure of the aesthetic, 
putting matters this way:
Immediate enjoyments, though various in quality, are still too nearly 
of one kind to afford any sure indication of the purely aesthetic. For 
that we must have recourse to criteria which are indirect and 
reflective, for example, the fact that this kind of experience is one 
which can be well-maintained instead of exhausting itself soon and 
leading to dissatisfaction.8 
If one wished, one could question his conclusions on the basis of 
phenomenological description: that is, as to whether his dismissal of immediate 
experience is based on accurate analysis both of its appearing to subjects and in 
deeper analysis of unnoticed elements to it. In doing so, one would be adverting to 
publicly accessible data of experience by which to represent the phenomenology. A 
similar process occurs with religious experience, particularly with respect to the 
(crucial) difference between description of the content as the 'numinous', say, or of 
a determinate god of a particular nature.9 And one further example from the moral: 
many philosophers have noted the way in which moral experience seems to be 
pointing beyond itself to an agent-independent value realm (chapter one highlighted 
this feature). One gives a direct phenomenological description in terms of
the insistency of spontaneous moral judgements. Such judgements 
are almost impossible to ignore. Moral intuitions can be seen as hard 
to disdain or write off as are perceptual sensings...10 
This is itself an interesting characterization of the experience. Phrases like 
'insistency'; 'impossible to ignore'; 'hard to disdain': these are standard subject 
descriptions of moral demand experience as moral philosophers represent them. 
What is interesting about them is the further analysis they call for. Such phrases can
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appear as marking the feel with which a seeming objective moral reality signals 
itself to subjects; as giving expression to the impingement on consciousness of 
some as yet indeterminate reality exterior to the subject; or as similar enough to the 
language of an inner compulsion by which to analyze matters into some complex of 
both outer and inner forces tugging on the subject. One writer on religious 
experience, for instance, talks of God 'invading' our attitudes and senses, of his 
'insistent impact' on one.11 More involved phenomenological description of 
experience promises to resolve this issue of both how the moral demand appears 
and what its implicit elements are.
Section Three: The philosophical relevance of this
procedure
A prime use of phenomenology can be to record a cartography of moral 
experience, as it were. This is of intrinsic interest. It represents part of a more 
general project in which philosophy is engaged: that of describing and analyzing 
experience, contributing to the self-understanding of persons thereby.12 It is also 
important within the canons of philosophical argument in two ways. As a form of 
corrective exercise directed to inadequate or inaccurate portrayal of experience it is 
of great utility. This kind of approach can be used as an end in itself, serving to 
overturn other alleged descriptions which fail to do justice to the experiential data.13 
Or it may simply help to develop and deepen an otherwise one-sided description.14 
An example by which to represent both points arises through the descriptive nature 
of moral experience as it concerns a particularist or principle-follow ing 
characterization.15 Regarding the first point just above, some moral philosophers 
believe moral experience is most accurately described in terms of particularism, that 
is to say, as being registered under a certain moral category without mediation by 
rules from which to derive the appropriate moral expression.16 They thus oppose 
this description to those17 who see moral experience in terms of the application of 
moral rules to the situation before one. Other philosophers would agree with
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particularism as 'first blush' description, but then go on to analyze more deeply the 
experience, claiming to discover behind the surface appearance the operation of 
moral principles serving to guide and define experience.18 Here one is faced, then, 
with two strands of a phenomenological analysis. Both are concerned to give 
description which is as accurate as possible of the experience, their respective uses 
being slightly different, the one relying on the immediate appearances as 
authoritative and the other undertaking further reflection on that data, claiming to 
overturn it as ultimate explanation of the matter when deeper reflection on those 
appearances is entertained.
There is another major use of a direct phenomenology in philosophical 
argument: which is to make claims concerning the existence and nature of the 
objects of experience. If one says that the truth of a matter in philosophy can best be 
ascertained by regarding phenomenological description as either: correct description 
of the nature of the experienced object; or adequate ground for taking the object of 
the experience to exist outwith the consciousness of the subject - then one has 
employed what can be called a 'phenomenological argument.'19 Hence the crux of 
the relevance to philosophy of a phenomenological account of a particular area of 
interest, and the import accorded to it, lies in the question: Is there ever such good 
reason to accept as correct the move from experiential content to independent 
object? If one answers: no, never; then there is no such thing as this type of 
phenomenological argument (though there may be phenomenological 
characterizations of philosophical topics and they may be of some use). On the side 
of taking there to be good reason for dealing with a philosophical problem by a 
phenomenological approach in this particular mode is the presupposition by which 
we generally order our lives that stands in favour of taking descriptions of 
experience to be (more or less) correct descriptions of the objects (including their 
existential status) which form the content of the experience.20 There are, of course, 
countervailing reasons that standardly operate to question such claims 21 But these 
take place against a backdrop in which it is prima facie rational to make such
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assumptions on the basis of experience.22 This is a very strong postulate indeed, 
naturally held and affirmed in the ordinary run of life, such that experience 
possesses a primacy for inquiry that needs disproving at least to as great an extent 
as it needs shoring up.
With respect to the question of moral phenomenology at hand, the kind of 
consideration being presented here has this consequence. It is sometimes thought23 
that an initial case for the objectivity of moral values (in Mackie's sense, as being 
stitched into the universe, or simply part of it) can be made out on just such lines. 
Some form of moral realism24 will then be supported. From people's moral 
consciousness it seems apparent that an independent object is signalled in their 
experience. And this, so the line of thought runs, is just that good reason for taking 
there to be independent moral values which the argument in the paragraph above 
puts forward.
I have already expressed the worry that quick recognition of the experience 
as being of objective moral values may go against the canon of phenomenological 
accuracy. Furthermore, even granted that that kind of content is being discerned by 
agents, one must disentangle another matter of phenomenological description. That 
is one concerning the difference between characterization of moral experience as 
being: of independent objects; or as of independent objects.25 This difference 
needs clarifying and its implications for a phenomenological argument exploring. 
One general philosophical attempt at a justification of the kind of phenomenological 
position put forward here consists in the following argument. Since there is good 
reason to think that independent objects are likely to produce experience of 
independent objects, then there is good reason to think that moral experience is as it 
is because its (moral) objects are independent ones.
The problem with this attempt at philosophical argument, irrespective of its 
formal consistency, is that either: something other than an independent object has 
often seemed a better explanation of the phenomenology;26 or that something which 
is independent of the subject other than a specifically moral object has seemed to be
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closer to the mark as giving rise to a certain phenomenology.27 How either form of 
criticism squares with the phenomenology of reflection by subjects on the moral 
categories they use and the overall picture of moral life they implicitly have is a 
consideration for the next section to begin to enlarge upon.
In addition to the comments made above, I want at this point to mention a 
variant of this kind of argument which tends to be overlooked by proponents of 
phenomenological forms of exposition. In doing so I shall enlist both direct and 
reflective modes of description as a way of bringing my debate on to the next 
section. This approach is what I shall call a 'negative phenomenological argument'. 
Instead of saying what there is on the basis of the phenomenological data, it will 
say what there is not. This may be asserted in virtue of either the absence of a 
putative experience or the presence of factors in the phenomenological data on 
closer inspection which counter the direction in which the appearances point. Such 
an argument is sometimes employed by opponents of theism when debate is being 
conducted at a phenomenological level. They either contend that, for all the 
religious experiences adduced by supporters of theism, there are just as many lives 
devoid of that experience; or that the experience itself manifests (disguised) 
elements of the subject's constitution (perhaps her wishes or desires) which 
discount the apparent phenomenological content of religious experience in its 
immediacy. In the former case a direct phenomenological consideration is being 
employed which, in tandem with questioning the actual content of alleged religious 
experience itself, makes for a negative argument: it is that the absence of certain 
experiences is good ground for asserting the absence of a certain object from the 
world. And in the latter an indirect argument is put forward: this takes a deeper 
reflective analysis of the immediate experience to question and overturn its initial 
seeming content.
It is particularly with the former line of argument that my concern shall rest 
in the next couple of chapters. In them I will present my phenomenology of the 
immediate experience of moral demands and make a simple, but weighty claim:
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which is that the description of this part of our moral experience given by Mackie 
and others is wrong. Attention to the data of our actual experience shows, I believe, 
that the kind of apprehension of value objects 'out there' of which Mackie talks on 
our behalf is not an accurate phenomenological description. He, of course, does not 
take that putative experience to be good ground for accepting the reality of its 
object.28 My further argument is thus also with those who take that alleged 
experience - what I shall claim is a misdescription - to give them some warrant for 
belief in values 'out there'. So the negative phenomenological argument that I will 
be marshalling is directed to two fronts: one being the intra-phenomenological 
debate on the accuracy of the investigator's report of our moral demand experience; 
the other occurring at that point where some affirmation of, or inference from, the 
alleged content of the phenomenological data is made with respect to what is 'out 
there' impinging on one.
Further negative phenomenological arguments can be brought to bear as one 
delves more deeply into the phenomenological data. This is a matter of investigating 
the horizon of the experience and testing it by imaginative variation, as I put it in my 
discussion of Husserlian phenomenology and its technique (chapter 2, section 2). It 
seems to me that a large part of the phenomenological argument at this level consists 
in the subject registering a certain experience on taking the content of her immediate 
experience to represent real objects 'out there' or when the possibility of its being a 
matter more closely linked to certain personal factors is considered. This experience 
is one which I will cover in part in section 5 of this chapter as one of a particular 
experience 'making sense' or not as its possible genesis and objects are 
contemplated. Not only, then, can one explore the deeper reaches of the subject's 
experience, but one can also record a kind of experience that itself goes on at the 
reflective level when the subject thinks on the seeming contents of the direct 
experience and putative explanations of that. (To continue with the matter of 
religious experience, for instance, one may attempt to explore the precise nature of 
the alleged immediate apprehension to see whether an actual deity or, rather, a
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certain charged, innervating sensation is the best way of characterizing the 
experience; whether the subject discerns the influence of any elements going to 
make up her experience which would cast doubt on the authenticity of its being 
genuine apprehension of a religious object; and how, on deeper reflective thought, 
she responds to the presentation of different possible explanations, both religious 
and otherwise, for her having that kind of experience). All of this, it seems to me, 
is an affair with which phenomenological investigation is quite properly concerned 
and for which it is well suited. This brings my discussion on to the kind of second 
order phenomenological exposition that can be drawn from a reflective level.
Section Four: Phenomenology of reflection
In tandem with the analysis of direct experience, one can entertain 
phenomenological analysis of reflection on experience. This consists in two 
discriminable facets. One is the probing of the original experience for unnoticed, 
hidden, or suppressed elements. It assumes that one can bring the original 
experience back before the view of reflection in order to study it more deeply. This 
is the kind of phenomenological analysis noted in the operation of point v. of the 
Husserlian method chosen in chapter 2.
There is also a phenomenological analysis of the reflective 'feel' subjects 
have for the concepts they employ and the place certain notions and practices have 
in their lives and thoughts. This kind of experience is as germane to 
phenomenological exegesis as is the immediate registering to consciousness of 
experience discussed in the previous section. Spiegelberg states that,
Experience is not restricted to so-called sense experience. There is 
for the phenomenologist experience of relations, meanings, values, 
requiredness, other minds, social and cultural phenomena. Any kind 
of cognitive contact with particular data is an occasion for genuine 
experience. 29
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And in the terms of the informal phenomenology being covered here, the matter is 
like this. The direct experience of the moral demand, as it seems to enter the 
subject, say, from a value realm outwith her own conscious control, is given up to 
reflection and the experience described of how this picture strikes her. One thus 
enters into the subject's experience of taking the appearances of direct experience as 
being the way things are (assuming, that is, that she actually does have the kind of 
experience which Mackie describes). This mode of analysis bridges the formal and 
informal approaches. It involves further probing into the general system of moral 
thought and experience of the subject and the place this occupies in her social 
existence - what was called in the previous chapter on formal phenomenology, the 
exploration of the 'horizon' of the experience, leading to the 'life-world'. The 
reflective feel concerning the direct experience can also be tested when alternative 
pictures of that experience are considered. Instances with respect to the moral 
experience can be varied from the notion of some independent prescriptive moral 
objects as Mackie sees them; to some relational explanation of moral experience in 
terms of certain naturalistic features of the world striking a human sensibility; to 
that of seeing moral value as arising simply through the decisions made by subjects 
without reference to any external moral reality. Each time the subject's reflective 
experience of taking these possibilities to be constitutive of the moral demand she is 
acquainted with in direct experience is registered. That is a quite similar informal 
counterpart of formal phenomenology's use of imaginative variations. And in both 
cases one is led to the 'essence' of the experience, insofar as one is discerning 
necessary features to it which cannot be dropped or replaced without loss of sense 
on the subject's part toward her experience.
Section Five: Senses
The terms 'sense', 'senseful', and 'sensefulness' will reappear constantly in 
my discussion of reflective phenomenology. I shall thus make plain at this stage in 
what ways I understand them. I shall propose four uses of the term 'sense'. I am
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not claiming that these senses are exhaustive, only that they represent the ones 
which seem to me the most suited to the description of the reflective experiences 
being covered. They are specifically directed to the subject's experience and the 
terms which she employs to describe it. To illustrate the uses I shall employ an 
example from moral philosophy which is close to the subject area at hand, namely, 
that of a subject's experience of obligation.
Here are the four uses:
1. The first use of 'sense' which I shall describe is that which takes 
it as 'linguistic meaning'. So when I talk of 'sense' in this way I shall be referring 
to the linguistic meaning of the term or terms a subject uses in describing her 
experience. For some people, in the case of 'obligation', the term itself is used to 
mean 'What I've promised to do' or 'What God requires of me'. Though my use of 
'sense' in this fashion usually concerns the subject's general and untutored grasp of 
the term, as part of the ordinary language of the immediate concerns of her life, its 
linguistic meaning can be explored by her from a reflective standpoint on her own 
grasp of it. This involves such considerations as to whether she would use it in 
what appear to be borderline cases of the experience and its putative applicability to 
describing it; where its use might become ironic or deceitful or inaccurate; and to 
how others seem to regard its meaning in possible contrast with that with which she 
operates.
The next two uses below also involve a subject in more and less reflection 
on her experience. These concern not so much linguistic meaning of terms that 
describe experience as the 'meaningfulness' of the experience itself. This is a matter 
which I believe is given to a subject both in a particular kind of experience in 
immediacy and on reflection on her experience (similarly to that which I mentioned 
in the previous chapter about the subjects' reflective assay as it seemed to me a 
relevant and enlightening way of understanding Husserlian phenomenology).
2. My second use of 'sense' correlates with what I shall call 'sensefulness'. 
The sensefulness of an experience or the terms used to describe it is the degree to
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which it can be said, colloquially, 'to make sense' for a particular subject. This 
involves both the immediate use of a term to describe her experience - how it fits 
with her experience and how it conveys what she intends it to represent - as well as 
her reflection on its use. Such reflection I mentioned in the final sentence 
concerning the first use of 'sense' above. It concerns her own assessment of the 
terms she uses to convey to herself and others her experience. This seems to me to 
rest on some grasp or feel on the part of the subject for the terms she uses to 
describe her experience which itself consists in a certain kind of experience.30 This 
'grasp' or 'feel' concerns both an ability (to varying degrees) on the part of subjects 
to discern correct and incorrect uses of expressions (as in the first use of 'sense' 
above) and a way of regarding such expressions as satisfactory or not, fitting or 
absurd. This latter, rather nebulous, affair I believe to be resting on a kind of 
experience which ultimately the subject relies upon in her use of such expressions. 
That is why I think it is reasonable to include it as something with which informal 
phenomenology is quite properly interested.
I think Kant is performing just this kind of reflection (a combination of the 
two uses of sense which I have so far noted) in the early stages of the 
'Groundwork' where he considers particular obligations.31 His thought is that, 
taken in certain ways, not only will the practices in question break down, but so 
also will the sense of the notion itself. The subject's feel, that is, for an obligation 
in the light, say, of the institution of promise-keeping becomes awry, awkward, 
disturbed when considering the possibility of applying the notion under certain 
imagined conditions. Conversely, though it is not easy to find handy terms to 
describe the ordinary functioning of this sense with a concept or picture of a state of 
affairs, the subject has a feel of satisfactoriness or fittingness, of ease or 
ordinariness, when dealing with matters. (One can think here also of the way in 
which some novels can question and expand one's view of a particular concept, 
such as the nature and role of self-deception, or the dilemmas of faith and morality 
that literary characters are faced with) 32
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3. The third understanding of 'sense' which I shall be displaying is that 
which refers to the 'meaningfulness' of an experience or experience-class. This 
follows on from my notion of 'sense' immediately above, and addresses the 
experience in a wider fashion. Here, however, such meaningfulness - as a feature 
of an experience that strikes a subject - need not always be given linguistic 
representation. This phenomenon is a somewhat rough and diffuse one to capture, 
but I think it can fruitfully be looked upon in this way. Take the example of love. 
Now the meaningfulness of this is a manifest fact for most of us : that is to say, as a 
phenomenon which enriches one's life, gives it depth and texture and significance, 
one without which a life would be dulled in the living.33 Not only is this an 
immediately experienced feature that usually goes with the phenomenon of love, but 
it is also something that is affirmed and enlarged upon through reflection on it. In 
the case of love this involves a complex network of thoughts on the value of 
relationships with others, the tensions between eros and agape, basic needs of 
individuals, human motivation, and so on. Gradually a picture of the 
meaningfulness of love builds up, and one's sense of it is explored and enriched. 
The 'sense' here of a concept, experience, or practice lies in the way in which it is 
felt to be significant in the life of the subject and the conceptual apparatus by which 
she reflects on i t
Such a 'sense' which an experience has need not always coalesce cleanly 
with a subject's ability to apply descriptive terms to it. There may be moments or 
even prolonged periods in one's life in which meaningful experiences occur - 
perhaps of a religious, erotic, or emotional nature - though one is unable to pin 
down precisely the correct term which captures it/them. Hence a subject's 
apprehension of this 'sense' will not always be accompanied by her appraisal of 
the experience by a term which has a sense in the two fashions outlined by me 
above. Conversely, she may regard certain terms like, say, 'God' or 'love' or 
'shame' as 'making sense' and yet either find herself at a loss as to whether they 
apply in a particular presented case or never find herself party to the particular
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meaningful experiences by which they are often signalled to consciousness in 
immediacy.
So, to take Ladd's previously cited talk of a 'ground motive' (chapter 2, 
section 2.vi), the sense of some moral concepts will be most fully revealed as one 
investigates the world-picture in which they operate and by which they are thought 
by subjects to have their particular qualities borne. On obligation specifically, 
Bergson is an example of one who tries to provide an appraisal of the way in which 
the concept and the practices it covers play a role in the life of collectives and the 
minds of individual subjects.34 That attempt works from a social significance to 
obligation (its role in the life of a community) to the significance it possesses for the 
individual subject (the role it plays in her interaction with others and the 
understanding of her social existence). This kind of reflection on the 'sense' of the 
experience is thus one further fashion by which a subject's overall grasp on her 
experience is given to investigation.
4. Sense as feeling or perception. This is of a kind with what is called a 
'sense of danger, a sense of the uncanny, or, more plainly, with the five senses. It 
need not commit one to identifying a special faculty responsible for the sense (as the 
five senses do). What it adverts to is the way in which a particular experience is 
being characterized - that is, in a perceptual mode. Though the former three 
construals of 'sense' also are couched in somewhat similar fashion - as they rely on 
what might be called a 'feeling' of something 'making sense' - this use of 'sense' is 
that which brings one into contact with the phenomena as they are given in terms of 
forces impinging on one, and as they seem to one to be located either externally to 
or from within oneself. Hence Prichard's talk of the 'sense of obligation' which 
confronts our daily lives.35 And the most fertile area in which to view this usage is, 
of course, that represented by the moral sense school of British philosophy of the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.36 The sense of obligation here is the 
sensing of a particular quality which a state of affairs holds for one. It may 
therefore be pointing to a special moral quality constituted in the particular state of
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affairs - and if so, such experience leads to thought on the lines of the three uses of 
'sense' above on how that construal of experience has meaning for the subject. This 
is certainly how Mackie takes our experience to be working. His analysis amounts 
to affirming that there is alleged experience of moral value at the level of this fourth 
sense, and that this enters into the linguistic sense of value talk, yet pronouncing it 
'queer' as he regards the possibility of real correlates to the experience not to 'make 
sense'. On the other hand, this kind of sense can be of the nature of a receptivity to 
certain naturalistic features of states of affairs without having to impute special 
properties to them (a sense of honour, or of shame, would seem to fall under this 
description, as perhaps does the sense of humour).37 Hutcheson claims only as 
much in talking of the moral sense.38
This use of 'sense', then, is most likely to be occurring in direct experience, 
to be followed up by reflective assay of the other three. But it can also operate on 
reflection, when the moral consciousness is engaged by examples as they are 
considered.39 This sense of the moral demand may be either heightened by 
consideration of the other senses or diminished as those other senses militate 
against it.
Section Six: Reflective phenomenology in general 
moral philosophy
Having discussed the uses of 'sense' in this area of informal 
phenomenology - and the uses would seem to apply equally in the formal mode40 - 
I wish now to elaborate briefly on the role reflective phenomenology plays in moral 
philosophical argument.
Firstly, an example from moral philosophy which illustrates well how 
widely the term 'phenomenology' is used. One writer wishes to show that most of 
us change our minds on moral issues (often for the better) as time passes, and that 
the major ethical theories cannot readily explain this factor. He says that, 'Here I 
want to simply introduce two observations [the ones above], and claim that they
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would be supported by a careful phenomenology.'41 The method he is exploiting is 
that of reflection on moral practice and moral judgement, how these change and 
how change might be accounted for, and how any account squares with one's feel 
for the practices in which one engages and the judgements one makes. Use of the 
term 'phenomenology' here is thus implicitly involving the entire range of method 
that has been canvassed in this chapter, taking it in an informal fashion to bolster 
argument.
Next, a recent instance of a more determinate use which is given in an article 
by Lovibond (1990). She attends to a problem of moral education, that is, the 
training of one's pleasures and aversions under the aegis of a conception of the 
good. In doing so she discusses particular cases in which this practice occurs or can 
occur and how a subject sees the task being undertaken. As such, she announces, 
'If this paper can lay claim to a "method",...its method will be phenomenological. 
And this means that its powers of persuasion will depend on how far I succeed, 
overall, in describing a recognizable cluster of moral phenomena.'42 In this respect 
her moral phenomenology mixes direct and reflective descriptions of experience - 
both as particular moral states of affairs strike subjects and as their grasp of the 
sense of them is tested, this 'sense' encompassing all four of my interpretations in 
the previous section
One more example. In his work On Moral Personhood (1989), Eldridge 
gives his second chapter the title, 'The Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness'. 
In that chapter he is concerned to contrast two trends in moral philosophy, between 
the 'specific attachments' of culture and tradition into which one is bom and raised, 
and the rationalist, autonomous decision-making image of the moral agent of the 
Kantian trend. He talks repeatedly of the 'phenomenology' of the way these 
'attachments' pull on the agent as well as the 'phenomenology of deliberation' with 
which the 'rationalist-universalist' moral philosophy is trying to deal.43 His 
analysis consists in an attempt to discern elements in both trends which reflect the
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actual working of moral concerns in the lives of persons: which is an amalgam of 
many of the phenomenological concerns that have been presented by me.
Section Seven: Modes of reflective phenomenology
The phenomenological method these three examples share, as it takes place 
in a reflective mode, is one of attempted accurate representation of experience with 
the subsequent use of that to overturn conflicting representations. One way in 
which this can be done is through the blunt claim that one's opponent has 
misdescribed the experiential data. This I shall call the empirical argument 
concerning the facts of experience. Another way is that which I shall label the 
modal argument from phenomenology. In this form of argument, the reflective 
assay on the underlying nature of the experience in question, particularly with 
respect to senses 2 and 3 above, operates in negative fashion: it is to the effect that 
certain explanations of the experience or putative descriptions of its nature strike 
one as not possibly being true. The result of adopting the alternative at the reflective 
level would be to render the experience and the concept used to describe it 
unintelligible or simply to transform it into some other kind of thing. That kind of 
phenomenological argument is associated particularly with Wiggins (1987b) and 
Platts (1980) who are discussed at length later. Positively characterized, the modal 
form of argument finds reflection on the experience to affirm that it has to be 
(necessarily is) thus-and-so if it is to be 'had' at all.
To return to the example of love as an experienced phenomenon in order to 
facilitate exposition, the following phenomenological arguments can be marshalled. 
I shall take as an opposing view the claim that love is 'really' lust in somewhat 
embroidered guise. On the 'empirical' count, such a claim fails - love just does not, 
on careful reflection, amount to lust. Though undoubtedly a component of love 
much of the time, 'lust' is not a coreferring expression for the special kind of 
experience or cluster of attitudes which is called love (failure of sense 1.); nor does 
it coalesce with thought on sense 2., for taking love to be lust-in-disguise does not
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'make sense' in the light of the differences in use of the concepts - the manifest 
distinctions between being 'in love' and being 'in lust' with someone, or between 
'loving' and 'lusting after', the former term in both cases having a sense for the 
subject not replaceable in terms of the latter.44 As to my third understanding of 
'sense', lust signally does not have the same place in persons' lives and outlooks as 
love. Only in the case of sense 4. do matters of discrimination prove more 
awkward, though persons do not continually confuse the two. The senses 2. and 3. 
provide the basis also for the modal argument. It is, negatively, the feeling that love 
cannot just be lust-in-disguise. To take love to be 'really' that kind of thing is to 
take it to be some other thing. The concept of love is eroded and shifted. The 
reflective thought is not merely representing disappointment in or a refusal to 
countenance the possibility that love just is this other thing, but a genuine 
conceptual difficulty in finding sensefulness in the picture of lust picking out the 
same elements of one's experienced world as love does. Positively put,1 the modal 
argument enters into interestingly congruent areas of debate with the moral 
philosophical concern standing in the background. For the notion which I have put 
at large is that for love to be a part of one's experiential and conceptual repertoire 
certain thoughts about it seem necessary. Most strikingly, the object of love must 
appear under the guise of being 'meant' for one, of forcing him/herself upon one's 
attention and 'capturing' one's heart.45 One cannot, that is, simply choose to love 
someone. The experience of love has features that are quite similar to the 
demandingness of moral experience, in particular an external call upon one's 
feelings and behaviour, though ordinary thought on love involves no tendency to 
ontologize any abstract property of 'loveness'. Moreover, while the unwilled nature 
of love is paramount in the experience of it, there is also a conjoined sense (sense
3.) in which what and whom one can love comes from within one's nature as a 
particular person, which is itself partly unchosen and partly formed by dispositions, 
modes of behaviour, and attitudes gelled, criticized, and maintained over an 
enduring emotional life. A person's loves tell us about the kind of person she is.
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She is not above criticism, despite being in love as one comes 'under the thrall' of 
external events - the kinds of loves one enters into are (notoriously) prone to factors 
of personality and upbringing which, if brought to light, would not pass the muster 
of critical appraisal. Likewise, the comparative sense (sense 3.) of the moral 
demand experience also involves a bond between what seem to be opposing ways 
of viewing it. If exteriority of the demand is thought at this reflective level to be 
necessary to its nature then one is presented with an interior counterpart as well: that 
of the sense in which the kinds of moral demands a person experiences and the 
force they exert upon her reflect (and partly constitute for others) the kind of person 
she is and the kind of moral consciousness she possesses (for which her efforts or 
lack thereof to cultivate it are amenable to rational criticism). This problem - if it is 
one and if its poles are correctly described - will be addressed in subsequent 
chapters. It brings me to a final expository point concerning characterization of 
experience.
Section Eight: Self and not-self
The apparent paradox highlighted above - that some classes of experience in 
immediacy and at reflective levels seem both to arrive from outwith agent 
consciousness and yet also are seen as manifesting qualities deep in the subject's 
character - needs a vocabulary with which to conduct discussion. The labels I will 
employ for this purpose identify experiential components in terms of 'self and 
'not-self, and also 'levels' or 'degrees' of those. I mean to employ them in this 
way. Subjects have a sense - as in the perceptual sense (sense 4.) above46 - of how 
a particular experience stands in relation to the self: as, say, important or serious or 
engrossing, or as peripheral or indifferent, or as threatening. This sense will be 
active both in direct contact with experience as well as in reflection on it (where my 
other instances of senses will come into play). And they also have a perceptual 
sense of the self s involvement in the experience, that is to say, as the experience
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seems to be generated by the self and its activities; or of the not-self, as the 
experience seems to be arriving from sources external to the self.
In this latter way, then, in any experience, the subject will have some 
(perceptual) sense of herself as contributor to it and of something else as going to 
make it up. Experiences may be characterized primarily in terms of self and not- 
self, though it is uncertain if any experience falls wholly on just one of these sides 
(and whether, indeed, one would wish to call it 'experience' if it did). Perhaps in 
certain extreme states of mood one finds the former engrossment, and perhaps in 
extreme religious states one is presented with the latter (the perceptual sense of 
being 'out of oneself', 'at one with the universe', particularly as it is found in 
Buddhism).47 At any rate, experience presents itself on a spectrum within these 
parameters; nor should the presence of both senses to an intense degree be regarded 
as incompatible (think of an extreme emotion of hate, which is decidedly self in one 
way, but often felt as powerfully alien in another).
These senses are evinced once more in the case of love. Briefly put, they are 
engaged in this fashion. The sense (as perception) of the experience is identified as 
very close to the self, as being of quite fundamental importance for it, and as being 
of quite proximate vicinity to the heart or core of the self. As to the sense of the 
space on a self/not-self axis being occupied by the experience, the previous section 
above has already pointed out the linked fashion by which the experience both 
enters one's concern from outwith one's self and yet meshes with deep aspects of 
it.48 Reflection on the lines of senses 2. and 3. affirms the sense 4. of the way in 
which one's loves are not subject to one's conscious control - love would not make 
sense, would not be love, if it was not experienced so. But alongside this reflection 
also runs the sense in which love reflects and makes determinate strong and abiding 
needs of the self and the character it possesses.
While introduction of the moral demand in Chapter 1 took place by the way 
of its exteriority (not-self), there is also in moral philosophy and everyday thought a 
concentration on an aspect of it as giving rein to the self. Signalling of the moral
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demand as if it is a form of compulsion, so that a subject uses the language of ’I 
have to...' or 'I cannot think otherwise...', is thought also by one moral 
philosopher49 to represent the self in a certain manner. He maintains that, ’...to 
accept an action as morally necessary or impossible for someone is to express an 
understanding of his life and character.' 50 This represents one way in which the 
self of a moral agent is regarded by others as somehow especially or intimately 
revealed in her awareness of moral demands, and in which behaviour in the light of 
them one thereby bears the imprint of one's moral consciousness before public 
scrutiny. A subject can also have this sense on her own part of where experience 
lies with respect to her self, in terms both of nearness to it and as the contributory 
self and not-self elements of an experience can be discerned. One is presented for 
study, then, with the possible image of moral demand experience as being both 
objective, in that the demand has a patent exteriority for the subject, as well as the 
locating of that experience near to the core self, as important to the self and as 
manifesting its own deepest and most significant features. This I do in chapters 6 
and 7. As Boyce-Gibson puts it, concerning the phenomenology of the sense (as in 
my senses 2., 3., and 4.) of value experience:
On the subjective side it is the enveloping fact of personality that 
here especially strikes us: it all has meaning and value for me, and 
the fact that it is my experience and that I have it is as fundamental 
for my experience as the conviction that there is something over 
against me that is not myself and has a meaning and a value of a 
complex objective kind, immeasurably transcending what my 
thought and feeling are able to assimilate.51 
I will direct phenomenological analysis in subsequent chapters to the nature of this 
seemingly paradoxical conjunction of self and not-self in the experience of the 
moral demand. And just as attention must be focussed on the question of how 
precisely the exteriority of the demand is viewed (wherein lies the explication of the 
objectivity-feature), so too this sense of the demand with respect to the self calls for
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critical analysis. One is returned to consideration of an imaginative variation 
concerning the objective prescriptivity mentioned in Chapter 1: can a subject 
experience the moral demand without feeling a particularly strong element of self to 
be involved with it? In the case both of self and not-self I propose to employ 
phenomenological investigation in order to detect the extent to which one or other is 
present in the relevant experience; the extent to which the two are mixed and the 
intensity of their presence; and the modal consequences of reflective attention.
Concluding comments to chapters two and three
Following on from the presentation in the first chapter of a problem area in 
moral philosophy, I have put forward in these two previous chapters the approach 
which I think best for dealing with that area. It is a phenomenological one. Chapter 
2 addressed the use of this method as developed by Husserl, and delineated the 
fashion in which I feel that that can be fruitfully employed. In chapter 3 I then 
continued exposition of phenomenological method, widening out discussion from 
the Husserlian 'school' of phenomenology to include what I termed its 'informal' 
usage in general philosophical writings. The two approaches do not strike me as 
being essentially divergent. They seem to differ only in matters of emphasis and 
systematic rigour. Both attend to description of the appearances of immediate 
experience; both try to go beyond the appearances and uncover implicit features of 
the original experience. In doing so, they move towards the discovery of necessaiy 
elements of the experience. And in investigating the experience for those necessary 
elements, I make use of the reflective sense subjects have for the experience in 
question, a procedure adopted by both formal and informal phenomenology under 
different labels (the former with talk of imaginative variations, horizonal unfolding, 
and life-world; the latter largely without an explicit vocabulary, in virtue of which 
fact I have suggested one).
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In addition, the third chapter in particular was utilized by me for the further 
adumbration of the precise nature of the problem area. Not only was the question 
raised of the kind of objectivity being perceived in the moral demand, but the 
overlapping of this with a sense of the not-self also led to discussion of the feel an 
agent has in her experience for the implication of the self. So the tenor of the 
discussion thus far has been that attention to the moral experience in question poses 
problems for descriptive analysis. Insofar as some philosophical expositions of the 
area are given in terms of moral values 'out there' and the engagement of self 'in 
here', doubt has been cast explicitly on the adequacy of such exposition. A 
phenomenologically-based attempt to get to the actual data is thus needed. This is 
what I now begin to treat in depth in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
We live in a world peopled not only with objects, given as real or 
merely imaginary, but also peopled with aesthetic demands that 
objects should in their presented form be or not be thus or thus, or 
with scientific demands that they should be rounded out into certain 
intelligible patterns of coherence and completeness, or with 
axiological demands that such objects should either exist or not 
exist...Wherever we turn we live in a...life-world...inveterately 
tugged or pushed in varying directions by aesthetic, scientific and 
axiological pulls and pressures.
J.N.Findlay.1
Introduction
In this chapter and the one following it I shall present the phenomenological 
data of moral demand experience in immediacy. I shall also represent the subject's 
reflective purchase on her experience. My presentation is weighted with a particular 
object in mind. It is that of seeing whether or not there actually is an experience that 
is as of objectively prescriptive values 'out there'. This chapter begins that task by 
building up a collage of demand experiences, comparing and contrasting them with 
the moral ones. The purpose behind doing that is essentially twofold:
- to give a preliminary placing of the moral demand in the 
experiential course of the demands we feel to be placed upon us, both in everyday 
life and from time to time in less ordinary circumstances;
- to see if certain phenomenological features often associated with 
the moral demand experience in moral philosophical literature are either borne out 
universally in that experience or are uniquely possessed by it.
I will compare the moral demand with other ones in respect of 
phenomenological elements such as strength of strike on consciousness, insistence,
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and peculiar tone. Through such a comparison, that twofold search above is met in 
this and the next chapter, and in a negative fashion with respect to the second 
element. As for this chapter itself, I find that a more varied and complex spectrum 
of moral demand experience is presented by phenomenological description than is 
given attention in the literature. Working within the tradition of moral philosophy, 
then, I throw doubt on certain images of the moral demand (as being a particularly 
heightened form of phenomenon in consciousness; as possessing a special quality 
like 'magnetism' qua the good; as having for us a specially powerful kind of pull 
that outweighs other demands or interests). This affects both a ground-clearing 
process, by which the experience itself is made more lucid, as well as making way, 
in the latter half of the chapter and in the one that follows it, for the specific 
question of the experience's nature as a value disclosure in the sense of Mackie's 
understanding of it. This chapter begins to question and attack that 
phenomenological supposition which Mackie has made. And more interestingly, I 
go on to identify the same phenomenology - what I am taking to be a partial and 
inaccurate matter - held by other philosophers who hold metaethical moral theories 
utterly different from his and those of his near followers. The call I make 
throughout is for greater notice to be given to the wide panoply of moral demand 
experience which we are given in the varied passages of our lives. So the chapter 
has a positive, declarative counterpoint to the scepticism which I throw on the 
phenomenologies of others. I undertake a phenomenological exegesis which begins 
the task of building up a presentation of the moral demand consonant with the 
appearances it has in experience. That this clashes with some generally current 
images of the experience I take to be the result of returning to the data of the 
appearances themselves.
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Section One: Ten sample demand experiences
I shall begin this chapter by looking at the moral demand in the context of 
other demands in direct experience. In order to do so, I should make plain an 
assumed postulate of my research which I first mentioned in chapter 1 (section 2, 
preliminary note) - that is, straightforwardly, that we are aware of some such 
experience identified as being of moral demands. As to the methodological 
injunction of presuppositionlessness (ch.2, sec.i), no initial categorization of this 
kind of experience in terms of forcefulness; qualitative tone; representation of a 
particular object; or 'venting' of an inner tension, is assumed by me. There is such 
an experience to investigate, and investigation relies on one being able to hold 
steady the experience before the mind's eye for that purpose. Following the 
proposed methods of research set out in chapters 2 and 3, the way in which I will 
bring forward the experience for analysis will be by contrast and similarity with 
other experienced demands, and also by exploiting one's grasp of the experience 
with which one is acquainted in immediacy as it is viewed in different lights 
(thereby enacting points ii, iii, iv, and v of the Husserlian process pinpointed in 
chapter 2, section 2).2
I shall take the following as examples of demand experience by which to 
conduct analysis:
i) A man experiences a demand on him to jump when he stands on a cliff-
edge;
ii) The little baby demands affection;
iii) The last clue in the crossword demands one to fill it in;
iv) Her poor dress sense demands correction;
v) Third world famine demands one to do something;
vi) A person who slips over on the icy path demands one's immediate help;
vii) His presence demands her attention;
viii) He feels that loss of face demands redress;
ix) The beautiful forest demands respect;
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x) Her kindness demands a like response.
I am referring here specifically to the experienced demand, with the 
exception of example vi) which is there for good purpose. Examples v,vi, and x 
are, I believe, the ones which we would prima facie identify as the moral ones. The 
possibility of there being some special quality to the experience such that any of the 
others could be experienced as moral by its addition will be canvassed later (section 
5). Part of the purpose behind choosing some of these examples is to remain within 
the everyday and humdrum affairs and concerns of life, such as ii, iii, and iv, in 
particular, reflect.
By the term 'strength' of a demand, I mean the forcefulness with which it 
impinges on consciousness. This is a differentiating measure between and within 
classes of experience that gives one some idea of how the impact of a particular 
demand or demand-type figures in the experiential economy of a subject. It has the 
methodological virtue of being neutral with regard to the origin of a demand, 
registering simply the feel it has for a subject as pressing or engaging, transient or 
anchoring itself. This phenomenological element of experience is instanced, say, by 
the lack of forcefulness with which the penumbra of one's visual field strike 
consciousness; the engrossing, captivating, powerful impact of a police siren close 
by; and the middle-range encounters of one's everyday sense experience on 
performing a routine chore like gardening.
I shall also use the discussion of this 'strength' of the demand in the 
subject's experience to bring attention round to that of the duration and passage of 
the experience as it strikes consciousness and then fades from it or ebbs and flows 
within it. Hence I shall give the reader description of how forceful a manner in 
which I take certain demand experiences to strike consciousness, both under usual 
and less than usual circumstances of encounter, and then follow that with thought 
on the intensity, duration and further route taken by the demand. This itself will
Chapter Four 87
lead up to greater discussion in chapter 5 of the qualities with which the experience 
is given in consciousness.
There are two tasks which this comparative analysis must undertake. One is 
to assay the kind of strength that one is likely to find exhibited in the impact of 
typical demands; the other is that which they may exert under less usual conditions 
of encounter. This latter task need not involve assumptions as to the 'proper' 
occasioning of a particular demand experience or any notion as to the propriety of 
its felt force. It exploits a descriptive vista on the direct experience of demands 
provided by the empirically ordinary or usual instances of them according to the 
course of subjects' lives. That democratic presentation of experience I take to be 
authoritative for research at the present stage in order that the appearances might be 
given their due sway.
As I approach each of the ten examples in turn, then, my attention will be 
given also to the non-ordinary cases. Imaginative variations of them will be pursued 
in later sections, and more extended reflection on such possibilities I will leave to 
the chapters that specifically deal with such reflection. I do not wish to dwell 
unduly on the non-moral examples, but some exegesis of their feel is required in 
order that an attempt be made to seek the comparative placing of the moral ones. 
That the following portrayal is quite lengthy, then, is made legitimate, I believe, by 
my constant reference back to them in the work that ensues.
i) To the first example. Many of us who have stood on a cliff edge or leant 
over the parapet of a high building will be aware of the slight tremor in 
consciousness, as it were, of a demand (sometimes labelled 'temptation') to fling 
oneself off. Usually this passes quickly and may not be easily distinguishable from 
the tingling sensation in one's heart and the soles of one's feet associated with 
vertigo. But in the less usual case the demand can 'swamp' one's whole being and 
necessitate a strong countervailing act of will to pull oneself back. Such an 
encounter can remain with one, being present in the mind (consciously or not) like a 
barbed arrow, to return to haunt one on appropriate occasioning instances. This
Chapter Four 88
kind of phenomenological quality of some demands I will call the 'assailant' 
feature: for one is put upon by them, seemingly helpless as they arise.3
ii) This example may seem ambiguous between the baby's calling out for 
affection; going in for affection-seeking behaviour, more or less intentionally; and 
the fact that one experiences an emotional tug towards it. It is with the latter instance 
that I am concerned. In this example, then, one's response is immediately engaged 
in the midst of the baby in the cot or pram or in one's arms. A warm glow girts 
round the demand one experiences and the response (be it by soothing verbal 
articulation or touch) is elicited spontaneously. This, then, illustrates a case in 
which perception and action go together as a unified manner by which one 
encounters the particular situation. On the other hand, difficulties occur in trying to 
describe the demand as experienced but with no response ensuing, even at the level 
of a smile to oneself or a raising of the heart. Somehow the response which is 
lacking is replaced under unusual circumstances, perhaps of attentiveness to some 
other concern, with a registering of the demand nevertheless taking place. This can 
be so in times of great stress and hurry, for instance, when one might pass the child 
by and vaguely sense the demand yet with a correspondent response being 
blanketted out by the exigencies of the moment. In the first instance described, of 
the usual run of the experience, the strength of the demand is not particularly great, 
occurring as a quite light and ordinary affair, and not grabbing one's attention 
forcefully. And clearly in the latter kind of case the demand is being perceived at a 
peripheral remove of consciousness. The force of such a demand may be felt more 
keenly by the child's parents or its day-to-day carers, but this is more likely a 
routine matter, to be heightened as the depths and strengths possessed, say, by 
maternal love enmesh with it.
One should not omit mention here, of course, of another feature of that 
demand and our response to it with which we are also (though possibly less so) 
familiar. And that is one of irritation and anger; of the demand being an annoying 
and unwelcome thing. I think that this response is likeliest when one is occupied
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with pressing matters or wearied by the constant attention needed by a young child, 
and is not an especially common phenomenon as a direct and unbounded response 
to the child (misanthropes excepted).
iii) This is a common enough form of demand experience, akin to those one 
experiences with respect to many unfinished projects of a smallscale sort like 
jigsaws, the arrangements for laying a table, or tidying a room. Again, the force of 
such a demand is not often great, being by the way of a momentary heightening of 
attention to the matter at hand. One simply notices the state of affairs and passes it 
by. But it does possess on occasion a compellingness that seems to capture one's 
energies, as when one is halted by the missing final element and finds oneself 
devoted to its solution, correction, or completion. This confrontation with a demand 
of the kind being described can also have a nagging, persistent call on one's 
attention which returns one again and again under all sorts of conditions to that 
problem. We all experience this phenomenon sometimes, and some people, utterly 
drawn by the demand to find the last item for a collection, will spend their lives in 
thrall to it.4 For the main, however, the pressure on consciousness exerted by this 
demand is momentary and weak.
iv) There are similarities between this example and the previous one. A 
dress sense that strikes one as awry, inappropriate for the occasion, too plain, or 
too sloppy may demand one's response, be it by way of intervention (telling her 
she should do something) or merely the wrinkling of one's nose. This does not 
normally impinge on consciousness with great force, but sometimes it may be 
signalled in that way. The cumulative build-up of a person's apparently willful 
refusal to listen to advice, and her apparent insensitivity to the way she strikes 
others, may lead increasingly to the sense of an overwhelming demand for 
confrontation and action to be taken. This sense of the demand gnawing away at 
one is of that 'assailant' type introduced above, that is to say, its force seems to 
exert itself upon one despite oneself (against one's 'better instincts', as it is 
sometimes said). But, like the example above, this kind of demand is most often of
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a fleeting and unpressing type, registering itself in the run of experience without 
stopping one's attention by the direct force of its impact.5
v) The experience of this demand cannot be adequately represented unless 
due account is taken of propinquity. For the difference in demand force between the 
presence of the starving on one's doorstep and their presence via the transmitted 
media in one's sitting room is marked. Indeed, at a purely phenomenological level 
of the strength of demand the latter may be felt (notoriously) to be no greater than 
that on one to buy a particular product advertised through the same medium. This I 
think is an empirically confirmable fact about direct moral experience, whatever its 
conditioning factors might be. The demand flits into one's consciousness, but at a 
low level of intensity, passing in and out of attention without galvanizing one's 
responses by the sheer force with which it lodges itself in consciousness. And it is 
this which I believe is one common experience of the demand when it is presented 
in such a way (the other being addressed just below). That is to say, the remove of 
the moral situation from one's geographical vicinity and from the lives of those 
nearest to one does seem to have a congruent remove in force from the vicinity of 
one's demand experience.6
The immediate doorstep confrontation, however, is attended with the 
charged, piercing experience of a demand. One's attention is captured, focussed, 
and dragged from one by the power of the demand(s) which leaps forth into 
consciousness on confronting the spectacle of the starving. It seems to saturate 
consciousness. The strength of this demand is too great to be ignored or allayed, it 
possesses a tendency to reassert over time this initial force in all its vivid and 
luminous character (though this can fade with temporal distance, diminishing like 
the dull thud of a slight toothache to a mere remembered and dim glow).
Now, reversing the two scenes above, one is presented with the following 
possibilities: in the first instance of a greater degree of demand strength on 
encountering media presentation of the famine than has been described; and in the 
second of a far less heightened demand force when immediately coming across a
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starving person or group. Concerning the first, this is frequent enough an 
experience to be tabled alongside the one already described above, though not as 
entirely frequent, I am arguing, as that one - should attention honestly be given to 
one's reactions in front of the television screen at such times. To be sure, the 
experience of the demand under such circumstances is sometimes quite great as the 
visual image hits home. The point I wish to emphasize is the more likely occurrence 
of a dim and blunt demand-registering. This is not an event which is encountered 
too often in the doorstep case, though there are some who experience it that way, or 
perhaps even not at all. It is an empirically rarer thing for the demand to be as 
emasculated in these instances as it is in the former. And in both cases the effect of 
a demand's 'taking root', so to speak, in consciousness, particularly as repeated 
encounter is undergone, can be of the demand gathering strength until it does 
indeed begin to have a nagging force on the subject, leading even to a stopping of 
her in her tracks, faced suddenly with the immensity of the demand. (Though it 
should be noted that this may not be a demand on her, but a demand that something 
be done which she feels). But the main run of this demand experience reads thus: 
an absence of forcefulness to the demand, though not infrequently heightened, as 
the object stands away from the immediate placing of the subject; a highly charged 
demand, pregnant with force, as one is put face-to-face with the moral situation, a 
charge lessened only infrequently.
vi) One very interesting facet to the experience of the demand in this 
example is that sometimes a moral response ensues so spontaneously that it is 
uncertain if a demand is registered at all at the level of consciousness. One just gets 
on with helping the person on seeing her need.7 This is not, of course, to say that, 
if asked later why one performed the act one would not be prepared to couch 
description of one's state of mind in terms of the demand put upon one by her need. 
But below this degree of developed thought, no such experience may be present to 
mind in the 'thick' of the event. It is to this feature of some practice in immediacy 
that I shall give the title 'moral spontaneity'. I include this example, then, because it
Chapter Four 92
forms an important part of later discussion on the part a subject's reflection plays, 
and what interpretation one is to put upon it, in deciding that there may have been a 
demand which she failed to apprehend or one which she did experience but in an 
unnoticed way.
A lot of moral experience goes on in such a fashion that it is only identified 
as such by the reflection of the subject. Much of those immediate actions of a 
caring, helping sort, and also those of sudden violent responses to situations,8 are 
of this nature. They form part of the bedrock of moral practice that goes on without 
apparent conscious thought as to what one is called upon to do or how one should 
appropriately respond. (Their nature as specifically moral being discerned by the 
subject in the cool hour). Rather than a phenomenology of experiencing a moral 
demand force, one finds instead something else of a more crude form, a visceral 
impulsion to action, a drawing of the subject to the act. This is a theme I will 
develop in subsequent sections of this chapter and the next. For the present 
example, and the feature of demandingness it throws forth to the subject, this 
apparent suddenness of response is a major element.
As to the matter of further reflection deciding that the subject was indeed in 
the presence of a demand that was unnoticed or unapprehended altogether, there are 
two distinctions which I think should be observed. One is between her mode of 
expression of this fact. She may, I believe, distinguish between 'Her plight 
demanded...' and 'I experienced a demand to...': which are not equivalent. The 
latter says something about the subject, while the former says something about the 
situation which she happened to come across. The same thing goes for a further 
distinction which she might make in the light of this one: between identifying a 
demand to which she responded and a moral demand which she apprehended or 
which limned about the situation. The subject may indeed feel that a demand 
accrued to the situation, or that she herself experienced something which only now 
does she acknowledge as a demand, even a demand on her, but she may not 
thereby call the demand a 'moral' one. She may simply feel that the demand was the
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kind of one to which one responds by 'just getting on with things' and not grant it 
so developed a description as being a 'moral' one.
The extent to which a demand is identifiably felt in this kind of example and 
similar groups, then, is not great. That something like one does impinge may be 
given ground by the experience of the subject thereafter - if, for instance, she failed 
by misfortune to act. Here it is likely a demand will assert itself in consciousness by 
its own force, and not just as the agent herself dwells in thought upon the affair, 
thereby indicating its dormant presence in that thick of the moment: as it were, by a 
process of backward extrapolation. Should the subject have failed to act 
intentionally this also may have been due to the presence of counterbalancing 
demands pushing her in other directions, the moral demand being in abeyance or 
merely very weak; or the spontaneous, propulsive tendency toward moral action 
simply having been lacking on her part; or the vector of forces having been resolved 
in the light of the moral and other demands by quick deliberation. It is in these cases 
where the moral demand is felt, sometimes keenly and overpoweringly, at others as 
a forceful pressure on consciousness that yet can be struck down as this inner 
tension is resolved in favour of a particular course of action. (And, of course, the 
demand can re-emerge subsequently to plague consciousness or stand sticking out 
slightly on its edges). What is to be focussed on in this respect is the ordinariness 
and immediacy of the connexion between demand and response in much of what 
goes by the way of our experience of obligation and acting in accordance with that. 
It is only in cases of clashing demands on one, or of personal counterbalancing 
forces on action arrayed against the moral one, that the moral demand is actually 
given fuller attention in immediacy. This is a similar point about moral experience to 
that made by Bergson. He highlights the naturalness and passive manner in which 
duty is followed, saying that it is only when a particular resistance is set up in 
special cases between obligations that, in his apt phrase, an 'acute consciousness of 
hesitation' occurs.9
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vii) Of all the demands listed here this one consistently bears the most 
intense and charged quantum of force. The sharp impingement of the horror and 
shamefulness which loss of face carries with itself is matched in this case by the 
felt strength of a demand to do something in extirpation of it. That demand, 
however it may well within one in respect of origin, often possesses great strength, 
confronting one both in immediacy and even more strongly over time as its force 
generates, spreads, and filters through one's conscious and subconscious self. It 
'weighs heavily' upon a person, engaging her energies like an occupying presence. 
And often indeed such a pressure can be exhausted by a single act or encounter in 
which redress is made and an imbalance righted; or it may remain hooked into one, 
despite attempts to deal with it, lodged like an inner shadow cast over one's 
attention.
Notwithstanding the comments above on the commonly powerful degree of 
demand force, the keennesss of the demand can also vary, not always 
proportionately to the degree of shame involved,10 from pinpricks of light strength 
and short duration in an oppressive grind of daily humiliation, which may have 
cumulative effect, through to the full-scale clattering into consciousness of that 
powerful demand already described. (As to the question of this demand being a 
moral one, or closely associated with that - as it appears to be identified in some 
cultures - that will be addressed later). The point about this example is that it is one 
of what is routinely a very strong experience of a demand. Loss of face rarely goes 
unattended by it.
viii) I would not say of this demand that it has quite the power of the 
previous one. But it is undoubtedly one with whose felt strength we are all 
acquainted. The magnetism of the other's presence draws one's gaze. One is forced 
by the demand to follow him/her with one's eyes and thoughts. The everyday 
frequency with which one meets this demand does nothing to diminish it, and yet 
also it is not one which continually harbours itself in consciousness, striking one in 
vivid manner (like multiple flashes on a photographic plate), but soon fading away.
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It is a demand, that is, with which one is frequently presented, a force often exerted 
on one, but one which does not ordinarily exert a power akin to that buffetting 
effect which the cliff-jumping and loss of face ones seem usually to have.11
On some occasions, of course, we are also all acquainted with the tenacity 
of the demand’s force on oneself, directing one again and again to the thought of 
the other person and sometimes leading on one's behaviour in more and less 
consonant ways. The demand's force seems to consume and overpower one's 
faculties. One is 'in thrall' to a power reigning over oneself. Even when this force 
is not in possession of one to this extent, there is also the phenomenon of the 
demand's waning yet sharp presence as time passes and the object of desire ceases 
to be the occasioning factor of such a forceful hold. This strong demand, routinely 
encountered, gives one pause but not always a complete halt.
ix) In the beholding of a scene of great beauty in nature the kind of demand 
in this example will often fill one's consciousness, permeating it to the exclusion of 
other thoughts and feelings. It has a 'swamping' effect, though not in that 
threatening fashion with which demands i. and vii. in their intensity signal 
themselves. (I refer the reader to my point in footnote 3 on this matter). The 
demand one experiences is not piercing, bearing down forcefully on one, but by the 
way of a gently-toned one which engrosses the self with it, what I think is best 
described as a 'restrained force'. Even in those instances where the demand seems 
to fly forcefully into consciousness - as one reaches the summit and is 'taken aback' 
on facing the glorious scenery below, say - the demand is not arrayed with the kind 
of power with which those other two mentioned possess. Rather, the demand 
floods into consciousness, taking oneself with it.12 The force of this demand will 
probably diminish over repeated encounters with the forest, but unlike those which 
lose or loose their grip on consciousness and edge from it, this one can maintain a 
certain repeated quantum of demandingness as the object is met again and again and 
from different perspctives13 and the demand comes to centre itself in 
consciousness. As a representative comment on the kind of phenomenon to which
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this example is referring, and one that perhaps points beyond the experience to a 
value in the environment that issues forth the demand, here is one from Charles 
Taylor:
I think...that there is a demand on us to respect the integrity of the 
wilderness areas, for example, which goes beyond the call of long­
term prudence (which is urgent enough to be sure).14
x) The experience of the demand to respond, like with like, to another’s 
action, of kindness in this case, is a familiar enough one. I will concern myself in a 
later section with the nature of this as a specifically moral demand. The force of the 
demand is not particularly great, being in the normal run of affairs a matter of an 
almost unregistered ripple on consciousness, an awareness of a slight pressure on 
one in respect of behaviour. That is, the demand - for some congruency of action in 
the light of that which has been directed to oneself - enters consciousness not 
keenly and onrushing but softly and domestically. Otherwise, in the less usual run 
of things, the demand can take on more pregnant force as one's failure to respond is 
mulled over in the mind and the weight of this takes form in the strike of the 
demand on one. As with example vii., such a demand-pressure on one may be 
vented by a single act directed toward the other or her stand-ins (family, friends, 
nation even), or it may take on a kind of hauntingness that does not permit of so 
simple a dealing, occupying a position on the unnoticed boundaries of 
consciousness and standing forth more centrally as occasioning factors fuel its pull 
on one. But to re-assert the initial point: this demand presents itself in weak manner 
to consciousness ordinarily, a tension ensuing through it only as action consonant 
with it does not take place.
Section Two: Comparative demand strength
These ten vignettes of the experience of demand experiences on one give 
some initial illustrative material on the ways in which the forces such demands exert 
variously compare and contrast. Generally speaking, one is presented with four
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broad categories of demand force. They are these. Firstly, demands with intense 
strength that bludgeon consciousness into attending to them (meaning by 
’attending’ simply the directing of attention to them and not necessarily acting in the 
light of them). Examples i,v (partly), and viii evince this feature quite notably. And 
as a sub-classification of this category I am including a demand like that sketched in 
ix where one is also being presented with a powerful demand which does not seem 
to possess the feature of entering one like a hammer blow, but which nevertheless 
in its felt strength comes flooding into consciousness to fill it and possess it. 
Secondly, are a group of demands that may come to re-assert themselves with 
greater power than their initial tarrying with consciousness represented. These are 
ones such as standardly occur in cases vi and x, and less usually so - but with an 
especial poignancy - in vii. Examples iii and iv may also occasionally give rise to 
the growth of particularly strong intruder-like demands on one. Next, analysis 
presents simply demands with low to medium quanta of experienced force, ones 
that impinge on consciousness lightly, unpressingly, and/or fleetingly. Such are the 
main display of experiences described in examples iii, iv, partly v, and partly vii. 
And fourthly, a class of demands that seem not so much registered with lightness in 
consciousness, but which pass below that threshold altogether. This is the most 
usual form given by examples ii and vi. Their entitlement to inclusion as specifically 
demand experience rests, then, on their being unnoticed ones, discerned as an inner 
tension is set up in problem cases or over time as the subject fails to respond to 
them.
Section Three: The moral demand in this classification
It will be seen readily that the moral demand variously occupies space 
across the spectrum of general demand experience. The moral demand to act or 
forebear ranges from the sharpness and power of the first type mentioned above - a 
great pressure to do something in the example with the starving or, what was not 
put forward, the alarm-bell intensity of the demand not to steal, say; the brooding,
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building, erupting force of the second type as an initially low or medium power 
demand takes one with its accumulated force (for instance, the possible route taken 
by the demand portrayed in x); to the pressure of the next type, the demand to help 
or the demand to stop oneself being only briefly arresting or not strong enough to 
rise above a certain minimal level of ’being noticed'; and through to the fourth 
category of presence, one which paradoxically seems to be represented by the 
demand’s absence, as in the case of some unreflective, spontaneous acts such as the 
helping of the fallen person or the non-involvement in an easy opportunity to pilfer 
from the till, the moral demand being unrecognized at the time, but acknowledged 
on later reflection or as a problem occurs which halts the subject and puts her in a 
more thoughtful position. So one form of the consciousness of demands which a 
subject has is that which takes place only subsequent to the actual situation in which 
the demand is later felt to have been ingredient.
I wish also to state that the experience of what might be thought to be quite 
powerful demands of a moral nature does not usually give them as so. The general 
example of forebearance illustrates well how variable in nature is the force of the 
moral demand upon one. For in everyday living one is not struck by demands not 
to steal, not to lie, not to murder, & c. - these simply are absent from 
consciousness, or exist in unnoticed form at any rate. Only when the opportunity or 
temptation to perform one of these acts arises (and this itself might be characterized 
as a felt demand upon one) does a corresponding and counterfacing demand to 
refrain arise. Such demands, when they do arise, can be like mere blips on 
consciousness, fended off without difficulty, or they can quite often rein one in, 
assailed by the degree and intensity of force with which they stay one's hand.
I think that two important points can be made in the light of this:
1. Variety of demand force The felt force of the moral demand is
not a straightforward matter, but requires attention to the subtle range of shades 
with which it impinges on consciousness. This is a salient characteristic of 
experience of moral demands and one which suggests that much of the moral
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philosophical tradition through which the experience is apprehended has been one­
sided. For that tradition has tended to concern its description with the more 
powerful elements of the experience. And that has been, broadly characterized, with 
the heavy impulsion on consciousness of the demand to act (that one addressed in 
part of my example of the starving) or what I like to call the 'alarm bell' force of the 
proscriptive demand. But analysis of that force makes such a picture look 
monochrome in its starkness.15 If moral demand experience were indeed of that 
sort, the subject herself would spend her entire moral life being buffetted to and fro 
by the alternate attracting and repelling forces exerted by the demands. Since that is 
not how our moral experience is always going on, and since the moral states of 
affairs in which subjects find themselves cannot be so exclusively described, I am 
taking these in combination to present good reason for less polarized representation 
of the nuances of actual moral demand experience.
This is not to deny the striking importance in the moral life of those 
demands of a particularly heightened force. Nor to disregard the fact that further 
analysis is called for in respect of possible peculiar differences of tone between 
these various demands that are experienced with an intense degree of strength. It is 
to accentuate gradation. It is especially to emphasize the routineness and unforceful 
nature of great tracts of moral demand experience. Far from one being struck by the 
weight of moral demands impelling one towards or away from certain situations, 
the more usual course of moral experience subsists somewhere in the region 
demarcated by the beholding of the famine-via-the-media example and the kind of 
sub-experience sketched by examples vi and x. Moral experience is to be found 
often in climes less strong than those occupied by the kind of demand that enters 
consciousness with a force like that of the sharp stab of the pain of a headache. 
Much of it goes on without that 'acute consciousness' of its presence which 
Bergson notes. And one pointer to phenomenological development of this point is 
the possibility of this kind of experience representing deep and important matters 
for the subject while yet not signalling itself with great demandingness to
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consciousness. That is to say, the horizon of the experience can be explored, and 
the imaginative variation canvassed in which importance or centrality to self and 
intensity of strike on one come apart. (Such an analysis takes place partly in the 
next chapter, and then in the later ones).
2. Similarity of demand force The strength of moral demands in 
experience has counterparts in the weighted comparison with other forms of 
demand experience.16 No special demand strength seems to capture the moral one 
apart from the others. This point, then, is partly repeating the stuff of the previous 
one - that the moral demand should not be looked at only as it bears a heavy imprint 
in its immediacy - as well as placing the complexity of the experience within the 
context of a finer-grained run of general demand experience. And so we have the 
following sharedness of strength:
- of overwhelming, powerful demand confrontation (cf. the doorstep 
construal of v with example i);
- low to medium strike followed by a gathering of strength in consciousness 
by the demand (cf. the second halves of examples vi and x with the second halves 
of examples ii, iv and viii);
- a low-weighted skitting in and out of consciousness by the demand (cf. 
the first halves of examples v and x with the first halves of iii, iv and viii);
- a barely registered demand, or one that is unnoticed in the rapidity of 
response, that nevertheless seems to be present to consciousness in some way (cf. 
examples vi and almost x with example ii).
One thing this clearly suggests is this. As a criterion of simply being a moral 
demand, strength of experienced demand alone will not perform the task. In terms 
of strength, the moral demand varies too much from a single weighted 
characterization and possesses too much similarity to a host of other experienced 
demands for force to be an adequate signalling to consciousness of the impingement 
of a moral demand. And this is what a slightly more reflective hold on the nature of 
the experience would lead one to expect. The force of the demand to leap from the
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cliff in example i would have to be accounted sufficient to make of it a moral 
demand if felt strength were to be construed criterially in this way. Cliff-leaping 
demands do not usually enter consciousness in that way.17 More notably, this pair 
of points which I am asserting also shows that high strength of felt demand is not a 
necessary condition of a moral demand being experienced, given that much moral 
demand experience is located outwith just this range of force - though it may 
represent a necessary condition of moral education, of ensuring that this kind of 
experience is especially efficacious with respect to behaviour, and so forth, that the 
experience be engendered in such heightened fashion.
Concluding note to the previous sections
This excursis into the general realm of demand experience has thrown doubt 
onto the notion of felt strength of the moral demand as being a unique or even 
specially prominent feature of it. It has also emphasized both the similarity of 
demand force of the moral one in inter-demand comparisons as well as the breadth 
of experiential strength within an intra-demand survey of moral ones, reiterating 
particularly the lack of felt strength in much of what commonly passes for the 
experience of moral demands. The purpose of going through this analysis is 
twofold.18 It has been, firstly, to begin to get a representative picture of how the 
moral demand stands out in the consciousness of subjects. Felt strength seems a 
good initial candidate for leading one into a phenomenological description of the 
appearances. Using a comparative overview of demand strength between moral and 
other ones aids research in the attempt to discover essential elements to the former 
which make it stand out in consciousness (towards which rather sceptical attentions 
have been directed so far).
Secondly, this form of analysis takes one to further questions concerning 
the experiences. It sets the scene for applying phenomenological research to other 
aspects of the demand. In this respect, two elements of these demand experiences 
stand out as drawing one's notice. One is the possible differentiation between the
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demands by some qualitative tone differences possessed by them which serve to 
delineate the nature of the demand as being of such and such a type. An example 
from two comparable experiences which do not normally invoke demands on one 
concerns the similar strike on consciousness in terms of impact strength of, say, a 
bright colour and a pungent smell. Differentiating them in terms of tone, or felt 
quality, are, say, the brightness and redness of the colour and the pungency and 
'garlicness' of the smell. Similarly, one might search for specific differences in 
quality between the cliff-jumping demand and the demand to help the starving on 
one's doorstep, though they may both sometimes possess indistinguishable levels 
of power as they enter consciousness. The other element, which is intertwined with 
the considerations above, and which prompts analysis on viewing the nature of 
these demand experiences, is that of the degree of objectivity felt in the experience 
and how this feature might be experienced. This possible feature, combined with 
that element directly above of a special quality, can also be studied for necessity to 
the nature of the experience. I drew partial attention to some aspects of this feature 
in talking of certain demands as being experienced as 'assailant' or as flooding 
consciousness and distinguishing these features also from that of an experience 
arising without any seeming control on the part of the subject with respect to its 
constitution in consciousness. This will form the basis of my characterization in 
chapter 5 of the 'exteriority' of the demand as a crude signalling of objectivity. 
Such a phenomenon will also lead on to the question of the source of the demand; a 
value realm, of course, being the pertinent suggested basis for moral experience by 
some moral philosophers.
Now I turn to analysis of the first of these two elements.
Section Four: Felt tone of the moral demand
A: Kinds of qualitative difference Having mentioned above th e  
examples of redness and pungency as representing qualitative differences in the 
phenomena, I shall go on to compare moral and other demands with respect to tone
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or felt quality. The kind of differences being scanned for could fall into one of two 
types. Difference in tone could represent qualitatively separated items in experience 
with strict and impermeable divisions between the classes of items. Such I take 
redness and pungency to be. There is no point in experience at which one merges 
into the other, or at which discrimination between them becomes uncertain. They 
are items in experience which can be isolated from one another with distinctness. 
To mark this quality-category, I shall introduce the term 'strict separability', 
meaning by this the kind of sharp division between experienced tone to which 
attention has been drawn. Secondly, there is the possibility of finding experiential 
tone to be a matter of degree within a particular scale through which the experiences 
themselves share essential features. A ready example of this phenomenon is given 
by the shades of a single colour. Maroon and crimson, for example, stand closely 
on the same scale, participating in the category 'redness' whilst being held apart by 
slight qualitative differences. It may not be easy to discern differences on a colour 
scale. Mistakes will commonly be made in classification. But separability of 
phenomena both adjacent to one another and at further distaces on a scale is marked 
by the wealth of colour words that exist and which a certain trained attentiveness 
can marshall accordingly in cases of fine discrimination. More usually, one can 
readily identify as separate crimson from pink, say, while recognizing their shared 
membership of a class. This category, I am saying, is one of the 'separability of 
similars'. Here, then, unclarity of distinctness can occur and blending of one 
quality into the other give pause in addressing the tone differences being 
experienced. The way in which one quality tends towards and topples over into the 
other may also be a cause for uncertainty; or of a matter, conversely, of the evident 
addition or abstraction of a particular quality that makes for the difference that is 
marked.
B: Tone of the moral demand experience I shall inquire first of all into 
the presence of a special feel to the experience of moral demands that might always 
seem to go with it. My analysis will then go on in tandem to see if any such feel
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demarcates it strictly from other areas of experience or whether it amounts to a 
quality that more loosely separates it from those other ones. The moral experience 
would then be part of a more general area of experience, being similar enough to 
other demand experiences to group it with them. There is, of course, a concern 
lying just by the side of this analysis. It is with the possible rendering of the 
demand experience as uniquely toned by some quality that impinges on one from an 
objective value realm. My search for differentiating features to moral demand 
experience, then, will be going on in a fashion faced toward that concern.
Initial credence to the view of a particular felt quality to the experience is 
given by a number of writers. Here is a representative trio of assertions to this 
effect.
1. Feelings of moral approval and disapproval are unique in their felt 
tone. They cannot accurately be reduced to some other sorts of 
feelings.19
2. The valuational attitude of aesthetic prizing...carries with it a 
feeling quite easily distinguishable, by introspection, from the 
feeling component of, say, the attitude of moral commendation... 
[Tjhere is...a diffuse quality of feeling-tone common to both cases 
(and to all other instances of approval), which takes on a more 
determinate form in each of these two cases of approval (and in 
every other).20
3. [There is a] "light" in which a valued object comes before us, as 
precious, as worthy of admiration, etc., a light which is often more 
evident to the valuing person than any attitude he may have to an 
object, and which can persist and haunt him even when the relevant 
attitude is quite in abeyance 21
I have had cause to deny any specially weighted force to the moral demand in 
experience as clearly differentiating it from others. What I am proposing to do now 
is to check these reports above with the various demand experiences to see if they
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'read off correctly from the phenomenology when the object experience they deal 
with is transferred specifically to the moral demand. Firstly, I shall see if any 
'unique' tone can be described. I will suggest that candidate notions for this are all 
shared with various other demand experiences, and that no one tone - other than the 
experience's being felt to be a moral demand (a point on which I expand in section 
five below) - captures adequately the phenomenology of the moral demand 
experience (this being a counterpart to the claim that in terms of strength moral 
demands vary considerably, no one force rating being of salient descriptive 
accuracy). Then I will make the claim that moral experience does indeed enter 
consciousness as moral, but without strict demarcation from other areas of 
experience. I shall maintain that the experience occurs non-inferentially, but amend 
that assertion in the light of reflection on experience, stating that, while the 
experience as a moral demand often occurs with immediacy, this does not mean that 
criteria for its nature as moral are lacking. This analysis will have an overall shaping 
effect on the rough mould of the experience which is now being dealt with, and it 
will lead my study into throwing sceptical light on the notion of the demand 
experience as signalling values 'out there' to consciousness. The picture that will 
emerge of moral experience will be more flnely-textured than the tradition ordinarily 
describes, while also representing the moral demand as far less determinate than has 
been attested to by that tradition.
To the first question. Borrowing from one of the quotations just cited, 
wherein does a 'unique' felt tone reside? A prima facie plausible quality is given by 
the phenomenological feature which I will very generally describe as a 'repulsive' 
demand, one that marks out the morally bad. The converse to this is the 
attractiveness of the good, what Stevenson calls its 'magnetism'.22 This 
characterization captures well, with respect to repulsion, those features of shock, 
horror, forbiddingness, forbiddenness, and untouchability which go with that 
moral demand which forces itself into consciousness and proscribes one's 
behaviour. If there is a peculiar kind of 'lighting-up' of morally worthy object states
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of affairs (see the third quotation above), then no less so is there a flaring of the bad 
before one's gaze, so to speak. In the midst of such a phenomenon consciousness 
is repelled. It shrinks back. That extreme form of the bad which is called 'evil' has 
an especially disabling effect on one, pushing one away, compassing one's 
thoughts and actions. And as to the illuminating appeal of the good, the demand 
seems to draw one on, to clothe consciousness by an attracting force.23 There are 
fewer comparable terms here to describe the alighting of the good than there are for 
the bad.24 But this general feature of the good seems to involve a positive pull 
forward on one, a demand that enters consciousness with a lambent and beguiling 
charge.
Now these qualities capture fairly adequately a part of the range of the 
experience of moral demands. There are demands that seem to peal in 
consciousness in just those ways. The tenor of the demand to help has a particular 
horror appended to it on being confronted with the starving. That of the demand to 
refrain from some action like joining in with looting, say, pulls one back, repelling 
by shock, or by forbiddenness, or some mixture of these and other intense qualities 
of the demand in consciousness. And some moments of beholding the good 
demand one's assent and participation. Certainly the ideal of justice has had that tug 
on the energies of people. In both types of case a peculiarly heightened state of 
consciousness is wrought within one. The qualities being described seem to 
luminesce about the demand, producing an especially prominent tone to it. That this 
is but a segment of the run of moral demand experience, however, is plain on 
directing attention to the range it spans. For these demands indeed are prominent 
ones, with respect to a greater range below them.
The general run of the experence just is not like this. That is to say, these 
qualities are not evinced universally in moral demand experience as they have been 
described. That a demandingness is signalled need amount to no more than an 
irritation or shifting out of equilibrium of consciousness. This is an important point 
to make about the moral demand. Rather than a particular attraction or repulsion
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towards particular states of affairs, one finds in its stead a more inchoate pressure 
that something be done or that it cease with respect to a situation. For a demand in 
consciousness is not thereby a demand on one. Minimally, it demands 
acknowledgement of a troubling factor in consciousness, a breach signalled in the 
ordinary passage of events in the world which requires redress. But that is not the 
same thing as a demand that hooks one toward or away from a particular action. 
The next chapter will deal at some length with the notion of the moral demand as an 
irksome one, a pressure hemming about the subject. For the moment, I should like 
to focus still on the directedness of the moral demand: that is to say, on the question 
of whether phenomenological analysis of the demand experience shows it to be 
taking a particular object. This would amount, for instance, to the demand being 
directed to x to do y with respect to z- Demand example vi, in so far as it is 
registered, does just this: the apprehender of the demand is demanded to aid the 
fallen person. Or, taking a negative example, the demand is placed on John not to 
raid the till. But what of the first half of demand v? The demand seems to be simply 
that 'something be done': that one gives money to charity; go out to the starving as 
an aid worker; vote for the party which proposes to give most overseas aid; work to 
bring down the system that leads to maldistribution of resources; & c. Or merely 
that someone somewhere (a beneficent god even) get something done. And demand 
x ? One is demanded to behave correspondingly to the person or her proxies, but 
this leaves open a multitude of possibilities, with those ones in which one brings it 
about indirectly that some ordering of events comes to gift the original benefactor. 
Few moral demands do seem to possess the specific directedness of a call for a 
certain action by the demanded subject toward a particular situation. The contours 
of the experience are less firm than that and the map subsequently plotted from them 
of far greater complexity than that which emerges if the experience is squeezed into 
the mould of those particular determining properties labelled above.
It is clearly the case, then, that a distinction should be noted between a 
demand experienced as being on me; a demand that is experienced, but not as being
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on me; and one that is experienced in either of these two ways, but with no clearly 
specified object. In the latter instance one may have to do quite some searching to 
discover the source and object of the demand25 - and even if the genesis of it were 
to be identified within one's own breast, that is often not a matter at all apparent in 
the immediacy of the demand experience.
There is not a logical connection between the mode of 'magnetism' and 
repulsion and the carrying of a clearly delineated object in the demand. One can be 
pushed and pulled about without being aware of that in the state of affairs before 
one which is determining the quality or that from/towards which one is specifically 
refraining/acting. So the point being put here is not that lack of directedness or of 
propulsiveness to the demand experience need entail lack of such qualities. It is the 
outcome of phenomenological analysis, to the effect that, as putative universally 
instantiated elements to the moral demand in direct experience, neither of them gives 
one a sure hold on that experience. Concerning the feature of directedness, this 
begins to give one pause in regarding the notion of value-apprehension. For the 
experience is arising largely without the specific signalling to consciousness of 
those properties of oughtness, rightness, duty & c. which are the stock-in-trade of 
the tradition.26 In place of that one finds the demand referring often more 
amorphously to a feel of something amiss needing redress, or a disquieting 
confrontation before one (and conversely of a settled, warming state before one in 
the case of the good).27 This could mean that a value realm itself is amorphous, 
pressing on one but without giving specific direction to action. No decisive warrant 
against that construal is given by the facets of experience attended to thus far. But 
the consideration of propulsion taken together with the lack of directedness gives 
further pause. Mackie thinks that ordinary moral experience is as of inherently 
action-guiding moral values. But ordinary moral experience is not. It is not as of 
that because, when phenomenological focussing takes place, moral demand 
experience soon breaks down from those 'peaks' represented by the shrill 
experiences accorded due recognition at the beginning of this section. Description
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calls to notice a registering of unease with respect to certain states of affairs, or even 
the bare pinprick on consciousness of the demand in the first half of example v, 
which hardly amounts to a propelling force in any direction at all.
Two further rejoinders. Even to those moral demands that are particularly 
intensely associated with a repulsive or magnetic quality there are plenty of non- 
moral demands in direct experience marked in just the same way. Example i notably 
seems to involve both. The magnetic (even hypnotic) sensation of being dragged 
toward the precipice, the tempting veneer with which the jump-demand is covered, 
is phenomenologically no different as magnetism. Nor is the correspondent horror 
of the repulsive demand to stay oneself and draw back. A similar picture is given by 
the demand in examples vii and ix. The other demands one's attention, as does the 
forest, with a strong magnetic quality (famously so in the former case). If strength 
and repulsive tone of the demand experience were criteria for its being a moral one 
then the demand felt, say, not to wear green colours, hitting one like a shock and 
acting as repelling force on one's behaviour, would have to be accounted moral.28 
And subjects' experience of the moral demand does not generally signal that 
demand as so. Moreover, at least as far as magnetism is concerned, the relations 
between demands can become inverted: that is, as signalling the good to 
consciousness magnetism is not always so linked. Evil has an allure, a magnetic 
demandingness with which most of us will be familiar. In some complex fashion 
the phenomenology of forces acting on the subject seems to coalesce around the 
very attraction of that which is charged with a repellingness.29 (It is not that the 
latter quality is simply in abeyance - one should think here of the elated sensation of 
youth when first participating in some activity which one felt to be forbidden).30 
Evil does have an electric potency that can lead one on despite some apparent 
apprehension of a countermanding demand.31
The other sceptical note I wish to sound here concerns what I take to be a 
phenomenon related to the magnetism and repulsion of some moral demands. It 
seems largely concerned with a rareified version of the good (though the effect of
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contact with that may be said to give the impetus to a particularly intense response 
to evil). That phenomenon has been noted by various moral philosophers. Kant 
returns again and again to the special feeling of 'respect' for the moral law,32 one 
that in his works is rendered in some of the few lyrical passages he invokes. Butler 
regards conscience as a magisterial and awe-inspiring phenomenon.33 One recent 
philosopher talks of 'that tinge of "upward-looking" reverence which is one aspect 
inherent in every experience of value.' 34 And Durkheim goes so far as to talk of 
some moral experience in terms of the 'sacred' for a social group.35 These ways of 
reflecting moral experience do present one with that special-toned feeling that goes 
on occasion with the moral demand, transmitting to one as if from some especially 
elevated value-realm or level of self.36 Consciousness is fired by what appears to 
be the numinous character of the demand. The subject feels herself drawn into 
participation with a power that both overrides other demands and asserts itself with 
a kind of ultimate authoritativeness.
These sorts of experience are by no means uncommon. That particular 
intensifying and channelling of one's energy that goes with apprehension of this 
hyper-demand, as it were, will be one which most people encounter at some stage 
in their lives. It is most plainly associated with what we call supererogatory actions. 
To suggest, however, as Kolnai does in the quotation above, that the feature of 
'reverence' attends 'every experience of value' (which subsumes the moral demand 
under its ambit) is to read back into the general current of the experience what only 
takes place at its very peaks. The ordinary acquiesence in and acting in accordance 
with the moral demands one meets in everyday circumstances goes on against a 
backdrop almost entirely devoid of such alleged features. Most of the relevant 
experience and behaviour take place in a milieu in which people do things because 
they are the done things - and not because of the innervating charge wrought by 
apprehension of a particular striking-hued aura to the moral demands they meet. 
Many such moral demands are acknowledged with sparse attentiveness and small 
effect on consciousness. They come and go. Rarely is there a great 'leap' in the
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subject in response to that force described by the authors cited. I think Bergson is 
pointing to a roughly similar split in the phenomena when he distinguishes between 
the 'natural obligation' of that which is socially inculcated and stands to ensure the 
day-to-day maintenance of a society, which he thinks acts as 'a pressure or 
propulsive force' on most individuals, and that 'complete and perfect morality' of 
humankind (often initiated and empowered by the lives of individual exemplars) 
which 'has the effect of an appeal' on one.37
If there are indeed moral demands that do generally have the kind of feature 
being challenged here, they constitute a small group. I would suggest that such a 
group amounts to a core largely made up of prohibitions. Murder looks to be a 
likely candidate: the particular horror-struck revulsion and repulsion which is 
experienced toward it seems to give the prohibition in it the character of the 
'sacred'. Such things as incest and sexual relations with children look to be 
carrying a similar charge. But note that this mitigated finding of the quality has 
already upturned its presumed object. Far from reverence and awe for some 
paradigm image of the good, one is faced with that tone to a specially enlivened 
feeling directed toward the prohibition on evil. And as to this reverence or respect 
for the good, it is hard to make out quite what its object is thought to be. Kant takes 
it to be engendered in the striking down of 'self-conceit' by the moral law and the 
apprehension of the possibility of acting in accordance with it.38 Butler thinks that 
the peculiar sublimity of conscience is a matter of the natural ordering of the person 
and her faculties.39 Neither of these give an adequate phenomenology of the actual 
encountering by the subject of moral demands. The experience with which they are 
concerned is a rather strictly delineated one. Its overlapping into religious 
experience does not aid in maintaining it as a sign of the moral demand (unless, of 
course, one takes 'god' and 'the good' to be coreferring definite descriptions). 
There are a number of objects in religious belief and practice which demand awe, 
wonder, reverence &c. from the initiated40 without thereby being of the nature of 
moral demands. These are phenomena which in contemporary times one will find
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especially closely associated with experience of the natural environment and 
attitudes toward its preservation.
My general emphasis thus far has been, then, to question certain traditions 
in moral philosophy with regard to phenomenological description of the moral 
demand in immediate experience. My main worry has alighted on two ways in 
which such description has been too narrowly circumscribed. One concerns undue 
attention on certain particularly striking features of the experience (strength; 
magnetism/repulsion; reverence) which, while granted their place, should not be 
interpolated throughout as if they were constant and partially defining features of 
the experience.41 The other, congruent with the first, has been to state and reiterate 
the variety and richness of moral demand experience, both as a category itself and 
as one compared with other forms of demand experience. This brought about 
emphasis on the 'ordinariness' of moral demand experience, on the lack of a 
consistently notable quality to it present throughout its variations in sheer 
forcefulness. In the light of this, I will attempt in the next section to discover what 
there is to the moral demand in direct experience that does mark it out from other 
demands with similar degrees of force and similar intensities of qualitative tone (a 
marking-out that, after all, allows examples to be employed in the first place by 
which to exploit the subject matter). That section will complete the chapter and lead 
the direction of my thought to the nature of an objectivity feature attending the moral 
demand.
Section Five: Demands as moral demands
In this section I will maintain that: the moral demand enters consciousness 
as moral in non-inferential fashion; that subjects standardly have awareness of 
certain demands as moral, though there are borderline cases with other types of 
demand in experience; that in the light of both of the previous points there are some 
criteria for a demand's being identified as moral, hence allowing for the admission 
of having been in error at the immediate level, even if the experience in immediacy
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is not consciously sifted in virtue of them; and that these facts look to give some 
warrant to the notion of a value-realm 'out there', particularly as evinced in classical 
intuitionism, though such a warrant can and should be resisted.
- i) That a demand is a moral demand in immediate experience is not 
something inferred from its particular force on one, its importance or seriousness to 
one, or the peculiar heightened tone it might possess. The identification comes in 
with the experience; or rather, as the experience. This signalling, then, is going on 
in what I shall call, for want of a more apt label, an 'intuitive' manner. This term 
need not entail anything whatsoever about the origin or genesis of the demand or 
about a special receptive faculty: only about the way in which it appears before 
consciousness.42 And that is in a way which does not involve the subject 'reading 
off from certain experiential features the presence of the moral demand.
Two analogies, from religious and aesthetic experience, will aid in 
clarifying the description I wish to invoke. In the first, one finds in the immediacy 
of experience religious description to be given rather than certain features of the 
experience forming the basis for some tentative theistic hypothesis. Martin Buber 
speaks of Israel beholding the parting of the Red Sea in the following manner:
What is decisive with respect to the inner history of Mankind...is 
that the children of Israel understood this as an act of their God, as a 
"miracle''; which does not mean that they interpreted it as a miracle, 
but that they experienced it as such, that as such they perceived 
it...43
So here there is no move from the awesomeness, the sheer impossibility of the 
event, the decisive defeat of an historical oppressor force, to the conclusion that the 
God of Israel is present and active. The people (think that they) experience him at 
work on their side. Their experience straightaway is of a religious kind.
From aesthetic experience, take the apprehended beauty of a painting, one 
of Turner's sun-rayed sea-scenes for instance. The beauty-experience is given in 
consciousness as that, an originary phenomenon unwrought by prior determination
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in thought of other experiences marking it out as being so. The phenomenology of 
the appearance of the experience in consciousness shows it unmarked to the subject 
by any process of its being inferred from the presence of other experiential tones on 
viewing the painting: ones such as the pleasure taken in it by the subject, an 
uplifting of one's spirit, of being 'taken aback' (though these will often be present 
also). The experience may come to one after much peering, moving up close to 
study a particular aspect and stepping back to view the whole. It may 'well' on the 
edge of consciousness and then strike one in its fullness (though, like much of the 
run of the moral demand experience, aesthetic experience is not so often as striking 
and moving as it sometimes seems to be regarded in the literature, more usually a 
quite simple noticing of the beauty of a painting or the sweep and vigour of a 
musical composition). But this is not attended in the consciousness of the subject 
by an inference from certain collated factors which gives rise to the presence of the 
experience itself and its identification as being thus and so.44
And this is similarly so with the moral demand: its presence being by the 
way of an originary impulsion in consciousness. Prichard expresses this feature in 
stating that,
The sense of obligation to do, or of the rightness of, an act of a
particular kind is absolutely underivative or immediate.45 
This points to the quality of the experience which is often present in immediacy 
when one is not specifically in the mode of attending to a moral problem. The 
suddenness, unbiddenness, unexpected way in which the demand strikes 
consciousness as one is watching the television and the famine-scene is played, or 
as the front door is opened to reveal a starving person confronting one, attest to the 
feature Prichard describes.46 There is also that same quality to the demand which 
ensues when one wonders over specific courses of action in the light of the 
unformed demand which one experiences to the effect simply that something be 
done. The demand does not seem to have arrived by a process of inferring it from 
other elements (nor, importantly for later chapters, does it feel as if one has
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wrought it by one's own choosing) - which is not to say that, counterfactually, 
there are not features by which it could have been inferred. This form of immediacy 
of the demand, its apparent arising without one's willing, can be labelled as the 
'categorical' feature of it. For the demand is given as such in direct experience, as 
calling on one without seeming to be linked to one's own desires in its immediacy. 
The subject feels as if something other to herself is pressing on her. But note that 
she does also in those religious and aesthetic experiences described. These 
experiences - of the holy and of the beautiful - do not seem to arise in 
consciousness through one's own choosing. Even as one does choose to turn 
attention to that which is already thought to be within a particular milieu - to a work 
of art, to an iconic image, to a documentary on famine - one does not feel oneself to 
be choosing to have the corresponding experience.47
The fact that a particular demand is experienced as a moral demand, and that 
this is not based in immediacy on an inference from other elements of the 
experience, is neutral with respect to the question of whether there is a special tone 
to the experience, or a special intentional content, which one could sheer off from 
the experience, as it were, and investigate. One would then deal with a particular 
'ringing' quality which signalled experience as moral, or with a content such as a 
value-realm which went to underpin description. (More will be said in point iii 
about this matter). For instance, Davis, who is quoted at the beginning of Section 
4, contends that, of moral experience,
...man is so constituted...[as] to find certain kinds of actions, 
intensions and situations repugnant or disvalued in a peculiar sort of 
way. This repugnance, while analogous to other repugnances men 
feel, is unique in its experienced tone. It is as useless to attempt to 
describe the experienced tone as it would be to describe sweetness 
or colour. It has to be felt to be known, and once felt, description 
becomes superfluous,...the very being is in the seeming [like 
sweetness].48
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Analysis may be unable to do anything more concrete than try to convince the 
reader that description is accurate as it accords with his/her own moral experience 
when it is called to mind, or that it leads the reader into agreement if, as Davis 
claims, the experience cannot be adequately described. More determinately, it can 
say this. That one's experience is of a religious, or aesthetic, or moral nature is, in 
immediacy, a matter of the overall tone and content of the experience. This implies 
that there is not a single unique, sortal feature to each kind of experience that can be 
shorn off and analysed in separation from the experience. The religious nature, the 
beauty, the moral nature of the experience does not appear in direct experience as a 
special additional tone that would allow one type of experience to topple into 
another type as the particular feature was added or subtracted. By 'overall' tone and 
content being involved in the identification I mean simply to indicate the immediacy 
of the experience as, say, moral, which I have stated to be non-inferential and not 
given characterization by the presence of some single special feature which could be 
rendered up for inspection in isolation from the experience.
- ii) If subjects in direct experience do not infer the experience to be that of 
a moral demand, it is because the experience is presented in ordinary and 
unproblematic manner as moral. Whether the demand force itself be minimal (the 
first half of example v) or quite overpowering (the second half of example v), in 
both cases it is routinely identified as a moral one. Or, as it was put at the beginning 
of point i above, the identification is part and parcel of the experience itself. This is 
a matter of the phenomenology of the appearances. What it does not establish is the 
impossibility of experience of moral demands that are not identified as such - 
because of inattentiveness in the heat of the moment, or because an interfering 
factor such as a high emotional state renders in flux the subject's consciousness of 
the forces weighing upon her. To say, then, that a demand impinged on a subject, 
but was unnoticed or not identified as such by her, or that a subject later 
acknowledges that she should have felt a moral demand on her or that the
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demandingness which she did experience should have been experienced as moral: 
this need not be to say anything at all about the notion of values ‘out there' which 
are not being fully apprehended. It is to say that, despite the usual fashion in which 
the experience enters one as a moral demand, in some cases there is an experience 
striking consciousness which, but for certain other forces tugging also on the 
subject, would be experienced as a moral demand.49 And sometimes also we talk of 
demands unnoticed, though we feel that we should have done so.
There are, of course, borderline areas. In these, either the subject is herself 
unaware of the nature of her experience, or others are attempting to correct it. The 
former case partly consists of that kind of realization presented above, that the 
noticing of the moral demand has been prevented. And there are those times when 
one discerns that what one took to be a moral demand was in fact a demand of 
another sort, one placed upon one by an emotional attachment or revulsion to some 
person or group, or one which seemed to one as moral in virtue of the effect on one 
of some feeling of the overriding importance of a particular matter. This corrective 
reflection, as it were, takes itself two modes. One is the denial of the content of the 
demand, though the appearance of it in consciousness remains steady. An example 
of this phenomenon is the way in which the moral demand in appearance retains its 
character with respect to certain groups of people, though one does not any longer 
identify oneself in terms, say, of racist beliefs. Though one is not 'really' a racist, 
the demand may continue to exert pressure on one and continue to do so as a felt 
moral demand.50 (In extreme cases, the apparent doggedness of the demand 
assailing one may, in virtue of the dislocation from what one takes one's 'real' 
attitude to be, lead to severe psychic disorder). The other is the denial of the tone of 
the experience as moral. In this case one may continue to regard the content of the 
demand as pressing, important, a matter of great moment, yet question the tone of 
the experience as moral in virtue of other considerations (a point expanded in iii 
below). Borrowing from Foot,51 a seeming demand of a moral nature directed to 
hedgehogs mating in the light of the moon can be questioned through thought on
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what objects should be felt to place moral demands on one.52 This, then, tries to 
slough away that moral nature of the demand, even though one might continue for 
all sorts of other reasons ardently to consider hedgehog mating as an important 
matter. At a reflective level, something like a repetition of the point concerning 
inference might be made: that is, that the demands one experiences are not 
accounted moral simply in virtue of, say, the importance of the object one was 
engrossed by. Much the same corrective emphasis goes on also by others towards 
the nature of the experience one reports. Others will point out unnoticed aspects to 
the states of affairs one is directed toward, pinning down one's own experience and 
asking for more careful study of its nature. They will try to get one to see how, for 
instance, anger or repressed desire clouded one's awareness of the demands on one 
or how they lead, through their intensity and felt importance, to an illusory veneer 
to experience. Since this section mainly has its weight as deeper reflection on direct 
experience I will not pursue these thoughts, leaving them to arise again at the 
appropriate point in the chapters that deal with that reflection. They act as brief 
partial notes on the re-ordering of the experiences - or attempts by one to do so - 
which strike one in immediacy. One thing which I do think that this section has 
highlighted as an aspect of the phenomenology, however, is the range of different 
subject responses on looking more closely at the raw stuff of her immediate 
experience. A particular difference which I should like to emphasize is that between 
one's acknowledging that one did experience a moral demand but do not do so 
now; and the thought that what one experienced as a moral demand then, one 
realizes now was not really a moral demand.
- iii) To repeat a point made earlier: the non-inferential nature of the moral 
demand in direct experience is logically compatible with the presence of criteria or 
experiential qualities that would make an inference possible.53 And, even in the 
absence of these, the immediacy of experience may be open to an understanding in 
terms of the training and refining of one's perceptions through socialization and
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repeated exposure to an expected respose.54 To discover criteria is a matter of 
exploring the horizon to the experience, thereby testing subjects' grasp on the 
matter. One evident matter to which Foot, amongst others, has drawn attention in 
the articles cited is that of the almost necessary link to human benefit and harm, her 
point being just that without this connection we fail to make sense of a claim that the 
experience is a moral one (I say 'almost' since the recent proliferation of literature 
concerning 'deep' ecology seems to make of the demand to preserve the natural 
environment a moral one irrespective of human want).55 This itself does not seem 
to me an argument for or against the possibility of experiencing such and such a 
demand as moral in immediacy, but it does seem strong as one concerning our own 
later thought on the nature of the experience and how we should be able acceptably 
to convey it to others.
Ewing says of this non-inferential moral experience:
Even where intuition is not backed by any explicit process of 
inference...[one] is right in refusing to regard it as a quasi- 
miraculous flash of insight standing by itself and not essentially 
connected with any thought-process at all. I presuppose at least a 
partial analysis of the situation or a selecting of certain aspects of it, 
a process which presumably takes some time and may be more or 
less gradual, and it is certainly effected deeply by our previous 
experience and thought. What we see immediately may be the result 
of a careful survey or long experience of the whole situation or the 
whole system involved and yet may be incapable of deduction from 
definite explicit features in that situation or system.56 
Williiam James noted a similar building-up to some cases of religious experience.57 
And a more recent empirical survey found respondents prepared to list a number of 
factors in religious experience, absence of any one of which would have led to 
withdrawal of its identification as so 58 Similarly, the aesthetic experience ]s not 
one that goes on for the subject in unfathomable isolation from certain factors,
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particularly as a contextual matter involving what are thought to be called by others 
'works of art', 59 and/or as she is already aware of the factors to which she 
generally responds. (For Lewis, quoted in the early part of Chapter Three, this 
would necessarily have to be the case in order for direct experience to be regarded 
as aesthetic at all. Unlike him, I am saying that phenomenological analysis of the 
appearances does show that, problem cases notwithstanding, subjects are aware of 
experiential differences in the nature of their classifications as a matter of course). 
Again, these matters require a reflective assay that must be left until later with 
especial concern for the putative value objects involved as giving the experiences 
their nature. I draw attention to them at this stage only in order that the sway of 
appearances so far described not accumulate too greatly in a single direction such as 
that to which point i above inclined. The main theme is this. Recall the assertion in 
point i that no one isolable quality could be found to experiences of beauty and the 
moral demand that accounted for each one's nature and which could be removed 
and swapped among experiences, thereby altering them from one to another. 
Verification of this assertion occurs in seeing that experiences indeed do not flit 
from one type to another through subtraction and addition of a particular element 
that entirely alters the experiential compound. For example v to be of the nature of 
aesthetic experience, or example iii come to appear as religious, there is no 
experience on the part of the subject of some peculiar quality that can, all of a 
sudden, transfer one into the other. Only in example ix might those three be 
standardly conjoined in a fashion making it hard to discriminate between them; or in 
which the three types of experience vie for attention, one with the other.
The upshot of these considerations is that the connection between moral 
demand experiences and their objects - be it a logical and necessary one or a 
contingent though deep-seated one - does forge a link of a sort that goes intimately 
between the experience and general matters of human welfare. The phenomenology 
of appearances at the direct level does signally bring forward the non-inferential and 
unbidden features of the moral demand. But further analysis also brings out the
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way in which their originary constitution in consciousness is taking place within a 
contextual frame. In this light, one writer, in addressing the issue of moral intuition 
- that form of description of immediate moral experience which is most similar to 
this analysis - says that,
Intuitions are moral because they involve seeing situations in such 
general terms as good and evil and, when refined, in the more 
concrete forms good and evil take... By good and evil I mean 
benefit and harm to human beings. And by moral good and evil, I 
mean benefit and harm to human beings produced by human 
agency. Thus the realm of morality comprises the many ways in 
which human beings may benefit or harm each other. Moral 
intuition, then, is to see a situation in terms of some human beings 
benefltting or harming other human beings...60 
Here, then, is one way in which experience and object are generally seen as 
connected, one which was mentioned earlier also. Not only does it put that forth, 
but it also demystifies the notion of moral intuition as specially connected with 
some kind of value realm.
This brings my discussion on to the last point of the four in this section and 
directly to the question of a value realm 'out there' being apprehended in 
consciousness.
- iv) Mackie states that 'the only coherent form of objectivism in ethics [is] 
some form of intuitionism...'61 These intuitions he takes to be of an order of 
objective non-natural moral properties which somehow (and rather vaguely) are 
taken to underpin our moral judgements and practices. Brandt, who, like Mackie, 
has no truck with such an order, also grants the force of such a notion in popular 
moral experience.62 Moral intutions and a faculty for receiving them have been 
thought to answer some of the phenomenological problems raised in my chapter 1 
concerning the nature of apprehension and action.63 As Mackie thinks, this facet to
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direct moral experience looks to be pointing to an objective value realm which is 
out there; which is apprehended in moral intution (this phenomenon, indeed, being 
that of the apprehension of a value realm); and which intrinsically motivates the 
perceiver.
Now intuitionism has had very weighty64 and notorious65 objections 
levelled against it in the course of recent moral philosophy. Even its supporters 
concede that that 'classical' position adopted by the British moralists of the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries is no longer tenable.66 What one tends 
instead to be presented with by contemporary proponents is a diluted form, largely 
of a Rawlsian bent.67 Much of the debate on this issue is not germane to the 
phenomenological questions which moral intuition raises in the context of the 
foregoing discussion. What is of quite central relevance, however, is this. The 
notion of moral intuition derives credibility from the non-inferential nature of 
immediate moral demand experience. I have argued that analysis shows there to be 
no special moral quality to the experience - other than the fact that the experience is 
moral - which is felt at the time to account for its being so.68 Moral intuitionism is 
one way in which the nature of the experience is analysed as being charged by 
some kind of objective moral property. And thus debate is turned once again to the 
question of an objectivity feel to the experience and the value realm that is being 
thought by us (according to Mackie) to be intuited.
Section Six: The vagueness of the experience
To the objectivity feel in direct experience the next chapter is entirely devoted. For 
the present, the phenomenological analysis of the appearing of the moral demand 
leads my thought in the following manner. There is an immediate sense that 
something 'out there', that which simply is other to the subject herself, is working 
to form the experience and to support the judgement that one is apprehending a 
moral demand. This term 'support' is a deliberately vague one. I do not think it is 
the case that, pace Mackie, subjects experience moral demands in such a fashion
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that they regard them as 'making true' the moral judgements they might form on the 
basis of the experience. At the heightened level there may sometimes be a notion at 
large that the very piercingness and seriousness of the experience itself is some 
notice of its extra-phenomenological license, but the rendering of this in terms of 
truth or as a knowledge claim, backed by a value realm, is not a phenomenological 
fact of immediate experience. Besides, as pointed out before, the general run of 
moral experience is not of that specially-heightened type. In direct moral experience 
as a whole there is simply the immediate sense of a moral requiredness, of a reality 
to be dealt with (not necessarily by oneself), which can be pressing to greater and 
lesser degrees. But there just is little experience at this level of that value realm 
which might make true the judgement 'Here is a moral demand'; nor is there within 
the experience a sense of knowledge-being-acquired in virtue of contact with 
objective values that act as originator of the experience and as directed content of 
it.69 There is a sense of being in touch with something that tugs on one, encircles 
one's attention and gnaws away at it, and this can be felt at times to be of great 
importance and urgency, but that is not the same thing as experience of objective 
moral values.
Mackie has stated that his analysis says what there is not. And what there is 
not is a realm of objectively prescriptive moral values. The facts of the experience 
of moral values, he thinks, are false for they represent to one just that realm. But 
what my phenomenological description has done so far is to reverse that order of 
thought. It has not revealed as content of the subject's moral demand experience 
any consistent or persistent signalling of an objective value realm. It has indicated 
ways in which subjects' experience on occasion touches upon matters of very great 
urgency and importance; it has begun to explore the way in which the moral 
demand is constituted in consciousness in a fashion unamenable to the subject's 
own volition; and it has repeatedly emphasized that feature of a pressure or force 
hemming about the subject which moral and other demands exercise with varying 
degrees of power and intensity. That none of these features, singly or in
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combination, amount to the signalling in consciousness of an objective value realm 
is evident.
It is logically possible that there just is such a realm which causally interacts 
with subjects in rather arcane ways unannounced in phenomenological analysis.*70 
A negative phenomenological argument to the effect that what is not given in 
experience does not have a place in the world will be possessing, therefore, only a 
preliminary potency. Rather, the analysis thus far questions, and finds wanting, a 
particular view of moral demand experience, working within a phenomenology of 
the appearances and describing the arising in consciousness of the demand, together 
with those others of a non-moral form. And the significant thing about that view is 
this. Both Mackie and his supporters - and their opponents - who contend different 
metaethical theories about the nature of morality against one another, share the same 
phenomenological description of the direct experience. Some are inclined to think, 
like Mackie, that it is merely an error and not to be taken as giving philosophical 
weight to any particular axiological theory; others believing it to grant initial force 
to some (mitigated) notion of value apprehension.71 What neither party does is 
simply to look more closely at the phenomena of the moral life. The image of values 
being given to consciousness in direct experience of moral demands seems an 
uninspected assumption, one taken for granted by all parties to various disputes. 
Insofar as they agree on an initial phenomenological givenness of values in 
experience, no matter what subsequent construal they put on that, they are all 
curiously adrift from the texture and content of the moral demand in immediate 
experience.72 There may, of course, be non-phenomenological reasons for taking 
there to be an objective value realm, and a phenomenology of reflection on it may 
give extra weight to that notion (later chapters are directly addressed to this latter 
matter). If that is the case, however, it is correspondingly not the case that these 
values appear as such in the direct experience.
I will bring this chapter to a close by again exploiting an analogy between 
the carrying of moral values in direct experience and the objects of (direct) religious
Chapter Four 125
and aesthetic experience. There is, I believe, a widespread tendency to think of 
these kinds of experience as being brought about by, and having the contentual 
form of, particular delineated states of affairs: namely, God and the value beauty. 
Phenomenological exegesis of the relevant experiences reveals, rather than the 
apprehension of a god, let alone a particular faith's image of that being, a far more 
richly-variegated congeries of experienced features - of the holy, the eerie, the 
awesome, the powerful, the numinous, of being 'taken out o f oneself, &c.73 
God, of course, figures as the content of a fair portion of religious experience. But 
the greater part of it is going on outwith such a determinate and committed 
description of its form. Whatever independent reasons there are for theism, 
religious experience does not represent a consistent phenomenological window on 
to God as such. And so it is similarly with aesthetic experience. Rather than the 
value beauty being apprehended in all instances of this type of experience, one finds 
instead degrees of niceness, pleasantness, soothingness, of being drawn into the 
object and out of oneself.74 This is not to say that beauty never figures in the 
phenomenological scheme of aesthetic experience; but it is to say that it represents a 
non-universal element to it and does not constitute itself in consciousness via 
apprehension of a value realm in which it inheres.75 Both cases of seeing specific 
objects to be instantiated across the respective experience classes, then, fall short of 
phenomenological accuracy in describing the appearances. To that extent, and 
bringing to mind the experience of the moral demand, these three objects of 
phenomenological analysis have been seen in the claims above to be of a nature 
which is unsupported by attention to that phenomenology.
One writer on ethics and theology has argued that those interpretations of 
the call of duty on one as divine commands, given through apprehension of the will 
of a divine lawgiver, are both conceptually and phenomenologically suspect. He 
expresses cogently the worry with which this chapter has contended:
...I maintain that there is no awareness of any such relationship [to a 
divine being] inherent in the duty-consciousness itself, and I suggest
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that those who think there is do so precisely because they are not 
successfully abstracting from their independent theistic convictions. 
Their moral phenomenology has, so to put it, been vitiated by 
infection from beliefs at which they have arrived by a quite different 
route.76
This is not an objection that one could put to the likes of Mackie, who certainly is 
not, of course, arriving at the phenomenology from an independent belief in 
objective moral values. It does represent, though, the problem of shifting emphasis 
from certain aspects of the direct phenomena, or from reflective pronouncements on 
its general course, to the viewing of it as entirely coloured in such-and-such a 
fashion. What I mean to express here is the feeling on my part that attention by 
moral philosophers to some heightened phenomena of the experience has led them 
to take that sub-class as providing general phenomenological results. One particular 
item they seem to have latched upon is that rough awareness we may have at the 
heightened level of our contact with some kind of moral reality. In this chapter I 
have not been at all sanguine on the matter of finding determinate moral values in 
direct experience of moral demands. The two that follow will try to develop further 
phenomenological description of the immediate experience and its carrying of an 
objectivity feature. In them I will again be casting doubt on the notion of values 'out 
there', this time concentrating on how the 'out there' figures in the experience.
Chapter Four 127
Concluding comments to chapter four
Starting from the presentation of sample demand experiences, descriptive 
texture and context of the moral demand experience have been given sway by my 
exegesis. I have had repeated occasion to turn attention away from the heightened 
or peak form of the experience and toward the greater part of the experience which 
goes on below such a level in order that that peak experience not be unduly 
concentrated upon. I believe that the warrant for taking our moral demand 
experience, with Mackie, as seeming to represent to us moral values from 'out 
there', derives almost entirely from looking at the peak form. But I have shown that 
the precise nature of that kind of experience is not at all happily captured by seeing 
it as value intuition (except in such a non-controversial fashion as to make it simply 
refer to whatever we sincerely feel under the circumstances). And the features it 
does possess - such as intensity, overbearing importance, strength of impingement 
- are shared with other kinds of demand experience. In itself that is of no great 
import. But insofar as those features might seem to be signalling the interaction of 
values with us from some special realm, this being by way of an inference from or 
overall gloss on the experience, then the similarities throw up problems. For if 
analysis embraces that construal, its pursuance in the other areas leads to an absurd 
multitude of 'queer' entities: of the objective demand to jump in example i, for 
instance, and that to collect the last item in example iii.77
Deflating more seriously the image of the experience as value intuition is the 
straightforward intra-phenomenological finding that no such determinate data are 
given, either at the heightened moment or elsewhere in the broader reaches of the 
experience-type. The debate between Mackie and those others who are more 
inclined to give some credence to the value phenomenology he impugns is one 
about the status of the objects to which such experience refers or on which 
subsequent moral discourse depends. This chapter, however, has given pause to 
acceptance of the foundation of such a debate. What I have done is to move a step 
further back from the arguments about queemess and the explanatory necessity of
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value entities. And taking the phenomenology as it describes the appearances of the 
moral demand in consciousness I have been maintaining that objectively 
prescriptive moral values (the ones ’out there' which Mackie discusses) are not 
given in our experience. Sometimes we feel ourselves as if in close contact with a 
rather hazy moral reality. We want to say that the demands to acknowledge Hitler's 
evil and Mother Theresa's goodness come from something more than descriptions 
of character traits on the lines, say, of irascibility, humility, or frankness. And we 
may feel that to be the actual case on meeting the Mother or watching film of the 
holocaust. But that that is not felt to be an intuition of an objective value realm is my 
contention via the phenomenology.
All these considerations refer to that level of the heightened experience 
which I chose in the prospect of finding a value intuition there, if it occurs 
anywhere at all. I do not think it is there. Again, mention should be made of the 
more ordinary run of experience which goes on outwith the heights of intensity and 
strike possessed by the peaks.78 If the evidence for objective values of the kind for 
which my search has been made is equivocal at best, and simply lacking otherwise, 
at those levels, then it is hardly given at all in the general course of moral demand 
experience.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The purest of motives (or the basest: the law is always the same) 
appear as something exterior .
S.Weil1
"Ought" suggests a constraint, a lack of freedom, rather than 
fittingness, appropriateness, suitability. We speak of being bound, 
of having no real choice (in the case of very stringent obligations), 
of being committed, etc.
H.J.McCloskey2
Introduction
I am going to continue in this chapter with the themes developed in the last 
one. In particular I shall try to pin down those elements of our experience of the 
moral demand which may look to be, or could be inferred to be, giving us 
apprehension of objective values. And in doing so I shall analyze any such elements 
to see whether the phenomenology they display can accurately be taken as giving 
that kind of appearance to us.
The chapter begins with a discussion and description of the 'irksome' nature 
of the moral demand as it puts itself upon us. The ways in which this quality enters 
consciousness, maintains itself, increases or diminishes, are addressed and possible 
courses of its constitution in consciousness followed. Such a phenomenon is linked 
up by me to the receptivity of the subject to the demand placed upon her: that is, to 
her attitude towards it as important for her or not, and as it exhibits for her levels of 
varying nearness to her own perceived self.
I then carry phenomenological description on to the precise feel of 
exteriority which the moral demand has for us. I do that in order to engage study 
with the possible felt source of and confrontation with a value realm 'out there'.
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Different degrees of this felt phenomenon are recorded and contrasted with other 
areas of demand experience. This experiential sense is made more explicit by my 
teasing out the dual linguistic sense of the notion of independence of the subject: 
which involves either the feature of externality or that of unamenability to direct 
volition (or both for some phenomena). I argue that what sense of the former there 
is accompanying the moral demand for us is rather vague and inchoate and not at all 
readily viewed as contact with objective moral values in anything like Mackie's 
construal. As to the latter sense, that is touched upon in places, my main exposition 
of it being left to the two chapters that follow this one.
The chapter as a whole provides discussion of the phenomenological data as 
it may contain for us a perceived relation to some kind of (rather indeterminate) 
moral reality. This relation I analyze for both causal and non-causal alignments of 
the subject with that value realm as we apprehend it. One of the non-causal relations 
which receives particular attention is that one which appears from time to time in the 
history of moral philosophy, namely, the relation of 'fittingness' that subjects are 
alleged to perceive. In both cases of a putative sense of our interaction with 
objective moral values I find the actual phenomenology to be less than promising 
for any such claim.
In the overall tenor of its findings this chapter, like the previous one, is of a 
somewhat negative thrust. I challenge in particular the phenomenology of those 
areas most close to an apprehension of objective value. Taking even the level of the 
peak moral demand experience I deny that this is held by subjects as apprehension 
of a value realm from 'out there'. Applied to the moral demand experience, I show 
how the two quotations at the head of this chapter describe major elements of the 
phenomenology. I suggest ways in which the experience can be forceful, even 
threatening, as it strikes consciousness and trails through it, and argue that, while 
these may lead to confusion with the claim of an impingement of objective values 
on one, that is indeed a confusion and a move to be resisted.
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Section One: The moral demand as irksome
There is an experiential phenomenon common to much demand experience. 
Prichard captures its nature when he talks of the 'irksomeness' of the moral 
demand.3 In this section I am going to concentrate further on that phenomenon. I 
will again view the appearances of moral and other demands in order to describe its 
character. In doing so I will be trying to see how it appears both across different 
demands and within moral demand experience.
l.i - Pin pricks on consciousness
Many of the demands described in the last chapter share a feature which I 
shall call, somewhat crudely, but I believe accurately, that of 'irritatingness'. They 
enter consciousness in a manner similar to that of a buzzing insect which distracts 
one. One is temporarily forced to take note of them. Often, but not always, they 
prod one to do a certain thing.
This feature is present in clear fashion in the examples i, iii, iv, and vii 
which I presented in chapter 4. It is also to be found in the moral example v. The 
demands force themselves into consciousness in like fashion to the physical 
irritation of a pinprick. One is shaken in some degree by them, concentration halted 
by their presence. Concerning comparison between moral and other cases, Jung has 
commented on the phenomenological feel which the pang of conscience has for us. 
This description seems to me close enough to that of my interest in the experience 
of a moral demand to be worth quoting at length. He says:
In practice it is indeed very difficult to distinguish conscience from 
the traditional moral precepts. For this reason it is often thought that 
conscience is nothing more than the suggestive effect of these 
precepts, and that it would no longer exist if no moral laws had been 
invented. But the phenomenon we call "conscience" is found at 
every level of human culture. Whether an Eskimo has a bad 
conscience about skinning an animal with an iron knife instead of
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the traditional flint one, or about leaving a friend in the lurch whom 
he ought to help, in both cases he feels an inner reproach, a "twinge 
of conscience", and in both cases the deviation from an inveterate 
habit or generally accepted rule produces something like a shock.4 
In this passage he both brings to the fore a phenomenological feature of some moral 
demands - what he terms a 'shock' - as well as making the point that it is not a 
unique felt feature of just those ones. I think Jung here has a notion of that shock as 
bound with a feel of horror, taboo, one to the effect that 'this is not to be done.' But 
that is to narrow down unduly the general form this 'shock' has. The striking tone 
which Jung emphasizes is more basic than that, an irruption of consciousness.
The image I wish to convey is this. Those demand examples noted above 
arrive in immediacy with a braking effect on one. They supplant one's thoughts and 
demand attention. I ask the reader to cash out this image by bringing to mind those 
kinds of demand and seeing if she/he assents to my description of the feature. For it 
is my claim, after all, to be describing experience as we variously have it. And I 
believe it will readily be seen that this quality to certain demands is that one which is 
variously latched onto by descriptions of its 'irksom eness', 'shock ', 
'irritatingness'. (Bearing in mind my discussion of peak and non-peak demand 
experiences in the previous chapter, many moral demands clearly will not have a 
tone beyond that of a bothersome background clinging to the peripheries of 
consciousness).
What of the degree of irritatingness? In the next sub-section I will employ 
some second order reflection on how one might view ridding oneself of the 
irritation. That will describe how subjects are compelled by the quality to view it 
and thus the degree of irritation that is being exerted. As to the way in which it 
appears straightaway before one, that degree varies between the sharpness of a pin 
prick (demand example i in particular) to the (by comparison) dull thud by which 
the demand in the first half of example v is experienced. It is important to note that 
this description applies to the immediate strike of the demand on consciousness and
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not to one's subsequent thought that the demand, as pressing upon one, is onerous. 
For in that immediacy many demands are not experienced as so. There is, to be 
sure, in examples ii, vi, ix, x an apprehension of a demand, but not as an irritation, 
as a burdensome force weighing in on consciousness. And this is sufficient to give 
one pause concerning blanket endorsement of Prichard's description of 
irksomeness either as evincing the moral demand or even specially attaching to a 
particular species of that demand. The moral demands in vi and x do not in 
immediacy possess a particular quality of irritatingness. They may exert a lively, 
compelling tug on one, but that is not the same thing as being irksome. These 
demands are experienced in jejune fashion, are dealt with routinely, and do not 
enter consciousness with that stabbing force with which those that irk rather keenly 
are signalled. Conversely, those moral demands which do possess such a feature 
are quite manifestly not forming a sub-group uniquely picked out by it. Examples i, 
iii, iv are paradigm cases of the feature in demand experience. They pierce 
consciousness, in the latter cases bludgeoning their way into one's notice. With the 
registering of them as demands comes as a piece their irksomeness.
Between moral demands themselves that are experienced in this way there 
are differences of degree to the quality. Those that prevent one from going on with 
some tempting act sometimes have this in immediacy.5 They assail one and put 
obstacles in the path of one's plans.6 Those which are demands not of forbearance, 
but for commission, need not possess corresponding degrees of force and 
irritatingness. I mean by this that especially powerful moral demands do not also 
have to be experienced as strongly irksome.7 I take it that this undoes a natural 
presupposition that those demands which strike consciousness with great strength 
must be experienced as particularly irritating. To give a concrete example, consider 
case v. In the second half of that, of the doorstep starving, I have said that the 
demand to help is a very strong one. Yet to call it irksome or irritating in immediacy 
is to add into the original experience that which may be felt only after the initial 
shockwave of the demand has burst upon one, or which may never be felt at all.
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While the first half, which possesses in the main but a passing and weak force, is 
much more often accompanied by a direct, irksome quality. The demand, though it 
does not overwhelm one as in the doorstep instance, can nevertheless smart in 
consciousness as an irritation; there may be no particular action enjoined by the 
demand on one's part that presses upon one's resources, but the very difficulty of 
dealing with the situation and its famess from one may bring forth to the demand an 
irritatingness which, in the clamour of the doorstep-starving demand, is absent.
This quality of irksomeness, then, is widespread throughout demand 
experience and is not universally found among the moral ones. Most frequently one 
is presented with it in everyday demand experiences of a mundane sort that press 
upon one's time and inclinations which are otherwise determined. The demands to 
hang the crooked painting, wash the dishes, complete the essay on time are all 
standardly irksome. The demand to condemn Hitler as evil is not; nor, for instance, 
is the demand to give help to a person who has slipped on the ice in front of one 
standardly felt in this way. So the description of the moral demand as either only or 
always possessing the feature of irritatingness is not phenomenologically accurate. 
Perhaps moral demands begin to pick up this force as they maintain themselves in 
or below consciousness, or as the subject reflects on them. This brings me to the 
next sub-section.
l.ii - Irksomeness gathering
That demand which does not irk one as it arrives can grow to do so. And 
that which is immediately felt as an irritation may increase in strength of that 
quality, building up in consciousness, or merely remain with the same degree of 
force. The additional possibility is that of demands that diminish in irksomeness, 
occasionally losing the quality altogether while yet remaining as a felt demand. With 
all these possibilities it seems to me that one salient point calling for notice is the 
way in which the irking force of the demand is linked to its dragging one away 
from other matters with which one's attention and energies are engaged, or in
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which one would rather they were engaged. The demand concerning the starving 
person on the doorstep might not at first be irksome just because other concerns are 
blown away; but it may become irksome as other concerns (for example, one recalls 
that one is now missing one's favourite soap on television) creep back.
Are these three all facts of experience of the moral demand? Or is there a 
particular route which the moral demand takes once inserted into the flow of 
consciousness?
Let us follow a particular moral demand through its apprehension onwards 
and employ a mitigated form of Husserlian imaginative variation to see if its 
constitution in consciousness under different descriptions meets with our 
recognition. If it does, then my portrayal will have succeeded in describing a series 
of phenomena that attach to the moral demand without any one excluding the others 
in the different experiential possibilities. If it does not, then some factor that is part 
of the moral demand, and which either prevents others from being added or which 
itself cannot be subtracted without our grasp on it as a moral demand failing, will 
have been discerned to be essential.
A - Take, then, the famine-via-the-media example. Going through the three 
phenomenological pathways in turn, imagine that the demand, registered but 
without impinging in irksome manner, then goes on to press itself upon 
consciousness in that way. One finds oneself brooding on the plight of the starving; 
the demand has come to fix itself before one's attention and refuses to go away; the 
sight of a well laid table excites in one the thought of their hunger; one begins to 
give greater notice to media items on aid policy and third world debt, &c.; one feels 
powerless both to completely eradicate the hunger or to expunge the demand. In 
short, the demand has taken on a hue which it did not possess at the moment of its 
arrival in consciousness, and now one indeed is put upon by it like a stabbing, 
irritating physical pain. It is not merely persistent, but irksome, for it diverts and 
disrupts one's equilibrium.
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Is this a fact of the phenomenological path of certain moral demands in 
consciousness? I think that we do all find that this characterizes one way in which 
direct experience may go on to follow a pattern that brings the demand upon one 
with an irritating quality not found in immediacy. The demand as it were gathers 
about itself this quality subsequent to its initial appearance in consciousness. This 
can be a matter entirely outside of one's conscious approach to it, the quality 
beginning to emerge and increasing in its phenomenological tone despite what the 
subject is doing with regard to it. I think that more often than not this is just how its 
constituting itself before one is presented. But one can also contribute to the 
process in a more deliberate fashion. In coming to think that one should care about 
the relief of famine, that one's economic position is in some way partially based on 
and responsible for it, that one's superfluities could be put to good use in aid, one 
thereby can help to bring about the appearance of the quality. One cannot create it 
ex nihilo, that is, choose to be irked. It is not possible to conjure up the quality by 
one's own choosing. But one can reflect that its very irritatingness now is the result 
inter alia of one's subsequent assessment of the original demand experience. 
(Though the case is not that caring about something, taking oneself in principle 
obligated to act or forebear toward it, will be productive of the quality in question; 
only that it can be looked upon on occasion by the subject as being partially 
responsible for the demand's having a hold upon one).
B - As to the second case, of the demand maintaining its irksomeness, or 
that quality rising after the initial event in consciousness, much of that scenario has 
been located within the description above. We are to imagine again the heightening 
of this factor going with the demand as its presence in consciousness exerts on one 
a greater irritation than it initially possessed in immediate experience. That which at 
first was perceived only bluntly and partially comes to dog one in persistent manner 
with greater lucidity. The occasion for its irksome, pressing nature to be 
experienced is magnified; its presence seems consolidated in consciousness as it 
bears down upon one. It begins to irritate like an itch that cannot be scratched. Or,
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in the case of the demand retaining its originally felt irritation, intense or weakly- 
exerted as that might be, that quality sustains a felt pressure on consciousness 
which the passing of time and the distractions of everyday life do not dislodge.
I again think that this aptly describes another fashion in which the moral 
demand continues on in consciousness. That pin-prick impingement on 
consciousness which a famine can excite as one sees it for the first time does 
sometimes grow to exert greater pressure. One's attention is primarily grabbed and 
diverted as it is re-presented before one. The demand irritates one with increasing 
frequency as it is encountered again and again under different circumstances (the 
well-laid table; the wasted food at a restaurant; the pampering of pet animals; the 
agricultural surpluses of the Western world, &c.). It may take on such a heightened 
tone that it is regarded as an assailant in consciousness, a force haunting one like a 
guilty memory that cannot be expunged (the next sub-section develops this aside on 
the experience). But note that this irksome feeling is quite consistent with the 
demand content not mattering much to one, or with an intention on the part of 
oneself not to do anything about its pull. The demand could be felt keenly and 
pressingly, and yet be going on alongside one's thought that, 'They're in a far-off 
land, it's nothing to do with me, I'm not concerned.' That is to say, though the 
phenomenological quality of irksomeness is present, and one cannot fail to notice 
the presence of the demand, its content - that something be done about an end to the 
famine - is not enmeshed with the irritating quality of the demand.
So here is a noteworthy experiential phenomenon. Strength of demand and 
the irritating quality that might be attending that strength are being experienced 
without one caring much for that state of affairs to which the demand is directed. 
Importance, severity, or seriousness of the matter presented to one by the demand 
is not, then, an experienced feature that goes on with the power it exerts on one. 
Consciously blithe indifference to the plight of the famine victims is consistent with 
experiencing an irritating demand. It is not a frequent form of experience, but 
neither is it an unheard-of thing. What seems to separate the irksome demand with
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and that without concern for content, at a reflective level concerning the 
phenomenological description of the experience of the demand, is one's attitude to 
the quelling of the demand. In the case of the demand's irritatingness 
unaccompanied by any concern about its content, one wishes only that the irritation 
be lifted, that it simply disappear and not return to plague one. Whereas in the midst 
of that demand's irksome force allied with a concern engaged by its content, one's 
wish is not merely that the demand be removed from consciousness but that it be 
dealt with by means requisite to its contentual object. One wishes, that is, for the 
cessation of the famine and not - or not only - cessation of the demand as such. In 
the former case, on the other hand, it is the irritating demand one wishes to see 
off.8 There is a pressure on consciousness that must be exhausted in the most 
effective fashion possible.9 (This is a matter I address more fully in sub-section vi).
In summary, then, common moral demand experience very often 
incorporates the apprehension of an irksomeness which either can maintain itself in 
felt tone or build up to greater degrees of a felt burden upon one. And the subject's 
relation to this pressure differs according as she sees it or the demand content as the 
primary matter to be accorded attention and action.
C - The third form which the moral demand might take from inception 
onwards is in diminution of the irritation first felt in immediate experience. Take, 
then, for imaginative consideration the lessening of the pressure exerted on 
consciousness by the demand which one apprehended on seeing the famine 
portrayed on the television screen. One finds, that is, that the irksome pressure 
trickles away, and repeated exposure to the famine in media sources does nothing to 
bring it back. The demand no longer holds thrall in such an impinging fashion. It 
gradually falls away from being an imposition on consciousness, something 
broadly akin to the pressure of a headache, either altogether or down to a duller- 
hued tone. One is no longer hunted as if by some irritating insect that continually 
flies about one. The demand ceases (partially or wholly) to push at one in that 
manner.
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This phenomenon is surely one also with which we are acquainted. The 
demand experienced when first viewing the famine may carry a particular 
irksomeness, and maintain that pressure temporarily, before that quality comes 
subsequently to be sloughed off. It loses its particular onerous feel. This can be 
associated with the complete demise of the demand in consciousness itself. But it is 
not always the case.10 At this point I want to record a facet of the experience which 
seems to represent the obverse side of one recorded in B above. In that context I 
said that positive thought on one's relation to the content could be regarded as 
leading, among other factors, to the arising of an irksomeness originally absent 
from the experienced demand. In that way the irritation could be a signal to oneself 
of the seriousness and concern with which one regarded the state of affairs to which 
the demand is directed. But I am claiming also that diminution of the irksome 
quality can occur while one's concern remain constant or be elevated. This is to 
sound a descriptive note from the phenomenology of the demand's features as they 
are found to be allied or separate, not to claim the complete converse of the point 
made in B. That would be to say that one finds that the diminution can actually 
indicate to the subject or an interpreter of her experience that a greater seriousness 
or concern at the content has come about on her part.11 And though that is not a 
particularly common phenomenon, and certainly not criterial of any such change in 
attitude going on in one, there is some sense that can be made out of its operation. 
That is, there are moral demands with which one's self comes to be identified at a 
deep level: such as, I think, the saints and other moral paragons, and ourselves 
sometimes, find in particular moral projects. I will address this matter of the 
self/not-self in moral demands at length in the next chapter. What it is I am 
describing is the way in which the moral demand becomes assimilated into oneself 
over time, thereby losing the irksome, intruder-like force it may have originally 
seemed to possess. As one's concern is directed toward the famine and one 
becomes involved in relief efforts, fund-raising, political issues, &c., that irksome 
quality by which the demand seems an alien force in consciousness, striking at one
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despite one's own apparent wishes, fades away. The demand is not any longer 
experienced as an irritation; it is part of oneself.
With that much said in the paragraph above about the way in which the 
self s acknowledgement of a demand can come to remove the irritating quality, I 
should redress the balance by returning to the material at the head of the paragraph. 
For often the weakening of the irksome force on one is correspondent with 
straightforward fading of the demand as a presence in consciousness. The intrusion 
of the famine into the living room and into consciousness is followed for many of 
us by a drop in the keenness with which the demand is felt and of its assailing, 
irksome tone as it enters and remains before one. The demand no longer irritates 
simply because it is no longer present. Or its forcefulness has long since passed 
away, leaving but a slight awareness of a demand, one that does not exert pressure 
on consciousness. This fading of the demand, its strength and irritating tone both 
dropping away, is, I think, a common experience. Our moral life is in large part a 
succession of more or less powerful and irksome demand experiences which 
quickly lose their hold on our attention. They impinge and melt away like 
snowflakes on the ground which do not lie. The metaphor may be aptly applied also 
to the discussion in A and B. For the demand may filter below the level of 
consciousness as the water of the melted snowflake sinks into the ground, a point 
which I make in the light of a subject's possible reflection on the affair. It may then 
go on to return before one, assailing oneself, striking forth in surprising manner. 
This sets the scene for the next sub-section. But to return to the metaphor and the 
stuff of this particular discussion C, I believe that the simple diminution in an 
irritating quality to the demand, together with the fading of its force and very 
presence in consciousness, is a fact of moral experience which will be recognized 
by the reader. It is not a fact to which much attention is generally given in the 
literature.
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l.iii - Intruder demands
I want now to turn to a phenomenological description which seems to fit 
some demands of a particularly unwelcome, alien, and irksome nature. I will stick 
to the moral demand here, comparing this discussion, and that above, with other 
demand experiences in a summing-up section to follow.
There are times when a particular moral demand (or any demand at all) can 
be experienced as a burdensome and trespassing force in consciousness. And there 
are some moral demands that might always appear so. The pressure and irritation 
they exert on one seems an imposition, like a physical shackle put upon one. That is 
why I choose to label the experience by the group of terms 'assailant', 'intruder', 
'imposter.' The demand hounds one and continually signals itself, often in 
unexpected moments that do not seem related to its content. Such is, for instance, 
the way in which the famine demand returns right in the midst of some idle 
conversation or journey apparently having no bearing on the matter. It is 
experienced as an incursion into consciousness, a weight on one like a parasite, that 
may be felt as somehow threatening to one.
Of this phenomenological quality, one writer who has addressed the 
experience of shame from the standpoint of psychotherapy describes ably its 
impingement in these words:
More than other emotions, shame involves a quality of the 
unexpected; if in any way we feel it coming we are powerless to 
avert it. This is in part because of the difficulty we have in admitting 
to ourselves either shame or the circumstances that give rise to 
shame. Whatever part voluntary action may have in the experience 
of shame is swallowed up in the sense of something that 
overwhelms us from without and "takes us" unawares. We are taken 
by surprise, caught off guard, or off base, caught unawares, made a 
fool of.12
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All of these terms seem to me to be applicable equally to the immediate experience 
of some moral demands, as well as to their subsequent presence in consciousness. 
(Shame itself is, of course, often closely associated with the experience of moral 
demands).13 In terms of the concrete example I have been using, I present for 
consideration the following description which I think is recognizable as one 
sometimes encountered. Imagine, that is, the moral demand cutting its way into the 
flow of one's experience as one watches the news item concerning famine. All of a 
sudden one is assailed by it. Without prior warning the demand is insistent, 
pressing upon one. The image of the wracked victims will not go away, the 
demandingness returns and repeats itself away from the screen image. And yet the 
actual state of affairs the demand refers to is not coalescent with one's interests and 
sympathies; the demand intrudes upon one, having the guise of an alien and 
uninvited interloper. (Equally well, the demand could come to take on this form 
after its initial apprehension. That which one performed as a matter of course, 
easily, voluntarily, and perhaps even happily, could suddenly turn and strike out, 
as it were, lodging a forceful demand pressure on consciousness for action that puts 
an entirely new and unwelcome light on the matter).
The appearance of the demand as intruder is similar to, but not the same as, 
the felt force of a compulsion (that which drives one on to drink, to gamble, to take 
dangerous risks, for instance). One could simply choose to do nothing about the 
intruder, bearing it within one like a physical irritation - an itch that cannot be 
scratched, as it were. The assailing pressure of the demand need not rein one in and 
force one's behaviour (though it will provide a prima facie motive for dealing with 
it, given that a subject will wish to have the pressure eased). As with the example B 
earlier, one might try to tackle the very fact of the demand's presence and pressure 
as an intruder - by taking a pill, for instance, if such a treatment existed. Or it might 
be dealt with by concentrating on its content, and trying to do something about 
helping the famine victims. But this would be primarily directed to the assuagement 
of a force on the self and not to the relief of the suffering of others (which would be
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seen best to facilitate the former). Moral philosophy itself could serve a therapeutic 
function as one convinced oneself that no obligation was really laid upon one and 
directed one's thoughts to the establishment of an easy conscience. The kind of 
psychic fracturing involved here makes this no easy task. I think there are instances 
we will all recall when in all sincerity we believe that we have done nothing wrong 
or that we are not even partially obligated to get involved in a particular matter, and 
yet the intruder demand persists. The area of sexual mores and behaviour is a most 
obvious and striking demand to reflect on. Those brought up in a rigid code of 
sexual practice, often linked to religion, do find on breaking away from it the echo 
of its voice clamouring in them despite their manifest belief in the permissibility of, 
say, contraception or homosexuality. Such an echo often has this quality of an 
assailant force pounding at consciousness.14 It may not be articulated at the level of 
'badness' or 'ought-not-to-be-doneness' as it strikes one about, but rather as a 
more nebulous sense of unease and trepidation in the presence of it. For that very 
reason the intruder demand is all the harder to pin down and confront. The Greeks, 
particularly the tragedians, often employed a device such as the furies in a way 
which comes close to representing this conflicting and alien force in 
consciousness.15 One is plagued by that which is outside of the concerns with 
which one identifies. Elaborate and ingenious propitiation will sometimes be 
necessary to throw off such assailing powers.
l.iv - Comparative description
I want briefly now to see if the claims made in preceding sub-sections about 
the moral demand apply wholly, partially, or not at all to experience of other 
demands. My basic contention is that they do apply wholly across the broad range 
of demands first discussed in the last chapter.
I have already said in sub-section l.i above that irritatingness is manifested 
as such in the immediate experience of non-moral demands, especially examples i, 
iii, iv. They too exert a less than welcome, intrusive and burdensome force on one.
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And some of them take on frequently an overwhelming intruder quality, particularly 
as the demand to jump or to acquire that last piece of the collection disturbs 
consciousness.
As to the different routes taken by the non-moral demands after they have 
entered, I think it is evident also that they share with moral ones in the variety of 
ways in which they then progress. The jump-demand, for instance, may go on 
either to loom large in consciousness, pressing especially at one at every sight of a 
high building or precipice, or to fade away to a mere nagging shadow on the 
periphery of consciousness (or it can disappear altogether). The slight apprehension 
of a demand for redress in the shame example (viii) is well known to us as one that 
can begin to take on the hue of a greater and greater irritation, building up a 
pressure on one until it all but dominates daily life. These examples call, as do the 
moral ones, for further description as they enmesh with, exhibit, or clash with 
concerns of the self. The jump demand almost always will appear as peculiarly, 
disarmingly alien and trespassing on the self, while the shame example at least 
carries with it a component directed toward some kind of roughly 'defensive' 
measure in the light of some perceived injury to the self. That is a description I will 
undertake in chapter 6. I want now to end this section by describing the 
phenomenology of reflection on the irksomeness and intrusiveness and simple 
presence of these demands as one thinks on how they might be handled.
l.v  - Exhausting the pressure on consciousness
In the description of B in sub-section iii, and of the intruder quality in iv, I 
talked of the subject's relation to the demand, mixing the immediate with more 
reflective modes of description. In the latter sub-section I said that sometimes what 
is desired by the subject is just that the demand go away and stop bothering her. In 
the former I pointed out a relation which is the converse of that: the subject's 
desires are directed specifically to the content of the demand, not to the fact of a 
demand pressure on her consciousness. These two possibilities (there are others,
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but I want to concentrate on this stark opposition) both seem to invoke a certain 
implication of the self. In the former, it is the disturbing, distracting, almost painful 
force that needs to be vented in order that the stability of the self be maintained. The 
other would seem to involve the more felicitous ordering of the selfs concerns 
consonant with the content of the demand. One involves the self getting away from 
the demand; the other, its turning towards that which is demanded.
I am going, then, to inquire into this phenomenology, seeing if description 
of the moral and other demands falls on one side or other of this division, or 
whether it straddles both.
- A pill to end the demand pressure
In this sub-section I am going to take a crude but enlightening possibility 
that is directed to the cessation of the irking force of a demand. It is simply that of 
one envisaging the availability of a pill one could take which would put an end to 
that quality. Since the demand would not subsequently reproduce this pressure - 
that is how the pill works - then it is quite likely that the demand presence itself 
would be erased or pushed out to the half-noticed edge of consciousness. But it is 
primarily to the irritation it inflicts that the imaginative variation is directed.
I think that, with respect to some demands - especially one like the overseas 
famine demand where our ability to do something is strictly circumscribed - it is the 
case that most of us some of the time would opt for the pill. This is, of course, 
particularly directed to that case where the pressure exerted by the demand grows 
and continually follows one about. Though it is not regarded simply as being a kind 
of morally-charged headache, its phenomenological quality does appear in a similar 
guise. It becomes necessary, perhaps even with a tinge of proactive regret, to cut 
oneself loose from the pressure the demand inflicts. It has become too burdensome 
to bear. This may be due to a simple negative calculus about the degree of irritation 
one will put up with, or to what I think is best described as sheer exasperation in 
the face of the appalling disaster and the apparent impossibility of its relief (by 
oneself or some other agency).
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There is also a host of moral demands which one meets in the course of 
everyday life to which a quick turning to that pill would be a likely response. Rather 
simple and not greatly energy-consuming demands of hospitality and charity can 
appear in quite wearisome manner, provoking the response 'I suppose I'd better be 
welcoming/helpful/&c.' In the heat of the pressing moment one might indeed opt 
for the pill. But, I shall say in the next sub-section, this is less likely on reflection to 
lead to that measure than some of the non-moral demands, assuming one stays 
one's hand long enough to give some reflection on the matter.
As to other demands, I think it is certain enough that those of the nature of i, 
iii, iv and viii are going to be expunged gratefully by taking the pill. Their binding, 
burning, haunting force on one is like a heavy load that needs shedding. In example 
iii, the demand pressure may indeed be vented and ended on gaining the missing 
piece or correcting the small error, but the quality of force which it is exerting is 
often one that we would rather choose to be rid of by the pill than by the prolonged 
and troublesome business of acting in accord with its content. The jump demand 
clearly has both a content and assailing force that we all would be relieved to see 
off. And the demand for redress of loss of face, coming to press more and more 
upon one, to take up greater space in consciousness and probably to disfigure and 
disorient one's relations with others as well as within oneself, is also one that a pill 
would be well directed toward (indeed, some manifestations of this phenomenon 
are dealt with in the West by therapy, which is a kind of prolonged and involved 
counterpart to the imagined pill).
- Dealing with the demand content
A large part of the experience of the moral life is given as one directs some 
reflection (cursory or at length) onto the demands one encounters. I do not refer 
here to that kind of reflection on whether there are values 'out there', or what 
precisely it is about a state of affairs that excites in one the apprehension of a moral 
demand. I mean that reflection that registers at a second order level one's own 
attitude to the elimination of, or dealing-with, the moral demand. Here, then, a
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subject simply decides whether her wish is that the demand qua irritation be 
eradicated from consciousness (or its pressing force, at any rate) or whether it is its 
content qua a state of affairs calling for moral action that she wishes to be resolved. 
It is notable that these two attitudes may be held together by us in some instances. I 
said of the famine example above that one possibility is that exasperation might 
drive one to the pill. Yet it is not that one's attention is directed solely to the 
pressure of the demand, allied with an indifference to its content. One primarily 
wishes for the suffering to be alleviated and ended, and it is the very magnitude and 
apparent impossibility of this task being met that switches attention in exasperation 
to getting rid of the demand quality that is maintaining itself in consciousness.16
Now I think that the moral demand does come out of this reflection 
somewhat differently from other ones. The ease with which a moment's reflection 
would call for the pill with examples i, iii, iv, viii is unmatched by a corresponding 
wish for the moral demand to be so erased.17 For the latter typically involves 
direction to matters of human suffering and amelioration that are recognized to need 
attention - rather than there being just some diffuse, awkward demand pressure on 
one. And it is this content of the demand that, I believe, most of us wish to see dealt 
with, not the fact that one is irked by a particular class of demand. But I think also 
that this point needs to be carefully placed in the wider descriptive perspective of 
this reflective phenomenology. Firstly, I have stated in the previous chapter that the 
directedness of the moral demand is often no more than a rather vague call for 
something to be done, or even that something happen (i.e., the demand that the 
famine be ended). So the content of the demand need not especially press on 
oneself: it is merely that oneself happens to have apprehended it. Secondly, I also 
noted from the descriptive phenomenology earlier in this chapter that the irritation 
can go with a feeling on the part of the subject that the demand content doesn't 
matter to her, that she does not care about it. This is a feature of immediate 
experience that need not be overturned in reflection. I think that, self-deception or 
kowtowing to convention notwithstanding,18 it is a common enough phenomenon
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that one be indifferent or only slightly concerned about a particular moral problem, 
even though the demand it constitutes possesses an irksome force.19 In this light, 
one recent writer has also talked of those experiences which I have called 'intruder' 
demands, ones that threaten and do not seem part of oneself, which he terms 'It- 
experiences'. He points out that,
One should draw a distinction between feeling bad because one 
thinks that one has done something bad and feeling bad because of 
'it-experiences'. People are threatened by them but don't feel 
responsible for them...[They] are like violent strangers that have 
fought their way into intimacy.20
It may be a correspondingly common experience that we also feel that we 
should care, even though we don't, and that second order reflection brings us to 
care about caring (and its lack) on our part.21 But if sizeable areas of our moral 
experience present us with demands about things we find it hard to bother about, 
then they seem likely candidates for the pill treatment. One would use the pill to 
ease the pressure on consciousness - that being the thing that mattered most to 
oneself and not the demand content.
With that much said above as proviso, I think it accurate to go on to say that 
the moral demand will receive a greater comparable degree of reflective accord than 
other demands. The pill would not be a viable option because it is the content of the 
demand that matters and needs addressing, and not the brute presence of a pain-like 
sensation in consciousness. But this, of course, is predicated on the fact of our 
caring about some things to which moral demands point. Probably none of us care 
(except notionally) about all moral problems; many of us care a bit about some and 
a lot about a few; and most of us much of the time plain don't care especially 
strongly about these matters to anywhere near the extent that moral philosophers 
sometimes claim we do. Nor should it be forgotten, of course, that conversely there 
are contents of our non-moral demands with which our interests and care are deeply 
bound.22 The avid stamp collector may feel that the pressing demand to obtain a
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particularly rare first issue is, though irksome, connected nevertheless with her 
abiding and affirmed passion for the hobby. The man held in the thrall by the 
constantly repeated pressure of the demand to redress face will sometimes also bear 
a similar relation to the content of the demand. He will reflect that the demand 
content should be attended to in place of simply taking a pressure-quelling pill. And 
he will be doing so because that kind of demand coalesces with something he cares 
about and perhaps thinks worth caring about for any other person, namely, the 
maintenance of his honour or good name or the need to affirm his own self in the 
light of injury to it. I believe that that kind of reflection on the demand content will, 
at least for some of us, be a recognizable phenomenon. It is certainly a common 
enough one in presentday cultures of the Far East and of a rather Sicilian concept of 
honour, and closer to experiential home, is quite likely a reflection that many of us 
maintain despite its generally frowned-upon exhibition in contemporary society.
The reflection that occurs, then, with respect to the content of moral 
demands does look to be one that more readily eschews the pill than in the case of 
other ones. I think that this is partially because we do care to some vague extent 
about moral affairs, concrete ones like miscarriages of justice and starving children 
or more general ones about the 'state of society', for instance. And it is also 
something that comes out in a similar fashion to the thought experiment sometimes 
employed with respect to the prospect of one's being permanently plugged in to a 
hedon machine. In that case, it has been claimed,23 though once on the machine life 
would be a remarkably pleasurable and painless affair, on prior reflection about it 
we would not choose to be plugged in. I am not so sure that it can be taken for 
granted that few would actually choose this option. But leaving that as a sceptical 
aside, the point of the thought experiment is that reflection would not wish for that 
possibility to be actualized as life would be rendered meaningless and just would 
not be worth living. Life in a hedon machine does not accord with a minimal image 
of a worthwhile human life being lived out. In closely analogous fashion the pill 
possibility seems to meet with a similar sort of resistance on brief reflection. A life
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in which the moral demands one perceived were erased as one deals with headaches 
and toothaches would be one found wanting, emasculated or withered in crucial 
ways. For, irksome as some of these are, they are the stuff of a fully human life. 
One in which care ceases for the demand content and centres only on the fact of a 
pressure on consciousness is a poor and less than worthwhile life. It is that even 
though it would in all probability be a lot easier psychologically for many of us than 
the one we do lead.
For this conception of human life and the place of moral demands within it I 
would claim fairly widespread accord. But it is hard to know quite what it amounts 
to, other than the hazy presupposition that not caring about others is not only a bad 
thing, but a bad thing also for the person who doesn't care.24 To those who just 
don't care about others, and to those of us who care a bit but not greatly, there may 
be nothing more that can be said than that we should care about our lack of caring 
and try a bit harder. The reflection does seem to represent this general feeling that 
we do care, albeit nominally in many instances, and that it is worth cultivating more 
of it. It shows that much. It does not show that we would never opt for the pill, 
only that the picture of a life always involving recourse to it is not a particularly 
appealing one. This much will not be sufficient to delineate strictly the moral from 
other demand contents. For the picture of a life devoid of passionate involvement 
in personal projects like stamp-collecting or of a way of living that did just put up 
with something like loss of face without the burning need to 'get even' - at least 
occasionally - are also peculiarly unattractive. And the taking of a pill to rid one of 
the demand pressures in those cases would then also be one that reflection found 
itself ill at ease with. So the most that can be said is that, on initial reflection, one's 
relation to the content of the moral demand is felt by us to be something that inter 
alia goes to make up a specially human life. To take a pill for the excision of the 
demand from consciousness is, on the whole , not an option one would choose to 
be universally taken (either for ourselves or permitting it for others).
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Concluding comments to the section
In this section I have concentrated on providing phenomenological 
description of that particular irritating, pressurising force that demands often 
possess. I have said that both moral and other demands share this feature. And I 
have explored the ways in which that appears both across moral demands and 
between other sorts of demand. In doing so, I have also briefly begun using 
description of a more reflective outlook on our attitude to demand contents. Here 
again I found that the constitution of moral and other demands in consciousness 
takes various shared routes with respect to the irking quality. The relation of oneself 
to the content, a relation of caring, of seeing as worthwhile and important, is a 
matter of similarity between demands too. The imagined availability of a pill to quell 
the irritation is one to which I believe we would be inclined to assent in the 
immediacy of the demand, but perhaps in lesser degree for the moral ones than for 
others. This received backing on some reflection on the demand's irritation, its 
content, and one's relation to that latter feature. It looks to me that we are unlikely, 
on that reflection, to wish for widescale use of that pill (though that does not 
exclude the possibility of occasional resort to it being a live option). But that also 
looks to me to be predicated on our caring, and caring quite deeply, about moral 
matters. There are, then, two caveats to that description of a reflective appraisal of 
our immediate experience by us. Firstly, if there are numbers of people who do not 
care, or if - as seems quite likely - there are a lot of moral demands about which we 
all do not (cannot on some readings)25 care all that much, then this reflection does 
not universally hold.- Secondly, if there are a lot of non-moral demands about 
whose content we also care about - and that is an absolutely certain fact about our 
lives - then we would not wish to be rid of their irksome force either if if meant 
erasing the demand itself from consciousness. And so, unless caring a lot about the 
content just is to render a demand a moral one - and I think that is not proven - then, 
once more, the moral demand is sharing a feature with other demands that does not 
uniquely define it experientially.
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One final comment to this section. I want to emphasize that the irking 
feature to which I have turned attention is one that not all moral demands evince in 
the immediate course of experience. Some do go on to gather that quality about 
them (as I said in sub-section iii), but not all do. A primary part of my worry about 
the concentration of Prichard and others on the irksome feature is simply that it 
does not seem to do descriptive justice to the overall run of moral demand 
experience. For, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, a lot of that experience 
occurs either without any irritating quality and simply as a registered demand that is 
signalled as such in consciousness, or it is occurring as so immediately part and 
parcel of a spontaneous act that its very presence is a debatable matter.
Section Two: Independence of the demand
Talk of the nagging, irritating quality to the moral demand leads me to draw 
up the following considerations with respect to its phenomenology. Is that feature 
like a headache, something self-contained, a purely 'inner' phenomenon? Or is it 
that way because some part of external reality is felt to be tugging on one and is 
signalled as such within the experience? To these questions an adequate 
phenomenological description of that component of the demand's arrival in 
consciousness is, I believe, called for. And since that will be describing the arrival 
as it strikes the subject it will not involve - as yet - any further reflection on her part 
on the apparent commitments of her immediate experience. I will simply try to 
describe the arising in consciousness of the moral demand according to our 
awareness of that.
2.i - Incomingness
One phenomenological feature which is shared by moral and other demands 
is that which is succinctly captured, I think, by the description of its 
'incomingness'. That is, the demand seems to arrive in consciousness from a 
source (or sources) that is (are), minimally put, outwith the subject's own bidding.
Chapter Five 153
This general feature is expressed by one phenomenologist in terms that recall the 
content of the previous section. He says that the moral situation 'demands' action; it 
'requires' it; it 'confronts' one; we 'must act'.26 This emphasis on the 
constraining, almost coercive, force which is exerted on occasion by the moral 
demand picks out the heightened form of a universal feature to that demand. That 
feature is one of the demand's seeming pathway into consciousness. It does not 
arrive as if under the guiding control of consciousness. It impinges, rather than 
seeming to rise up from within the resources of consciousness itself.
Now this is a salient feature of the moral demand. It would look to be 
giving at least an initial credence to the notion of something 'out there' pressing in 
on consciousness. And perhaps with a little more refinement of the phenomenology 
a value-realm might be associated with it. But I think it must be noted in the light of 
the paragraph above that such a feature requires discussion to be split between two 
quite separate phenomenological descriptions. One is 'incomingness', the sense of 
the experience entering from outside consciousness. This bare description of the 
experience can then go on to serve as the basis for a finer-tuned phenomenology. It 
will be in terms of the precise nature of that which is experienced as outside of 
consciousness impinging on it. The other is the seeming degree of independence of 
the experience from the subject's own willed control. This phenomenology 
describes the way in which the experience arises in consciousness and how the 
subject's relation to it is perceived by her, as bringing about or able to bring about 
the experience. So the case of a headache falls between these descriptions in the 
following manner. It does not have a phenomenological component as it is felt of 
being under one's control qua occurrent experience. One cannot choose to begin 
or end it. What one can do, of course, is choose to do something that one knows 
will cause it to come or go - studying late into the night, for instance, or taking an 
aspirin. But one cannot just choose that it appear in or disappear from 
consciousness (as one can do, say, with an image of a house in the mind's eye). 
And as to its immediate presence in consciousness, I think it correct to say that it
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appears as a specially inner phenomenon, requiring attention to its painful presence 
rather than to any externally-related content. Again, there might be some awareness 
of something external that has brought it about. The headache itself, though, does 
not in immediacy seem to have a content ’out there' - it is all and only inside. With 
that said, the phenomenon does have a degree of incomingness to it, as if suddenly 
brought on by the incursion of an external force. But care must be taken in the 
description not to mix cause with content of the experience.While something ’out 
there’ may be immediately felt to be bringing about the experience, it is not the case 
that there are headaches felt from ’out there' to have been experienced within. So 
this example illustrates different ways in which concentration on different 
phenomenological aspects of experience come to be described.
2.ii - Demand experience and incomingness
With the exception of that demand (example vi) that barely hovers on the 
edge of consciousness, all the demand experiences described in the last chapter 
share an incoming feature. That is to say, their appearance is signalled as the 
impingement of an outer reality on one. The jump demand (i) seems to be assailing 
one as it is experienced. The moral demand in v (both halves) seems to be calling 
one from outside of the seat (consciousness) of its apprehension. Given that these 
are phenomenological descriptions, such features of the experiences are, of course, 
quite consonant with an absence of anything external (source) to which they refer, 
or even, within the phenomenology, of an absence in the experience of a sense of 
something specific that is doing the calling or assailing (content and its exactness). 
One can experience a calling without being aware of the caller, an assailing without 
the assailant.27 So far, then, incomingness is an indeterminate and vague feature to 
demand experiences. It is given expression in all those terms in which ’being 
demanded’ is variously couched: required, called, obliged, forced, pressured, put 
upon, &c. They all reflect that sense of the demand's entrance into consciousness 
as if from some location other to it. Such demands put themselves upon oneself.
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They seem to well in consciousness in the manner of an external reality pouring in. 
They do that much: signalling themselves 'in the manner of some realm external to 
the subject.
2.iii - Cause and content in the experience
It is important, in this light, to reiterate the separability of putative cause and 
content about which I spoke in the previous sub-section. If a demand has the 
incoming feature then that is a basic datum of phenomenological description. It is, 
in the case of demand i for instance, generally unadorned by a causal factor that 
provides a particular given content of that which is doing the demanding.28 There 
are three possible ways by which cause and content of the demand experience 
interact with its incoming feature. Firstly, neither feature might be present. In that 
case the subject merely feels the crude pressure of some demanding force external 
to her. The experience she has is not given (in immediacy) with either (putative) 
cause signalled or specific demand content (with respect to its directedness to 
external reality). Such is the case of apparently objectless sensations of a demand 
pressure as are experienced when one's mind idles on ambling down the street and 
a sudden 'demandingness' is experienced, the content of which (if it has one) one 
may have to take some number of steps to discover. Next, is the presence of one or 
other of these factors but not both. So the incoming demand can be apprehended in 
immediacy with the co-present sense of that which is responsible for its rising. And 
these phenomenological elements may be pulling in opposite directions. That is, 
while the experience signals itself to consciousness as incoming, one might also in 
immediacy be aware of an 'inner' cause, of an anxiety or guilt, say, that is behind 
the apparent incoming phenomenon of the demand. Quite how such a possible 
tension is resolved is not presently in question. This is only one way in which 
cause and incomingness interact. In the case of an acknowledgement of an external 
cause contained part and parcel with the apprehension of the demand incoming no 
such problem arises (self-deception notwithstanding) and both phenomena go
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together. And in this case, though there are two out of the three components being 
experienced, I am considering them with a determinate content absent. While, then, 
the demand incoming is experienced as being wrought by something, one's 
experience is not signalled with a specific state of affairs as its contentual object. 
(Indeed, the same can go for the cause: there are plenty of experiences we have in 
which some vague sense of an inner unease or some external melee of events is felt 
to be causally responsible for the demand without anything more concrete being 
discerned).
The absence of a content - at any rate, of a determinate content that can be 
pointed to and isolated - is a phenomenon of demand experience. Take, for 
instance, the experienced demand described by some people as that put on them by 
their god, but which seems to have no more content than just being a 
demandingness striking consciousness from outside. Minimally put, the content 
may be the bare one to acknowledge the very occurrence of an experience. The 
distinction which I wish the reader to bear in mind, then, is that between: 
contentless demands, involving the sense that there is something one ought to be 
doing without any idea even of the general sphere to which it links; vague and 
inspecific demands, involving the sense that one should do something to help the 
hungry in Africa, though one has no clear idea of what one might do.
Since the experience of a demand is phenomenologically attended almost 
universally by some content - the demand is a demand to or for something or other 
- then I think it better not to push a distinction between demands with and without 
content. Rather, and of greater utility for discussion, I believe that one between 
contents that do or do not possess a degree of specificity in what is being demanded 
or determinate object in that to which the demand points should be employed. 
Hence the demand in i, though generally unattended by its cause in immediacy, has 
a quite concrete content: jump from the cliff. This is an example, then, of the 
incomingness including a content, a particularly determinate one, though not having 
also its cause signalled correspondingly in experience. The demand experience in
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vii, on the other hand, has loss of face as its cause, but not a specific demanded 
response other than the demand for redress which places a nagging pressure on 
one.29 And the demand in example iii has both cause and specific content going 
alongside its incoming feature to consciousness at times - cause being one's 
passionate and abiding interest in the hobby and the content being the highly- 
directed one of getting the last stamp for the collection. The fact that the experience 
in this instance is incoming may again represent a phenomenological tension with 
the manifest inner cause present simultaneously. There are also times when such 
demands seem to have an incomingness associated with an external cause, and not 
simply an inner determination of one's interests: this cause being external not in the 
sense of the physical externality of an object like a stamp, say, but the very demand 
to collect it being somehow presented as outside of the subject. Indeed, to take the 
example to its extreme, in the case here of an intruder demand being experienced 
there is often both an awareness of an inner cause in tandem with the disorienting 
phenomenon of an apparently outer, alien force tugging at one. Here the senses of 
'just me' and 'out there' are ineliminably intertwined.
While many demand experiences have cause and content co-present with the 
incoming feature, it need not be the case that in immediate experience a well-defined 
content is signalled with an equally prominent cause. Demand i has already been 
mentioned. A specific demand in certain interpersonal affairs to slap someone, kiss 
them, avoid them, &c. may be something of a mystery to oneself and take quite 
some reflection in order to unravel the route by which it impinged on 
consciousness. Indeed, given that that unravelling will often locate the demand 
source in deep or unnoticed urges or needs of oneself then it is just as much so that 
oneself is a mystery to oneself. I think that when one brings to mind the raw data of 
immediate experience, or when one tries to pay especial attention to it in its 
immediacy, this phenomenological description of the experiential features is 
relatively widely instantiated. Demands that specifically enjoin the doing of 
something, the refraining from something, or simply the believing of something, do
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not always enter consciousness with this incomingness accompanied by a sense of 
that which is responsible for it. As I said earlier, they enter 'in the manner o f an 
external reality hemming one about, but not with that reality located in immediacy. 
The reality to which one is directed by the content of the demand is plain enough, 
but may not be the same thing as the cause (or at least be so given in the immediate 
experience). So, taking the demand to avoid someone as an instance, that specific 
demand to put one's mark on reality by doing (or not doing) something is not 
always tailored to the easy identification of its source. In some way it is probably 
felt that the particular person is source of it, of course, but that is not necessarily so 
even if he is its (contentual) focus. On later reflection it may transpire in a multitude 
of ways how it is that the demand came to strike one: the rudeness displayed by the 
person toward others; his domineering character; his preparedness to use 
unscrupulous means to get his way; one's own suppressed sexual desire for him; 
some not quite definable aura of danger about him that calls forth the response; his 
badness or wickedness; his resemblance to a part of one's own personality or a 
previous self-stage that one is at odds with; and so on. These make various 
reference to inner and outer causes. They point also to different kinds of properties 
which the person himself displays, from those taken straightforwardly as defects of 
character to the more problematic one of wickedness which may stand for the 
subject who is doing the reflection between a description of character used by third 
persons to a special kind of real property inhering in that person.
Many demands do have all three phenomena together in immediacy. They 
have a triadic schema in experience. The demand is apprehended by one as being: 
placed on someone (most usually oneself, at the limiting case apparently to no-one 
in particular); arising from somewhere (more or less specific); and as being for 
something (also including degrees of determinacy). And so the demand example iii 
is often experienced in just this way, as a demand on one arising from one's 
interests to get a particular item. That in iv can be the demand felt to be on anyone in 
society from the generally accepted and seemingly agelessly correct dress code to
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prevent that woman from wearing red jumpers. In ix nature itself demands from 
oneself and everyone else to accord it respect and care. To the extent that some of 
these examples and others described have an incoming force as of an external reality 
impinging on one, and yet are readily identified on brief reflection or in immediacy 
itself as arising from one's own self, there is something of a paradoxical air to 
them. Since I take it that that just is how a lot of experience presents itself, we 
obviously as subjects of experience and actors do not find this awkward. What this 
suggests to me is this. Though the tracks by which experience travels may often be 
seen on later reflection to be within oneself, that is not at all how the experience 
directly strikes one. It simply possesses the phenomenon of entering consciousness 
as if from external sources. Its incomingness is an ordinary and (for the subject) 
largely unproblematic feature of the direct phenomenology. As to that other sense of 
the experience arising outwith one's own conscious control - even though it may 
represent the tug of a willed design of one's own - 1 will deal with that later. For 
now I want to apply this discussion more closely to the moral demand.
2.iv - Incoming moral demands
I think that where objectivity as out-thereness gets the larger part of its 
credence is from the phenomenon of incomingness which the moral demand 
experience has. This minimal sense of an outer reality impinging on consciousness 
does go, I believe, with the apprehension of all moral demands.30 It is highlighted 
in moral philosophical literature by both those quotations which head this chapter, 
that is, as hemming about the subject (like an external force) and as imparting a 
sense of being in contact with some reality (perhaps like a value realm) external to 
oneself. As one writer puts it,
The very fact that we are constrained by moral obligation appears to 
imply that it is independent of our attitudes and our will and that 
these are subject to it rather than it to them.31
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These two components, if they are adequate to the actual phenomenological data, 
need not, of course, be inseparably connected. One can feel the pressure of external 
reality yet choose simply to ignore it or to thwart it. And mutatis mutandis one can 
feel compelled or forced or circumscribed in one's way of thinking or doing 
without this being caused by, or being felt to be caused by, the strike of a reality 
outwith oneself. I will now go on to describe in their fullness the appearance of 
these phenomena in direct experience of the moral demand as (and if) they are 
revealed in looking at the incomingness. I will also describe the shades of variation 
of cause and content that are experienced with that feature.
2.v - 'In the manner o f  an external reality
Here is a quotation from Williams that I would like the reader to bear in 
mind as this sub-section and subsequent ones are read through. He says of a certain 
kind of ethical theory (for instance, that of Prichard) that:
[It] takes the fact that an experience is demanding as sufficient 
evidence, indeed the only evidence, that it is the experience of a 
demand. It takes resonance to be reference, and that is certainly a 
mistake.32
My claims throughout the analysis to follow are going to be operating with a similar 
suspicion, that the demand experience, at its heightened form especially, may look 
like intuition of values 'out there', but that the actual content of the demand is not 
phenomenologically given in that manner.
Recalling, then, the use of the expression in the title of this sub-section from 
earlier, I wish now to determine descriptively just how much is being signalled to 
ourselves with the incomingness of the moral demand. Let us take example v of the 
perception of the starving. In the second half most especially there is likely to be 
something of that element of 'shock' which Jung talks of, a careering into 
consciousness of a forceful demand. This undoubtedly has a piercing, incoming 
quality. The demand impinges on consciousness with all the violence of a bright
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light dazzling the eyes. It seems as if one is impelled by or tugged by or forced by 
or lassoed by a reality over which one has no control and which is putting itself 
upon oneself. The demand streams into consciousness with (some of) those 
features reinforcing the sense of its arrival from outwith oneself. As the external 
world of physical obstacles places restrictions and necessities on one's interaction 
with it (both physically and in thought about it) so does it appear that one is being 
similarly constrained and hemmed about. This is not an inference from the one class 
of experience to the other. The inference from where there is constraint to there 
there is an external reality doing it, apart from any question of the fitness of its 
logical form, does not occur.33 There is in immediate experience the phenomenon 
of the demand's incomingness as well as sometimes its constraining influence on 
one's behaviour and thought (and often an irking feature too). And these 
phenomenological features are not necessarily conjoined. While I believe that we 
find most moral demand experience (with the possible exception of the barely 
noticed ones like vi) to possess the incoming feature, it is clear that not all irk one. 
The moral demand strikes with a degree of incoming force (chapter 4 pointed out 
just how varied in strength that force can be) which is not universally attended by 
that element of constraint and bordering of the subject. One simply apprehends a 
demand as if from outside which calls for someone to do or not do something. 
Even in the case of oneself being specifically demanded, I am not so sure that this 
is experienced in a constraining manner. Rather, the subject is simply presented 
with possibilities to be actualized.
Unless part of the sense of a demand is defined as that which constrains on 
being experienced then it seems to me intelligible enough that a demand should be 
experienced, and experienced as incoming, without the subject also experiencing 
that other feature. What is more to the point here is whether we do in fact have 
experience of this sort. And I think that there are areas of our moral experience 
which do appear in just that fashion. The first half of example v seems to represent 
no more than the bare acknowledgement - if that - of the presence of a demand that
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flicks in and out of consciousness. The demand to refrain from pilfering the till, 
say, may itself not be experienced with that alarm-bell, halting quality which I noted 
earlier, but rather as the simple presence of a kind of negative sign hanging about 
one's proposed action which is apprehended but which does not include the 
constraining quality. It is not that here one experiences constraint but overcomes it 
(which is more usually the case). Nor is it that the the demand signals to one that a 
certain prudent caution should be exercised (which is not the same as an actual 
constraining experience). What seems to be presented to the subject in the 
immediate appearance of the demand is a basic inflow of it from a location exterior 
to consciousness itself. The same goes for the first half of example v. Something 
like a call for redress issues limply forth from the famine state of affairs in that 
example. Neither need actually put brakes on one's behaviour, as a constraint does. 
Nor need they engender boundaries or channels by which one's judgement be 
circumscribed.
The registering of the demand here is a minimal fact unaccoutred by such 
other elements. Even to talk of its 'acknowledgement', as opposed to the neutral 
'impingement', is to suggest more than goes on in this kind of case. To 
'acknowledge' its presence, or even (further) to acknowledge the legitimacy of the 
demand (though doing nothing about it), involves the subject in a degree of self­
reflexive and paused behaviour that does not go on with this kind of direct 
apprehension of the moral demand. For the experience simply inserts into 
consciousness a demand. It does not halt or constrain. What it may do is create a 
certain unease or tension on the part of the subject. Indeed, the demand experience 
itself will often be best described as an unease which sometimes has a directed 
content. But while that may constitute a constraint it does not imply the existence of 
an external constraining force. I mean by this statement the following. If the subject 
does feel constrained by the demand, or if there is an unease, a worry, a 
trepidation, which itself amounts to a constraining phenomenon, this is quite clearly 
not the same as that sense of constraint which arises from physical obstacles. Nor
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does it imply it. There is an experienced demand, and it may set up an awkward 
sensation in consciousness which seems to drag slightly on one. In these cases, 
though there is some awareness of an amorphous external reality impinging, there 
is not also an experience as of that reality itself being the constraint that pins one 
down and hems one about in the manner of values-as-obstacles. There most likely 
is indeed an experience of social pressure and expectation on one signalled in the 
demand - of the criminality of the act in the till-pilfering. And the famine case may 
constrain one because the suffering of others calls for attention in virtue of it not 
being the sort of thing one likes to see go unaided. Quite how and where value 
apprehension figures in these phenomena is unclear. The subject herself is not 
perceiving them in immediacy. She is experiencing the incoming demand and 
perhaps a tension with it or quickly arising from it. 'In the manner o f an external 
reality does not mean, and is not experienced as, that of an external value realm. In 
fact, it does not appear to be of a value realm tout simple, wherever that might be 
situated.
Since the examples given above were deliberately chosen to deflate an image 
of moral demand experience as a special kind of window onto a value realm, I shall 
now turn to the more promising area of demand experiences which have a specially 
heightened nature to see whether they truly introduce into oneself a value 
representation. Taking, then, the example of the second half of v, where the 
demand is at that experiential peak in the run of the general encounter with moral 
demands, does this have an incoming feature which signals to us the impingement 
of values 'out there'? Does this experience, or that on experiencing the demand of 
the supererogatory and ennobling, constitute itself in consciousness with the 
phenomenological appearance to which Whitehead took himself to be pointing in 
the comment which heads chapter one?
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Section Three: Externality of moral demands and values
3.i - Incomingness
Certainly the kind of moral demand experience being viewed here possesses 
this phenomenon. So does the rest of moral demand experience, I have argued. 
These heightened experiences - of the second half of v; on seeing the local youth 
setting fire to a cat;34 on experiencing a great pull on one from witnessing the acts 
of charity workers- all enter consciousness at least as if from external sources. And 
this phenomenological quality is not merely pointing to that obvious sense of 
exteriority in which other people, other's suffering and joy, are outside of one. The 
description of the demand experience cannot be reduced to that bare portrayal of 
physical exteriority, as it were. The quality at hand is something signalled in the 
experience which, in immediacy, seems to be arriving from a realm outwith the 
subject (both outwith the location of her physico-psychic arena of existence as well 
as outwith her own willed control). It is not, at least in this immediacy, felt to be 
arising and arriving as a pattern of events and states from which the subject feels a 
further quality to be produced or on which she senses herself to be projecting a new 
and specific quality.
3.ii - Incomingness and exteriority
I have so far talked of this phenomenon of incomingness as being given to 
the subject's consciousness as if flowing from some rather undifferentiated external 
reality. But I now want to sharpen the description, in the hope of finding exactly 
whether and how values from 'out there' are felt to be present in the experience and 
making demands on the subject.
Firstly, I want to say this. The moral demand experience goes on in a 
fashion that can be described as incoming. That is, the data given to consciousness 
appear in just that mode: as given. They enter, progress, and pass through 
consciousness all as phenomena that present themselves before one. This is not to
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view consciousness itself as a kind of passive spectator before the theatre of 
experience.35 It is to register the phenomenological description of how it is that 
much of experience is constituted before consciousness. And that is by the way of 
the bare phenomenon of incomingness, of arriving in consciousness. This refers 
straightforwardly to that mass of experience which seems to enter one without 
being wrought purely by means of the resources of consciousness itself.
Secondly, I should reiterate that the moral demand experience does possess 
this feature: I think universally so. Chapters 6 and 7 will approach this matter at 
much greater length, particularly with respect to the putative converse phenomena 
of choosing to be demanded or conferring value. For the time being I wish merely 
to emphasize this as a feature of the experience, noting as I do so, and in the light of 
the above paragraph, that it is not an especially striking or rare one. The moral 
demand enters consciousness, it presents itself, is given , impinges on it. In the 
form in which presently it is being considered, these features appear in specially 
heightened relief. Not only is the sheer forcefulness of the demand experienced, but 
with it also a lively sense of incomingness occurs, of its forcing itself upon one. 
One feels oneself held in thrall by this striking phenomenon coursing into 
consciousness. But this is not, of course, a feature absent from other areas of 
experience. That of the moral demand shares it across a wide range of experiential 
phenomena. And so, if it tells one something particular about the moral demand, it 
must do so as being experienced as incoming from somewhere particular and 
interesting. This brings me to the matter of exteriority and its description.
The exteriority of the demand is given as an experienced sense of its placing 
and route into experience. That placing is, in some way to be determined, outwith 
the subject; its route being from there into consciousness. The subject herself has an 
immediate awareness of this placing and route, even if that may only best be 
described loosely and without form. To illustrate this phenomenon with some 
examples from non-moral demand experience: in the case of the demand to correct 
someone's poor dress sense this can be felt (directly or on reflection) simply as the
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demand of one’s community, a matter of etiquette which one perceives in virtue of 
being a (willing) member of that group and its mores; the demand to redress loss of 
face as being one situated for the subject both within his own breast and as lying in 
a social milieu of expectation, upbringing and accepted behaviour that makes 
demands on him; and that of the demand to refrain from drinking too much as the 
(external) call of the law or society or one’s god. These are examples of a sense on 
the part of a subject of a demand's exterior location, and they are more and less 
straightforwardly so. They make explicit the experientially given placing of the 
demand apprehended. For most of us most of the time they are the routinely 
delineated stuff of demand experience. And that they do on occasion come into 
consciousness in powerful and disorienting fashion, as if from some mysterious 
and transcendent realm, hard to describe except in vague terms, is a fact which 
should be borne in mind when looking at the moral ones. For, if these demands 
have ordinary construals as being placed in a social realm and travelling thus into 
one as a state of affairs being grounded in a particular context; and if from time to 
time they take on a strange-hued guise as being supernatural, oddly-placed or 
simply difficult to pin down and accurately place:- then so conversely might the 
moral demand have a less queer position in experienced social reality than the 
Mackie reading gives it. All of this is not to make light of the deep metaphysical 
troubles one courts in investigating the nature and working of society. It is, 
however, to sound a dissonant note to an over-ready identification of the call of a 
seeming externally-placed moral demand with some special realm of moral values.
Simone Weil's comment at the head of this chapter indicates the feel she 
takes there to be in moral experience of an intense form. In her case a theological 
backdrop forms the interpretative map by which it is followed. She has a notion of 
the self s role in moral affairs that is both complex and rather austere.36 While one 
need not follow that particular trail which she wends, her general pointing to the 
sense of exteriority does latch upon the particular phenomenon with which we are 
now concerned. Moreover, she herself seems reluctant, despite her theological
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impetus, to identify the focus of the exteriority with god as it is revealed in the 
immediate experience. The case I wish to argue for, on the basis of 
phenomenological description, is similarly that the exteriority of particular moral 
demands in direct experience is a raw phenomenon beyond which any further 
pointing needs a higher reflective level of thought directed to it.
A strong and pressing demand like that to aid the starving man on the 
doorstep or to draw back from looting in a riot has not only the incoming feature 
but also is apprehended - in these cases - as if by the way of some external reality 
that in some special fashion imposes itself upon one. Now this may be given 
articulation via the medium of what god or the universe is requiring of one. But 
even this much, which can vary in its degree of specificity, may only be a 
metaphorical redaction on the immediate sense of what it is that the subject is 
perceiving. I shall unpack the suggestions of this previous sentence. By pointing to 
its varying specificity I mean to question the precise nature of such a claim. That is 
to say, even granted a claim that god originates the demand and that one's 
apprehension of it is of a demand travelling from god or a god-ordered world, one 
is left with much to delineate in the phenomena. There is the question of how god’s 
demands are themselves felt: as peculiarly moral injunctions or as divinely ordained 
commands and thence as moral through that. And there is the precise religious 
nature of the experience each time it occurs: whether, that is, one is apprehending 
god's will directly or god's will mediately via the particular way in which he has 
put together creation (including the possibility of his having stitched values into it). 
With both god and also with a less personified notion of the demands of the 
universe arises further the descriptive question of the directedness and form of the 
demand: whether such demands are on oneself and motivate one; whether they are 
apprehended as demands for some state of affairs to be realized or curtailed rather 
than always on oneself and one's acts; whether they are perceived as principles 
instantiated under particular circumstances or as situation-imbedded.37 One other 
question which naturally occurs to me as phenomenological description is
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undertaken concerns the subject's own sense of passive apprehension of the 
demand, be it that of god, the universe, or of some special value realm. That is one 
which attempts to clarify the precise degree of exteriority felt by the subject in the 
immediate experience: whether its nature is entirely made up by the incoming, 
exterior phenomena or by some indeterminately weighted interaction of a receptivity 
or sensitivity on the part of the subject with some external realm.
As to that notion of demands of god or the universe being an impression 
read into experience, I intend by this suggestion to emphasize subjects' own 
awareness of the possibly metaphorical picture they have of their own experience. 
While we all at times may feel especially enlivened and in touch with a deeper 
reality than ordinary experience gives us party to in these phenomena, we do not 
always have a ready vocabulary by which to express the content and feel of them. 
We grasp at a sufficiently heightened description to match the power of the 
phenomenological qualities apparently working through us. And in coming up with 
the language of divine demands or the demands of the universe we at least locate the 
experience in terms of its forcefulness, significance, and importance for us. That 
need not be felt, on our part, to be locating the demand so clearly as actually 
residing in the will of god or way of the universe. Some philosophers have pointed 
out just this.38 It indicates its exteriority and straightaway gives it a kind of 
italicized emphasis in the realm of public discourse. This is not to follow an 
emotivist analysis of this particular area of moral expression, but to canvass the 
possibility of a descriptive phenomenology of heightened moral demands, on the 
one hand, in tandem with subjects' own response to it, on the other. To that effect, 
my claim is that much of this identification of the demand with the call or way of 
god or cosmos is fed back into the original experience, that is, into that which is of 
a less determinate nature than the description gives. This redaction may occur 
rapidly or even simultaneously with the reception of the experience itself. But that is 
still a matter of putting a gloss on immediate experience which is not given in that 
experience as it enters consciousness. Perhaps it is hard for us all, or for those of
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us of a certain kind of sensibility, not to incline to ascribe experiences of this 
powerful, stimulating kind to an apprehension of divine or cosmic orders. And 
perhaps there just is no other mode of expression that adequately reflects the depth 
and aura of the experience than this kind. Yet this should not obscure from 
descriptive analysis the extent to which we are ourselves aware of the as if  
construal placed upon the immediate experience. It is not so much that we intend all 
along such renderings to be taken non-referentially; but that what location they are 
given serves primarily as marker of the significance of the experience. Articulation 
as demands of god or universe, that is, is a way in which a sub-class of demand 
experience can be granted due signalling in virtue of its power and vivacity.
One additional problem with the identification of this kind of demand in 
experience lies in its outstripping the area of the specifically moral. Indeed, 
religious demands are often portrayed as those which, for the apprehender of them, 
do not so much herald a higher moral order as supercede (or merely bypass) it 
altogether. Such are the demands of faith which issue in Abraham's preparedness to 
sacrifice his own son, or of the paradoxical righteousness of Job in refusing to link 
righteousness with reward. Though God relents, as it were, in both cases neither 
the Old Testament actors nor ourselves as readers are left with a clear notion of a 
higher moral order. One is simply left bemused, aghast at the apparently arbitrary 
testings God drops on his chosen. (This reaction, with which one should engage, 
possibly being the 'point' of the stories). Even the apparent reward for faith in both 
cases cannot be taken in any straightforward moral fashion. For both contain an 
unease, a sting in the tail, which is not resolved but left hanging at the culmination 
of the stories.39
Undoubtedly, religious demands have some moral element for the faithful. 
And for the faithless too some kind of intuition of a cosmic pull on her will have (or 
will come to have) - especially as its demand comes into conflict with other ones on 
her - a moral element. These kinds of demand instance a wide range of callings on 
their apprehenders. More often than not the response consonant with them is of a
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passive acceptance and/or active worship of the divine or the universe. That they are 
experienced as moral demands requires inquiry equally into the nature of the moral 
demand as into that of the demander. Traditionally, god and universe seem to have 
made a vast range of demands on folk. Not all of these have been seen as moral, 
though they are frequently extremely powerful and felt to be significant and deep, 
involving the very being of the subject. Given the contentual diversity of that realm 
of experience identified with a special kind of demander (whatever the reality of 
that), it remains necessary to find adequate description of just how a divine demand 
is a moral demand and to delineate that from divine demands that are not so. In 
some fashion all divine demands might be thought on reflection to be moral ones - 
but they are not always apprehended as so in direct experience.
This gives some credence to my suggestion that it is the very forceful, 
enlivening, commanding aspects of some moral demands that seems to place them 
for ourselves in the realm of the divine/cosmic. There may be no other adequate 
metaphor by which oneself can grasp the nature of the experience and communicate 
it to others. And if these demands seem peculiarly significant, drawing from a deep 
level of one’s self, halting and putting into question everything else in life, then it is 
hardly surprising that they should be couched in a form of religious or quasi­
religious description. My claim, though, is that this goes on - if it goes on all that 
much - by way of an inference or, to remain as closely as possible to the actual feel 
of the experience, via the medium of an interpretative process that makes concrete 
the meaning and meaningfulness of the experience to oneself. This interpretation 
need not be a prolonged reflective matter. It can be closely allied with the experience 
as it enters. What I mean to indicate by distinguishing between inference and 
interpretation is similar to that which is operating for aesthetic experience. In that 
area one's immediate appraisal of an art object is usually based not on an inference 
from its qualities but on an overall interpretation as the experience enters oneself 
(one being more and less conscious of the occurrence of a process of interpretation 
between experiences). Hence, for both cases, the gloss put on the raw data of
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experience need not be a phenomenon controlled by the subject in the light of her 
weighing of the experience. And for the subject herself, it need not, and almost 
certainly does not, feel like an added component has been 'read into' the experience 
in the way in which I have briefly suggested.
That an interpretation goes on, or that its past occurrence moulds the norms 
of expectation and experience, does not strike down the possibility of carrying out 
an inference from phenomenological features of a certain kind of experience to 
metaphysical speculation about its source. But it seems to me that that is not really 
how the heightened moral demand gets on occasion to be linked with divine or 
cosmic orders. Correspondingly, the apparent ready response of some of us (for 
this is not a universal feature of experience) to locate a particular moral demand in 
such an order need not dash the possibility of phenomenological description 
disentangling this feature from the data of immediate experience. That does not 
mean that the experience itself is given in bare, uninterpreted form - simply that a 
degree of reflection on the phenomenological data of immediate experience gives a 
description in which the original presence of that religious element or gloss about 
the experience is questioned. That does not, as such, rely on a deeper reflective 
phenomenology of the sensefulness to the subject of a moral demand's being so 
engendered. It is a matter of what is and what is not given up to investigation on 
careful unpicking of the threads binding together a particular experience when one 
tries to render it up in its immediacy. And the important point I have been 
representing concerns the extent to which many of us are aware of the 
interpretative-metaphorical character of this kind of location, even though it may 
seem to be part and parcel of the experience itself. This is not a matter of subjects in 
a secular age not taking seriously the apparent religious nature of the experience. It 
is rather that, in taking the heightened moral demand experience very seriously 
indeed, no other obvious candidate description offers itself as reflecting the 
phenomena than that of the religious-cosmic one.
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Expressing the experience in terms of its great and life-engaging importance 
to one goes some way to highlighting the experience, and expression with the 
personal reference omitted goes further.40 So does talk of being unable to do, 
think, or see matters otherwise. As bringing into sharp relief, both to oneself and to 
others, the height of this demand experience, however, assimilation of it to the will 
of god or way of the cosmos performs a task for which it is particularly well-suited. 
If any area of human experience provides a window onto such realms, these peaks 
of moral demand experience seem good candidates for doing so. It is just that, 
given the need to mark the experience out in suitable language, and perhaps a need 
to have such experience located in something like the being of a supreme issuer of 
the demands, then it is not surprising to find both the mode of expression being 
used and its claim to be reflecting accurately something that does appear (though 
not so determinately) in the immediate experience. (By this latter need, to have the 
demand specifically placed in either god or cosmos, I intend to outline a point that 
will be made more fully in chapters 6 and 7. It is to the effect that reflection on the 
moral demand, together with analysis of its direct phenomenology, shows that an 
essential component to it is that of its otherness, the sense of its being at least partly 
and in a significant way made up of the not-self. I will argue that the otherness need 
not amount to anything more than the experiential sense of the demand not being 
entirely constituted by oneself. But here, with the heightened demand construed in 
religious terms, I am claiming that otherness, or alterity, takes on a specially 
personified guise, being located in the person of god, or as that cosmic order which 
stands before one).
Before passing on to further discussion of the heightened moral demand 
experience and its putative connections with an objective value realm, two general 
rejoinders that go with the foregoing discussion need giving their place. The first is 
simply to repeat the point that this form of demand experience is not one that serves 
to represent the claim to perceive a demander or value realm in immediacy as a 
whole, even though it is the one to which attention is generally, and perhaps
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understandably,41 turned. So there remains a great mass, indeed the greater part, of 
moral experience below the level of this peak, enlivening class. Any results of 
descriptive phenomenology at this level therefore need assessing in the light of their 
possible absence at the less intense levels. It is, of course, logically possible that 
subjects should take themselves to be having an intuition of the divine or cosmic 
will at these lower levels of everyday demand apprehension and fulfilment. But that 
is something which stays, I believe, in the realm of possibility and is not borne out 
by the empirical measure of descriptive phenomenology. Hence my suggestion that 
at the higher - that is, more forceful, intense, and engaging - reaches of the demand 
experience, it is these features that are responsible for any overall image of the 
divine rather than that an apprehension of the divine will or way of the cosmos itself 
brings forth the described features.
The second point, which further narrows down the breadth of this range of 
experience within the general course of the moral demand, is addressed to the 
constancy of this religious interpretation of the demand as it is affixed to the 
particularly heightened demand experience. For the image which has been portrayed 
and questioned over the last few pages is not itself one that is instantiated 
throughout the peaks of the moral demand. That it is the case that there are such 
specially engaging and striking instances of moral demand experience, and given 
that these are not the complete and only forms of that class of experience, it is so 
much more the case that their religious/cosmic aspect is but a narrow phenomenon 
of a very much larger general area to which description is directed. Even remaining 
within the heightened demand experience, then, one will not get far viewing it 
through the categories of the theistic/cosmic. The reason for this is simple. It is that 
we do not, as subjects of the experience, find ourselves always alluding to such 
categories in order either to describe or to interpret the peak experiences. Some of 
us never do so, though many of us do seem inclined on particular extreme 
occasions to grasp at and venture forth the (roughly) religious mode of expression. 
That this description of experience is not universal, and that when it is employed it
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is generally associated with religious experience and divine demands, rather than 
being limited to moral demand experience under a religious aspect, gives pause to 
any descriptive exegesis of the phenomenology in question. The religious aspect 
just does not have any great constancy. It is not therefore sufficiently widespread a 
phenomenon on which to base general conclusions about moral demand experience. 
There may be a divine will or way of the universe which issues demands (including 
moral ones) on us, and there may be ways in which we can come into contact with 
them, but I doubt that religious experience itself gives all that much warrant for any 
steady and universally acceptable determinate image of such things. That is another 
matter. What I am saying here is that the phenomenology of moral demand 
experience at the heightened level gives little material for taking it to be caused by, 
reflecting, consonant with, or even entailing such divine/cosmic demands. (It can 
be objected by the upholder of some version of theism that this shows not the 
absence of certain demands and demanders but the blunting of our consciousness of 
the moral and the divine. Secularization and scepticism have inured us, she might 
argue, to what there is to feel if only we would turn our hearts with sincerity in the 
right direction. That is a form of argument, based on the supposition of willful 
negligence and disobedience of the divine, that is to be found throughout the 
biblical stories and the religious literature of other traditions. I do not find it all that 
compelling, though I can see its validity within the deliberations of a religious 
mind-set. The fact starkly remains that not much of the demand experience 
possesses this special kind of phenomenology for us even after reflection on it, and 
that which does is problematic for study).
Tarrying with the sometime religious/cosmic nature of the heightened 
demand experience has provided a background and launching-point into the subject 
of the objective realm of values. There are a couple of threads from the previous 
discussion that I wish to weave through that which is to come. One is a matter of 
the extent of our identification of the experience as being thus and so. I will argue, 
as with the religious phenomena, that the claim to be apprehending moral values
Chapter Five 175
needs careful attention in order to describe its precise feel. And in that light I shall 
be asserting that description gives rather poor results if it is an objective value realm 
that is thought to be signalled at this level. The other element which I shall be 
employing is that of our own consciousness of the metaphorical rendering given 
should description of experience be couched in terms of a value realm 'out there' 
impinging on us. With that brought to mind via the phenomenology, my additional 
claim will be that what degree of alleged value intuition there is going on is 
frequently itself held by us in non-referential fashion.
3.iii - Value experience and experience of values
Though there is an area of our moral demand experience such that the 
apprehension is sometimes called value experience, this is not being claimed by us, 
it seems to me, to be experience of objects called values. Such a claim might best be 
regarded as being to the effect that the particular area represents the calling on one 
of values we (collectively or individually) hold. One way in which I shall flesh out 
this claim is by viewing the independence of the values as independent of the 
subject in virtue of the social context. The incomingness of the demand and its 
apparent exteriority are shared by whatever value apprehension is thought thereby 
to be present because values are not chosen by oneself and values are outwith 
oneself in the sense that they are social phenomena. Of this kind of understanding 
of the phenomenology Durkheim talks of 'the independence, the relative externality 
of social facts in relation to the individual', and says that,
[Wjhile one might perhaps contest the statement that all social facts 
without exception impose themselves from without upon the 
individual, the doubt does not seem possible as regards religious 
beliefs and practices, the rules of morality and the innumerable 
precepts of law - that is to say, all the most characteristic 
manifestations of collective life. All are expressly obligatory, and 
this obligation is the proof that these ways of acting and thinking are
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not the work of the individual but come from a moral power above 
him, that which the mystic calls God or which can be more 
scientifically conceived [as social facts].42
On the other hand, the strong claim might be made that at least one objective 
value exists in a sense different from and higher than the one involved in its being 
what an individual or collective holds to be important, or would come to recognize 
as such. Then the incomingness and exteriority of the demand would be displayed 
by the value apprehension because values are not chosen by oneself and values, it 
would be alleged, are outwith oneself and others in virtue of subsisting in an 
independent, objective realm of being. And of this claim, Singer registers his 
dissent in these words:
Talk about a "value", which often goes along with talk about 
"creating" or "discovering" values, is difficult to decipher. Surely 
there are values, for a person's values are what that person regards 
as important, but this does not somehow embed in the universe or 
give warrant for talking of values as "there" somewhere independent 
of us, and such talk is either nonsense or elliptical for something 
sensible.43
While, on the other side of such claims as to what we think and feel, Clark believes 
that ordinary, non-philosophical folk are 'confident' in 'versions of the Platonic 
Theory of Forms', to which they (we) 'submit our thought and action' for the 
'objective truth' on moral affairs.44
With respect to these two alternative ways of viewing the moral demand (in 
its heightened form especially) I shall try to employ phenomenology to discover 
what it is we are maintaining in our reports of experience; what it is we actually do 
experience if that experience should be different from our reports; whether we have 
an awareness, and what kind of awareness it is, of the means by which any value 
apprehension is brought about and how those values affect ourselves in signalling 
themselves. Having said above that our own reflective acknowledgement of the
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metaphorical nature of value talk should be considered, I will have cause to go on to 
throw so much doubt on the descriptive accuracy of the latter form of experiential 
claim that, even as a metaphor, talk of an objective value realm is not well instanced 
on attending to the phenomenology.
3.iv - What there is experienced as and as if 'out there'
In the heightened demand experience one can observe a force at work 
pressing on the subject as if from an external locus. Is there a sense of this locus 
contained in the experience? Do we otherwise, as subjects ourselves, incline to ask 
whether for each force and demand we feel or have felt there must be a forcer or 
demander responsible for the pressure? Do we ask this of the moral demand?
The first thing that I believe one gleans from the phenomenology is simply 
the urgency of the pressing (heightened) moral demand. I have already talked of its 
forceful, possibly irksome tone, sometimes clamouring for attention, sometimes 
constraining one in various ways. The phenomenon to which I am now pointing is 
the sheer confusion of a badgering force hemming one about in the heat of this 
urgency. Such an experiential encounter, especially as it occurs with respect to the 
demands in negative situations of the ills that befall others, will often disorient 
oneself; momentarily paralyze one; the sensation of fear and pitched anticipation 
being wrought in one's breast. What comes through this initial glance at the 
experience, then, has nothing whatsoever to do with values, be they intuited from 
metaphysically awkward realms or not. The subject is simply swamped by the force 
which confronts and halts her.
An expression which approaches aptness for this kind of experience and the 
moral situation it is directed to is that of the 'crisis' moment. The attendant 
qualitative phenomena in the experience do not seem to me to differ all that much 
from those found generally in crisis experiences - that is, times when conflicting 
courses of action bear upon one; when quick decisions must be made in times of 
danger and uncertainty; when some part of one's very character is threatened and
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the possibility of one betraying oneself and others is alive. As for the moral case, 
the demand of the powerful kind presently being considered immediately plunges 
oneself into a situation of this crisis sort. Simply ignoring the demand seems 
impossible when in the thrall of it. One is confronted with a state of affairs to-be- 
dealt-with, for sure, even if that is not at all the same thing as a value-to-be- 
actualized which is felt as if from ’out there’. The moral situation before one seems 
to be engaging with oneself in such a fashion that one's attitudes and actions toward 
it reflect much more than merely a passing interest in the panorama of experience 
crossing consciousness.45 One way in which this phenomenology may be brought 
about, or rendered explicit to oneself, is through a value conflict. (It is not only a 
value clash that issues in the striking experience, but it often can be). Such a 
conflict of values can be more and less given to the surface of consciousness. The 
subject herself can feel the demand as one to resolve the situation and the clash of 
values it brings in its train. Far from being experienced as special objects acting on 
her, these values are simply those ones, and felt as those ones, which are the things 
or general concepts held by the subject as important (either for her, for her 
community, or as important simpliciter ). The primary descriptive phenomenon in 
the forefront of her consciousness in that case is the conflict of values, the crisis 
situation, and not any sense, however vague, of a specially located objective 
demander calling on her. Though there are the phenomena of incomingness and of 
exteriority present in the experience, or rather, seemingly bringing in the experience 
to oneself, these do not indicate to the subject the correspondent presence of, or 
sending forth of the experience by, a value realm. There is simply the sensation of a 
pressure on one in virtue of a certain impasse in the values held by and available to 
oneself. And even though the ways in which that pressure comes to exert itself, and 
that apparent exteriority be manifested, are not without their own degree of 
awkwardness for investigation, they are not being held by us, as subjects here, to 
be constituted in ways that make reference to an objective value realm.
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That objective realm which is likely to get noted is simply the one of the 
world in which ills and benefits befall persons and are intentionally directed to them 
- which is the world of physical and social facts, but not value facts that are 
objective insofar as these are read off from a realm different from that world. 
Objective values that are felt seem objective in the sense of being independent of 
one's own control and choosing. Indeed, this is the working definition of 
'objectivity' in this matter given by one phenomenologist of values.46 That says 
something interesting and important about value. It may prove a necessary feature 
of the experience, and of the very concept, that it have an independence of some 
sort about it. But that, of course, is something possessed by a number of 
experiences that have no relation to a reality of the sort indicated by their content. 
Singer, for instance, talks of the possible error of 'confusing objectivity with 
independence of one's will - a criterion on which hallucinations would be 
objective.'47 While there is a physical reality of conditions - hot sun, wearied brain, 
and so forth - that can be investigated as causing, say, a mirage, there is no reality 
to the content of the mirage-appearance, a shaded and water-filled oasis, for 
example.48 But even this analogy breaks down, I believe, for the moral demand 
experience. For what I am saying here is not: values appear as if 'out there' in the 
peak experience, but this is illusory;49 rather I am saying: that kind of value 
intuition does not even go on in the peak experience (where one could reasonably 
expect most likelihood of observing it). There are phenomena of incomingness and 
exteriority going on, and there may also be (though not always) a sense of 
value/values that the subject has in strange and inexplicit ways, but the two are not 
so intertwined that the value takes on a life of its own as if from a self-subsistent 
realm. Independence of value from subject choosing does not entail independence 
of the subjective. Nor does it carry the locational feature as arising from a realm 
separate from oneself and others in experience, heightened or otherwise.
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3.v - What is and what is not under one's control
In this sub-section I want briefly to recapitulate a point made earlier about 
the independence of experience from one's choosing in order to repeat it with 
respect to the moral demand and value experience. The point was made initially in 
sub-section 2.i. It concerned the ways in which the occurrences of certain 
experiential states of affairs could be seen as under one's control. The example of 
a headache was given as one which could not simply be wrought in consciousness 
by willing its arrival therein, but which could be brought about by performing some 
action known to lead to its occurrence. Similarly, I believe that the notion of 
conferring moral value and demandingness on objects and events is properly 
viewed also in the light of that distinction. What one cannot do is simply will that 
one be presented with a moral demand upon oneself, or that something have value 
because one chooses that it be so. But what one can do is choose to perform (or 
omit) some act that will either bring about, or put oneself in a position to have, the 
requisite experience. Choosing to watch a television documentary on, say, drug- 
trafficking would be an instance of this kind of action if one knows it is the sort of 
thing that will engender a moral demand experience in one. Or a case of directly 
causing there to be demands on one and values of some sort instantiated would be 
possible simply by siring a child. One has not thereby created the demand or value, 
but one has brought about the circumstances under which these phenomena are said 
to exist (even if, rather notoriously in the case of caring for children, not always in 
one's own experience). This is a point to which I shall devote a section in my final 
chapter. If it is not possible to will the particular experience of the moral demand 
within one, nor is it possible to create a demand or a value with an intrinsic 
demandingness about it by the direct exercise of one's volition. This has two 
implications of interest which I explore in that later section. One matter it reveals is 
that the experience itself is never felt just to be or to have been brought about by 
one's own deliberate call. Some element of the not-self, however that be construed, 
is felt to be involved in the experience, with respect both to its cause and content.
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The other thing it shows, I believe, is this. Wherever a demander or value that 
demands may reside, and however it be effective in putting itself upon the subject, 
she herself cannot just choose to bring it about. This is so again in virtue of the 
involvement of the not-self in the constitution of these states of affairs - which I 
shall investigate more fully as a phenomenological and conceptual affair in chapter 
7. And what I shall also maintain is that these things - the experience and that object 
of it which may or may be said to subsist beyond the experience itself - are 
constituted crucially in some part by the not-self. Nevertheless, what I shall argue 
alongside is that the not-self is decidedly not given in some special self-subsistent 
realm of values 'out there'.
There are ways, then, clear and unmysterious ones, by which one can put 
oneself in a position to be under a demand or to be aligned with respect to the 
experienced sense of a value impinging upon one. That I do not think it possible to 
do this directly - that is, by willing it be so that a demandingness or value 
straightaway exerts itself - may say something about the demand and value or about 
oneself as apprehender of them or about both.50 What I believe it shows will be 
explored in the next two chapters. In them I shall direct attention both to the ways in 
which moral demandingness and value is experienced and can be experienced, and 
to the ways in which we hold onto the nature of the experience at a reflective level, 
in order that essential features of them be discerned. In anticipation of that, and for 
the purpose of expressing my initial opinion at this juncture, I am saying that the 
demand appears in consciousness outwith the control of the subject insofar that she 
cannot just immediately conjure it up by a flat of will. (The same goes for the sense 
of value/values which she has). But it would be incorrect, thereby, to see these 
matters as entirely removed from the operation of the choice of the subject. Given a 
likely knowledge on her part of those states of affairs which generally bring about 
for her the requisite experience - or are held by her community to be the ones that 
should do so - then she can decide to do a number of things that will put herself in 
the corresponding position. And conversely, of course, and more commonly for
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ourselves, she can choose to turn away from those states of affairs, or not 
participate in those activities, of which she is aware that they will put upon her 
some sort of moral demand. This occurs each time we turn away from the television 
screen or switch channels because the documentary on famine is too disturbing, and 
our personal capacity to help too pitiful. Or when we refuse to get involved in a 
project or relationship - say, joining a volunteer project to help severely disabled 
people - because we are aware of how burdensome the demands it would place 
upon us and the values it would require us to strive to maintain or promulgate. In 
this latter case it is, of course, not only a moral demand or moral values that are 
being felt would be incurred, but other ones too (a well-kept garden is a demanding 
project, but to most of us it is likely only to involve a moral demand if it belongs, 
say, to one's ageing and ailing relative to whom one has promised to look after it). 
What all this points to is at least some understanding on the part of the subject of the 
conditions under which she is presented with a value or put under the thrall of a 
heightened demand (still keeping to this particular area of the experience). Hence 
my continuation of phenomenological description now turns it to the possible 
viewing of that understanding and the degree to which it is given in the immediate 
experience.
3.vi - Values or demanders as causing the moral
demand in experience
In this sub-section I am going to look at the experience of the heightened 
demand to see whether there is, as the moral experience goes on, a sense on the part 
of the subject of a value or demander causing her experience. This causal relation 
between herself and some other states of affairs I take in the kind of construal of 
causation in experience as instanced by loud noises causing headaches and houses 
causing visual images of houses, when those facts are known in immediacy to the 
subject or only discerned on reflection. But as I address this matter I would ask the 
reader to keep at the back of his/her mind the fact that I will convert the discussion
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in the next sub-section to that of the less rigid relations - fittingness and 
correspondence, in particular - between subject and putative object that might be 
occurrent in the experience. For now, though, I will concentrate on this causal role 
of values and/or demanders as experienced by the subject. 51
What I am looking for here is something like this. A person feels a demand, 
say, to worship a deity. This demand (as it is put upon her) she feels to be directly 
caused by the divine demander. There is her, the deity, and the latter issues forth 
the demand which strikes her in just the same causal fashion as a traffic policeman 
holding up his hand makes her feel she should brake the car. The event description 
under which the subject herself categorizes her experience is that of the deity 
demanding something of her. Similarly, for a moral demand or the sense of a value 
calling on one, the corresponding phenomenology would be given by that 
description on the part of the subject that straightforwardly claimed the experience 
as being wrought by a demander or a value.
Are there, then, instances in which this kind of description in causal terms is 
evinced by us? The short answer is in the affirmative. The more developed answer 
is not, however, one consonant with the causal relation being felt as inspired by any 
sort of special demander or value realm 'out there'. It seems to me, on looking as 
closely and carefully as possible at the phenomenology, that the demanders and 
values felt to be causally responsible for the relevant experiences are not of the sort 
that give scope for the notion of a moral reality with its own special kind of 
existence being the generator of that experience. What are regarded as and located 
as thus responsible may themselves be metaphysically intriguing and challenging 
entities, events, or states of affairs. But as to the Mackie reading of the 'queer' sort 
of values being claimed to be present, and causally so, they are not of that 
interesting order.
What are, on occasion, identified as causally operative in the experience? 
Sometimes it is the existence of specific persons who make moral demands on one. 
One's family and friends do so. One's head of state, trade union leader, teacher,
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priest, employer can do so.52 Ideally, it is generally thought, humankind as such 
(and perhaps non-human life at a certain stage of sentience) make moral demands 
which one should acknowledge and try to act on appropriately. And if that 
conglomerate is sometimes a little too remote from our experience - or from the 
heightened form of it, at any rate - then it is certainly the case that the unknown 
other or group does make demands on one in immediacy which are felt as she falls 
and cries in pain or as the wracked and starving stranger asks for help. To the 
question, What is causing the demand? I think we as subjects discern a number of 
factors of more and less precise description that are responsible. These vary from 
one person to another and within the course of our own roughly repeatable moral 
experience. 'Seeing her pain'; 'The wanton cruelty'; 'His manifest kindness' - these 
are fairly precisely located descriptions we give of what caused our experience. 
More vaguely, we will recognize simply that the other's presence is causing the 
demand, without elaborating any further - and often without being able on much 
reflection to elucidate more finely those exact features which excited apprehension 
of the demand. 'Something about the way he treats her' comes midway between 
these two sketched positions.
The kinds of feature that I do not find pointed to at all often are the ones 
most frequently debated in moral philosophical texts, especially in recent times. 
They are those of 'goodness', 'rightness', 'oughtness', and their negative 
counterparts. I doubt that these terms are used much by the mass of us in order to 
register our moral experience and the qualities therein when we are engaged in the 
course of everyday life. But as to the matter of regarding these qualitative features 
as themselves causally responsible for the demand experience I think that the 
phenomenological picture does not bear out such a suggestion. This bodes ill for 
the discovery of value entities with which we feel ourselves to be causally 
interacting in the production of moral experience. For the nouns I have just listed 
are those most commonly thought to be the value terms which might figure in any 
such causal account.53 There is a debate at large about whether an epistemologically
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fit moral theory involving these properties can be adequately formulated or not.54 
That is a matter that goes beyond the phenomenology. With that phenomenological 
description, however, there is not such scope for debate as to the experienced 
causes of the moral phenomena pressing upon one. We do not feel properties 
(occult or otherwise) of goodness or rightness to be causing our experience.
The nearest we may all come to this kind of report is in the particularly acute 
sensation that the evil of some person is bringing about our perception of him in the 
corresponding fashion. But even this is not so much pointing to a special value 
feature instantiated in him as to a character trait or deeper infection of self in him 
that is manifested before one. Further reflection may, though not always, pinpoint 
the particular character flaw and its exercise in behaviour. One will sometimes 
precisely identify the particular action or personality trait that excited in one a moral 
experience: the callous disregard for human suffering ; the easy preparedness to 
employ torture for political ends; the banal and routine unpleasantness to strangers. 
And once these reports move beyond immediacy and become reflective 
pronouncements on one's experience, then they look much more like assessments 
of the other and his behaviour than causally wrought experiential reactions. The 
notion of the person's evil causing one's experience and judgement of him as so 
soon drops out of one's own conception at that stage. Reflection determines what it 
is about a person and his acts which excites in one the particular moral experience. 
This is not the same thing as a clear and direct sensation in immediacy of one's 
experience being wrought by a peculiar disvalue hovering about the individual. The 
interesting interpretative question which remains is that of whether something called 
evil causes a person's evil character and acts and how that kind of explanatory 
device coheres within our epistemological-metaphysical framework.55 But as to a 
sense in our experience of goodness and rightness, badness and wrongness, 
playing a clear and direct causal role in the production of our experience, I think that 
when we cast our attention upon the stuff of the direct impingement of the moral
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demand on consciousness we will not find such a sense in so recognizably distinct 
a form.
We feel ourselves respond, react, moved to think and do certain things in 
the light of coming across certain moral situations and characters (actual or 
imaginary). But an awareness on our part of the causal antecedents of our moral 
behaviour (both thought and action) does not figure with respect to demanders and 
values 'out there'. For most of us there seems to be as clear a causal pathway from 
seeing others in pain to the arrival in consciousness of a moral demand as there is 
between seeing that and our wincing. Similarly, the immediacy of the sensed causal 
route from viewing another's act, say, of helping the destitute, to the experience of 
a moral value being displayed or implemented is - again, for most of us - as close as 
that from the viewing to that sensation we call a 'warming of the heart'.56 So we do 
have a sense in the experience of something to it that brings about the moral 
phenomena, and brings them about in what feels like other clear-cut senses of 
causal manner. In this respect, while I do not think the likes of goodness and 
rightness are felt by us to be playing that role, there may be better chance of 
discerning the felt operation of the so-called 'thick' ethical concepts like courage, 
kindness, ingratitude, spitefulness, &c.57
Once more, then, the question for phenomenological analysis is whether we 
do sense these kinds of things as conducting a causal relation with us in the 
experience. And appended to that, of course, is the question of how we are viewing 
these features of acts and actors. For they may themselves be felt to be the particular 
representations, reflections, instantiations of moral values of a specially 
transcendent or ideal kind. Or it might simply be that it is felt that a certain 
developed capacity for the spontaneous classifying under moral concepts of certain 
actions and characters naturally excites the relevant demand or value-feel. (This 
latter being a sense going on in immediacy rather than a reflection on moral 
education and the way in which it trains our reactions). These two possibilities 
merely highlight large general areas of the subject's relation to her experience. But
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one other which I think especially deserves some mention is that of the subject 
simply not having a particularly well-defined awareness in immediacy at all of the 
exciting properties, though she does feel herself to be causally interacting with 
something other than the sheer physical state of affairs before her. This latter sense, 
indeterminate and inchoate as it is and may remain, is about as near as we get, I 
believe, to instancing the kind of value phenomenology Mackie and McDowell take 
us to be possessed of.
With respect to this issue, the latter philosopher holds that,
Given that Mackie is right about the phenomenology of value, an 
attempt to accept the appearances makes it virtually irresistible to 
appeal to a perceptual model.58 
My appeal, then, is that such a phenomenology is eminently resistible. This is not a 
question of whether we ourselves model our experience on primary or secondary 
quality perceptual interactions. (This is the point which McDowell takes to separate 
himself from Mackie at the ontological level). It is the simple sense of being 
confronted by a reality that tugs on one. The sense itself is simple - of a call on one 
(or just a call which one happens to have apprehended). But that which is being 
sensed may not be so simple, even on reflection. And one may not be at all clear 
about what precisely one’s reaction fixes on - in the case of the famine: the human 
suffering, the squandering of the world’s resources, the inability of the home 
government to do anything - and one may need to winkle out the precise object of 
one's reaction of horror or sympathy or whatever. Indeed, we are acquainted 
ourselves with the puzzlement that some moral demands bring in their wake, as 
well as that nagging and unwelcome quality they can have. This takes the form of 
sheer surprise or bemusement that one should feel such and such a way - that, for 
instance, one should find oneself suddenly feeling the demand to condemn some 
form of behaviour like betting that one had previously not bothered about. Nor are 
the objects of that sense simple for the subject once she herself comes to think on 
the matter. It may remain to one a confusing and even unintelligible affair as to just
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how and why one came to have the experience one did. More generally, the simple 
sense of a causal relation with the moral state of affairs confronting one is not 
attended by the simple awareness of just what it is about it that maintains such a 
relation with one. 'Another's pain' or 'The giving of money to the poor' - these are 
examples of the straightforward accounting for one's experience by giving the 
seeming cause. Yet it is important to recognize as a phenomenological fact, I 
believe, that the sense of being in contact with something special about the moral 
state of affairs (we know not what, to echo Locke's words from another context) 
remains unclear. Exploration of the 'horizon' to this sense and of the contextual 
background that girds it about might give one further shades to a picture of finer 
resolution. But the immediate sense which subjects have with respect to the 
presence and operation of peculiar moral qualities to the state of affairs before them 
will remain as a brute datum of the phenomenological description at that level.
One writer on the notion of moral knowledge puts the aim of his book as: 
...to show that "the ordinary moral consciousness" is right in 
regarding itself as a consciousness, as an awareness of things that 
are not dependent for their existence or properties upon the fact of 
being apprehended.59 
This seems a fair enough report of the way we do feel. The experience of an 
independent element at work in the moral demand experience we encounter (which 
may or may not be granted reflective assent) is not, however, experience of an 
independent moral entity that works to give the experience its particular strike and 
tone. Such a point needs emphasizing, both as a phenomenological finding and as 
a logical consideration. In the former mode it is the descriptive presentation of 
moral experience as being a certain way. At best it might hint at experience of an 
independent moral reality, particularly in the peak moments. It hints at that putative 
experience insofar as it gives one both senses of independence in experience: of an 
independence of the experience itself and its content from one's direct volition, and 
of a feel of something independent about the moral state of affairs in similar way to
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its physical independence of one, but not being identical to its physical features. 
That second sense (taking ’sense' here to refer both to the linguistic meaning of 
'independence' as well as to its felt operation as being distinct from consciousness) 
gets very close I believe to seeming to us to be disclosing a window onto a special 
mode of reality, that is, in its value guise.
Yet I do not think it actually gets far enough beyond the sense of something 
different from the physical description of the event that is either signalled in or 
causally responsible for our experience. Since this particular sub-section is 
concerned with that causal reading within the experience I shall stick to it, though 
the overall criticism of potrayals of our experience as signalling values 'out there' is 
obviously the one to which I am also directed. As to that sense on our part of the 
causal route by which our particular moral experience is wrought, I will try to 
illustrate my point with an example. In the specific case of finding oneself in the 
Ethiopian scrubland where thousands of homeless people are dying of malnutrition 
and disease I should think that one would find oneself in the thrall of a particularly 
strong moral demand experience directed toward cessation of such a situation. 
From where is that causally arising? Mirroring a point I made slightly earlier, I 
believe that phenomenological description will often fail to locate any kind of sense 
of that origin at all in the immediacy of that experience. There is a sense of 
urgency, of a pressing, awful, shocking state of affairs that calls to be dealt with. 
There is a flooding of consciousness with the sheer desperation and horror of the 
situation. There is an awareness of suffering on a monstrous scale. No doubt 
something or other among these descriptions is felt to be, at least on cursory 
reflection, to be causing one's experience and the response it represents. But in the 
thick of that original experiential state the charge it possesses and which 
momentarily captures one's whole being does not really seem often to have been 
caused by anything specific other than the general scenario confronting one. Even 
that use of causal language may go too far away from the indeterminacy and 
pressing immediacy of the direct experience. For, just as I do not think we are
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usually aware of tables causing visual images of tables - we simply inhabit a milieu 
in which we sometimes see tables - so am I claiming that often we do not have an 
awareness of that which is causing our experience with respect to the moral demand 
in such an heightened instance. The demand simply is presented to us in more and 
less forceful fashion.
In the more common run of our moral experience, constituting that range 
which occupies the space below the peak ones, the demand is indeed very often 
presented to oneself, as if an object for contemplation rather than a pressing, 
nagging, swamping matter of moment. And in that less common but more 
noticeable peak level of experience, while the demand is not merely presented in 
neutral colours before one but engages the attention and captures viscerally one's 
impulses, it seems usually to be going on without containing within itself a sense 
also of a particular causal agent responsible. The demand is not experienced as 
being a purely inner correlate of an external factor exciting it. There is a more 
complex sense of its placing with respect to the apprehension of it and the 
demandingness being exercised upon us (and which, perhaps one feels, others 
would and should also experience if only they were suitably equipped or 
positioned). My detailed examination of that will take place in the next chapter. But 
here I want to reiterate the lack of a well-formed and consistently present sense of 
specific factors operating causally upon one to bring about the experience as it 
occurs. Not only, then, is there an evident lack of an experienced interaction with 
demanders or values 'out there'; but there is, furthermore, not much sense on our 
part of causal interplay with anything specific at all as the experience strikes oneself 
in all its overwhelming intensity.
Rather than the cause of one's experience being given as related to a specific 
value instantiated in the situation, or specific features of that situation in a wertfrei 
mode, one is simply drawn in by the situation itself that confronts one. Similarly, I 
believe, one's immediate reaction to a painting or a landscape vista is often of this 
undifferentiated type. The awe, wonder, and rapture with which one responds is
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not always attended on its occurrence by a sense of the precise features which are 
causally responsible for one's reaction. They can, of course, be made apparent to 
one on reflection, but not always in the first blush encounter with the object. And 
also with one's response to a religious object: it is only when one comes to think on 
the experience of the seeming divine reality that questions begin to be addressed 
about those features of the numinous, the powerful, the holy, the strange, the 
creepy, the transcendent, and so forth, with which one thinks one was causally 
involved. In the immediacy of these experiences, and those which are the 
heightened moral ones, I want to say that one finds oneself too much part of the 
very situation before one to disentangle experience and causes as they are apparent. 
One is not so much a spectator as bound in with the state of affairs before one, 
drawn into it. Such, then, are those reports we occasionally give of a sense of 
losing our selves in the aesthetic or religious confrontation - and, I think also, that 
sense is triggered at times in the midst of the heightened moral demand. At the time 
of its striking itself upon consciousness, the demand not only sinks into one but 
also seems to plunge oneself into the situation before one. Since this can be a 
profoundly disturbing and unwelcome matter for us, I take it that what is occurring 
in that kind of moral situation is a rather more complex engagement of self than is 
recorded by a sense simply of an engrossment of self or entire filtration of it into the 
experienced domain of the moral demand. That is to say, there is some finer 
gradation of levels and elements of self given both in the immediate experience and 
for reflective analysis than an absolute portrayal might (mistakenly) be suggesting. 
For, while the peak moral experience certainly seems to involve a permeation of 
self within the confronting situation, there yet can be that part of oneself which 
finds such engagement frightening, unwelcome, even distasteful. And there can be 
also that experience which I mentioned earlier of surprise or bemusement at one's 
involvement; or, of course, of a deep sense of a true self being revealed and 
brought into play. This suggests to me that a more developed model of the self and 
the ways in which it (or areas of it) are taken up by moral states of affairs is at play
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for the subject herself and requires detailing for analysis itself. (Chapter 6 does this, 
and Chapter 7 continues with the theme).
With that much sketched above on the way in which the heightened demand 
sometimes coalesces with, or borders on, or makes complicit a level of the self, I 
will repeat the point that discussion was intended to make and partially explain with 
respect to the sense of the causal instigators of the moral demand experience. It is 
this. In the midst of this heightened form of experience there is usually not a sense 
at all on our part as to the precise features of the moral situation giving rise to it. 
This goes both for the uncontroversial features - pain, relief of suffering - and for 
the 'thick' moral qualities which may or may not have a more difficult ontology - 
kindness, courage, wickedness - through to those more controversial and 
metaphysically awkward moral features that possibly could be felt as values or 
demanders perhaps located 'out there'. The raw data of the experiences are much 
more crude and amorphous than the invocation of that sense would suggest. They 
are - quite significantly - below that certain line of conscious deliberation, and in 
being so are - also significantly, I believe - similar to other instances of heightened 
non-moral demand experience that sometimes themselves flood consciousness. By 
calling these descriptions of the phenomena 'significant' I mean to maintain that 
they give one a reading of the experience which is rarely itself told in moral 
philosophical literature as it encounters that heightened form of it. Slightly odd as it 
may sound, I am stating that not enough attention has been paid to the vagueness 
and to the 'swamping' nature of this experiential type. And little attention has been 
granted either to the ways in which the moral experience at this level appears in 
similar phenomenological guise to other non-moral and particularly charged demand 
experiences.60 For so soon as one ignores these features one naturally, it seems to 
me, suspects there must be some sense on the subject's part of a causal route by 
which her experience can be explicated. Or if the vagueness is recognized, one may 
tend to think again that analysis must push beyond that and that there must be some 
implicit apprehension by the subject of that route and its causal underpinning. But I
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think that, for a certain fairly broad extent of this special range of the experience, 
there just is no such sense. In that light, phenomenological description corresponds 
with veracity to its object data simply by registering these experiential facts. And 
they are those of the very rough apprehension of something pressing and urgent 
putting itself upon oneself. In that way, I think we do have the sense of brushing 
against, of being in contact with or party to, a reality of some sort. Rather than that 
reality being experienced as the impingement on one or intuition of value entities or 
the will/way of a special sort of demander, however, it is signalling itself through a 
much less defined level of awareness. Reflection on this vague sense of tarrying 
with a special mode of reality logically could later view that as having been the kind 
of value apprehension which Mackie believes we take ourselves to be given in 
immediacy. Such reflection can go on also in a similar way for the aesthetic, and 
most especially, the religious phenomena in their heightened aspect.61 That course 
of reflection usually will connect up or try to see a connection of the experience 
with the subject's own course of life, beliefs, and attitudes. Whether or not a 
reflective affirmation of the value realm notion as given to or causally productive of 
the experience, which I have been criticizing at the level of immediacy, leads to or 
feeds back into that immediate experience is something I will address later. That 
issue is certainly not uni-directional from reflective assay to immediate experience: 
there are, after all, plenty of people who experience what they call 'ghosts’, even 
though they 'don't really' believe in them. And there are lots of god-fearing, 
church-going folk whose direct religious experience is entirely lacking, or is even 
that of the inert indifference of the universe, whose faith is yet not (entirely) shaken 
(though this faith may not be labelled so clearly a 'reflective' matter for them). 
Whatever the outcome and ongoing influence of such reflection, I think that if the 
reader looks closely at the immediate experience of those peak moments, she or he 
will find the same description to be primarily apt, i.e., that in its pressing 
immediacy there is no sense other (perhaps) than of a vague reality with a moral 
dimension aligned with one.
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3.vii - Fittingness
The final thoughts contained in the sub-section above lead me away from 
the sense of causal interaction with special moral values 'out there' and into that 
which is of the fittingness, appropriateness, or meetness of one's experience and 
action as it corresponds to those values or the will/way of a divine/cosmic order. As 
I understand these terms and their part in moral philosophical language they are 
taken together to refer largely to criteria for one's judgement and action as one is 
aware of the normative ordering of the world. One's judgement or act is fitting, 
then, if it is consonant with that order - which is itself open to discernment in more 
and less plain fashion. This is certainly the use of 'fittingness' in the classic works 
of Samuel Clarke and John Balguy.62 How that ordering is viewed is, of course, 
another matter - the latter for instance, believed it to represent the divinely intended 
ordering of created nature, its way being open to the light of reason. A more recent 
example of the use of the notion is given in a work titled The Phenomenology of 
Moral Experience where the author claims that such analysis shows this relation to 
be the fundamental one going on in moral experience.63 The general understanding 
of this concept and the experiential feel its proponents seem to wish to point out is a 
shared one amongst its supporters. It is that of the alignment of thought and action 
with an independently existing way of the world. This way can itself be a moral 
order of some metaphysical complexity - so that fittingness is between 
judgement/action in the light of the moral 'ought' directly present to the agent - or a 
natural order to which one's thought and behaviour are morally inclined as they 
coalesce or fail to do so in fitting manner with the way in which natural objects 
develop and are potentially directed (as in natural law theories).
It is with the former notion of fittingness that I am most interested. The 
latter one touches on the subject area of phenomenological study, but only insofar 
as it becomes itself like the other in claiming that moral value is open to recognition 
as one follows and promotes the healthy course of the natural order. It differs from 
the former in that such moral value is not usually seen by its proponents as a
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special kind of property exhibiting a special kind of existential status, but as being 
immanent to the natural order and instantiated positively or negatively as the 
(perhaps divinely) intended or inherent direction of that order is promoted or 
frustrated (both intentionally by us and not). Either way, then, we are faced with 
the question for descriptive survey of whether and how the subject feels herself to 
be aligned in a manner called 'fitting' with either moral values or a demander from 
'out there', both of which would be directing her experience and the actions she 
proceeds to issue forth on that basis. Rather than being felt as causally bringing 
about the experience, the subject will be feeling that her experience is related to the 
objects by way of its contentual aspect. The phenomena of her experience, that is, 
would be signalled in terms of fittingness or appropriateness as they correspond to 
a value or a demander's will whose presence or operation she discerns in the 
situation or in general. (Such discernment itself could be through a feel of 
fittingness in her experience, or based on a more reflective self-analysis through 
which she has come to apprehend the correct moral order and with which she tests 
the fit of her experience).
As it concerns immediacy of the moral demand experience, I think that it is 
the case that, at the heightened form of it, we do have some experience of this 
phenomenon. Our experience does on occasion seem to be fit or appropriate, to be 
giving us valid information about our world and the future action that is called for in 
virtue of the world's ways. And as to its directly apprehended mode, I think also 
that the sense of fittingness here is one contained in the immediate experience, and 
not only a possible reflectively-wrought sense further to the original experience. 
This kind of experience does not seem to me particularly common, however, and I 
doubt if the phenomenon itself is a universal feature of (occasional) heightened 
moral experience (I can see that 'fittingness' may be a near-universal experiential 
phenomenon only insofar as it relates to a wider range of experience than the 
moral). It may be that some of us don't have that form of experience because we are 
blind to its operation, or misdescribe it, or we are just (willfully or otherwise)
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closed to the value realm with which experience should cohere for its proper 
functioning. And it may also be that, while these experiences are not frequently in 
evidence, they do represent nevertheless those moments for us when we most 
strongly feel ourselves brushing against that moral reality which has various 
possible groundings in metaphysical thought about it. Such moments could hold or 
come on reflection to hold a prized place of importance or significance in our 
experiential economy and in the self-interpretation of our life and its development. 
So I will look at this mode of our demand/value consciousness, even though I don’t 
really think it an especially widespread or commonly operative one, with this 
preliminary understanding of its possibly important role.
I think that two salient points are given by a general overview of the kind of 
experience. The first, which I put briefly in parentheses above, is that it is a 
phenomenon spread over a wide range of our experience. Most, if not all, of us are 
acquainted with that particular tinge and hue of a feeling that matters are aligned just 
right in our life, or in the universe as a whole, if only during the felt moment. There 
appears to be no set pattern to the coming into consciousness of such an experience. 
No doubt it is most strongly associated for us with such things as religious 
ceremony; gazing out at a wilderness landscape or up to the firmament; with love- 
making or flying or artistic contemplation or drug-taking. It has a habit, though, of 
arriving unannounced, if not always unexpected, and may occur in the most 
mundane and everyday situations. Staring out of the window on a short bus 
journey, one might find oneself all of a sudden in such an elevated state. Now this 
experiential phenomenon is not itself captured only in terms of fittingness, but part 
of it often is and sometimes that might be the best available description of the 
experience one can grasp for.64 The particular diffuse tone it possesses is 
manifested in a sense of heightened awareness, of something being consonant with 
a more or less determinate order of things. This 'something' ranges from the 
particular nature of the actions or states of affairs one is momentarily engaged in 
through to a deeper sense of one's very being resting side by side at ease with that
Chapter Five 197
order. And as to the order itself, again this is very often a rather shapeless matter. If 
a sense of the causally operative order is not always particularly well-defined, as I 
argued in the previous sub-section, this phenomenon is even less susceptible of a 
sensed determinate object toward which one is experiencing the fitting relation. So 
far as the immediate experience is concerned, I think that - odd as it sounds - a 
sense of fittingness is described as such by us without the corresponding object. 
That is to say, we do in these moments have this sense, which we record in terms 
of fittingness and similar words, but not an immediate consciousness of exactly 
what it is with which we have entered into this relation. This contention I believe to 
apply equally to moral and non-moral instances of the experience. And this is the 
second point. For, while the phenomenon runs across a broad band of experience 
classes, it also shares this feature across them, of an inchoate, uncertain object with 
which one feels oneself to be enjoying the relation of fittingness. I do not think this 
experiential sense causes us, as subjects of it, much trouble by its very vagueness. 
We do use this class of description - to the extent, of course, that we actually do 
have the experience - without inquiring into the nature of the fitting relation or 
being all that concerned by its evident lack of clarity. This note I append simply in 
order to point out the degree of indeterminacy we can put up with in our experience, 
even while a philosophical mode of thought would press for greater explication of 
the matter.
With these two major points having been presented, I would like to draw 
out their place in the reading of the experience to which I seek to give 
phenomenological description. Firstly, I should state that the fact that a particular 
tone or strength of an experience class, such as that of the moral demand in its 
immediate strike on consciousness, is shared with other classes of greater and 
lesser analogous purport, need not itself be of any signal importance for analysis. 
So the repeated cause I have had in this and the previous chapter to draw out 
similarities of the moral experience with other areas of our experience need not 
prima facie be viewed in sceptical light. What is required is that for each proffered
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instance of an analogy-drawing or of a shared feature highlighted its specific 
significance be made clear. And the one which I wish to elicit here is this. The 
degree to which this experience forms a part of a wider purchase on a fittingness- 
type of experience, suggests to me that its importance for the picture of that moral 
experience should be carefully circumscribed. I take this to be a straightforward 
application of the Husserlian steps of presuppositionlessness and of permitting the 
appearances to have an initial sway for one's assessment of the descriptive 
presentation. The first simply enjoins in this specific case that one not move too 
quickly from a particular viewed slice of experience to conclusions about its genesis 
or entire nature based on the questionable importance and claims made concerning 
the fitting relation. The other turns the description on its head entirely. For paying 
close attention to the appearances rests that felt quality of fittingness in a wider 
placing within the experience of the moral demand, one which sees it in quite 
restricted contextual space. Since this is a matter of recording immediate 
appearances as the phenomena of our moral experience are constituted in 
consciousness, it may omit the deeper significance of that narrow band of 
experience as its horizon is uncovered for analysis. Nevertheless, the fact that its 
occurrence is far from frequent or universal (as fittingness in moral states of affairs) 
at least suggests that a greater recognition should be given on the part of philosophy 
to the wider panoply of moral experience from which it stands out. Since this band 
is not given generally in the mode of fittingness, or at a heightened awareness of 
value entities interacting with the subject, I believe that a view of the moral demand 
in experience as appraising one of and putting one into contact with a special kind 
of value realm is seen to be tenuous as a phenomenological claim if it is pursued via 
the fittingness relation.
This would not itself be so damaging a point to make if such value intuition 
did go on in the heightened experience. There is no reason a priori why any kind of 
value realm and apprehension of it should be widespread and available in absolutely 
clear ways to description. That is why I have devoted so much attention to the
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heightened form of experience, on the supposition that it is reasonable to expect that 
kind of intuition to be given there if it is given anywhere. The problem, of course, 
is not just that the general range of the experience goes on at a level of strength and 
intensity below the standard examples of moral philosophical literature, and does 
not appear to be signalling special sorts of values or demanders from 'out there' to 
us; it is also that the peak form of experience does not do the signalling either to any 
great degree or any determinate degree. I use terms more cautious here than simply 
saying that no such experience is marked by a value sense because, as I have said in 
previous sub-sections, I think there is something like this sense that does go on. 
What the riders modifying the 'degree' of the data given in that sense's operation 
are intended by me to indicate are two facts presented by the appearances, both of 
which I have been in the process of discussing: the first, that the form of experience 
itself is not the one with which we are most often acquainted; and the second, that 
even at its peaks the moral demand is not the intuition of values as special external 
objects, but of a much more rough and vague sense of touching upon a reality that 
is inter alia thought of as if a morally-charged reality of some loose kind. This, 
then, is the second issue I wish to draw out from the points sketched above. It is 
that, though fittingness gives some purchase on an outer moral reality, it does not 
give very much. Nor does it give it very clearly. A sense of the fittingness of one's 
apprehension of a demand with the way of whatever, or of that relation of one's 
action with some way, is a weak candidate for phenomenological presentation of 
value ontology. Far more felicitous results would be gleaned, I believe, from the 
feel of fittingness which goes for us with the experience and behaviour in the light 
of and correspondent with the values we hold and our group avows - those 
commitments, needs, and treasured goods which we strive to maintain, protect, and 
promote. This feel, which I do not think is all that different from the one we have 
when we come across the right phrase or word in tackling a composition to be 
written, is not specially mysterious. (It can be undergone either in immediacy or 
later on reflection). Perhaps one tends too easily to assimilate the notion of moral
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fittingness with those spiritual-religious ones with which I compared it earlier. 
Given the issues at stake, that might be an understandable approach. But when the 
comparison class is taken instead from the rather more mundane sense of fittingness 
that goes with the right arrangement of one's daily affairs then I think that we will 
find ourselves less inclined to give the moral one a special metaphysical status.
The importance and life-significance of the moral field is not impugned 
thereby, of course. But the tendency to assimilate its operation to a realm of external 
moral values with which we interact by the way of a sense of fittingness need not 
be followed. As a matter of the logic of the concepts, it does not follow that from 
the feel one can infer specific moral objects corresponding with it; nor, indeed, as 
the descriptive object of phenomenological exegesis does the feel exhibit itself 
aligned with a moral reality both clearly and distinctly given up to view. 
Furthermore, I do not think this sense of fittingness is all that strongly evinced to 
oneself when it is active. This again moves it away from the religious analogy and 
in doing so away from a heightened awareness of some divine demander or cosmic 
way toward which one's thoughts and action are fitted. While I cannot conclude 
from this that absolutely no value apprehension goes on at all for any of us, I do 
think that these considerations weigh in the balance of evidence against taking a feel 
of fittingness as that one which delivers us party to a special value realm. The 
rationale for my looking most closely at the heightened form of demand experience 
generally, and at its quantitative accompaniment by the fitting sense, has a coupled 
foundation. The most obvious reason for doing so is that I then follow the trend of 
moral philosophical exposition of the matter. This both puts the debate within a 
recognizable and established framework as well as giving me the material with 
which and against which to work. So a good deal of my argument stands in the 
experience generally given in the literature, while reacting against that also in 
pointing out the lack of attention it entails to the wide swathes of moral experience 
lying below such peak levels. The other reason for this type of examination is a 
little more tendentious and, while I think it reasonable, I am not able to argue much
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beyond the stage of convincing a reader that it is indeed a reasonable enough 
assumption on which to work. And that is the one with which I have often been 
working, namely, that if there is an intuition of external, special moral somethings 
on our part, one would at least expect to find it in the heightened experience if 
anywhere. This carries the corresponding implication - though it is not entailed in 
strictly logical fashion, again I feel it to be reasonable - that failure to find it evinced 
at such a level means absence of it from the experience tout court. Looking at the 
phenomenology of this particular set of data, as well as the others discussed earlier, 
I believe that the overall panorama of the experience that comes to light is one which 
does contrast with much of its standard portrayal in the literature, and that, in doing 
so, that image which emerges is both closer to the actual working of our experience 
and further away from the notion of it as being of putative value entities acting on 
us.
Further to this form of argument from the phenomenological finding which 
I have repeatedly employed, I want also to make another point which I have 
canvassed before. I should like the reader to recall the emphasis given in my 
previous discussion, where I maintained that the most common form of a 
heightened, significant experience of the moral demand is put upon us by the way 
of the negative ones concerning states of affairs that are amiss, in crisis, bad, or 
evil. I take from this two suggestions of importance for the critical project being 
expedited. The first is simply that which was made before, that concentration of 
moral philosophical discussion on 'the good' distorts, ignores, or at least leaves on 
one side unnoticed, the more poignant, powerful, and common form of moral 
experience: this form being of quite the opposite. (This point is directed, of course, 
to a matter of phenomenological exposition and the objects of our moral experience, 
rather than to any kind of impugning of the philosophically-aided search for the 
good in life). If I have had cause in preceding sections to cast doubt on the alleged 
presence in our experience of 'the good' as it seems to inhere in or radiate from a 
divine will or cosmic ordering or special value realm; and given my continued
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emphasis on the haziness and indeterminacy of the objects of our moral experience:- 
then it is in the compass of evil that I think we are likelier to encounter the more 
piercing and clarified apprehension of disvalue. Fittingness here fades into a 
background presence as the grinding, arresting, assailing sense of the very 
unfittingness of certain states of affairs leaps into sharp relief. This is, I believe, the 
phenomenon with which we are the more familiar and through which our moral 
consciousness is most commonly and strongly engaged. As to its degree of 
determinacy, while I believe it to be a more clearly delineated form of experience 
than its obverse - as I said just above - it too requires care when attending to what 
turn out to be the multifarious ways in which subjects brush against this area.
An initial remark that certainly calls to be noted is, straightforwardly 
enough, that we ourselves hardly ever use a form of identification or expression 
for our moral experience which makes play of such terms as ’fittingness' and its 
opposite. Though there is an experiential sense of these relations occasionally at 
large, much less often for the former than for the latter I believe, they do not form 
part of the ordinary moral discourse of our community, either between or within 
ourselves. And further to this point, I wish to make another one which is directed 
both to the substance of this sub-section as well as to the general understanding of 
the nature of the bad or evil in our moral experience. It is one that attempts to give 
more phenomenological depth to the description of the negatively toned experience 
than is captured under the aegis of 'evil'. What I think captures these phenomena 
more aptly than that philosophically weighted notion is a congeries of descriptions 
invoking the following modes of an experiential sense: the shocking, horrifying 
nature of the situation before one; the jarring, disturbing sensation in  
consciousness and sense of the situation as possessing those properties; the 
awareness of crisis, of matters out of kilter, a sense which veers towards that of 
chaos at its extreme. This shift of emphasis from evil to the sense of things severely 
amiss constitutes the second suggestion of importance to which I think this 
phenomenology gives rise. It is a more lucid phenomenon in consciousness at the
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heightened level of the moral demand than any corresponding sense of 'the good' 
being presented or tugging on one. Taking the doorstep-starving as an example, the 
unfittingness of the situation is a far clearer, more striking experience than is the 
sense of fittingness wrought in one's possible further action of rendering aid. 
Insofar as a heightened form of experience is sometimes with one in the first half of 
example v - the famine on the television - 1 think that these phenomena again differ 
with respect to determinacy of content. For the unfittingness or clashing, crisis- 
borne sensation which is directed to the famine has a fairly lucid content, that is, the 
suffering and the need for its immediate cessation. The fittingness of one's reaction 
of horror, and/or dismay, and/or anger may also be a felt phenomenon, though not 
very often in immediacy. But as to the fittingness of one's action or of any action at 
all by any means or agency, insofar as that goes beyond the simple eradication of 
the crisis, that is generally like the presented demand itself, a rather open-ended and 
unsure matter. Unfittingness is a more common phenomenon than fittingness, then, 
if these general areas of experience should be described by subjects in such terms. 
But that relation represents itself only as a small segment of the ways in which we 
experience and express such negative phenomena.
With this much having been said, the often greater and sharper intensity of 
the apprehension of unfittingness seems to me, though closer-looking to an external 
value disclosure than the good and fittingness, ultimately not to be doing so either. 
To be sure, in these especially charged instances we do come near to a kind of 
negative value intuition. Our everyday moral language easily lends itself to that 
reading. For many of us, in the teeth of some situation that fills us with horror and 
indignation, the natural, philosophically untutored response makes reference to a 
global or transcendent evil over and beyond the descriptive epithet of particular acts 
and characters as being so. The sense of unfittingness, of some kind of instability 
in the ordering of our affairs, perhaps tending even to a cosmic scale, could appear 
as the misalignment or sundering of moral values 'out there'. (Not that our 
identification of our experience or its object at such times would rest at use of the
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term 'unfittingness': that would be felt to be woefully inadequate either to the tone 
of our experience or the severity of the situation it is directed toward). Now I think 
that these types of experience, encountered with respect both to largescale issues 
like the actions of certain repressive regimes toward their populace and on a 
personal, local level like seeing some kids setting fire to a cat, seem to us to be 
particularly close to instantiating a value like 'evil'. If there is some sense on our 
part approaching that of a sense of this value somehow at large, then it is not so 
much of the unfittingness of matters, nor of the value causally bringing about one's 
experience and subsequent action, but rather of the awesome, dreadful fashion in 
which the situation is presented to one and, for most of us, in which it is thought it 
will be presented to any other who comes across it. And this, I think, is not well 
analyzed either as intuition of a value quality or as expressing the tone only of the 
experience itself. It neither ascribes a (totally) independent property to the situation 
nor is it contained only within the experiential datum; yet it does contain some sense 
of the independence of the experience's object and it does express also the strike 
this makes on the self. Something more complex than, say, either the sense of 
horrifyingness 'out there' or the purely 'inner' phenomenon of being horrified, is 
given through our moral experience. Fittingness is thus a good illustration of this 
matter. For, as an experiential phenomenon,65 its apprehension consists in the felt 
interaction both of an external order with which one is in proper relationship and the 
right ordering of self which is capable of entering into such alignment.
My talk of the senses (both linguistic and as a feel on the subject's part for 
her experience) of 'independence' and of 'self ingredient in the experience of the 
moral demand requires further descriptive work to make clear their contribution to 
that experience and marriage within it. What I am inclined to take away from the 
phenomenological analysis of the chapter is this. Presentation of the experience as 
specifically and universally directed toward special objective moral entities or 
properties or, conversely, as simply a subjective reaction lacking any reference to 
independent states of affairs, is incorrect. That much is evident to a quite quick
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phenomenological glance. But further to that, I believe that the phenomenology 
shows the experience to be not at all readily bifurcated in this fashion, such that one 
could resolve its constituents down onto the sides 'objective/subjective' or 
'outer/inner' without a complex remainder. Some further kind of vocabulary needs 
to be employed to give adequate descriptive record of the feel this experience has 
for us. And in order to expedite a more felicitous form of analysis I believe the 
categories of self/not-self should be used. Such investigation promises to bring out 
the extent of independence of self being experienced with regard to the moral 
demand, figuring both in the way of independence-as-exteriority and of 
independence-as-unwilled/unwillable. It will act also as a development of reflective 
thought on the constitution of direct experience which takes it through to those more 
specially reflective modes of consideration on the experience which were pointed 
out in the latter half of chapter 3.
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Concluding comments to chapter five
I have tried in this chapter to wrestle with a number of different moral 
philosophical themes that, through the moral demand experience and 
representations of it, point to moral values and/or demanders 'out there'. In each 
case I believe that I have shown the opponent view to rest on an inaccurate or 
misleading phenomenology. Summarising the route taken and results gained, the 
following general positions have emerged:
- i) Some moral demands irk, that is to say, appear in consciousness as 
unwelcome, irritating, and even alien. But not all do and some that may be irritating 
need not also be felt as alien, threatening presences. The complicity of the self and 
its identified concerns seems the determining factor in this matter.
This exposition led me to look at the experiential sense of the demand's 
independence of the subject:
- ii) Moral demands all possess the feature of 'incomingness', that is, of 
seeming to arise from sources either outwith consciousness or independently of 
one's conscious control. The former phenomenon I call 'exteriority'; the latter I 
have generally labelled as being unwilled/unwillable.
Hence I was brought to look at the exteriority of the demand, looking 
specifically for moral values 'out there' contained in the phenomenological data. 
This task I approached through the media of both the contentual and causal elements 
to the experience. In both analyses I am maintaining that either:
- there just is no sense of any outer moral reality interacting with oneself for 
each moral demand experience;
or:
- when there may look to be such a sense, as I believe there fairly often to 
be at the heightened experiential level, it is loose and indeterminate. Moral values 
'out there' are not taken as object. Something like a morally-tinged reality may be 
felt sometimes to be at large and at work, but only in rough and imprecise way. 
Nor, pace Mackie, do we make much use of reference to such things in our
Chapter Five 207
everyday moral discourse. To be sure, moral matters are felt to be very important 
and pressing, matters on which we can't just beg to differ.66 But that isn't the 
same thing as perception of, or a claim to be perceiving, a value realm.
I think that the particular hue which the peak demand has in consciousness 
resembles that of an obsession.67 One is forced, one cannot ignore the demand. 
And yet there are 'obsessions' which are intimately conjoined with the self and 
aligned with its concerns - such as engage themselves in hobbies, political beliefs, 
and friendships. The moral demand seems to me to display both alien and close 
relations to the self for us as different individuals and for a single individual at 
different times. In the light of this consideration, the next chapter goes on to look at 
the independence-as-unwilled, and to try to unravel the degree of self/not-self felt to 
be working in the experience.
As a kind of postface to this chapter and the previous one I want to say this. 
The tenor of the discussion in both may look rather negative in places. I have often 
attacked certain ways in which the moral demand experience is represented in moral 
philosophy. From its presentation as a particular charged experience giving a 
window onto a determinate value realm, my phenomenological exposition has gone 
instead to a description that sees those phenomena as far less widely exhibited and 
far more vaguely so. As I said in the introduction to chapter 4, though this is a 
negative critique, it has also a positive drive to it. The analysis attacks those 
portrayals of the experience in the process of and in order to formulate a 
phenomenology more closely reporting our actual experience.
My claim is that part of the interesting and original nature of this is founded 
in the way in which accurate phenomenological description counters the one given 
by parties who are divided by different metaethical theories but who share a value 
phenomenology. This obviously gives rise to the question of how it is that certain 
phenomenological elements of the experience should be so shared across moral 
philosophical theories and traditions. It especially raises the question of how and 
why they should have employed inaccurate, errant phenomenologies. As to the
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practice of phenomenological description in this thesis, these questions are not
germane. But it would not be right to say nothing on the matter. So I will voice my
suspicion. It is that a concern with metaethical problems and preoccupation with
procedural rules of moral debate has resulted in a neglect of the everyday workings
of the moral consciousness as it comes across moral demands.68 M oral
philosophers have tended, therefore, to take quick and superficial assay of such
experience when they have thought it necessary to mention it; it being rather
unsurprising therefore that they should have latched upon certain notable features of
the heightened level of experience. I think the notion of a consciousness of values
'out there' making demands on one has arisen through disregard of the complexity
and composition of the experience - which I have tried to render more
representatively. I hope that these claims on my part do not appear too inflated,
given that I claim to be dispatching as inaccurate a number of views of the
experience. I believe them to be based on a sober and careful analysis which will be
o
borne out by the reader as you think on the data provided by your own moral 
consciousness.
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CHAPTER SIX
Is...valuation primarily a stance that we, as agents, or experients, 
take up to objects or states which come before us, or is it primarily a 
"light" in which objects or states appear before us, much as they 
come before us as being about to do this or that, or as having this or 
that bearing on one another, etc. In other words, is valuation 
primarily an attitudinal or phenomenological matter, a matter of how 
someone stands to some content or a matter of the way in which 
that content comes up or appears before him? Or is there both an 
attitudinal and a phenomenological side to the matter, and is there 
perhaps some deep relation between them?
J.N.Findlay1
Neither object-directed nor subject-confined, the moral experience 
resides in a tertium quid.
A.-T.T ymieniecka2
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Extended introduction
The guiding thread that ran through the previous chapter continues through 
this one. In that chapter I had cause repeatedly to emphasize that the subject- 
independence of the moral demand experience need not, and should not, be seen by 
the way of special independent moral values 'out there'. How the experience should 
be seen instead is as involving some external reality and as independent of the 
subject's directly willed control. This contention was made by means of 
phenomenological presentation of the experience. In it moral values or demanders 
of a specific nature and location were not found themselves to be present as if 'out 
there'; but the independence of the experience from the subject of it was discerned. 
The point of the argument in the two preceding chapters, and that which I maintain 
also in this one, is summed up admirably in the following quotation. In the context 
of criticizing the value ontology of Max Scheler, one writer comments that:
[Some notion of objectivity seems to arise] from the psychological 
observation that our liking, approval and admiration (or reverse) 
seem very often to be elicited from us by the thought or perception 
of an object, and are not simply conferred or projected upon objects 
at our own arbitrary pleasure. But mere impressions of this kind are 
a slender foundation on which to build an ontology, nor does it in 
the least follow from these facts that the act of approval has to be 
construed as a sort of perception (or response to perception) of a 
non-natural property lurking in or behind the object approved of.3 
The stuff of this quotation obviously goes beyond my specific areas of discussion. 
So I am going to restrict the thought contained in it for my purposes to the 
phenomenological investigation of the moral demand experience. Having found 
wanting descriptions of this experience as containing special value objects, then, I 
will now undertake inquiry into how the experience seems to the subject to be 
located. In order to do this, I have chosen to adopt the terms 'self and 'not-self to
Chapter Six 211
capture the admixture of constituents which the subject feels to be responsible for 
the experience.
The description of the experience's constitution will show, I believe, that 
certain distinctions current in moral philosophy fall on different sides of the 
self/not-self division according as the subject has some awareness of the 
experience's placing on a band bridging degrees of the self and the not-self. Such 
distinctions include the following: 
subj ecti ve/objective 
interior/exterior
under one's control/independent of the will 
constituted by the self/constituted by the not-self 
near the core self/away from the core self.
I think that there is a natural supposition at large in moral philosophy that in our 
experience all the left hand sides of the distinctions above align with each other, and 
that so too do all the right hand sides. I shall question whether that really is the case 
in this chapter and show ways in which the alignments are more subtle.
For the purposes of this descriptive work I shall be maintaining, then, a 
twin usage of the terms 'self and 'not-self. One will be referring to that perceptual 
sense which we have (however determinate it may be) of the degree to which the 
self and that which is other to it make up a particular experience.4 And the other will 
be utilising another kind of identification which we sometimes have in more and 
less clear fashion regarding an experience: the degree of nearness to a core self 
which the experience displays. An apposite way in which the reader might view 
these distinctions is by taking a particularly powerful experience of an emotion like 
hate. While this is usually held by us clearly to be composed by the self, it can also 
(either in immediacy or on later reflection) be identified as far from the core self, 
perhaps even as alien or threatening. It is not something with which one identifies 
oneself, even though one is the logical 'owner' of the experience. It is, to that 
extent, perceived as the 'not-self.
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The purpose of such an analysis has two chief strands to it. One consists in 
executing further phenomenological description of the moral demand experience, 
giving a fuller account of its appearance in the consciousness of the subject and her 
later reflection on it. In doing so, I will try to address the content of the two 
quotations that head this chapter as suitably directed by me to the relevant subject 
area. Concerning the Findlay comment, I shall show that some experiences of the 
moral demand may indeed be resolved within the kind of distinction about which he 
is inquiring; that is, as matters of self and not-self face one another and interact. But 
I will also point to a range of demand experience which cannot be so easily captured 
descriptively in that way and which require instead more careful representation. One 
form of alignment of the self and not-self which I believe deserves greater attention 
is that of a porous and indeterminate admixture of them such as might be called a 
tertium quid in the way of the other headline quotation for the chapter.
The other element to the chapter will ferry discussion to further and higher 
reflective levels at which the subject can address the experience. This will involve 
both the degree of the self s commitment to moral and non-moral matters and how 
demandingness figures in those schema, and also a more reflective appraisal by the 
subject of the possible nature and source of the demand. So this chapter will present 
a description of the experience that can be seen both as self-contained as well as 
straddling the earlier phenomenological exegesis and that to come.
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Section One: What is and what is not the self in 
experience
I shall present my description by means of a few examples of the type, 
discussing the approach they represent, and then applying it as I go along to the 
moral demand experience. I will later put to use once more the analogous areas of 
aesthetic and religious experience, which seem to me especially meet ones in virtue 
of the similar questions that naturally arise with respect to the constitution of 
experience discerned by the subject in them.
l.i - Experience as constituted by the self and not-self
Here is an example of the registration of an experience which has been 
presented thoughtfully as to its exact location:
The flowers I look at in the garden, as they are for me, are as much 
contents of my consciousness as is my body, and even as is my 
most intimate selfhood, and their pleasing quality is a species of 
pleasure belonging out there rather than in here. It is not that I 
register the shape and colour of the flowers and feel an inward 
frisson in response, but that the flowers themselves are directly 
pleasurable.5
The way in which this experience is taken by its recorder as being owned/generated 
by/inhering in the self is detailed. And also there is a sense of the not-self going to 
make up the experience: that which is not part of consciousness, but given to it. The 
second sentence of the quotation has what at first may be a slightly ’queer' look to 
it. The flowers-being-pleasurable is quite a different way of seeing matters than the 
pleasure (self) taken in the flowers (not-self). Such a description seems to have 
itself placed in both camps, as it were.6 This is one state of affairs in which self and 
not-self seem to have been described in a mixed fashion. In this chapter I shall 
return to that kind of phenomenon and discuss it at greater length.
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This kind of point is made also by another philosopher writing on the notion 
of such phenomena as the (perceptual) sense of danger and pleasure being allegedly 
purely matters of the self and presented to one as such. I shall quote him at length. 
He asks that we do this:
Take a situation that is very threatening. Imagine a tree falling down 
in your direction. Does it really make sense to believe that we do not 
perceive the danger directly but that the "neutral" tree causes a 
sensation in us and that the whole response of our body is produced 
by it?7 
And he adds that:
It is a matter of immediate experience...In these situations there 
often is no sensation inside us. It may sound strange, but if one 
wanted to describe these experiences correctly, one would have to 
say that it is the cigarette itself that has the quality of "being- 
tempting" [one of his earlier examples]. And the same is true for the 
falling, threatening tree, for a leaf that is luxurious, for a vulnerable 
face, or voice that is revolting. The main pattern in all these 
situations is that of a presentation. One confronts ..., there is no 
duality of indifferent, neutral stimulus and value-quality-endowed 
sensation. In direct experience these qualities are not by-products.
On the contrary, they "come first", their assertion is immediate, and 
it is they who in turn evoke effects. They are of one piece with the 
"given", and are encountered as integral with it.8 
So here also we find another philosopher giving a representation of particular 
experiences in which he employs the distinction between that which appears as self 
and that which stands as other to it. Both authors represent elements of the direct 
experiences they address as being located on the other side of the self/not-self 
distinction from that which we are sometimes inclined philosophically to locate on 
the self side. The way in which the flowers are 'pleasurable' and the situation
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'threatening' for each author is given as outwith the breast of the experiencing 
subject rather than as being an 'inner' response to an outer 'stimulus'.
As for myself, I find the two sample descriptions partly consonant with the 
data from the experience, but requiring greater refinement. I am not so sure, for 
instance, that Sprigge adequately distinguishes between pleasure, being- 
pleasurable, and 'pleasurablenesss', so that they do not end up getting rather 
merged together in the one experiential description. On the spectrum of self/not-self 
those states of affairs would seem to me on first glance to be composed differently, 
to involve differing degrees of the self s involvement. In the case of pleasure, one 
is presented apparently with a phenomenon of the self; while in that of the flowers- 
being-pleasurable there is a more intimate relation between the properties of that 
which is other to the self, that which is a disposition of the self, and their interaction 
in the instant. And in the case of the 'pleasurableness' of the flowers it appears that 
the phenomenon is placed outwith one's self: while inhering in consciousness as an 
experience, it is not seeming in its immediacy to be located within the self. I would 
express a similar point with respect to Bergmann's characterization where also, I 
think, being-tempted and being-tempting are not treated to sufficient description; as, 
too, being-dangerous and one's sense of danger seem disregarded, at least as 
possibly involving shades of difference. At any rate, they serve the illustrative 
purpose of bringing into focus a particular phenomenological form of describing 
experience.
One way in which I would like to refine the descriptions given above, and 
which I will be using later in regard to the moral demand experience, is by finding 
less distinct the description of self and not-self in certain areas of our experience. In 
the samples given above it seems to me that the authors try to show that much of the 
experience lies on the other side of the self/not-self distinction from that with which 
we are often likely to identify it. I think, however, that the distinction itself will be 
rendered much more fluid and indeterminate in the immediacy of some experience. 
That is to say, the subject will be sensing neither a clearly defined self nor a precise
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focus of that which is other to the self in the experience. She will be enmeshed in 
the experience such that, as it is occurring, no definite loci are felt by her to be those 
which are constituting the experience.
l.ii - Experience as identified with the self or not-self
I want to employ one further direct quotation to head into my specific 
approach to the moral demand experience. It gives a good summing-up of that 
approach, as well as providing me with a view to explore and develop. One writer 
on conceptual issues in the nature of the self has put his view in these words:
At a minimum experience may be roughly divided into two major 
categories: self and not-self. That is, there is a class of experience 
which the individual can identify as personal or intrinsic to his own 
individual existence. This class may be distinguished from 
experiences which seem extrinsic or separated from the individual. 
Within the class of self-experience may be included the emotions, 
iconic images, sentiments, feelings of right and wrong, sensations 
of pleasure and pain, desires, both overt and covert physical 
movement, memories, and so on.9 
Now this characterization seems to me to express well the general ways in which 
experiences are taken by the subject as part of her, as readily placed within the 
general map of her own self-identification, as ones that find an easy habituation in 
the concerns, interests and commitments of her own self. Such an involvement of 
experience with the self may be more and less significant for the subject: as being 
'personal or intrinsic to his own individual existence', as the author above puts it; 
or simply as located within the vague boundaries of that which is acceptable, 
comfortable to the self, generally conformable to what one is prepared to find 
within those boundaries.
One point which I wish to draw out in the light of the comment above, and 
about which I have talked already in the previous chapter, concerns the ways in
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which the experiential play of self and not-self, as the subject identifies them in 
immediacy, can alter. Taking the experiences listed by Gergen, I think that they can 
also on occasion appear as presences other to the self, or even alien and threatening 
to it; they are then identified in some way as not-self, even if it is the self that 'has' 
the experiences.10 They might appear also in the paradoxical guise both of 
asssailant to self and yet as revelatory of its own deep needs and desires: as a desire 
or pleasure which one regards as perverse or distasteful or foreign to one may yet 
reveal - either as it arises or on later reflection on it - parts of one's own shrouded 
self. That is, experiences can appear to different subjects and to the same subject 
across time as either close to and identified with the self or as facing it, simply as 
other or even as opposed to it.
I think that in this kind of area it is also useful to distinguish between the 
feeling that an experience is constituted in part by the self but is not definitive of 
one's true self; and the feeling that an experience belongs to one and is definitive of 
one's own true self. Such an identification may require epicycles on one's own part 
in order to track down, as it were, both the origin of a particular experience and 
how one ultimately regards it. And I believe in addition that a subject can operate 
with a general feel for the proximity of certain experiences to a core self of 
concerns, interests, and engrossments that have central place for her own 
identification.11 Experiences may, then, be close to the core self or penumbral; 
threatening to it or merely outwith its local orbit.
I have one final general commentary to present in this preliminary section. 
The quotation from Gergen above represents in its tenor the complexity that one's 
description must try to capture in the kind of divisions through which the subject 
matter is sorted. And the ways in which the categories of self and not-self overlap 
with those of the subjective and objective in the experience are not prima facie 
obvious, I believe. To recapitulate my work in the previous chapter, I think that 
objectivity in experience may be differently perceived according as its independence 
of the subject is felt either as exterior to her or as outwith her direct willed control. I
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have already suggested that that which is part of oneself (extreme anger, for 
example) may also be experienced as if the assailing force of the not-self were 
putting itself upon one; while an independent force like that of a seeming divine call 
on one may also be felt as closely allied to the central currents of the self. Initially, 
then, I am saying that there may be differences between the different categories that 
describe our experience which may also prove to have a significant bearing on that 
of the moral demand. I now turn to that particular experience.
Section Two: Self and not-self in the constitution of the 
moral demand experience
To begin with, I shall try to describe the sense a subject has of the moral 
demand experience’s placing on the scale of self/not-self as it occurs in immediacy, 
and then go on to mix freely both direct and more reflective modes of her grasp on 
the experience. I will present to the reader the moral experience both as it seems to 
the subject to be constituted by either self or not-self and as it is felt by her as close 
or far, alien or comfortable, important or peripheral, or merely other to the identity 
and interests of the self.
Let us look at an example taken from the literature. Take the one presented 
by Harman, in which a subject responds to the local adolescents setting fire to a 
cat.12 Harman is keen to portray and use this example in such a way that any so- 
called 'moral facts' or 'moral properties' are not seen to play any part in the 
explanation of one's moral reaction (be that bare horror at the kids' act or the more 
articulated registration of a specific value judgement). Given, however, the writ for 
analysis promulgated above, let us study the case and a subject's possible 
experience of a moral demand in terms of a phenomenological description of self 
and not-self.
I present here a list of possible unravellings of that description as it might 
describe the subject's experience in immediacy and on later reflection. I shall put the 
descriptions in summary form and then develop each point afterwards.
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a) The subject feels the 'badness' of the act demanding that the situation be 
dealt with (perhaps by herself)- This is experienced by her as the impingment of the 
not-self on her. Her sensing the badness and the demand, or judging that the act is 
so, is the felt contribution of the self to her experience.
The same kinds of identification go also for her experience of the illegality 
or forbiddenness of the act as the not-self, and her registration of shock or horror as 
within the perimeters of the self.
b) The exteriority of the cat's pain and the kids' act is experienced as the 
not-self, as outwith her own self. Her feeling these to be bad, her being horrified or 
feeling sick at the sight, are experienced as part of her self.
c) The subject experiences feelings of horror, repulsion & c. as identified 
with the not-self and which impinge by their demandingness on the self. Such 
feelings seem to her as faced toward her as if from outside the central core of the 
self.
d) A hazy or no distinction could be made by the subject in immediacy 
between the object and her reactions. In this case the subject has no clear sense, or 
none at all, of the way in which self and not-self are related in the constitution of the 
experience. Later reflection may, of course, resolve the distinction more finely for 
her.
2.i - Exteriority of moral demandingness as not-self
Distinction a) seems to me the primary one on which a purchase might be 
gained for the notion of a special moral property 'out there' which has a 
demandingness or which specifically makes demands on oneself. And insofar as it 
makes reference to an apparently exterior state of affairs like 'badness', then it does 
look to contain that kind of predication.
I think, however, that in this instance the element of the not-self is 
experienced not as a specific property or disvalue of badness 'out there’ that stands 
before the response of the self as an independent reality. Rather, it is felt as a matter
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arising from some kind of brute reality with which one interacts and which puts 
upon one the sensation of the demand that is itself outwith one's own willed control 
and therefore independent of one in virtue of that. The 'badness' and the 
demandingness, whatever their metaphysical status, are something the self knocks 
against. They do not lie within the self s direct sphere of action, as it were. They 
are not-self because the self has to deal with them in experience and not simply its 
own workings - the response being felt as that which pertains to self in the light of 
the presented independent state of affairs.
So here is one part which the not-self can play in the experience: as 
independent of the self, either as outwith its control or as a component in the 
experience not felt to be made up by the self. In this way, then, the objectivity of 
the demand experience is identified with the not-self. The objectivity component 
consists both in the apparently exterior placing of the not-self from the subject and 
also in its being outside of the direct control of the self.
Turning now to the second half of a) and to the sample description b), I 
think that the two presentations of the not-self in the experience are those ones by 
which we very often articulate the context of the moral demand. Indeed, they are the 
ones into which I believe reflection on the experience will often resolve the 
sometimes shapeless mass in which the initial spectrum of self and not-self appear. 
Rather than the quality of 'badness' or a disvalue-being-instantiated, we find here 
either the sheer otherness of the cat and its pain or the element of the not-self that is 
felt in that list of forbiddenness & c. that occurs in the description of b) and the 
second part of a).
The features of forbiddenness, of not-to-be-doneness, which we experience 
and which may put a demand upon one are salient in the experience here. They 
themselves are by no means neutral or unawkward with regard to their own 
metaphysical position, but they are the ones which I think figure more highly in our 
moral experience than that of seeming value qualities, to which attention is often 
given in the textbooks. This set of expressions, registering shock and horror as
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integral to the demand experience, is the stuff of our daily moral life. The sense of 
an act's forbiddenness;13 the awesome, fearful sense of 'I wouldn't do that !'; the 
extreme aversion it excites in one's breast: - these are the routine ways in which an 
act of the kind being viewed here has its correlate in the pole of the self. They are 
the ones in which that particular alarm and horror which one can feel at the sight of 
the act is given to consciousness.
As to the sense of forbiddenness & c., I think that there are different 
contents of these experiences for subjects which involve different metaphysical 
objects: from a divine prohibition to societal ones,14 that latter sometimes involving 
the background consent of the subject in a shared moral code, and sometimes not 
so. In particular, I want to distinguish between the apprehension of forbiddenness 
as falling within the domain of the self and the forbiddenness which gets 
apprehended as possibly being experienced as the not-self (in virtue perhaps of its 
arising from the independent will of society). That is, society and its codes are both 
ontologically independent of the subject as well as independent of her ability to 
choose what are and are not held by it as valued and otherwise. This is a point to 
which I will return later. At this stage I just want to emphasize the ways in which 
the not-self often seems to call on the self for a response or acknowledgement, 
leaving aside notions of the source or validity of that call. In this respect, the 
phenomenologist Spiegelberg talks of this kind of presentation to the subject in his 
description of approval when he says that,
...the object of approval is anything but an inert "victim” of our 
responses. It presents itself as demanding approval and even as 
deserving of approval. In this sense approving is...an answering act 
responding to a situation, or,...a "requiredness", analogous to the 
way in which a question calls for an answer.15
In this section I have begun to identify the subject's sense of where an 
experience of a moral demand lies on the scale of self and not-self, in reply to the
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question asked by Findlay in the headline quotation to this chapter. One main way 
in which the not-self and objectivity are experienced as the same component by the 
subject is in the seeming exteriority of elements in the experience, or in the 
independence from her direct control of the experience's arising and subsequent 
course, or in both.
In the next strands to my discussion I am going to show how the experience 
will sometimes render these overlaps and distinctions rather less clear. In particular, 
I shall inquire into the degree to which the not-self element to the experience can 
appear either as alien or threatening to the self; or as coalescent with its core 
composition; or as too intertwined with the self for any easy distinction to be made 
at all. It is in the light of a putative connection between the independence of the 
moral demand experience and the core self that I shall be putting forward my 
argument in the next chapter.
2.ii - Exteriority of the experience of moral 
demandingness as not-self
In this sub-section I shall address sample c) from my list above. Having 
said just earlier that the self is brought up before the independent matter of the 
demandingness, and that between the self s ambit of control and contribution to the 
experience and that which is outwith it there is a division, it seems to me clear 
enough that part of such a division can, so to speak, rest at a greater distance from 
what is characterized in a) as the self. That is to say, there are experiences of the 
moral demand which are most aptly described in the terms I have given for c).
This kind of division represents much of the stuff of my chapter 5 on the 
irking or threatening or alien presence of the demand in consciousness. If it is the 
case from a) and b) that the demandingness with which the situation presents one is 
the not-self counterpart to an acknowledgement and moral response identified with 
the self, then so is it in some cases that such a response can seem an independent 
kind of presence in consciousness, one to which one is faced as if to a phenomenon
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other to the self. The phenomenon which I want to mark out here is that of how on 
some occasions that which looks to be within the locale of the self can appear on 
others to have shrunk away from it. To remain in a geographical metaphor, here the 
self seems to have shrunk compared with a), and the experience itself of the 
demandingness is felt as lying on the other, not-self side of some indistinct 
boundary. What is felt to belong to the self here, then, is simply the having of the 
experience.
In this case the not-self element to the experience is perceived both as part of 
the independence from the subject of the demandingness and also as inhering in the 
very apprehension of that. The experience itself strikes the subject as separate from 
the self, as standing faced toward it rather than being within its own perimeter. This 
may have a threatening or alien appearance, or it can simply be that the experience 
has not enmeshed with the self and so sits peculiarly divorced from it. In the former 
case the self has a lively experience of the not-self with which to contend; in the 
latter, the self takes on the role of (perhaps indifferent) spectator to its own 
experience.
I think that this is an accurate description of that experiential phenomenon 
with which we all from time to time are acquainted, one of the apparent exteriority 
and even strangeness of what we yet take to be a manifestation of our own inner 
life.16 The self has the experience, to be sure - but it seems that the experience is 
faced as other, as not-self to it. An experience like that of the demandingness 
issuing from the act before one can, I said, fall within the domain of the self. When 
it does not do so, it is as if the experience were impinging on the self without being 
part of its own central geography. The experience has not called forth the general 
concerns and interests of the self, but remains separated, either on the peripheral 
edges of the self or striking as an interloping force at its equilibrium.
In this sub-section I have shown another way in which a subject feels the 
impress of the not-self on her. In the case c), then, she takes herself to be aware of
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the not-self both in the independence of the experience from her and in the particular 
peripheral or alien hue it has for her. That which on other occasions is sensed as 
pertaining to the self in its constitution is yet in this case faced to the self at a 
remove from it. While the self may be felt still to enter into the make-up of the 
experience as it is had, the experience is received as if other than and sometimes 
striking against the self. Compared to its placing in a) and b), the experience seems 
to have fallen away from the self. The not-self overlaps not only with the objectivity 
features of the experience - as independent of the subject - but also with the very 
awareness of the experience's presence to consciousness.
The significant division that is represented by this type of experience is, I 
believe, that between the occurrence of an experience and its location on a kind of 
scale of nearness and famess to the concerns, interests and identifications of the 
self. In this way an experience can be far from that core as a matter of but slight 
interest, or it could strike at that core in virtue of its threatening, trespassing quality. 
If the constitution of an experience involves a geography of self and not-self as 
component parts, then so too is there a corresponding involvement of self and not- 
self as that experience finds a placing with respect to the core concerns and 
identifications of the self.
2.iii - An indeterminate composition of the moral
demand experience
As a further species of the experience which is given to the subject, I now 
discuss the possibility of its being presented as constituted in unknown or 
straightforwardly undifferentiable manner. Rather than any strict demarcation being 
sensed between self and not-self in the demandingness issuing from the situation, 
the subject's immediate experience in d) gives to herself a much more porous and 
vague admixture of the categories. There seems to be either a rough conjunction of 
self and not-self which may resolve itself as the subject reflects on the experience;
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or there is a hazy interaction between the two which remains as an indeterminate 
matter even on reflection.
In the case d), then, thought on the experience might be able to disentangle 
the initial mix of elements of the experience as it was had. What was originally 
experienced as a rather amorphous mass might come to be subject to a finer-grained 
resolution: say, as one distinguishes the particular smirk on the adolescents' faces; 
the cat's screech of agony; one's own jarring shock at the act. These components of 
what was otherwise an undifferentiated matter in immediacy will often be assigned 
to the poles of self and not-self. But it may be that no such unpicking of the original 
threads of the experience occurs on reflection and that the subject is left with a sense 
either of indeterminacy as concerns the overlaps between self and not-self, or of no 
distinction at all within the experience. It is with that possibility, and its reality in 
the immediate experience, that I will now engage my description.
In the case d) I believe that one is presented with the moral demand as if 
mid-way between the poles of self and not-self.17 The distinction is not submerged 
entirely, as it were, without distinction. But a clear and sharp distinction does not 
seem to the subject to be given in the exigencies of the situation. The demand does 
not enter consciousness and signal its composition to the subject: it is given simply 
as there ; as a force to be dealt with; as a phenomenon that presents itself to one. Of 
course, the cat, its suffering, and the adolescents' behaviour can all be given as the 
not-self. And certain strong reactions of repugnance and horror might be 
experienced as constituted by and inhering in the self, subject to the qualifications 
which I discussed in 2.ii above. But the moral demand itself seems in immediacy to 
hover between those poles. The subject lives through the presentation of the 
demand: it being experienced as a presentation neither from self nor from the not- 
self, but as an experiential state of affairs in which she and the situation before her 
interact in some diffuse way.
What I am saying here is not incompatible, I believe, with my contentions in 
the last chapter concerning the incomingness of the demand. That phenomenon can
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arise from sources either within or outside of the self - though at the time it need not 
be experienced as if arising from a particular located source. A powerful emotion 
can 'take' one through the same phenomenological feature of incomingness as an 
experience of an external object striking our consciousness, and yet be recognized 
on reflection as (somehow) occurring from within the depths of the self. So in this 
case I am describing the phenomenon of an experience in immediacy in which the 
demand is signalled not as lying in a precise place on the scale of self and not-self, a 
demand which nevertheless possesses the feature also of that incoming appearance 
before consciousness. This might involve for sure some hazy sense of the 
demand's incomingness as occurring in virtue of some kind of interaction of the 
not-self with one. Such an interaction might correspondingly be experienced as an 
encroachment or even assault on one, or perhaps as a welcome appearance before 
one. But the actual feel which the subject has in immediacy - and perhaps also on 
later reflection - provides no easier distinction than that rough one.
At times, I believe that the subject's situation is best described as being 'in' 
the demand, even though I realize that this form of words may not chime too readily 
in the ears. I mean by it to convey the subject's sense of the demand's 
undifferentiated nature with respect in particular to her own involvement in its 
constitution. The demand does not seem to be composed simply by the not-self in 
such a way that it is apprehended by or processed and interpreted by some inner 
sanctum called the self. It is not that kind of interaction that is being felt as 
presented. Rather, the self s involvement seems to me no more a matter of an inner 
experience than does the presentation of the demand occur as a purely 'outer' 
phenomenon. The self and not-self are inter-related in the experience in a more 
complex manner, one which the categories of 'inner' and 'outer' do not manage to 
convey.18 For the demand here is constituted in consciousness in an amorphous 
fashion: the subject, while being the one who has the experience, does not feel 
herself to be separated from the demand as observer to object, which is why I 
venture the expression 'in' the demand to describe her experience.
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It seems to me that matters stand like this. To continue with a geographical 
model, the self is spread out to encompass the moral demand, and the element of 
the not-self which is composing that demand filtrates into the self. Experience of the 
moral demand in this indeterminate fashion is one into which I believe we all often 
stumble as moral situations bring themselves to our attention. It is hard to capture 
with descriptive felicity this phenomenological matter of the experience's 
constitution as the subject discerns it. No terminology appears to be in accepted use 
for this kind of experiential blend. So I am going to propose my own. To these 
vaguely apprehended phenomena - of a roughly apparent not-self intersecting with 
some process or state of the self - I shall append the expression 'relational but 
indeterminate'. This both indicates the dual aspects under which the experience is 
appearing as well as doing justice to the rough and entwined way in which they 
render themselves up to the subject's immediate sense of their constitutive role in 
the experience. The phenomenological datum here is best characterized, I believe, 
as one which I choose to call that of 'osmosis'. I take such a term in metaphorical 
form from its use in biology, where it refers to the permeability of membranes to 
the passage across of molecules. What I mean by it is to capture that sense on the 
subject's part of a dynamic, participative flow of the self and not-self in the 
experience. It is one which I think may not only refer to a particularly powerful case 
like that in the Harman example, but also to much of our moral demand experience 
generally - that is, to the everyday case of a demand being presented when one 
gives little thought over to its composition, and also to those which themselves defy 
further clarification.
In this sub-section I have tried to illustrate another way in which the 
phenomenological data of self and not-self are given to the subject in immediate 
experience of the moral demand as well as on later reflection on that. The kind of 
experience represented by d) is one as of a vague overlapping of the contour lines 
of self and not-self which ordinarily are given more distinctly in the experience. It is
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for that reason that I have used the tertium quid quotation at the head of this chapter 
to indicate this general area. The fuzziness or apparent absence of strict demarcation 
lines between self and not-self is, of course, sometimes resolved on greater 
reflection. Talk of a tertium quid is licensed, I believe, both by the lack of definite 
location in the initial experience and by its sometimes subsequent maintenance of 
that appearance to further reflection. The subject is presented with neither a clear 
sense of how the not-self figures in the demand's constitution nor of how the self is 
involved in the make-up of the experience. She is party to a phenomenon which 
does involve self and not-self, but which involves them in an intricate, diffuse 
manner. Rather than a distinct sense of the experience's composition between self 
and not-self, her awareness of it is as of a third kind of alignment, that which has 
melted the two in a complex compound.
By virtue of my presentation here I have also given further descriptive data 
in response to Findlay's question. The case of the experience in d) is a more 
complicated one than the kinds of states of affairs to which his quoted comments 
refer. It involves a far less ready discrimination (or none at all) by the subject of the 
experience into its constituent parts located in subject and object. In addition, I think 
that this type of experience aids in the general overview of how the various 
categories which I listed in the introductory section align with one another. And 
matters stand like this. While in this case the experience is felt as independent of the 
subject, the degree of involvement of the not-self is not given to her: she does not 
have any control over the experience, but neither does the experience seem to be 
under a distinct influence of the not-self, or distinctly constituted by it. Moreover, 
the categories of 'inner' and 'outer' do not correspond to those of self and not-self, 
for the experience can be unsurely placed between the latter two while seemingly 
given purely as an inner phenomenon, that is, as an experience playing before the 
mind's eye. And that which the subject takes to be the cause of the experience might 
be straightforwardly exterior to her while the content of it is yet very obscurely 
combined from the self and not-self. As a further complication, I shall also point
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out in section 3 ways in which these differently constituted experiences coalesce 
with or stand against/away from the identifying concerns of the self.
2.iv - The absence of a sense of self and not-self in the 
experience
Having described above the ways in which the subject's grasp of her 
experience sometimes blurs the distinctions between self and not-self, I now want 
to look briefly at the possible absence of that distinction altogether from the 
experience.
I think that on occasion, particularly in the peak experience of the moral 
demand, the subject herself does not even have a sense of self and not-self in the 
porous interaction that goes to constitute the experience. She simply exists in the 
thrall of a demand experience. Its presence in consciousness is for her a 
phenomenon that passes over the scale of self and not-self. Indeed, at the limiting 
case, I wish to say that the subject's response is more like 'Here's a demand' than 
'I am the subject of a demand.'
Of this kind of experience I want to suggest two things. Firstly, it seems to 
be one that is especially significant at the heightened level of the moral demand 
experience. In the exigent, cudgelling experience of the sort a subject might 
encounter on seeing the kids set fire to the cat the scale as it were dissolves in the 
face of the demand. The subject is swamped by the demand, unable to determine 
what is arising in the experience from self and that which issues from the not-self. 
In the instant, she simply lives through the experience and is not given access to the 
elements going to make up the particular powerful force in which she is caught up.
The second thing I want to say is not incompatible with the content of the 
paragraph just above, but it does somewhat deflate its tone. It is that the scale is 
also bypassed in much of our ordinary, low-strike experience of moral demands. 
Rather than an awareness of the strands combining to make up the experience as it 
is had in everyday circumstances, the subject will most often not have any feel, as
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an experience is given, of its being located at all on the scale of self and not-self. If 
in the presentation of the latter paragraph the experience seems to have transcended 
the scale, in this one it passes as it were below the subject's consciousness of such 
distinctions as it impinges in light and unforceful manner on her. The subject 
merely registers the experience without any further elaboration of its constitution 
being given to her.
2.v - The absence of a sense of self in the experience
Following on from my description of the heightened experience passing 
over the scale of self and not-self, I want to make the rather odd-sounding claim 
that there are times when the only part of the distinction given to one is the sense of 
the not-self. Insofar as the experience impinges on the subject, striking her and 
taking her attention by main force, then her sense of self can dissolve in the 
demand. The demand's own composition as arising from and directed to the not- 
self is apprehended, but her own sense of self - beyond the minimal conscious level 
of being the one who is having the experience (and even this degree of self- 
reflexivity may be submerged) - is swept aside by the force of the incoming 
demand. Put in less harsh and threatening terms, we can say that in this case she is 
taken out of herself or that she 'forgets' herself as is so often associated with states 
of religious and aesthetic contemplation (see also my example viii from chapter 4). 
The tug of the demand on consciousness is felt keenly and overpoweringly, and the 
moral situation which cries for redress is the salient component occupying 
consciousness, often to the exclusion of other elements that may be discerned in the 
'cool hour'. In this way it can be said that on occasion it is only the sense of the 
not-self with which we are acquainted in certain peak experiences.
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Section Three: Self and not-self in the reception of the 
moral demand experience
With the various readings in hand of the ways in which the moral demand 
experience can appear in consciousness as differently constituted by self and not- 
self, I turn now to discussion of the ways in which it is received as peripheral or 
central, alien or welcome by the subject. What appears to me as being of signal 
importance for a full description of the subject's experience, in terms of self and 
not-self, is a kind of geography of self-identification. This matter I believe to be one 
of the self s ongoing notions of that which is important, of concern, of significance 
to it, with which and by which inter alia it identifies itself as the kind of entity it 
is.19 And in this respect I think that the phenomenological data of a subject's 
experiential life in general present us with that self by the way of a planetary model: 
that is, as a central core of basic, essential identifying concerns and interests 
surrounded by orbiting satellite clusters of other ones in experience which come and 
go, lodge themselves and move inward as they gain in importance to the self and as 
they become deep concerns of the centre, or which move out from that core to the 
periphery of the self.20
This kind of identification of self and levels of nearness and famess to a felt 
core, as well as the degrees of ease and disorder with which experiences enter into 
the self, is of importance for the experience of objectivity in the moral demand. In 
example c) from my list above the moral demand experience was perceived itself 
like an object striking consciousness, from which the core self either shrinks back 
or simply holds itself as logical owner of an experience which seems at a certain 
remove from the self. In d), and in the sub-section 2.iv, the virtual circumventing 
of a determinate sense of self and not-self in the peak experience appears 
nevertheless to involve the subject to an intimate degree. Though she may not have 
this sense of where the experience is lying on the range self/not-self, I think that we 
may yet say that in that kind of engrossing, overpowering experience the self is 
brought into the midst of the moral demand from its deepest level. This might
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sound paradoxical to the reader. Simone Weil expresses with great alacrity this 
strange facet of particularly intense moral experiences when she talks of the self 
shrinking before the good.21 This itself is a phenomenon which is figured in the 
thought of many of the world's great religions as the losing of a narrow and 
bounded self for a greater sort of self in which their belief is invested. As to the 
precise feel at the time, the powerful sense of the importance of the demand, of its 
mattering, it seems to go beyond that of mattering to the particular self living 
through the experience, even if that might be identified with its deep concerns on 
reflection. This brings me to my next point - which is also an apparently 
paradoxical one.
It will be evident from the last two chapters that I believe the independence 
from the subject of the moral demand experience to be that with which an 
objectivity element is to be identified (and not with an independent realm of values 
'out there'). In the next chapter I am going to claim that this is an essential feature 
of it. Here I want only to make the point that the experience throughout the cases 
discussed by me, if it is felt by the subject to be important and to matter, does so as 
seeming both independent of the self and yet as close to its core.22 That this may 
look to be a paradox is only the case, I believe, should closeness to the self be 
linked necessarily to the ambit of what is controlled by the self. And I do not see 
there to be a warrant for taking that to be the case. Indeed, a little reflection on this 
should reveal to ourselves that what is experienced in that way is rarely a matter of 
an initial choice or as being under one's direct control (though an ongoing 
commitment - some kind of effort to maintain one's interest and attitudinal stance - 
may be felt as necessary for some affairs to continue to be concerns of oneself). 
Most often, the core concerns, interests and stances of the self, by which its very 
identity is carried for oneself and for others, are those which seem to have chosen 
one and not the other way around. I think that this contention goes especially for 
one's relationships, both friendships and long-term sexual ones; for the basic 
political and moral impulses one draws on; and for certain loyalties to place and
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people. What is of signal importance, and which forms the basis of the discussion 
in the next chapter, is the appearance of the importance, worth, mattering, 
fascination & c. of such concerns as an independent feature of them, not possessing 
this only in virtue of having been chosen by the self. This does not mean that the 
concerns & c. are robed by certain occult qualities of 'matteringness' or value that 
are instantiated as if coming from a special realm 'out there'. What it does mean, 
rather, is this. The phenomenological turn, as it were, by which inert, peripheral 
matters in the experiential economy of the self come to its centre is one which has as 
an essential feature that of the independence - the not-self - from the very self into 
which they enter so intimately.
This, it seems to me, tells us something about the moral demand experience 
and something about the self. I will comment only briefly on the import of this 
matter, as I aim to cover it at much greater length in chapter 7. As to the experienced 
moral demand, it figures in the phenomenological description in terms of its 
incomingness; its independence of the subject's (direct) will; and it appears as 
arising from some amorphous extra-subjective reality: - these being the facets given 
as not-self in the constitution of the experience. If that informs us of ways in which 
the moral demand must appear for subjects to have experience of it, then our 
description is moved into the domain of the self. For these phenomenological 
features may prove to be necessary both to the self s interaction with its experience 
qua a particular band of its experience, as well as being so with respect to a 
conceptual analysis of how it is that a self operates with certain notions and 
concerns. This need not mean that, pace an extension of Taylor (1977 & 1989), 
experience of moral demands and deep concern for moral issues is essential to the 
very nature of the self, of a being that can be said to have a self. Nor does it 
discount that experience which we sometimes have in which something appearing 
as important is registered by us as yet peripheral to the core self, knocking to be let 
in, as it were. But it does suggest that, if a being is to experience moral demands, 
then that experience must be of such and such a way in order that that being can
Chapter Six 234
make sense of it as being a moral demand. I will proceed in the next chapter to test 
whether such features of the demand phenomenology really are essential to it.
Clearly the examination here forms part of a wider aegis for study under 
which the moral demand experience is subsumed. That is, the contention on my 
part that there looks to be an essential connection between nearness to the core self 
of moral concerns, interests & c., and simultaneously a sense of the demand's 
impingement from the not-self, would seem to go also for such other concerns and 
demands as the projects, hobbies, loyalties, and passions one evinces, carries 
through and identifies oneself with in everyday life. They too put demands upon 
one; seem of a worth or importance or seriousness that stands independently of 
one's choosing; and go deeply into the self as that which one cares about and which 
partially constitute one's very image of self.
So here we have an interesting incongruence between the different impact of 
the not-self in the experience as it enters or tugs on the self. In some instances it can 
simply brush against the core self, so to speak, calling on it from the edges of the 
self s own circumference of interests and concerns. Such a call might persist and 
come to drown out other elements pulling on one's attention; or it might simply fade 
altogether from consciousness. In other instances the experience is received as if the 
self were already attuned to its course into consciousness; it goes deeply into the 
self, is readily taken by the core self as kindred and of meaning for it. And in 
another kind of relation between the not-self and the core self, the former seems to 
enter closely into the core but in a threatening or disorientating way, in the manner 
of an incursion from an unwelcome force that confronts the self.
Of these phenomena I want to say two further things. Looking at the 
possibility of the not-self interacting with the core self in a manner conformable to 
its concerns and interests, it seems to me that this might help account for the way in 
which many moral demands are experienced lightly, or barely experienced at all, 
and yet draw on the subject in some way, often in her actions (as in example vi of 
chapter 4). For it appears that the experience is received so cleanly into the core self
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as not to mark its passage by any interrupting or assailing force on one. Indeed, its 
very demandingness is hardly perceived unless some interfering factor prevents the 
subject from acting consonantly with the situation before her. This is a theme which 
I will pursue at greater length in chapter 7. And another one which I shall also be 
following in that chapter is this. To the extent that some demand experiences seem 
to strike at the self, and yet others simply fade away from its further edges, it looks 
as if one sort of demand calls strongly on the self and the other is virtually silent. In 
these instances the difference may be given by the fact that the threatening demand 
does not so much strike at the self as alien but as calling on elements already within 
it, and which cause the subject to be the site of an awkward conflict between 
different forces from within her own self tugging her in different directions. And 
here part of its own content seems to have been drawn from the self, to assail it as if 
other, not-self to it.
Much of the foregoing assumes, of course, that moral concerns of some 
determinate sort do hold sway with us and are to be found in the core of the self. 
But that may not be so for all subjects, and the relation may also be a somewhat 
fluctuating one for others of us. In that respect, talk of moral demands 'going 
deeply' into us should be qualified in the light of the finding that patently not all do 
so and many simply drift across the less attended reaches of consciousness. In that 
way, too, the demand is very much not-self, as if a stranger meandering the borders 
of one's self.
Section Four: Social origin of the experience as not-self
In my discussion of cases a) and b), I mentioned in passing that the element 
of the not-self to the demand experience might be accounted for through its 
representing demands of one's social group that one had apprehended. I think that 
this possibility is sufficiently noteworthy to stand as a separate point. What I shall 
do in this section is suggest ways in which the otherness (not-self) from one of 
society, or a part of it, may look to be the not-self which is responsible for the
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particular impingement of a seeming independent moral demand upon one. But I 
shall also cast doubt on such an account of the phenomenology in virtue of 
differences between cause and content of experience: while there may be a social 
genesis to a certain pressurising sensation which puts itself upon one, there is not 
usually in the experience a content as of a demand of society upon one.
4.i - A social account of the phenomenology
Firstly, to a positive characterization of the matter. Demands arising from 
one's social group may have gone through a process of internalization, and any 
basis they may have in rule or law systems have become implicit in a sensitivity for 
moral matters. But ultimately the social context is as not-self, as outer, as could be - 
and yet at one and the same time, in the light of what is posited as to the social 
construction of the self,23 this may not be entirely at a remove from the self s 
concerns and ways of identifying itself, given certain basic, universal facts about 
social life.24 Society, then, or some likelier sub-group around which a subject's life 
basically revolves, is that which could constitute the geographical not-self, and that 
which might account for that vague sense of the demand's being felt to be placed in 
or arising from 'out there'.
This kind of phenomenological approach would be trying, then, to explore 
the background life-world to the experience and claiming to find an explanation for 
the demand's particular feel in that. So this kind of approach would not commit the 
crude error of making moral judgement to mean 'that which does/does not accord 
with the demands of society', or of taking direct moral experience always to be 
referring to such an object when patently neither is the case. What it does do is this. 
It looks at the phenomenological horizon to the experience and finds moral demands 
arising in contexts involving other persons whose situations and existence make 
demands on us. Further to that, is the mass of those demands which are more 
expressly laid upon one by social living: ones arising from the taboos, 
proscriptions, and etiquette which any society enshrines. And people, and the
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society they compose, are concrete entities (albeit with a complex metaphysics 
when it comes to society) in ways in which moral values 'out there' are not.25 
Moreover, given that very vagueness of the reference to the reality from which the 
demand is issuing which I have found in the experience, the social reality of moral 
demands is one way from which that sense would seem in likely fashion to have 
arisen - even though the direct experience itself is not making explicit reference, or 
doing so regularly,26 to that reality.
This point has been expressed somewhat similarly by W.H.Urban in his 
work on valuation. He puts the matter this way. Concerning the kinds of objectivity 
of value which he upholds, one 'inner' and the other 'outer', he says of the latter: 
...a value is said to be actual and objective when its object exists - 
not in the physical sense, as an object of sense perception, but still 
in the outer sense of being the object of a demand external to and 
independent of the will of the subject27 
And this is so for Urban when the values of the community are apprehended by the 
subject:
...the assumption of existence in this case means outer existence in 
wills other than our own.28
Here we find, then, a fashion by which the notion of the existence of values 
and demanders 'out there' is made clear by the invocation of a public setting. My 
quoted contention from this author is not meant to suggest that the subject simply 
kowtows or unthinkingly goes along with the express demands of a certain ill- 
defined majority, though clearly some of us do so all or some of the time, and many 
people would appear to think that that is how things should be.29 It does serve to 
show how the voice of the demand in consciousness which is often as if from some 
reality 'out there' can arise and constitute a tug or brake on the subject (and also 
how the routine social occurrence of moral situations should be attended by 
demands of such low-level or barely-recognised strike as that described in my 
example vi in chapter 4).30
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In this way of looking at the phenomenology, then, its proponent would be 
claiming to discern the operation of the not-self as located in the pressures put upon 
one by social living, and arguing that the diffuse nature of the demandingnesses 
which we perceive is understandable in the light of the extremely wide-ranging 
social reality which is its background. Moreover, such an argument might also 
begin to address whether the not-self element to the experience is a necessary one: 
perhaps in virtue of putative facts about the inculcation of a moral consciousness (as 
necessarily having to represent moral affairs as independent of the wishes of the 
individual).31
4.ii - Problems from the phenomenology for the social 
account
Much of what I have represented above would seem quite plausible. Some 
moral demands are experienced by us directly as issuing from the demands made 
consciously and expressly by others (individuals or collectives) on us. And some 
are signalled as if with a certain occult quality to them: as specially inhering in the 
'nature* of the person,32 for instance, or as having about them a peculiar awe­
inspiring call in respect of certain interpersonal contexts. Moreover, we are perhaps 
ourselves dimly aware of the ways in which our upbringing and social life have put 
in us and maintain a consciousness of moral demands, however they may appear to 
be located in the actual experience. The not-self which is composed by a social 
group might also be that with which one's own core self identifies to differing 
degrees 33
The social setting of the moral demand should therefore be borne in mind, 
both as a possible explanation of the phenomenological feel of experience, and also 
as forming the circumambience in which the experience operates.34 In the case of 
forbiddenness, of an action being felt as 'beyond the pale', or one which the subject 
feels herself 'called' to do (and where these are not taken specifically to be divinely- 
inspired demands), we may seem to be especially close to the location of the
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experience of independence as one's perception of widely-held standards. Of 
course, not all of the experience might reveal its social grounding as it occurs, but 
then that would simply mean that its origins had become obscure. Blackburn says 
of the phenomenology, in the light of an attempted exposition on his part of the 
ways in which moral experience arises in a social setting:
The precise "feel" of an ethical stance may be a function of local 
culture, in its scope, or some of its interactions with other pressures 
and other beliefs. A pressure toward action can be associated 
variously with pride, shame, self-respect, and there is no reason to 
expect a simple phenomenology to emerge. The essence lies in the 
practical import, but the feelings that surround that can vary 
considerably. There is no reason for a stance to feel much like a 
desire, for example...No "reduction" of an ethical stance to one of 
any other type is needed.35
Now all these comments just above give due acknowledgement to a possible 
social account for the demand experience. But I think that they involve a series of 
confusions that result from the rather tenuous foundation which they have in the 
actual phenomenology.
It is clear that cause and content of the experience should be kept in sharp 
distinction. If it is the case that a comprehensive history of the genesis and 
maintenance of this particular kind of experience can be given in terms closely 
explaining its social links, then it is not the case that such an origin and history are 
carried within the experience. Some of the experience does, as I have said, strike 
one as emanating from or conforming to the demands of a social group. But it is 
not, on the whole, signalled as arising in that way, and its content does not refer to 
demands of that sort.
There are a number of confusions into which I think a social account can fall 
in virtue of this distinction not being attended to. One problem may come simply 
from the fact that the causes of our experience of moral demands are not always at
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all clear in immediacy or on later reflection. And when they are, they tend to relate 
to the particular impact of the individual circumstances of a case before one's mind. 
'Demands of society' are not usually, however, felt to cause one's experience of a 
moral demand. This brings me to a second problem encountered in distinguishing 
between the social strands of a causal web from which our experience is putatively 
constructed. It is this. There is a great difference between a demand which relates to 
society and which one apprehends, and a demand which is put upon one as being 
an explicit plea or voiced expectation on one coming from society. In the former 
case one takes oneself to have encountered that somewhat vague reality in which the 
demand has its reference and from which it arises. And in the latter, one actually 
feels that a social pressure is being put upon one to conform in what one 
experiences, and perhaps in how one acts, to some more and less precise wish of 
one's social group. My belief is that the phenomenology shows only that the not- 
self qua society is roughly configured in our experience as occasionally being the 
reality with which we interact in our experience. And I think it shows also that 
occasionally we do feel ourselves to be subject to the (sometimes explicit and 
conscious) demands issuing from one's social group on oneself. These latter 
demands may be felt as burdensome, threatening to the core self or as conformable 
to its workings (or simply as indifferent). But in neither case is the moral demand 
experience a general phenomenon. Such causes - if causes they be - of our 
experience are not given as so in the phenomenology.
This brings me to a further criticism of this kind of social reading of the 
demand experience. For it is not the case either that the content of our experience of 
moral demands has society or some sub-group of it as content: that is to say, as the 
object to which the demand refers and to which one's thought and acts are directed 
in its wake. To the extent that moral demands are experienced in inter-personal 
contexts, that is not the same thing as their being experienced as referring to social 
instigators and contents of the experience. The not-self as relating to another person 
or persons in experience is different from the not-self of a putative socially-bound
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experience. In the latter case, the subject contends with an impingement on her of 
social codes and expectations which appear as independent of her. But in the 
former, in our everyday dealings with other people in situations that put moral 
demands upon us, the form of experience is on the lines of that expressed by the de 
Beauvoir characters from my quotation in footnote 30. In this kind of experience 
the demand has as its centre the other person, her character, situation, and acts (and 
herself as one who is acted upon), with the demand flowing from the other in virtue 
of her very existence and not as a kind of felt pressure accumulating from the 
organized expectations of others. In both cases, then, the demand is felt as arising 
in part from and referring to the not-self, but the not-self is quite differently placed 
in either one.
To sum up this section, I wish to emphasize the following. Social accounts 
of the phenomenology of moral demand experience will derive whatever interest 
and plausibility they have through independent research from that of the actual 
contents of the phenomenology itself. The not-self which contributes to the 
experience and to which the experience may refer for the subject is not generally felt 
to be composed by a general mass like society or by its own codes and demands. 
There is often a social context in which moral demands arise in our consciousness 
(i.e., as usually involving other people), but that is not the same thing as social- 
based demands being felt to be bearing down on one.
The truth of the statement 'What you perceive is the import of widely-held 
standards' is compatible, of course, with the truth of The moral demand experience 
presents itself to you as the import of widely-held standards'. But the conditions of 
identity for these two statements are not met in the phenomenology. The second one 
is straightforwardly falsified by the general run of the experience. And as to the 
first, its explanatory power relies on considerations lying outwith the actual data 
given in the experience.
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What I have done in this section is try to discover whether the not-self of the 
experience, the contribution of which to the phenomenology I discussed in sections 
2 and 3, can be more closely identified as placed in, or arising from, or referring to, 
society or its codes. I think that my digging into the levels of explanation and 
conditions for the truth of them within the phenomenology has shown that the not- 
self cannot simply be viewed as society or its call on one. Society is other to one, 
objective with respect to one's own self (as independent of that) - but (usually) not 
the particular object taken as not-self in one's experience. And in virtue of this, I 
want now to turn my attention away from society 'out there' and toward our nature 
'in here', as it were, to show how the not-self might have a placing rather more 
close to experienced home.
Section Five: Our nature as not-self
Facts about human nature are facts about us, but they are ones which are 
independent of us. We do not choose, nor have all that much control over, that 
stock of needs and responses which go to make up our human nature. In that way, 
while the moral consciousness which apprehends demands - if such a feature were 
taken as part of our nature - would be seen as lying on the 'self side of the 
division, as something intimately associated with the kind of being we are, it is not 
one which comes under the self s control or which is felt as arising simply from 
states of the self. Thus it can appear as something that 'happens' to one and to 
which one's relation can be as that to the apparent not-self.
I am not concerned here to enter the debate as to what the invariant features 
of human nature might be, and to what extent it is a social construction which 
changes across time and culture. What I do want to do is look at the possible ways 
in which a moral consciousness and its operations might be appearing to us, 
assuming for the purposes of argument that it is part of our nature. And if that were 
the case, then such a faculty or propensity would be outwith the subject's control in 
interesting ways. For its operation and the experiences it involves do not fall under
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her individual choice, since her nature is not something which she has chosen. The 
experiences it participates in or to which it is susceptible will appear as arising 
outwith her to that extent (strange as that may sound, given that it is her nature that 
I am discussing).
I think that there are two primary ways in which demand experiences could 
be given to the subject in this way which bear noting. One is that her moral 
consciousness could be that which is susceptible to demands made by situations on 
her or explicitly voiced by others. Such demands are experienced both as exterior to 
her as well as independent of her direct volition. They are thus constituted in part by 
the not-self, and her own contribution to the experience might be discerned only as 
that of the locus into which they flow, as the one who is the seat of a particular kind 
of experience. The susceptibility to this experience would then be felt as part of the 
self, the experience itself being given as the appearance of the not-self before one. 
Such an interaction would be open to those kinds of dissociation of the subject from 
her experience as I discussed in 2.ii above and in section 3 on the way in which the 
participation of the core self is discerned.
Another way in which the experience might be given is as of the demands 
themselves being part of her nature. In this case she experiences moral demands as 
phenomena intimately linked to her self, perhaps as the face presented to her by 
what are deep needs or concerns of the self. (I do not want to delineate the self 
exclusively in terms of needs or concerns, but list these simply as possible sources 
of the demand manifestation). So it is the demand experience itself with which her 
nature is identified, not just the tendency to encounter the onset of such 
experiences. In the midst of this experience it is the nature of her own self which is 
revealing itself to her, and yet it does so via the medium of the apparently 
independent experience that has arisen before her. In that sense, we would seem to 
be given a Janus-like phenomenological image of the self s core nature appearing 
before it in the guise of that which is other to it. Again, this is a feature to which I 
will grant more attention in the next chapter.
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Once more, then, we find that inner and outer overlap in different ways with 
self and not-self. If it is the case that the demand experience appears as if from outer 
sources with a content correspondingly pointed outwards, this yet links closely in 
to the self as the demand expresses part of one's nature. The self is party to the 
demand as if to a phenomenon other to it, but it also finds its own imprint somehow 
borne in the appearance of the experience. It is not just logical owner of a particular 
experience, but a willing site for its occurrence. And if it should be the case that 
sometimes the subject is repelled or threatened by the demand, then she will be put 
in that often disturbing position of sensing a part of her own self as wearing the 
guise of the alien not-self: as somehow both part of her and yet also as partitioned 
off from her.
In this section I have developed a further element to my presentation of the 
moral demand experience as located on the band self/not-self. As to the arguments 
immediately above, and also concerning those earlier, I believe that attention to this 
form of description casts further light on the ways in which the experience presents 
itself to the subject. In particular, I think that it shows how the query behind the 
Findlay quotation at the head of this chapter represents the possible poles of 
experience rather too starkly. If it were the case, for instance, that the experience 
results from a certain projective tendency on our part, or that it is one of those 
things that goes along with a socialized human nature, it is certainly not given to 
subjects as a straightforward datum from which its constituent elements can be 
distinguished. What does not appear to the subject at the time of the experience is 
that of a morally inert exterior reality (the geographical not-self) acting upon a 
morally sensitive inner entity (the geographical self), to produce that experience of 
the moral demand which is then surveyed by the self as near or far from its 
concerns. And it does not appear to her either that, the experience once produced, 
such a state of affairs is purely a phenomenon going on within her (like a 
headache).36 The experience she is having is characteristically given to her; it holds
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her attention and sometimes causes her unease - as if it is both independent of her 
control and composed at least in part from outwith her self.
Section Six: Unexperienced demands
I want to follow up my discussions above by inquiring into the nature and 
extent of our recognition of demands that are/were somehow ingredient in a 
situation, but which we fail/failed to apprehend. This, it seems to me, is of 
particular interest with respect to the notion of the not-self, to which reference might 
be made in such an acknowledgement. For one way in which a subject might be 
using such a notion is to mark out the presence of a special kind of value which was 
'out there', but which somehow did not send forth its demand upon one, or which 
one did not notice. This will permit me to get on with study while allowing for 
either line of argument concerning whether a value has an inherent demandingness 
feature or not. And one other possibility which I will also keep in mind is that of 
one's failing to notice or acknowledge the demand arising from one's own self: so 
that it is/was as if such a call fell on the concealed part of a not-self spectrum.
6.i - Moral demands as present but not experienced
Clearly we do employ a description of our moral experience such that, for 
instance, we talk on occasion of the failure to have noticed the demand to end the 
evil of an act (often with a reason for that failure: such as inattention; preoccupation 
with other matters; the crowding of one's perception by strong emotions; 
misinformation as to the correct act description; & c.). This, too, occurs in aesthetic 
experience at those times when, over-tired by work or worry, one admits that a 
composition was a glorious one even though one was unable to appreciate it,37 or 
in religious experience when a believer will admit to having been too angry to heed 
the call of her god. It may look as if these ways of diagnosing our own experience 
could give some purchase for a view of the not-self as a moral reality 'out there' 
with which we are not always able to maintain a steady perceptual relation.38 And I
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think that this does seem to give some support to the notion of a value reality whose 
demands have not been recognised, insofar as it invokes alongside the 
phenomenology of discovery and the unwilled nature of the demand experience that 
of the non-appearance of ones that nevertheless are seemingly granted later to have 
been present. Indeed, one of the primary phenomena of the moral life is that sense 
which we have of the demand left unfulfilled; of the situation left undone; of the 
response absent through one's own insensitivity to another's need.39
Now this looks to be an affair which is spread along the axis self/not-self in 
interesting ways. It suggests to me that there is a relation to both notions of the 
involvement of self which I have used in this chapter: that is, as an experience is 
partly composed by the self and as it is perceived in differing degrees of proximity 
to the core self. What seems to be noticed by the subject is the following. A lapse in 
her interaction with the not-self is acknowledged by her - or is claimed by third 
parties to have occurred - in dual fashion: both as she seems to have failed to 
apprehend something that was there in the moral situation to be attended to, and 
also as the engagement of the concern or interest of the self was not elicited. The 
phenomenon of such a form of recognition - of a demand left unanswered or of a 
feature component to a state of affairs that was unnoticed or repressed - clearly 
makes reference to some part of the not-self either as it lies in the past or as it 
reasserts itself in the present experience.
In rather more complex fashion than that in which I have presented the case 
above, it may also be that in this kind of instance we sometimes re-assess our own 
experience as lying differently on the band self/not-self than originally we had 
supposed. What I mean by this claim is this. That which we may be inclined to 
identify outwith our own breast, 'out there' in the not-self, so to speak, may come 
on further reflection to be taken as the unattended call of one's self. As the initial 
moral situation is surveyed before the mind's eye, it may resolve itself more finely 
into the constituent parts which played in one's experience at the time. That 
phenomenon which initial reflection takes to have been a demand issuing from the
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not-self, but which was unrepresented within the self at the time, may appear with 
more thought on the matter rather to have arisen unheeded from the self. In that 
way, it is acknowledged by the subject that a part of the self was either ignored or 
silenced in the immediate moment: so that that which has issued from one's own 
self takes time to filter into accepted relations with the self.
This form of recognition of a demand unexperienced at the time does not, 
however, make reference to a value realm 'out there' which went unacknowledged. 
It seems to rest on a kind of roping-in of an experience on reflection from an 
apparently exterior placing to an inner source. The degree to which such a demand 
is assimilated to the self can be more and less according as one finds it consonant 
with one's own image of the basic identity of the self. And that assimilation can 
occur both for demands later taken as arising from one's own self and for those 
thought as flowing into one from the not-self. In the latter case, that might involve 
straightforward recognition of a demand issuing from another self which went 
unheeded, or as one felt to be more vaguely located in an outer reality. But in either 
case, what happens is that a call made on one, or simply a call that one could have 
apprehended , is felt to have been made - even though in the moment of its issue 
one did not seem to be party to it. Later reflection might then determine whether the 
very constitution of the demand is to be sought within one's self or outwith it.
Such recognitions, as one believes them to be, are often attended by that 
further phenomenon with which our moral life intimately acquaints us, as of being 
called to court or as of being in the thrall of a force bearing upon one's account of 
oneself. I think that this phenomenon ranges widely in one's experience, such that 
often much reflection is required to pin down the precise nature of the fault for 
which one is being assailed and the precise tone of the sensation itself - usually that 
of unease, sometimes of having been caught, and often also of having been 
deficient in one's perception of matters. I do not want to restrict the possible scope 
of this phenomenon by calling it 'conscience', and thereby importing philosophical 
presuppositions about its nature. But obviously this is the name under which it has
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generally gone in moral philosophical literature. And of that particular phenomenon 
it has very often been remarked that something like a sense as of the demand of the 
not-self, or even of the rebuke of another self, goes on within one. Kant, for 
instance, speaks thus:
...conscience has this peculiarity, that although its business is a 
business of man with himself, yet he finds himself compelled by his 
reason to transact it as if at the command of another person ...hence 
conscience must be conceived as the subjective principle of 
responsibility for one's needs before God.40 
And John Ladd takes this kind of phenomenon to be striking enough to talk of an 
apparent 'split personality' account as describing the experience, saying that, 
Phenomenologically it appears almost as if it were an "external 
compulsion" or the "voice of God" 41
6.ii - Unexperienced demands as 'out there'?
I believe that this general experiential affair does not give very much 
purchase on the notion of a prescriptive value reality or special kind of demander 
'out there'. It does make reference to the independence of the self which the moral 
demand has in experience. It will sometimes make concession to a model of 
perceptual failure. And it does make play on some sense of the continued presence 
or pressure maintained by the not-self in the manner of an external reality. Yet I do 
not think that one will find, on closer inspection, that these rather diffuse thoughts 
and worries which we express are laying claim to a special kind of status to the not- 
self which they feature. They do so no more than when, in wondering whether a 
joke was funny but one did not 'get it', one makes reference to a special reality of 
humour-demanding entities that one failed to apprehend; or when realization that 
one's anger blinded one to danger a special entity of danger was exerting itself upon 
one from outside.
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Often reflection will give one a sufficient vista on one's own past experience 
to be able to discern adequately that element of the not-self to which the inkling of a 
perceptual failure dimly refers. That is to say, sometimes a straightforwardly factual 
account of the factors which should have excited apprehension of a demand will 
reveal to oneself how a demand was, as it were, 'about' the situation but unnoticed 
by one. Such is the case when one finds out or realizes that a joke at the expense of 
another hurt his feelings; or how an apparently harmless gesture was deeply 
offensive to a particular religious temperament; or how the barely noticed cry of 
distress of a fallen child called for one's help. These are the facts and events which 
one failed, perhaps culpably, to apprehend. Or they are the ones which one did 
apprehend, but in a partial manner or such that the concerns of the self either failed 
to be engaged or were in opposition to the demand which was laid upon one.
In addition, it looks to me that a related species of this experience concerns 
that of a change in one's stance to the content of a demand. In this case it is not so 
much that a demand is acknowledged which was not experienced at the time, but 
that a demand which was experienced as relating to a particular state of affairs 
comes to be taken as a demand on oneself. Hence the demand seems to pass from 
being a matter of the not-self, one which the self happened to brush against, and 
into the domain of the self as it is taken to be calling on one and not just as an 
objectless call. As I say, this is not the same thing as acknowledgement of a 
demand which was entirely unapprehended or unnoticed, but it is a similar affair 
insofar as the demand's apparent not-self location at the time impinges now on the 
self.
To the extent, then, that we do talk sometimes in these ways - of demands 
left unanswered, or simply ones which don't get experienced - we are not making 
reference to a special value reality with whose demands one occasionally fails to 
enmesh. Yet there is some sense on our part of a reality that does make demands 
which we can fail to encounter. And I think that such a sense cannot be reduced 
without remainder to the notion of unnoticed facts or interfering personal factors of
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the sort which I mentioned two paragraphs above. This goes to show just how 
much the involvement of the not-self is taken by us to be integral to the demand 
experience: such that its contribution to experience can be conceived in entire 
separation from that of the self and taken to have 'been there' in a situation awaiting 
one's grasp, but for certain factors preventing adequate apprehension of it. The not- 
self aspect of the demand is taken not as inhering in a value reality 'out there', but 
in the roughly discerned independence of some external reality which is ingredient 
in a type of experience waiting to happen.
Section Seven: The description extended to non-moral
cases
I now want to conclude this chapter with my standing ploy of seeing 
whether the descriptions of the moral demand experience here are of a special order 
compared with other areas of experience, particularly as they also involve demands 
on the subject. I shall not allow this section to take up too much space, but I do 
want to check on the comparative placing of the moral demand experience with 
others. And about this matter I should like to note that the contended descriptions of 
the moral demand experience - as either being the tug of some kind of external 
reality or as a 'mere' inner sensation sometimes confusedly appearing as if from 
outside in virtue of a certain efficacy of projection that goes on or has gone on - 
seems partially determined for some moral philosophers by the class of comparison 
examples chosen. My own inclination, with respect to the phenomenological 
features displayed by moral and non-moral demand experiences, is to concede a 
variety of comparative similarities which pull the force of the analogy in both 
directions.
Firstly, I am going to produce a short list of non-moral demand experiences 
that display similar shifting emphases on the band self/not-self as were observed in 
the moral case on the subject herself apprehending them in immediacy and on 
reflection. Here is the list:
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- 1. McDowell talks of a critic trying to help someone to see values in works 
of art that 'one should find (as the phenomenology of experience tempts us to say)' 
or, more likely, 'to enable the audience to find for himself the value there is in it 
(still speaking as the phenomenology invites).'42
- 2. Another philosopher puts matters this way:
In unreflected experience value appears to be in the object of value. 
And we may presume that a common-sense observation of a 
beautiful picture...will, when not further reflecting on the nature of 
beauty, take it for granted that the value beauty belongs to the 
[work]. And as a property of [the] work, it will seem to be on a 
level with its other properties. The value beauty appears to have a 
kind of reality in no way different, for instance, from the reality of 
the colour of the [work]. Value and colour are distinguished and 
determined as the objective elements in the experience with the same 
certainty as the subjective elements are. It is absolutely certain to this 
observer that it is he who sees colour and experiences the value 
beauty; but this is no more certain than that it is the picture which ' 
has the colour and the value which he experiences. Seeing and 
experiencing belong to him; colour and value belong to the 
picture.43
- 3. The depths and mysteries of outer space sometimes evoke astonishment 
and awe from an astronomer.44
- 4. The cliff-jumping demand from example i) of my chapter 4.
- 5. Example ii) from chapter 4, where the mother lives 'in' the demand 
which she feels issues from her relation to the child.
- 6. Despite an outstanding performance from the orchestra, one's misery 
inured one to it.
I think that these samples illustrate that wide range of varying involvement of self 
and not-self evinced by my reports from the Harman moral example. And they do
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so with respect both to the geographical nature of each putative experience's 
location on the band self/not-self as well as to the placing of it relative to the core 
self. The salient variations which I wish to point out here are: an alleged sense of 
the apparently independent value (not-self) of the object (examples 1. and 2.); the 
strong not-self element being strikingly alien to the self (example 4.); an inner 
reaction (self) to an outer presented reality (not-self), with the reaction being 
intimately identified with oneself in virtue of its relations to the core self (example 
3.); 45 a recognition of some demand or value which demands acknowledgement 
(not-self) barely registered in virtue of other factors (self or not-self) [example 6]; 
little discrimination made (example 5.).
The least tentative, though least informative, conclusion which one can 
draw from comparing these examples with the moral one is that the groups share 
certain phenomenological features. But the crucial question which issues forth so 
soon as one gathers the comparison classes in one's thoughts is how relevantly 
similar the classes are and how one's use of particular similarities determines the 
reflective stance one then gains on the position of the moral demand experience as it 
exhibits different configurations of self and not-self. The basis on which I do so is 
a feel or grasp on our part which I believe we are able to exercise for the 
phenomenological data of the moral demand experience and how our reflective 
judgement sees its relative placing with other non-moral demand experiences. Such 
a feel which I claim to be exercising here depends on being met with an answering 
assent from the reader on giving his/her consideration to the data her own 
experience gives to her. This area is a disputed one, it should be acknowledged, 
with the comparison classes being bandied about according, my suspicion goes, to 
the prior convictions of the author as to the ontology of moral value. I shall try to 
perform the comparison purely as I see 'shades' of phenomenological data to be 
participating in the one 'colour' or as they appear separate and disanalogous.
Let us consider, then, two alternative and conflicting positions which one 
could take from a comparative purview of the phenomenology of demand
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experience and how it relates to a possible not-self value realm. One analysis holds 
that experiences of moral value are sufficiently similar to experiences of sameness, 
number, rest and motion - which 'are partially due to our nature as observers and 
partially due to the way the world is'46 - for their objects to merit a certain 
philosophical respect as steady and ineliminable features of the world. The author 
here seems to be adverting to the apparent permanence and necessity of a not-self 
feature in certain of our experiences to uphold the notion of an objective status in 
the world for that not-self feature. From the putative acceptability of an objectivity 
feature (as in the world) to the not-self in the other examples, he takes it that the 
same must be granted of the object of the moral experience.
The other position holds that, while experience of moral values and their 
demandingness is not classified by us in immediacy only as a species of 
psychological phenomena, or as projected from an inner source, and while these 
often appear to be 'a glow, as it were, in which the object is bathed',47 it is 
nevertheless the case that plenty of other areas of experience share these features 
and are plainly not thought on reflection to reside in the object in any significant 
way. Indeed, attention to the comparison classes could lead to absurdity (or 
'queemess', as Mackie would put it) should one try to uphold the notion of value as 
inhering 'out there'.48
Each of the views above gives to one a different answer to the Findlay 
question at the beginning of this chapter. Both see the value experience as a 
relational matter, between a subject's sensitivity and certain features of objects, but 
both also incline towards different readings of the status of the object, or not-self, 
contribution to the experience and how it is taken by us. The first one takes there to 
be sufficient warrant within our experience, particularly when compared to other 
'respectable' areas of experience, to ascribe some (unspecified) degree of 
independence 'in the world' to the object of the experience. And the second takes 
there to be sufficient warrant within our experience, particularly when compared to 
other, less respectable - qua objectivity - areas of experience, to deny any
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significant independence to the object of the experience. This second one need not, 
of course, deny that something in the object excites the value experience, but it 
does deny that the object should be conceived in the terms of the reaction, that is, as 
imbued with a value quality.
The views above also differ in their appraisal of the contribution of self to 
the experience. The first view is inclined to see the self s role as of a sensitivity to 
and receptivity to certain features of the world such as value. The second, however, 
will generally regard the apparent value properties of objects in the manner of 
Hume, as resulting from a 'tendency' or 'propensity' for the mind to 'gild' and 
'stain' external objects49 - even though the self need not always recognise its own 
imprint on the objects of its experience.50 Some analyses may accept elements from 
both arguments, taking that which has been projected to be too distant from any 
clear link to self for it to be regarded simply as a subjective phenomenon.51 In that 
case, that which was projected, or part of an ongoing but unrecognised projection, 
would be seen by the subject as under the guise of the not-self and the value 
experience as guided primarily by the object and not by the shifting currents of her 
self.
I think that there are elements in both of these positions above which 
represent to us our own thoughts about our moral experience. Neither, however, 
strikes me as sufficiently accurate a presentation as to capture entirely the truth of 
the matter, qua phenomenological description, as we ourselves are given it in the 
experience. Concerning the second one, I think it is quite correct to state that we do 
not get images of the moral demand and the values it may allegedly behove one to 
attend to as having a determinate signalling as of a special kind of properties or 
entities in the world (or as having their being in divine or cosmic demanders). It is, 
to that extent, right to compare unfavourably the moral experience with those non- 
moral ones whose objects do not have the real property of the sort putatively 
ascribed in the various experiences to them. The not-self of the moral experience 
here should not be located in a special value realm or as inhering in a special kind of
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value property which flows about the object. The datum of independence from the 
subject falls short of that kind of being. Moreover, the comparison may weaken the 
moral example even more than its author suspects. For my descriptive presentation 
in previous chapters has shown that: rather than our misleadingly thinking there to 
be a value object 'out there' as content of our experience, an error which is then 
overturned on reflection, such a determinate object is not carried at all. Hence the 
moral experience may come out rather more badly from the comparison cited by 
Miller than he thinks.52
Having given due acknowledgement above to a deflationary account of the 
kind of not-self figured in the moral experience as it is considered in the light of 
putative comparative non-moral ones, I now want to grant some favourable 
attention to the other account. We do not feel, in the heightened moment, that the 
moral demand experience has no more claim to objectivity than experiences of 
humorous events or that 'temptingness' of food which appears to be located in the 
not-self, inhering in the object. Nor do we feel, on reflecting on the more general 
run of the experience, that the tug of a moral demand is to be associated with the 
kind of tug on our responses made by particularly appealing food or by an amusing 
situation. There is often felt by us to be something about the moral demand 
experience which makes it candidate to or even possessor of a much more enduring 
title to objectivity than those two experience-types which I mentioned in the 
previous sentence and the others quoted by Miller in his footnoted contention. 
That, however, may be the product of no more than the strong feeling which many 
of us have that matters of a very serious nature are at stake and that there must be an 
independent truth of the matter.53 And that in the experience which is perceived to 
be independent of the subject need not be underpinned by any objectively 
prescriptive moral reality, or even by moral properties/facts of a discernible sort 
given to the subject in the demand experience: the not-self has different heads, as I 
have discussed in this chapter, and different ways thereby of being that which 
makes for the independence of the subject.
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Whether or not some hazy sense of an indeterminate moral reality is still 
necessary if subjects are to maintain interest in the issues at stake; or whether for 
that they must believe simply in the possibility of experience of moral demands at 
least in part independent of purely subjective factors: these are the questions with 
which I shall be engaging debate in my next chapter.54 But as to the stuff of this 
chapter, I think that my presentation has shown that no specific value object is 
carried as the not-self. I also believe that my presentation has shown that the ways 
in which self and not-self connect with one another, and with other descriptive 
ways of rendering the moral demand experience, are far more complex than is 
normally given attention in the literature. Apparently, the subject is always given the 
experience by the means of some aspect of the not-self; but that which is not-self 
need not also be appearing as if from some determinate source.
Concluding comments to chapter
The phenomenological description of the moral demand experience in terms 
of self and not-self has proved to be a fruitful mode of research. I have given over 
presentation to the manifold ways in which the two interact in the subject's 
experience, including ones in which her sense of their involvement is far from 
clear. The constitution of the experience in part by the not-self would seem to be 
necessary for the subject if she is to have the experience at all: a matter which I will 
explore further in the next chapter. But the not-self also enters into different 
relations with the concerns and interests of the self, such that the experience can 
appear to the subject as threatening or indifferent or an accepted part of her.
A good deal of descriptive produce has been given by the investigation in 
this chapter. Amongst that, I would single out two points of major importance 
which link up with the general trend of my thought in this thesis. They are:
- i) The diversity of the experience as it ranges on the axis self/not-self. 
Such a broad variety of the demand's constitution that is given to the subject
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includes both quite sharply determinate distinctions and rather vague ones. It also 
encompasses an absence of any clear sense of a division at all, as well as that which 
appears to be entirely as of the not-self. I have repeatedly said that it is often only 
later reflection that will make plain - if it does at all - the actual constitution of that 
experience which was given but hazily in the immediate experience.
The Findlay question at the head of this chapter has been addressed in my 
presentation. Rather than finding the matter to be placed solely on either side of the 
distinction which he puts forward, I have found that the experience is made up in 
more subtle ways than that. In particular, I gave over some space to the 
phenomenon of the experience’s appearing as indeterminately placed between self 
and not-self, suggesting that the tertium quid metaphor was an apt one by which to 
capture this. By granting such attention to the differing interactions between self 
and not-self, both as it concerns the constitution of the experience and also as it is 
received by the self, I have shown how the self/not-self distinction cuts across 
those other ones which I listed in the introduction to the chapter. In particular, that 
which appears as an 'inner' phenomenon can yet be as of the not-self: both as 
independent of the subject and as alien to her. And that which is 'objective', that is 
to say, 'outer' or simply independent of the subject's direct control, can also yet be 
held close to its core by the self.
- ii) Whether the not-self is experienced as specifically located or as a very 
hazy affair, it is not experienced as or as if an intrinsically demanding value reality 
'out there'. Nor does reflection on the original experience lead one to thinking that 
to be the case. But there is a live (and sometimes lively) sense of the not-self 
involved with oneself. And as to this kind of phenomenon, I have suggested that 
many different possible sitings for it may be discerned by the subject, or none at all. 
In all the various cases the not-self can enter into different perceived relations with 
the core self depending on whether it coalesces with certain of its concerns or 
interests.
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It seems to me that the relation of the core self to the moral demand 
experience is given for us both in immediacy and also especially on further 
reflection on how one stands to the experience. Clearly such reflection involves 
thought as to whether moral issues - that is to say, moral matters in general or given 
as certain specified ones - do matter deeply to one, or (if they do not) whether one 
feels that they should do so. I have said of this relation that there looks to be a 
connection, perhaps an essential one, between the core self and the independent 
(not-self) appearance of the moral demand experience, both when the latter connects 
up to such core concerns & c. and when it does not. The question to ask of such 
reflection by a subject on this matter, then, is this. Do we find that this relation is 
perceived as a necessary one, that is, one without which the selfs grasp on its 
experience is loosened or wiped out? That has been the issue at the heart of my 
thesis, and to it I now devote entirely my final chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
If common moral experience is rendered unintelligible or 
unaccountable on some theory, then the theory must be defective. 
Moral principles must enjoy more than merely subjective or private 
status alone, although they need not and apparently do not answer to 
the description of Platonic forms or immutable natural laws of a 
specified and determinate form.
G.R.Lucas.1
[Pjerhaps it is necessary, if it is to be rational for people to "go on", 
that they should believe that it is still possible for them to have 
things of non-instrumental value.
D.A.Lloyd Thomas.2
The suggestion that a person may be in some sense liberated through 
acceding to a power which is not subject to his immediate voluntary 
control is among the most ancient and persistent themes of our moral 
and religious traditions. It must surely reflect some quite 
fundamental structural feature of our lives.
H.Frankfurt.3
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Introduction
This final chapter represents both the continuation and culmination of a 
number of concerns which I have allowed to rise throughout the preceding 
discussion. The prime stuff of this chapter is the description of a subject's higher 
reflective purchase on the moral demand experience. Such ’higher' reflection goes 
on when she reflects upon the nature of that experience as a class, beyond that 
reflection which she undertakes with respect to particular instances of that 
experience. I combine such a phenomenology with investigation into the ways in 
which the experience is connected with the self, both as it may manifest deep levels 
of the self and as it may serve in part to enter into the very constitution of a self.
One of the main concerns of this chapter, then, is with that higher reflection 
on the moral demand experience and putative descriptions of its nature which I have 
mentioned often in this thesis. It is a kind of reflection on the content of her 
experience as a class that a subject can undertake. And it is thought by some 
philosophers also to be a reflection that reveals to her necessary features of the 
experience with which she is already acquainted, though she may not have 
subjected it to close reflective inspection. I use the 'phenomenological arguments' - 
as they are generally called - of Wiggins (1987b) and Platts (1980), and also a 
recent one by Taylor, as I understand them to be relevant to my central interests, or 
as I think they serve as useful descriptions of the reflective phenomenology when 
suitably construed. Looking at such arguments as candidates for providing one with 
description of the essence of the moral demand experience insofar as its objectivity 
component is concerned, I argue the following major points. Firstly, I do not think 
that they say all that much about the kind of objectivity of the experience which they 
might believe to be necessary to it as it is held in reflective assay. Secondly, beyond 
a certain minimum descriptive level of that experienced objectivity - that is to say, a 
crude and rather diffuse sense of the experience's independence of one - any alleged
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account fails to pass muster as veridical to the data. If an objectivity element is 
essential to the moral demand experience it is not that which is given by 
apprehension of moral values 'out there', as Mackie takes us to believe we have. 
Indeed, I go further in this chapter with my argument than that. Against Wiggins et 
al I contend that reflective thought on possibly subjective sources of the moral 
demand experience and moral values need not be so destabilising of a subject's 
grasp on her experience as they may think. The reflective phenomenology of 
subjects' thoughts on such matters looks generally to be more robust and less 
productive of that experience of unease and dissatisfaction than those philosophers 
might believe. What I do affirm with them is that moral values and the moral 
demand experience cannot be chosen, are not directly amenable to the subject's 
will.
I end the chapter, and thereby the thesis, with discussion of the relation of 
the experienced objectivity to the experienced core self. Having argued that 
experience of moral demands cannot be regarded as constitutive inter alia of a self, 
I then explore the interaction of the objectivity component (as not-self) with the 
concerns, interests and identifications of the core self. My contention is that there is 
no paradox in the apparently intimate relation that often exists between them. But I 
do acknowledge that moral demands can be experienced as irksome and as contrary 
to other concerns of the core self. That is because moral concerns do not always 
hold strong sway with us and must find room in the core self amongst a cluster of 
other non-moral ones.
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Section One: Phenomenology of reflection
On occasion, throughout the previous three chapters, I have drawn the 
reader’s attention to the possibility of a higher reflective phenomenology that the 
subject can engage in and to its possible role in her general moral experience if she 
does so. Here I am going to turn my analysis entirely toward that kind of reflection.
I ask the reader at this juncture to refresh his/her acquaintance with my 
understanding of this higher, or second order, phenomenology by reference to my 
third chapter. And at this juncture I want to clear a methodological point by bringing 
out the different approaches which the formal and informal ways of doing 
phenomenology take in this respect. I will illustrate the point by an example from 
the general moral area in which my interest lies.
In the formal phenomenological mode one’s presentation of the experience 
is always of a reflective nature insofar as one's studies bring back to consciousness 
an item of experience for description. The 'higher' reflection goes on, I believe, 
when one moves away from the straightforward description of the appearances and 
tries to distinguish the 'horizon' of the particular datum and its essential features 
(see chapter 2 for my explanation of these terms). Thus, in the case of the 
experienced phenomenon of guilt, one does this. Having first described its initial 
appearance to consciousness and any immediate object(s) it takes, one then goes on 
to look into the background elements it has for the subject, such as its connection in 
her thought with childhood events, divine retribution, & c., and how it coheres 
with other attitudes and world-views which she holds (as to its propriety, say, or 
the kind of response she feels she should make in the light of it).4
I have tried to make clear in chapter 3 the ways in which an informal 
phenomenology deals with this matter. 1 shall repeat here that I believe it goes on in 
two ways; as I see it, the first being sub-divided and leading on to an understanding 
of the second. One way in which higher reflection is a descriptive matter for
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phenomenology is that it sometimes provides different presentations of the initial 
appearances than were given in the direct ones. This occurs, for example, when one 
’realizes' that it was not so much guilt that one felt about an event but the fear of 
being caught. The sub-division of this first mode of reflective phenomenology 
occurs at this point. For one can then go on to describe the experience which the 
subject undergoes on coming to such a modified understanding of the direct 
experience. This may be, say, one of shock on realizing one’s fear of being caught 
was greater than, or entirely in place of, that ’proper’ sense of guilt which, say, 
one's religious beliefs would duly underpin.
The second way in which the informal mode of reflective phenomenology 
takes this data similarly seems to me to rest on the registration of a particular kind of 
experience the subject has at this reflective level. The experience itself, on which 
this kind of application of phenomenology relies, is often of a rather vague sort. 
What that experience is, and how it comes about, I believe to be given in the 
following way. (For a preliminary explanation of the matter I refer the reader again 
to sections 1 and 4 of chapter 3). When the subject reflects in a general fashion, not 
about a particular instance of guilt, but about the role it occupies in her life and that 
of her community and how it 'makes sense’ to her as an class of experience, then 
the phenomenological description of her reflection presents some sort of experience 
of satisfaction, at-ease-with, sensefulness with regard to the general phenomenon. 
(Or, of course, she may have the opposite kinds of experience - of unease, 
senselessness, & c.). To that of guilt, then, she may find an experience of its 
sensefulness to be that given when reflecting on its connection with the breach of 
some law, be that divine/natural law, or the enacted one of the state. More 
importantly, from the point of view of those whom I believe to be the practioners of 
this method of phenomenology, is the marshalling of this reflective experience in a 
negative fashion. In this approach what happens is that the subject's experience is
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described on reflecting on a possible general understanding of her experience which 
she finds she cannot endorse, which strikes her as making less sense than other 
construals, or no sense at all, or which she finds somehow clashes irresolubly with 
the apparent content of her immediate experience. This is the sort of experience 
which I think Anscombe (1958) must wish us to have on considering non-theistic 
interpretations of the phenomena of guilt. And for many others outwith her 
religious tradition (or any other religious tradition) one is given sample examples of 
this reflective phenomenology as they find it impossible or absurd or queer on 
thinking that guilt could be simply a brute feeling excited by desires and acts with 
which punishment is associated by one.
So, combining both formal and informal modes, a higher level reflective 
phenomenology describes both a second order reflection on experience and an 
experience on performing that reflection. The way in which that informal 
phenomenology of an experience of sensefulness or its opposite is employed by its 
presenter seems to me to be constituting what I called in chapter 3 a negative 
phenomenological argument. That is to say, these philosophers - 1 am thinking here 
of Wiggins and Taylor - take the subject's experience of the senselessness or 
absurdity, or of the breakdown in one's ability to maintain any feel for a particular 
moral concept's application to the stuff of their experience, as giving them either 
good or irrefutable argument against the particular opponent view. This is especially 
so when the proponent of this kind of argument is utilising it against an opponent 
view that itself makes claims of a phenomenologically testable nature and which can 
therefore be subjected to straightforward falsification in virtue of the incorrect 
phenomenology it presents. Whether or not that leaves the field open, as it were, 
for the particular view held by the philosopher who has disposed of a rival view 
disconsonant with the moral phenomenology is, of course, a matter of some issue.
Chapter Seven 265
Section Two: Three phenomenological arguments
In this section I will consider three related ’phenomenological arguments’, 
as they are generally known in moral philosophical literature, which seem to me to 
bear on the question of the moral demand's experienced objectivity. Each one is 
addressed to similar issues in moral philosophy and my aim is to use them as they 
seem to me relevant to the question at hand of this thesis. I will omit, therefore, 
those parts of such arguments which are not entirely germane to this study, leaving 
mention of them to the footnotes.
As a general introduction to the kinds of argument I am about to put under 
way, these comments from Mackie stand as representative of the class. Firstly, 
there is this. Mackie is talking of the upshot of a belief that morality is no more than 
a device for dealing with preference-ordering and hence of an awareness of it in a 
utilitarian fashion. He says:
...the practical difficulty, for someone who is for part of the time a 
critical moral philosopher in this utilitarian style, [is] to keep this 
from infecting his everyday thought and conduct. It cannot be easy 
for him to retain practical dispositions of honesty, justice, and 
loyalty if in his heart of hearts he feels that these don’t really matter, 
and sees them merely as devices to compensate for the inability of 
everyone, himself included, to calculate reliably and without bias in 
terms of aggregate utility.5 
And, in discussing a certain developed projectivist account of our moral experience, 
he maintains that, despite what he feels to be the plausibility of such an approach:
I think that direct attention to traditional ways of thinking about 
morality, in particular,will still detect such a claim [to objectivity].6 
The point he is making is this. If one takes a certain explanation or alleged 
description of one's moral experience and practices on board, so to speak, and tries
Chapter Seven 266
to square it with how one actually experiences the area of morality in question, one 
finds oneself rejecting that explanation or description. This is particularly so when 
one finds oneself experiencing a breakdown both of the linguistic sense of a 
concept applicable to one's moral experience and of its sensefulness insofar as the 
experience plays an important role in a particular area of one’s life or in one's life as 
a whole. Clearly the moral ones do occupy a position of importance in our lives for 
most of us. But how important, and how intrinsic to our self-understanding, they 
are is a matter which calls for some scrutiny.
It bears noting at this point that there are, in fact, two logically separable 
arguments which I have represented by the Mackie quotations above. One is the 
claim that some views of morality, or a part of it, are such as to destabilise one's 
actual commitment to morality. Thinking that morality is 'only' a social construct 
that serves the interests of a particular elite might have such a result to those of a 
Marxist frame of mind.7 The other is that a certain view, again, of morality or part 
of it can destabilise one’s very grasp of the moral concepts themselves and lead to a 
tension between the reflection and one's direct experience of a working moral 
system. This possibility may be an actual fact of some persons' moral 
consciousness on the thought that there is no divine moral law. Either of the two 
results of this kind of reflective thought might follow on from the other; either need 
not necessarily be brought about in the light of the other, according to some of my 
arguments in this chapter.
Here now are the three phenomenological arguments which I mentioned, 
abridged by me to refer as directly as possible to the experienced objectivity of 
values and the moral demands by which they may exert or signal themselves.
A. David Wiggins.
In his British Academy lecture, Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life ,8 
David Wiggins challenges a subjectivist view of value as conferred by the agent and
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constituted by her ongoing commitment or interest. He proposes in its place an 
account of such notions as the worthwhile and the valuable, and the experiences 
through which they are given to us, as the objective features of the world which are 
responsible for the particular feel the correlative intentional states (of value, of 
mattering) have for us. His account has come to be called a 'phenomenological 
argument'. It is this. Insofar as a theorist takes value to be created by some 
subjective state of the agent, then he is taking a view of external reality which can 
be rendered up in a wertfrei description, for value is being said to originate from 
inside us and not from the outside. But if we take on board at the subjective level 
this claim - that is, see if it rings true with the phenomenological presentation value 
has for us - then, according to Wiggins, we find that: a particular value experience 
doesn't feel at the time as if it has been self-conferred; reflection on the general run 
of value experience makes little sense of the notion of that experience being so 
unrepresentative of its subjective origins; and value experience does not strike one 
as being that kind of thing unless it has such an objectivity feel attending it. That is 
to say, the subject cannot make sense of her value experiences, as they are had or as 
she reflects on them, when they are conceived as shorn of an objectivity feature. In 
Wiggins' words:
Where the non-cognitivist account essentially depends on the 
existence and availability of the inner view, it is a question of capital 
importance whether the non-cognitivist's account of the inner view 
makes such sense of our condition as it actually has for us from the 
inside.9
Wiggins believes that the subjectivist thesis is incorrect on two counts, the 
second being sufficient to dispatch of it. On the one hand, it gives false account at a 
descriptive level of the salient feaures of value experience. Hence it cannot rely on 
its alleged presentation of the data of our value consciousness to support its own
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argument. And on the other, in taking value apprehension to move one because of 
its subjective basis and in taking this to be a necessary feature of the constitution of 
value, it renders itself in a practical self-contradiction. For (so Wiggins' argument 
goes), should an agent come to think on this contention as correct she will find at 
this reflective level that the direct experience to which the thought is aimed makes 
no sense and is threatened or even dissolved. This is because it does not seem 
possible for an agent to conceive that kind of cleavage between world and self - 
between, that is, an allegedly value-neutral world and value-conferring self - 
without destroying much of the elements of value experience that go to identify it. 
For an agent to dispense with the objectivity feature of value experience is to make 
its whole ambit seem arbitrary and meaningless. Wiggins puts the matter this way: 
...by the non-cognitivist's lights, it must appear that whatever the 
will chooses to treat as a good reason to engage itself is, for the will, 
a good reason. But the will itself, taking the inner view, picks and 
chooses, deliberates and weighs, and tests its own concerns. It 
craves objective reasons; and often it could not go forward unless it 
thought it had them.10 
And he states further that:
The one thing that [value] properties cannot be, at least for [the 
agent], is mere projections resulting from a certain kind of efficacy 
in the causation of satisfaction...To see itself and its object in the 
alien manner of the outer view, the state as experienced would have 
to be prepared to suppose that it, the state, could just as well have 
lighted on any other object (even any other kind of object), provided 
only that the requisite attitudes could have been induced. But in this 
conception of such states we are entitled to complain that nothing
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remains that we can recognise, or that the inner perception will not 
instantly disown.11
The consequences of embracing a subjectivist value theory look to result in a certain 
incoherence concerning the very experience that that theory addresses, and upon 
which it relies for exploiting an inner-outer distinction. Wiggins' case, then, is that 
a practical contradiction, between the meaningfulness of value experience and its 
motivating influence in our lives on the one hand and a putative non-objective basis 
for it on the other, is engendered. His case can be summarised in this way:
1. The phenomenology of value experience is not as of subjective 
constitution when
a) in the thick of those experiences;
b) thinking about them.
2. Against a phenomenology of choice, one of finding out.
3. Against a phenomenology of free-floating commitment, one of 
constraint.
Element l.a) consists in showing the subjectivist's view of the phenomenological 
data of value experience simply to be incorrect, l.b) takes that phenomenological 
contention up to a reflective level, at which the subjective thesis is also invalidated 
in virtue of a disorienting, destabilising feeling which is wrought by thinking on its 
possible truth. Elements 2. and 3. supplement this basic impetus of the Wiggins' 
line, levelling against the subjectivist view phenomenological data (of discovery, of 
constraint) that do not seem to him amenable to the subjectivist thrust.
From all this Wiggins wishes to argue that the phenom enological 
appearances, taken both at direct and reflective levels of description, give good 
warrant for a particular view of our moral experience and judgement as objective. 
One might summarize the attitude he exhibits, and upon which a phenomenological 
argument relies, by his terse comment that:
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I object that that is not how it feels to most people.12
Zl Mark Platts
The phenomenologically based position put forward by Mark Platts exploits 
a similar move to the one above. He takes a basic antirealist contention and 
investigates the consequences of holding that to be correct - and believing himself to 
have shown that it makes for unintelligibility in the very experience with which it is 
dealing, he makes the further move of employing a moral realist explanation to 
break the impasse.
The contention which Platts examines is the application to our moral 
consciousness of a widely (though not universally) held tenet of philosophical 
psychology, that reasons for actions must make reference to the actual or potential 
desires of the agent. In the moral case this has led to antirealist conclusions13 - for 
in as much as motivation is held to be internal to perception of moral value, it has 
been thought that this relies on the presence of a requisite desire, with which the 
value is subsequently identified. And desires, though perhaps subject to certain 
logical requirements, need not be formed or directed by the norm of truth in line 
with the outer world.
Platts takes as correct without further question that view above concerning 
the role of desire as necessary to motivation. But he asks how desires motivate in 
this case. Exploiting a comparison with the way in which the painfulness of pain is 
an intrinsic motivating force for the subject of it, Platts wonders if a similar 
possibility in the phenomenology of desire - as sufficient qua desire to motivate - is 
instantiated for the general case. He does not think that it is: that is, he does not 
believe that what gets a subject into action is the ’desirefulness’ which a desire has, 
this being a matter of a description of its phenomenological force. He thinks that 
something else is (indeed, must be) responsible: taking this to be the experience of
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worth or value or, if you will, the desirability of an object state of affairs, which is 
not felt to be brought about simply by the desire. Platts states his belief that:
...desires, unlike pains, have a logical content, and desires motivate 
an agent because of his view of the objects of his desires as 
desirable . But this answer would be no answer at all if that view of 
the object of desire was seen by the agent simply as a consequence 
of its being the object of his desire; for then there would be nothing 
to constitute the motivating force.14
Platts does not suggest the jettisoning of desire from explanation in this 
light; he accepts that position from philosophy of mind. Rather, though, he believes 
that 'desirability is prior to desire; it is merely that recognition of desirability brings 
desire with it.*15 Hence, far from having the antirealist consequences that it initially 
seemed to exhibit, the phenomenological analysis of the matter leads to the counter­
claim that acceptance of the motivational force of desire in moral experience requires 
the notion of an independent reality of value subject to truth conditions and 
responsible for the very perception which makes for the desirability in question.16
Within this argument Platts also moots a consideration identical to the one 
used by Wiggins above. This is the move taken in assessing the experience at a 
reflective level of thinking on the possibility that value does consist in being 
desired. Platts maintains that reflection by an agent that, if she desired not-p rather 
than p, and that that is what it is for not-p to be desirable, this will lead to her 
finding the whole affair unintelligible and to a breakdown in her commitment to the 
objects of the actual desires that she has. Such thought will actually weaken the 
motivating force of the desire that p, according to Platts, so that:
For a reflective being with a nature like ours, the price of 
abandoning moral realism can be the end of desire.17
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His position relies, therefore, on the phenomenological description of the 
experience one encounters on second order reflection when considering the direct 
experience itself in the light of a particular view of it. This is in addition to his belief 
on how the direct experience actually strikes a subject when it occurs. In both 
cases, Platts takes himself to be convicting his opponent of holding a false picture 
of our experience at each level - and in the case of the reflective survey, of 
incoherence. For reflection fails to accommodate the experience in the manner of the 
antirealist explanation and cannot do so except on pain of collapsing the very 
experience under discussion. And what happens at a general reflective level of 
thought has those same effects on value experience in practice: whereas moral 
realism accords with the direct experience and reflection on it.
Here is a summary of Platts’ position as a phenomenological argument:
1. Moral experience contains experience of the independent desirability of 
its object (positive phenomenological argument: this is how it feels).
2. Desire does not of itself carry a charge sufficient to motivate (negative 
phenomenological argument: this is how it doesn’t feel).
3. The independent desirability of its object accounts for the motivational 
force of desire (inference drawn from the conjunction of 1. and 2.).
4. a) Reflection on the possible truth of an antirealist position leads to 
incoherence of the subject matter.
b) Mutatis mutandis, moral realism doesn't.
5. The thought from 4.a) leads to the breakdown of a view of desire on its 
own as motivational in specific moral experience (this requires prior acceptance of
1. and 2.).
6. The phenomenology of moral value experience, as well as the 
phenomenological analysis of reflection - particularly reflection on antirealist
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construals of moral value - lends strong support to moral realism (overall 
phenomenological argument).
Charles Tavlor.
The argument put forward by Taylor (1989) crucially rests also on how one 
experiences one's moral life and how it gives itself to one in a reflective view as 
different explanations of it are entertained. The overall passage of his argument runs 
through various different points which are couched in terms that evoke both formal 
and informal modes of phenomenology as I have presented the matter. I will 
reconstruct below the main features of it as I see them to press most clearly on the 
issues at hand.
The ultimate tenet to which Taylor holds is given in these words from the 
very first paragraph of his work:
Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, 
turn out to be inextricably intertwined themes.18 
It is from this tenet that his arguments flow and towards which he wishes them to 
point as confirmation. On the specific nature of such a claim I devote a later section 
(section 4). For the time being I note it only in order to indicate its constant 
presence in the background of Taylor's presentation.
He begins his argument by talking of the ways in which our moral reactions 
and other reactions to objects, such as olfactory ones, are similar and not. He states 
that they share the phenomenological feature of being 'gut reactions',19 wrought 
from us without our conscious direction. But then he notes that they are dissimilar 
in a crucial way: the objects of our moral reactions seem to be worthy or fit ones for 
them in a fashion which cannot be said to go also for smells and objects of 
nauseous reactions. This is something we are especially given on reflection on our 
moral reactions. In Taylor's words:
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We don’t acknowledge that there is something there to articulate [in 
the case of the non-moral examples], as we do in the moral case. Is 
this distinction illegitimate? A metaphysical invention? It seems to 
turn on this: in either case our response is to an object with a certain 
property. But in one case the property marks the object out as 
meriting this reaction; in the other the connection between the two is 
just a brute fact. Thus we argue over what and who is a fit object of 
moral respect, while this doesn’t seem to be even possible for a 
reaction like nausea.20 
His argument here is structurally identical to that which Wiggins and Platts make 
with respect to the object of our moral responses: which argument is that the 
response is felt to be governed by the object's meriting it. Unlike (allegedly) the 
case of the nauseous response, the property to which the moral response is directed 
is not constituted by the presence of the response itself. So Taylor is also claiming 
that something independent of the subject is felt to be going into the constitution of 
her moral response.21
Further to this description of the appearances of the moral phenomena, 
Taylor takes himself to be giving the reader insight into the essential framework’ or 
'horizon' which we require in order 'to make sense o f22 our moral reactions. 
These frameworks, by which we explain and understand our lives, are held by 
Taylor to be essential to our very 'personhood'.23 Such an approach on his part 
seems to me sufficiently close to that of the Husserlian exploration of the 'horizon' 
and 'life-world', as I noted them in chapter 2, to be making points in the 
phenomenological vein of this thesis. In the specifically moral case, he believes, 
there are certain evaluative notions we have which both capture our moral 
experience and give us the means to articulate more fully our lives: without which
Chapter Seven 275
our ability to deliberate and judge would be severely circumscribed. They are 
'indispensable.'
A particular argument which Taylor instances in this respect is levelled - like 
those of Wiggins and Platts - against those opponents of moral realism for whom 
the nature of our moral experience, and the language which captures it, is the stuff 
of their attack. It is Taylor's belief that the lack of fit between certain moral theories 
and the phenomenological data which we ourselves as subjects are given at direct 
and reflective levels is sufficiently significant to invalidate such theories. He says:
If non-realism can’t be supported by moral experience, then there 
are no good grounds to believe it at all. The non-realist would have 
to get down to the detail of the moral life, and show in particular 
cases how a projective view made more sense of them, if he were to 
convince us. But...the logic of our moral language resists this sort 
of splitting.24
Clearly this is a phenomenological argument of the type which I have identified in 
chapter 3 and which bears the marks of a similar approach to that of Wiggins and 
Platts.
Taylor's attack on subjectivist moral philosophies takes the form, then, of 
drawing attention to the way in which we experience our moral life and think about 
it. He makes such a point at those two levels, direct and reflective, which I have 
already shown Wiggins and Platts to be exploiting. At the direct level he says that 
the way in which 'the good', should it motivate one, is experienced is as so in 
virtue of its own peculiar quality and not simply because of one's having the actual 
experience. Hence he says:
It is easy to rush in with the standard subjectivist model: the good's 
importance reposes just in its moving us so. But this model is false 
to the most salient features of our moral phenomenology. We sense
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in the very experience of being moved by some higher good that we 
are moved by what is good in it rather than that it is valuable because 
of our reaction.25
And at the reflective level, he believes, a subject cannot render intelligible her life if 
she takes a subjectivist explanation of it to be correct. Quite the opposite is the case 
for Taylor: one needs to think of one's life according to some general feature of the 
independence from one of its moral aspect. (Though he does not elucidate precisely 
what feature is needed by us and what other ones might perform a similar role). 
Accounts which clash with our reflective moral experience 'are not construals you 
could actually make of your life while living it.'26
The kind of independence from one that such moral matters possess is not 
entirely plain from Taylor's presentation, but it does involve an experience as of the 
independent presence of a quality in the object meriting one's response. Such a 
quality, and the role it plays in one's life - especially when reflection is directed to 
the matter - is certainly independent of one's choosing and is also felt by the subject 
(according to Taylor) as involving some degree of independence from her as the 
apprehender of the quality.
I will summarise the essence of this further instance of a phenomenological 
argument:
1. For Taylor, a life which is conducted in some (indeterminate) degree 
according to the lights of moral experience and thought is constitutive of selfhood, 
or of personhood (the distinction is equivocal in his writings).
2. The objects of our value experience are not felt by us, either during the 
experience or on reflection on it, to be important, of worth, morally significant, & 
c., just because we have the particular experience.
3. The objects of our value experience are felt by us, during the experience 
itself and on reflection on it, to be important, of worth, morally significant, & c. in
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virtue of something about them which is independent in some degree of ourselves 
and which merits that kind of experience.
4. The conjunction of 2. and 3. falsifies certain  subjectiv ist 
phenomenologies of our moral experience. In seeing this latter to be constituted as 
moral experience by that response itself and not by the independent features of the 
object, such phenomenologies are incorrect as portayals of our direct experience.
5. The same phenomenologies are also unable to account for the sense our 
moral life has for us: which crucially does rest on considerations like 3. above.
6. Because of 5. subjectivist moral phenomenologies cannot account either 
for the putative truth of 1. above.
7. Some form of moral realism (unspecified by Taylor), which accepts 
points 2. and 3. as to the independence of one of the moral object, is consonant 
with our direct experience and does chime with reflection on i t
I am going to refer to these as the 'WPT line', from the initials of their 
authors. It seems to me that these three27 arguments are properly called 
'phenomenological'. I understand what they are tiying to do in this way. One thing 
which they attempt is to present the subject with a kind of thought experiment, if 
she has not already given thought to the matter. In recording the experience she has 
on performing that reflection, it produces putative evidence to the effect that her 
general overview of a particular experience class makes certain clashing construals 
of that unlikely candidates for correct explanation, particularly if they themselves 
claim to be accurately describing the phenomenology. The other28 
phenomenological ploy being used is that of a description of the background 
sensefulness of the experience which goes to make up and found the subject's own 
ability to use the concepts she applies to it and the way in which the experience is 
intelligible at all to her.29 This, then, is a case of describing what Husserl calls 'the
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horizon' and of trying to discover the essential components without which the 
experience ceases to be the particular thing it is.
2.i - The arguments adumbrated and criticised
As to the three arguments above, I believe that from them two things which 
bear significantly on the objectivity question can be taken. I distinguish two things, 
though the authors themselves do not do so, it seems to me. And they are these. 
One, as I have said, is to discredit and show to be false30 certain claims about our 
moral experience and how generally it is and is to be viewed. This relies both on the 
straightforward showing of an opponent view to rest on false description of the 
object data and also on that sense of breakdown and unease which ensues for the 
subject when reflectively considering certain putative accounts of the nature of her 
experience.
As to this latter phenomenon noted just above, I should distinguish between 
the kinds of experienced breakdown to which its description can be referring, even 
though I do not think that WPT themselves do so. One of these breakdowns 
consists in that sense of unease allegedly rendered in the subject if the origins of our 
moral experience are considered by her as located outwith any objective framework: 
this kind of consideration allegedly clashing with how the experience strikes a 
subject and how she thinks on it. Another, which may then ensue in the light of this 
unease, is that of a breakdown in the meaningfulness of our moral experience 
generally: as threatening to dissolve that kind of phenomenon which perhaps 
occupies an important part in our life and our self-understanding. And further to 
that - but logically separate from it - is the potential breakdown in the sensefulness 
for the subject of her moral life and the practices that go with the experiences. At 
any point in these experiences of dissatisfaction, unease, or breakdown may also go 
the claim that the subject's very grasp of certain moral value terms might be loosed
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or eradicated: so that she can no longer make linguistic sense of the terms with 
which she represents her experience.
These kinds of breakdown in the sense which the experience of demands, 
or of values that demand, have for a subject are different. Prima facie I wish to say 
that the feeling that life (or some part of it) is rendered meaningless is not the same 
as having linguistic difficulties with certain terms, and neither trouble is the same as 
one's ceasing to take morality seriously. These problems may be compatible with 
one another - that is, a subject may find herself in thrall to all of these difficulties at 
once - but the WFT line does not show that they all entail one another, either 
logically or as phenomenological facts following in the train of reflection on non­
objective accounts of the experience. Hence one is left to disentangle the precise 
nature of the forces which WPT intend their arguments to exert philosophically.
All three certainly wish to argue that there is a clash of some sort between 
the feel which this area of our moral experience generally has for us and 
consideration of proffered non-objective accounts of its nature. I think that they do 
want to hold the further thesis that reflection on those alternative accounts will lead 
to the kind of breakdown for the subject which I detailed above as a sensation of 
meaninglessness with respect to this part of our life (the general affect of this on our 
lives as a whole being correspondent to the importance that moral affairs might hold 
for us). And I think that they also want to establish that the very experiences in 
question, and the practices that go with them, will be destabilised and even broken 
down altogether should an agent take seriously the non-objective account as giving 
her the real nature of her moral experience. Taylor, in particular, wishes to argue 
also that such experience is involved with the make-up of the self to an intimate 
degree, and that the kind of breakdown discussed here will therefore also strike at 
the balance of the self (or an important part of it). In the debate that follows, then, I 
shall inquire as to whether any of these claims are phenomenologically correct as
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regards our moral experience and reflection on it. I shall also ask whether a clash 
between experience with a putative objectivity feature and proposed non-objective 
accounts of it need be so destabilising a matter for the subject if it is assumed that a 
clash is actually engendered in that way.
Following on from their alleged showing of an opponent view to be 
phenomenologically awry from the actual data of our experience, the second move 
these authors then try to make is to show that their own particular notion of the 
experience's position in our moral consciousness is the correct one. All three see 
this matter in terms of some kind of objectivity which the experience has and which 
the subject in some way needs it to have if that experience generally is to be had. 
They take this to chime with and adequately describe the phenomenology of our 
immediate experience, as well as being given reflective assent by the subject.
Now this is where my use of a distinction between the two moves comes in. 
For I do not see that, in disposing of a particular incorrect phenomenology, or 
explanation of a part of our moral experience which has fundamentally 
phenomenological grounds, sufficient warrant is thereby given for the adequacy of 
the alternative view held by these authors. And it is at the point where they offer 
that phenomenology which they take to be the one consonant with the data of direct 
moral experience and reflection on it that my worry begins. I do not believe that 
sufficient attention is paid by the three to the precise kind of feel which the demand 
experience carries for the subject. Nor do I think that sufficient care is taken actually 
to show that the allegedly redundant phenomenology is correctly replaced by 
another one that subjects do find adequate. I believe that the move which does take 
place after disposing of an opponent view is often only presenting one with the 
rough outline of something like the way in which the subject is related to her 
experience of moral demands. Of course, it may turn out that only a very rough 
relation is the one that correctly describes the matter.31 But then that should be
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signalled as a phenomenological description which is given by the relevant data. 
Moreover, as an additional worry about the kind of argument being exploited, I 
wonder if the authors in question have done enough to make explicit and 
comprehensible the nature of the negative thrust of their argument. That is to say, I 
am not sure if the kind of reflective breakdown they address - that sense of unease 
and dissatisfaction, the inability to carry on, which a particular suggested construal 
of moral experience might engender - is given adequate description as a 
phenomenon and as counter-argument to certain ways of looking at the experience.
Exactly what is it, then, for a reflective breakdown to be experienced when 
thinking on such a possibility that moral value is chosen by the subject? One thing it 
can be, but which is not often a philosophical argument against a rival image of the 
experience, is a dispiriting, as it were, of the subject on taking seriously the notion 
that value is really nothing other than, say, projected desire or a phenomenon of the 
will. I think that this dispiriting is indeed a powerful feeling, one with which the 
post-Enlightenment western mind has continuously grappled when the thought or 
deep feeling of the absence of a divine or natural moral law has been in play.32 But, 
as Hume points out,33 such an effect of a particular metaethic being considered as 
valid does not pass muster as a form of philosophical debate. It could do so if it 
were the case that a particular moral philosopher argued that that kind of value- 
constitution correctly described the matter while simultaneously holding the 
function of morality to be socially grounded in its upholding of cohesive, conflict- 
resolving procedures: for which a certain decent fiction of objectivity might be 
necessary if people were to maintain their commitment to it. Such a moral 
philosopher would then be expounding an apparently contradictory system. Or, at 
the very least, she would have to take care that her thoughts were not made public. 
Mackie may fall foul of just such an objection, Williams thinking that he does
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transgress his own avowed moral philosophy.34 Hume has also been criticized by 
Annette Baier on similar grounds.35
This kind of experience of worry engendered by a particular moral theory 
need not be felt by all as breaking down the very experience, conceptual resources 
and practices to which it is addressed.36 Moreover, a subject may conceivably be 
led by these considerations to abandon certain moral practices and beliefs in a moral 
system without a correspondent breakdown in the kind of objectivity experience 
which has been addressed. Certainly, though, a number of writers on moral 
philosophy do believe those kinds of effect to be producable by such metaethical 
speculation.37 And even the chief contemporary proponent of a Humean view of 
morality, Blackburn, concedes that there is the strong possibility of an 'unease' on 
considering his view, this unease being 'located in a tension between the subjective 
source which projectivism gives to morality, and the objective "feel" that a properly 
working morality has. It is this objective feel or phenomenology which people find 
threatened by projectivism, and they may go on to fear the threat as one which 
strikes at the core of morality.'38
In the context of a debate concerning that phenomenology which moral 
realists point to and advance as support for their metaethical theories and his own 
response to it, Blackburn says that:
It is, I think, particularly the side of morality associated with 
obligation which is felt to be subject to this threat...[Obligation] 
often needs to be perceived as something sufficiently external to us 
to act as a constraint or bound on our other sentiments and desires. 
The claims and shackles of obligation must come from outside us. 
Can anything both be felt to have this power, and yet be explained 
as a projection of our own sentiments? The charge will then be that 
projectivism falsifies this aspect of morality; it will be unable to
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endorse this kind of perception of obligation, but must explain it 
away as a phenomenological distortion. It will be the result of an 
error, and realist opponents of projectivism will join with 
revisionists to urge that it marks a point at which [Blackburn's 
metaethic] fails. The realists will trust the phenomenology, and 
revisionists will regret it.39
This kind of breakdown is a salient difficulty for those images of our 
experience of moral demands which find themselves so poorly supported by either 
direct or reflective phenomenological inspection. But the more explicitly 
philosophical difficulty which is generated by the phenomenological mode of 
argument is itself potentially a very strong one. I believe that the three arguments I 
am considering all purport to do the following. One element of this general 
approach is the straightforward falsifying of a particular description of the moral 
phenomenology. This goes on when that view of value as chosen, or value as 
projected desire, is seen not to capture the essence of our direct moral experience of 
the demands we perceive: which do not seem chosen, or projected, or created by 
us.40 The further element is trained on such views when they seem either to clash 
with that reflective experience of which I have talked and/or to be seen in the light 
of that as involving themselves in practical contradiction at a phenomenological 
level of presentation. In philosophical practice these dual aspects of the second 
element are intimately conjoined, the latter being the result of the former's having 
been shown. That is to say, an opponent subjectivist view is putatively shown to 
produce a contradictory relation between the place of value apprehension in our life 
and its claimed subjective basis once it has been established by WPT that an 
objectivity component is experienced by us in such apprehension. And it is when 
these two elements to a phenomenological argument are arrayed before the 
opponent view that I think all the interesting questions come into their own.
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It does not seem to me an especially contestable matter that a (purely) 
subjectivist approach falls through and cannot begin adequately to describe our 
direct experience. We do not experience ourselves as choosing the demands that 
come upon us, or which we have experienced in the past. One of the ’interesting' 
questions to which I alluded above is just how much and how precise the manner of 
objectivity which is found in the experience and which falsifies the subjectivist one. 
And the same goes for the higher reflective attention which the subject gives to the 
general stuff of her moral experience. If she rejects the value-conferral image (either 
as that conferral allegedly goes on from her as an individual subject or along with 
her collective group) then one would wish to know just what kind of objectivity it is 
with which that is clashing and which is upheld at the reflective level.
To these two points I have a number of comments to make. One is simply to 
note that facet of moral decision-making with which we are faced by moral 
problems and which throws onto the subject the responsibility for careful, honest 
thought. That this thought goes on in the light of, and working with, the moral 
demands that impinge unbidden upon her should not detract from an important part 
of our moral experience that goes on subsequent to the consciousness of the moral 
demand. Such a process does give some warrant to the notion of a subject's input 
to her own moral experience. But it does not give it that for the immediate 
experience of moral demands and the values they might be felt to disclose to one; 
these are not experienced as under the subject's direct volition.41 (Though this does 
not discount that some ultimate personal commitment of a willed form to certain 
moral concerns is felt on reflection by a subject to be necessary to the particular 
quality which her moral demand experience has for her).
A second point which I think merits some considerable attention is this. The 
immediate experience is, for sure, not one given in subjective form; but is the 
reflective experience really so disorienting as the three have put it? I am not at all
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sure that it can be taken as read that subjects do find, or would find, reflection on 
some possible subjective source of the demands that alight in the moral 
consciousness one that gives rise to a breakdown in the ability to make sense of 
themselves and their moral life. The likes of Russell, Ayer and Mackie all thought 
morality to have that subjective source and there is every evidence that their moral 
lives continued unabated, or even with a greater degree of involvement than the 
majority of us normally care to bother ourselves with. Sartre, too, campaigned 
tirelessly on all kinds of moral issues. These philosophers seem neither to have 
found their moral activity absurd or pointless in the light of their subjectivist 
reflections on it nor to have been in thrall to that kind of disquieting, dissolving 
phenomenology described partially by the arguments of WPT.
With respect to my point directly above concerning whether subjects would 
see any sense in going on with their moral lives if they came to believe that moral 
demands had no objective underpinning of the kind Mackie claims to identify, Mill 
has an interesting comment. It comes from the third chapter of his Utilitarianism, in 
which he discusses the experience of obligation and particularly that feeling which 
ensues when one takes oneself to have violated duty. While my area of interest is 
not confined only to that of feelings of obligation, these clearly form an important 
part of the moral demand experience. Mill's comments bear upon my arguments 
above and bring the tone of the argument generally forward to the next sub-section, 
in which I question more fully, via a particular philosopher's contentions, the idea 
that we 'need' to believe in a special kind of objective moral reality in order for the 
moral demands we apprehend to be meaningful or even for them to be had at all by 
us in experience. Mill says this:
There is, I am aware, a disposition to believe that a person who sees 
in moral obligation a transcendental fact, an objective reality 
belonging to the province of ''Things in themselves”, is likely to be
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more obedient to it than one who believes it to be entirely subjective, 
having its seat in human consciousness only. But whatever a 
person's opinion may be on this point of Ontology, the force he is 
really urged by is his own subjective feeling, and is exactly 
measured by its strength. No one's belief that duty is an objective 
reality is stronger than the belief that God is so; yet the belief in 
God, apart from the expectation of actual reward and punishment, 
only operates on conduct through, and in proportion to, the 
subjective religious feeling.42
2.ii - A specific counter-argument to that of WPT
I am going to take here a sample counter-argument which has been 
specifically directed by its author against the Wiggins-Platts reflective 
phenomenology. In the light of my comments above on the need to maintain a 
certain cautious reserve with respect to accepting the three phenomenological 
arguments that I considered, I am going to use the contention here to address that 
question of how much subjectivity of value one can 'take' at the reflective level with 
a view toward establishing how much objectivity is required in the experience of 
moral demands. The weight of Mill's quoted comments above will also be made 
apparent in the counter-argument which I describe here.
The philosopher whom I have in mind is David Zimmerman, who writes 
against Wiggins and Platts in the context of the debate between realists and their 
opponents in moral theory. To that specific debate I do not wish to grant too much 
attention. But the points raised by it seem to me here to weigh significantly with the 
issues which I am addressing in this thesis.
Firstly, Zimmerman voices his concern that the kind of argument put 
forward by Wiggins is 'all very well as a piece of phenomenology', but that it
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'leaves all the important questions about the nature and existence of the good 
unanswered.'43 That kind of concern is, I think, partially justified insofar as 
Wiggins does not address the phenomenological questions of the ways in which 
moral demands seem independent of one in direct experience and how values are 
taken to stand in that experience. But Wiggins is only dealing with a particular area 
and does not claim to be doing any more than that. Moreover, his analysis is not to 
be dismissed as 'all very well' when it is itself specifically located as an argument 
within the phenomenological claims made by other metaethical theories.
The next move which Zimmerman makes is to grant the force of Wiggin's 
description of the value consciousness as one that sees itself responding to matters 
of worth and importance that stand as so independently of the subject. He suggests 
that a holder of that opponent view which Wiggins takes himself to have dispatched 
can accept the validity of such a description while providing an alternative account 
of the states of affairs that stand behind the experience. In the terms of the realist 
debate, he puts the contention this way:
...the antirealist ought to be the one to make the provisional 
concession. To get the dialectic off the ground, he ought to take very 
seriously the phenomena the realist cites and try to show that a 
nonrealist moral ontology can in fact accommodate and explain 
them, and that where it cannot the price to be paid is not so high as 
the realist fears.44
I quote in these two paragraphs of mine these two approaches taken in the face of a 
so-called 'phenomenological argument' in order to show how a response is 
sometimes levelled against it: that is, as both refusal to allow much force to the 
argument qua a form of philosophy, and as an attempt to explain or explain away 
the appearances without endorsing commitment to the seeming content of those 
appearances. And in the latter case once again I find that particular coalescence of
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descriptive purchase on the experience which I have remarked often goes on 
between different parties to this debate and ones close to it. Few parties - oddly 
enough, given the relative utility of such a move - seem to bother themselves with 
closer inspection of the actual data of moral experience. That investigation is one 
which I believe throws much doubt on the notion of a moral consciousness 
responding to the demands of apparently independent value objects, other than that 
form of independence which the experience always has in being beyond the direct 
call-up of the will.
Whatever the precise descriptive account of this immediate level, there is a 
sense of the demand's independence, of things being valuable and important 
outwith the subject's own choosing. This is the phenomenology which the three 
arguments exploit. At the reflective level, they are saying, that sense of 
independence is endorsed and alternative portrayals found seriously wanting, or 
even wanting beyond all credibility. It is at this higher order reflective level that 
Zimmerman's counter-contentions display a third kind of opponent view. For he 
takes the force of the reflective argument at face-value and denies that subjects 
indeed need be so appalled by, or puzzled by, or conceptually disabled by, the 
possibility of a subjectivist account. This is a crucial move in the context of the 
work of this chapter. It is made via these questions from Zimmerman:
How much contingency can a reflective person take about his own 
desires? Or...how much self-delusion must an antirealist about 
values engage in to sustain his desires? Can he experience the "pull” 
of values in the world while at the same time believing that he 
himself is the source of these values?45 
What Zimmerman does next is to accept that one portrayal of the subjectivist image 
of our choosing value from scratch - by decree, as it were - does indeed fall foul of
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the Wiggins-Platts phenomenological argument.46 But then he puts this concession 
into the service of his own form of argument, and maintains that:
If desire rooted in the cognitive, constitutional, and historical density 
of the person is placed at the centre of a subjectivist account of 
values, then Platts' dilemma can be escaped. Heartily embracing 
values does not force the subjectivist into some kind of self-imposed 
delusion; and honestly facing the implications of subjectivism does 
not lead to the erosion of all his (nonappetitive) desires. For it is 
generally just not true that one's desires could just as easily have 
lighted upon p  as not-p . Human motivation has firmer contours 
than that. To be sure, the only necessity here is psychological 
necessity, but that is the only thing required if value is to have a firm 
place in the world.47
Now this seems to me quite a cogent response to the WPT 
phenomenological argument generally. It not only puts forward that alternative view 
which I earlier suggested - simply that we can put up with a form of subjectivist 
reflection - but also at the same time addresses the compatibility of that with the 
apparently objective nature of our direct moral demand experience. Zimmerman 
takes his argument to allow a subject to hold with certainty that some things just are 
important or valuable in themselves and not as someone happens to feel that way 
about it.48 In similar fashion to that of Blackburn (1987), this sense of the 
independent importance of some matter is taken as the expression of a commitment 
to a whole system of moral thought in which such matters are taken to be important 
and valuable in themselves and as not being so in virtue of, and not subject to 
alteration by, the subjective stances which people take. (Whether that kind of 
argument is good enough to account for the particular feel of our experience I shall 
ask just below). So the position I have been outlining via this particular moral
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philosopher takes on the WPT phenomenological argument on two fronts. One on 
which it is engaged is that of the putative breakdown of the subject's sense of 
meaning, both as a conceptual affair of the subject's language with which she 
gathers her own experience, and also as the meaning of her life as a moral agent and 
as inhabiting a particular kind of morally-populated world. It contests whether that 
breakdown does occur.
The other way in which it faces against the WPT argument is that of 
attempting to provide a phenomenologically adequate account of our direct 
experience of moral demands in the light of the availability of a subjectivist 
reflection on it. If it were the case that subjects could take a fair deal of reflective 
subjective thought on the source of the workings of the moral consciousness, or 
significant parts of it, then there is still left what, at the least, is a relation that looks 
to be askance between the direct and reflective descriptions of her experience. That 
is to say, the subject would seem to be put in the position of holding together in her 
thought two essentially incongruent notions of what this area of her moral 
experience consists in. The sort of line taken by the likes of Zimmerman and 
Blackburn to deal with this matter is to see the apparent objectivity of the direct 
experience as the product of the social inculcation of the valuational response 
(S.Blackbum, 1987), one important element of which must be a form of education 
that does not look to the subject to be dealing only with her own desires and 
responses.49 In that latter way an objectivity feature is doubly brought into play: 
both as the social setting of moral propriety and correctness is established, this 
being objective in that correctness of moral judgement and validity of value 
experience are answerable not to the individual subject but to the independent 
'other' formed by her collective; and as those things which the subject discerns as 
important and of value are felt at the direct level as independently so of anyone's 
will, this being supported by a second order endorsement of a first order way of
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response. And yet I think that one will still incline, on considering this kind of 
presentation, to ask whether a subject is not ultimately under some kind of delusion 
as to the imputed objectivity of her experience. Blackburn is certainly aware of this 
potential problem, as evinced in his earlier quoted comments on the nature of 
obligation and experience of it (p.282 of this thesis). His method of avoiding 
possible trouble by invoking two levels of approach to the stuff of the experience - 
one a direct experience of objectivity, the other a reflective endorsement of the 
experience’s being that way - strikes me, however, as too quick an attempt at 
silencing the issue at hand to dispatch of it without echo. For the subject is, on this 
account, under the impression of experiencing something or a quality of something 
that is not 'out there' in the world; she is in error in taking her experience as 
accurately reflecting the world. I believe that, of this phenomenology, Blackburn 
should either 'bite the bullet', as it were, and concede that it may cause the subject 
some unease, but that that is not so great as to engender the kind of breakdown of 
which WPT talk; or he should deny that direct experience is so determinately based 
on a subject taking herself to be apprehending such objective values and their 
demands. I will continue with this thought just below.
Having said this much, I do believe that this line of counter-argument to the 
phenomenological one of WPT has some mitigated strength. In pointing to the more 
resilient nature of the grasp which we have both on our direct experience in the light 
of subjectivist reflection on it and on the meaning of our moral life as we perform 
such reflection, it provides a direct opponent view to the notion of an experience of 
breakdown on entering the reflective level. And in attempting to provide some 
account of how the apparently clashing juxtaposition of objectivity at the direct level 
of experience and subjective construal at that of reflection is resolvable it is also 
contending with the WPT line. It is my belief that this latter account is performed by 
means of an especially interesting ploy. For the direct phenomenology of value as
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’out there' or intrinsic50 to certain acts and states of affairs is not only accepted as 
correct description but as being in some way necessary for our moral practices to go 
on and to carry our convictions according to the operation of a second order 
sensibility. The delivery of that reflective stance is that that direct experience is 
indeed how moral affairs should appear to be, as Blackburn sees it. On reflection, 
claims Blackburn on our part, we do not desire that desire should be that which 
goes to constitute value.51
So the direct experience in this scheme both upholds and enshrines the 
reflective one. With respect to this subtle phenomenological legerdemain between 
modes of the moral consciousness I wish to say this. Firstly, it is very hard to pin 
down a specific admission from a specific proponent of this form of argument that 
value is ultimately constituted by desire or by an unrecognized projection of desire. 
Blackburn, for instance, tends to hedge around the issue by his talk of second order 
attitudes to first order reactions. This seems to me to hide that fundamental disputed 
ground of the phenomenology as it concerns a subject reflecting that 'Actually what 
value is is...' And as to that question it seems to me that opponents of the WPT 
line should do one of two things. Either they should show, as my chapters 4 and 5 
did, that at the immediate level there can be dispute about the correct 
phenomenological description that captures adequately that objectivity which 
undoubtedly, but imprecisely, is perceived. Then the clash between levels may be 
avoided because it is not as stark as the WPT line portrays it. On the other hand, 
this opponent could stand by the contention, as Zimmerman does, that the 
experiential life of a subject, and the meaning of her moral life, is not usurped, 
broken down, radically disoriented, & c. by the recognition at a reflective level of a 
value source that is in manifest tension with the seeming content of the direct one. I 
do not believe that this is always made clear by opponents of WPT.
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With the paragraph above in mind, I still wish to maintain that, whatever the 
merits and drawbacks of each side to the reflective debate, there is, at the very 
least, something odd-looking about the relation between direct experience and that 
subjectivist reflective image which one can entertain. As I said above, there may not 
be a tension as such in the subject’s consciousness on considering these levels side 
by side, but it surely is an initially strange, incongruent affair in appearance. To 
take from the demand examples of chapter 4, I ask the reader to consider the 
'strangeness' of a similar operation performed with respect, say, to examples i and 
ix. And I think that we can usefully entertain the thought of an aesthetic experience 
and one also of a religious nature. The strange thing in example i is that, on 
reflection, most of us know such a demand is not 'out there' and is only a product 
of oneself, and yet find it often no easier to deal with the demand or its apparent 
exterior, assailing force in the light of that reflection.52 While in example ix, it is the 
thought that the demand which one perceives, the value of the natural environment 
it enshrines, inheres not 'out there' but only apparently so in virtue of one’s own 
projective constitution, that may engender a strangeness of relation between levels. 
I think that the same goes for those heightened aesthetic and religious experiences 
where one feels most especially in the thrall of some kind of exterior force - 
particularly so as the latter might seem to question one's whole way of life, as in 
conversion experiences, where the notion of a subjective source looks quite queer 
in the light of one's seeming lack of involvement in the constitution of the 
experience.53 Returning to the moral case, Richard Price looks to be drawing on 
just this imputed strangeness when he says that our moral experience arises
from our intuition of the nature of things ...It is scarcely conceivable 
that any one can impartially attend to the nature of his own 
perceptions, and determine that, when he thinks gratitude or 
beneficence to be right, he perceives nothing true of them, and
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understands nothing, but only receives an impression from a
sense. 54
Now the overall tenor which this series of thoughts strikes is this. At a 
minimal level one may experience the queemess of the relation of the two levels, 
between direct and higher reflective purchase on one's experience; this being a 
different kind of queemess between examples i and ix above, and a similar kind of 
difficulty which may strike one between the heightened aesthetic and religious 
experiences and the moral demand one. The moral case in particular may be 
susceptible of a similar phenomenological deflation, with respect to the WPT line, 
as there is for religious and aesthetic experience in general. For the majority of us, I 
believe, the reflection that aesthetic and religious demands and values do have a 
subjective source, even though occasionally appearing at a direct level in quite other 
guise than that, does not cause great problems. There is no breakdown in the 
experience class or in the intelligibility of talk about it. This contention I make in the 
light of what many people in our particular age seem inclined to feel about aesthetic 
and religious matters, particularly the latter. I also make it as a suspicion on my part 
- one on which I shall enlarge in section 4 - that the kind of breakdown of the self s 
involvement in a particular activity made out by WPT either does not occur or goes 
on only in a latent form that does not result in the kind of damage they believe it to 
do. And my general background suspicion to this matter which I am training on 
WPT here is that people can and do, as a matter of fact, get on with a far greater 
degree of contradictory and clashing beliefs and opinions, both within and between 
direct and reflective levels of experience, than philosophical orthodoxy generally 
would like to grant credence to. At this point one often finds considerations on the 
’unity of the self being brought to bear, this being the most salient leitmotif of that 
orthodoxy.55 But I think that simple observation of oneself and others will show 
that unity to be a formal condition either not met by the lives many people lead
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(people, that is, who do appear to be equipped with selves) or which is a far more 
strict condition than the actual unity of a self requires. That is, I believe that we find 
from observation of our own lives that they can and do contain legion amounts of 
what may look to be incompatible elements which yet manage to co-habit in one’s 
cognative and emotive constitutions. Of course, not all of these beliefs and attitudes 
might have presented themselves to a subject's reflection, or she may have avoided 
considering them together. But I do wish to add that I think that the general tenor of 
my presentation in this chapter so far shows that, in the specifically moral case, 
explicit consideration by a subject of allegedly incompatible perspectives on her 
moral experience does not have such destructive results as WPT present
2.iii - Further criticism of WPT
Having ventured the thoughts in the sub-section above, then, I want to 
move on with my criticism of the WPT phenomenological arguments. My overall 
worry above has been that that kind of argument could be phenomenologically 
false. The reflection on subjectivity either may simply not generate an experience of 
a clash, or the clash may not be so disabling as its authors take it to be. The 
disjunction which I believe applies to the WPT argument is this: either the argument 
is false as a putative description of the phenomenological data; or it is correctly 
describing a problem, but says nothing special about the kind of objectivity which 
the reflective level is thought to enshrine. It is to that second problem that I now 
turn.
What the three phenomenological arguments are claiming is that it is 
necessary, in order for a particular area of our moral experience to be as it is, that 
on reflection we endorse some objectivity feature to it. This necessity varies in the 
WPT presentation between hard logical necessity and a less rigid affair of the sort 
This experience needs to go with that one if the latter is going to be maintained,’ to
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put it into words on their behalf. And this objectivity is represented by all three as 
the seeming independent value and importance of matters which they possess and 
which we do not confer on them. Taylor holds the further thesis that a value 
consciousness is itself constitutive of a self. This is clearly a further thesis from the 
one that says that if a certain experience is to be had at all then certain conditions 
must be met. I will discuss it and criticize it later.
I will present my criticism here by highlighting a positive aspect of the WPT 
phenomenological argument. It is that value cannot be chosen. That is to say, a 
subject cannot just choose that something have value, without some sort of 
deliberation in the light of what already seems valuable independently of his 
choosing that it be so.
It is actually very difficult to find proponents of such a purely subjective 
view. Sartre (1973) is generally held to be the target, though even he has tried to 
show that that view should not be attributed to him in so stark a form.56 Another 
philosopher has put the view in these words:
It is...not in order to ask whether value judgements are objective, in 
the sense of corresponding to an object...I wish to suggest that the 
individual, in the last analysis, must make ah arbitrary selection 
among possible interests and principles. Morality has as its basis, in 
other words, an arbitrary, underived commitment to certain of the 
possible guiding principles and purposes . Faced with an assortment 
of a number of possible selves, one must make a choice.57 
Sartre's classic exposition of this position is given in his example of the young man 
faced with a dilemma over whether to join the resistance or to stay with his ageing 
mother. His potrayal of this dilemma is intended to convey both the tragic position 
of the man in having to choose between two equally well-recommended courses of 
action and the universal position of us all in having to choose in non-dilemma cases
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how to proceed in moral affairs.58 'Doubtless he chooses without reference to any 
pre-established values,’ Sartre claims, though he adds that, 'it is unjust to tax him 
with caprice.'59 And he has what looks like his own form of metaethical 
justification of the matter:
...I say that it is...a self-deception if I choose to declare that certain 
values are incumbent upon me; I am in contradiction with myself if I 
will these values and at the same time say they impose themselves 
upon me.60
Now the arguments of WPT against this position (Taylor is the one who 
specifically attacks Sartre) deal with the notion of choosing value, not with Sartre's 
normative criterion of individual responsibilty. With that, few moral philosophers 
have any objection. There is a difference between the putative experienced 
objectivity to moral demands and the mere kow-towing to the external pressure of 
social convention and the 'expected thing'. Of the latter phenomenon no moral 
philosopher has any good to say. Also, no-one would deny the tragic position of 
the young man. There are cases like that where one just has to choose and take the 
consequences of the unfollowed course. But what philosophers like Taylor point 
out is that such a choice already presupposes the opposite of what the portrayal 
itself is supposed to establish. That is to say, a dilemma is only set up precisely 
because the two courses of action seem equally worthwhile to the young man 
independently of what he happens to think and desire. If indeed his choice were that 
which created the conflict of values, he could end it by self-legislating for the 
promulgation of one and the annulment of the other.61 The kind of dilemma he is 
put in (as opposed to: that which he has chosen to put himself in), and the kind of 
tom regret which he feels for that course that he fails to take in virtue of performing 
only one of them, look decidedly queer if his choice is so fundamentally involved in 
the constitution of the matter. This is why Taylor calls the Sartre position 'deeply
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incoherent'62, another writer on the subject maintaining that, The idea of simply 
creating or recognizing a value from scratch by fiat is preposterous.'63 For not 
only is the phenomenology of the direct experience simply not that of the choice or 
conferral of value - as if by some baptismal sign we magically imbued a state of 
affairs with value - but it is also not one with which reflection finds itself at all able 
to cope when viewed in that self-legislative way. That is to say, it just does not 
make sense at such a reflective level why there is the direct experience of 
phenomena like the independent givennness of moral demands and their apparent 
tenacity beyond one's own willed grasp. Reflection on this matter is, I believe, 
likely to produce that disorienting experience of strangeness and a dissolution of 
one's grasp on a morally-hued existence of which WPT talk.
Before moving on to develop this argument, later following in the manner 
of Taylor on the self, I will reiterate the basic objection put to Sartre's views here. It 
is the threefold phenomenological argument to the effect that: Sartre simply 
misdescribes or ignores the actual nature of our moral experience; his presentation 
of the case is such as to produce that experience which seems to contradict the 
foundation of the whole matter in choice; and his subjectivist view is one which our 
own reflection finds incompatible with the content of the general moral experience 
we have. These three lines are well drawn together by Smith in his terse suggestion 
that a 'rather crude' but 'effective refutation' of the Sartrean view is provided by 
attempting actually to 'try it out.'64 We cannot, that is, get ourselves to the point of 
just choosing to value or disvalue something - unless in the light of considerations 
which already involve pre-given values. A similar thought is put by Cudworth on 
the impossibility of the willing of what is to be good and right by God or man.65 
And as to the idea of choice which Sartre upholds as the cornerstone of his moral 
thought, this itself appears to be eradicated by the very way in which he takes it to 
be in operation. Our ordinary understanding of making choices, deciding between
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alternatives that are available as live ones, takes us to be doing so in the light of at 
least some considerations that bear on one or other course. These considerations 
need not be entirely independent of oneself. For choice says something about the 
agent, about the sort of person it is who does choose in such and such a way; about 
how she chose in the light of certain considerations, how some bore heavily with 
her decision-making and others did not. In the Sartrean image of choice all this is 
wiped out: because the agent has nothing other than the fact of her committed 
decision to show as support for her deliberation. And that is contradictory. For 
Sartre wants to talk of authenticity, of responsibility for decision-making, and yet 
seems to cut the ground for saying this from under his own feet by his presentation 
of what free choice looks like. This is so because the image of the self doing the 
choosing is so very withered in comparison with recognizable instances of such an 
activity. Hence Taylor says of the young man's dilemma:
...I might ponder the two possibilities, and then I might just find 
myself doing one rather than another. But this brings us to the limit 
where choice fades into non-choice.66 
Smith also complains of the apparent arbitrariness which this brings with it, one 
which makes of the notion of choice an absurdity.67 Hence another opponent of 
the Sartrean position states his belief that:
Where making a decision is just a matter of plonking for one option 
rather than another, with no pregiven basis of values for moral 
deliberation, Sartre's "terrible freedom" tends to collapse into the 
worst sort of slavery - the isolated self buffeted around by 
momentary impulses and whims.68
These criticisms all seem to me valid, cogent, and sufficient to dispatch of 
the view they oppose 69 It is indeed a contradictory thing to argue for the notion of 
value choice when the same argument seems to eradicate the basis on which choice
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can occur. And if the whole notion is deeply incoherent, as Taylor believes, it 
certainly is deeply incorrect as a description of our actual moral experience: which 
does not go on in anything like that fashion.70
The trouble which I find with these criticisms lies along two tracks. Firstly, 
I am not at all sure that the pure subjective choice model of Sartre is an especially 
prevalent one to combat. There are few articles being produced in philosophical 
journals that present such a model as that one which underlies our moral experience 
or even our moral decision making. Hence I fear that such a notion is something of 
a straw man when attacked. Much more interesting, then, is the argument the WPT 
line provides at a reflective level against that of value as conferred by desire. As I 
have said, the argument does provide a certain degree of force against this model. 
But I tried to show by way of Zimmerman's counter-arguments that this reflection 
may not excite too destabilising a degree of that experiential phenomenon to which 
the WPT line points. This is where my second worry comes in. Having established 
that the pure choice model is incoherent, and having given some phenomenological 
presentation to suggest that one of desire is reflectively unacceptable, the WPT 
argument strikes me as falling short of the crucial subsequent discussion of just 
what alternative phenomenology to these models is consonant with our moral 
experience. That is, they leave one only with a rough notion that some kind of 
objectivity is experientially at large, both in the direct phenomenology and at a 
reflective level. Moreover, this is not so much the positive side of an argument, 
being itself presented in depth, but the upshot of an argument against the choice and 
desire models. The basis on which that argument goes on is indeed to exploit the 
objectivity feel we have in our value consciousness, without going on to develop a 
richer phenomenological analysis of that feel. In short, it seems to me that what this 
general line of argument does is to train against those subjectivist opponent views 
some general phenomenon of objectivity without giving the reader an idea of how
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exactly this appears or needs to be appearing on reflection for it to be maintaining its 
role in the constitution of the value experience. I believe that any appearance of 
independence of the subject at direct and reflective levels will be sufficient for the 
WPT argument to follow through. And that does not tell one very much. Unless it 
is made explicit that indeed it is this minimal objectivity that is found in the 
experience - as is the crux of my thesis - then arguments like that of WPT are left 
hanging rather open-ended. They take it that their presentations show some kind of 
objective moral reality to be figured in our experience; but they seem unable to point 
to any precise kind of objectivity that the experience has, or which it needs to have 
if it is to be experienced and if it is to move one. And where they do make 
determinate claims, about the kinds of breakdown which I have discussed earlier, I 
do not think their arguments are strong enough to carry their case.
Section Three: Moral value as independent of one
One way in which to indicate the complexity of this matter I now propose to 
follow. It is that which relates back to Zimmerman's argument, with my intention 
being to bring forward the passage of debate to the objectivity question. Firstly, one 
of the writers to whom I have referred above in my discussion of Sartrean choice, 
points out of the faculty of desire that:
...relating value to what is desired presents a picture of persons with 
a pre-packaged set of desires that have simply to be satisfied. Quite 
the contrary is the case, however. We grow in our appreciation of 
what is valuable in the world. The realm of value has to be explored, 
not fixed ab initio by our actual desires.71 
This seems to me a correct account of the phenomenology of discovery with regard 
to moral demands and the values from which they may sometimes seem to derive. 
We do not generally choose how the future will stand as moral situations come to
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strike themselves upon our consciousness: they come upon us without our bidding. 
But note how little headway is made here towards a distinct notion of objectivity 
that goes beyond the disputed claim of the implication of desire in our value 
experience. For discovery; being surprised at how one reacts; sensing the incoming 
force of demands on one, in which one appears not oneself to have had a hand: 
these are all quite compatible with the desire model which is being attacked.
One writer on moral objectivity, EJ.Bond, maintains that our cognitive 
constitution creates desire in discovering values, these latter themselves being 
created not by antecedent states of desire but by those ways in which the world 
captures one’s interest and hence leading to desire being engendered.72 To this 
general contention I have no particular comment to make, other than to say that its 
plausibility need not rule out a projectivist account of the desire-value nexus 
(indeed, Blackburn would accept its validity as a first order description of moral 
experience). But I do want to marshall the thought contained in it, and the quotation 
from Bond that follows below, against their own author by pointing out that they 
both strike me as accounts of the value consciousness which can be sufficiently 
closely employed also for desire as to show the complexity of the issue at hand. For 
Bond continues in these words:
No value that is a function of desire, supposing there were such a 
thing (which there is not), would be an objective value. But that I 
like something, that it interests me, pleases me, satisfies me, 
occupies my talents, makes me feel good, etc., is not a product of 
my desires and must be discerned by me in the course of living. It 
is, therefore, objective relative to any pre-cognitive state of mine. It 
is not created from within; it is discovered in the world.73 
Of this matter I believe it can be said that it well describes also the way in which 
one’s desires and that which engages them appear before one. For one’s relation to
Chapter Seven 303
one's own desires is not one of their being chosen, but of their alighting on one at 
an immediate level and (sometimes) of their reflective ordering and weighting by 
one at a higher level. It is not the case that one's desires are explicitly present to 
consciousness at all times such that they do not ever have that apparel of 
independence of oneself by which one aspect of objectivity is signalled. Indeed, to 
repeat one of the basic points of the previous chapter, one's desires are often just 
those which, when made clear to consciousness, strike one most strongly as the 
not-self.
I am making two points here which are clearly connected. The first is that a 
rough notion of objectivity-as-unwilled with respect to the moral demand 
experience permits of a number of quite different and opposing systems of moral 
psychology to offer explanation of the actual genesis of the experience. And the 
second is that only a tightening up of the notion of objectivity to exclude other 
possible accounts will permit the proponents of views based partly or wholly on 
phenomenological modes of evidence to make their particular argument 
authoritative.
This might be done in two ways. Both are necessary to complete the 
argument, and both taken together are sufficient conditions for the working of a 
phenomenological argument within the canons of such a form of debate that I have 
suggested in chapter 3. These are, of course, the ways of showing a particular 
argument to be false at both direct and reflective levels, and a proposed alternative 
description to be the correct one. Now ways of showing other presentations to be 
false may not at the same time be ways of tightening up the notion of objectivity in 
the experience. So the latter form of argument requires additional support to that 
provided by the former ones. My thought is that the vague sense of objectivity at 
the direct level may not get all that much backing at the reflective one as the 
proponents of the WPT form of argument may think. This is because of general
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considerations which I put forward via my discussion of Zimmerman’s contribution 
to the debate. It is also in the light of my belief, which has been at the heart of my 
phenomenological presentation throughout this thesis, that the objectivity which the 
subject is afforded by her direct experience of the moral demand, that degree of it 
which gives her some reflective endorsement and sensefulness, is a vague and 
rather minimal matter. And this matter, I believe, involves a much more durable 
relationship of subjects to their experience and to reflective thought on that than is 
putatively given by WPT. It also involves them in a kind of objectivity experience - 
that which is independent-as-unwilled - which is compatible with a number of 
background explanations of the nature of the experience. This latter point especially 
follows through if the kind of explanation being offered does not find itself 
dissolving the very experience and the concepts which it addresses (i.e., of a 'moral 
demand', of a ’moral value' that demands, and the 'objectivity' which they might 
possess) when it is held before reflective court.
Here, then, is my contention. The WPT line assumes that any description 
which is different from the contentual data of the direct phenomenology must fall 
foul both of that difference and also of the reflective experience on surveying it. But 
I do not think that that is the case. One reason which underlies my doubt I have 
given already in terms of an uncertainty about the way in which our reflective 
experience is actually given to us. In that respect, it is my belief that reflective 
thought on the possible subjective source of an experience which appears at the 
direct level arrayed with some objectivity element does not cause ourselves the kind 
of awkward sensation, disconcerting experience, conceptual breakdown that WPT 
try to exploit. (Given the way in which I have been trying to find adequate 
expression for this alleged experience in the previous sentence and elsewhere it will 
also be evident that I do not think that that experience is very clearly decribed by 
WPT either). The other major reason which I am putting forward is that which
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concerns the diversity of possible reflective surveys of the direct experience in the 
light of the actual objectivity feel presented therein. This reason is the culmination 
of my work in the previous three chapters on the rather rough and indeterminate 
sense of objectivity which goes on with the moral demand experience in 
immediacy.
I will give some further explanation of my thoughts here and then move on, 
in the light of that, to criticize Taylor’s further use of his phenomenological 
argument to link moral concerns and their experienced objectivity with the make-up 
of a self. That will lead me on, in turn, to a final discussion of that apparent 
paradox of the relation between contents of the core self with regard to moral 
matters and that sense of objectivity (independence-as-unwilled) which seems to go 
intimately with them. I will, of course, try to explain how I distance my use of a 
term like 'core self from that linkage by Taylor of moral concerns with the 
metaphysics of the self s constitution which I will have criticized.
3.i - Society as independent source of values
I will begin my presentation here by quoting what I take to be a fair example 
of one way in which a subjectivist account of the moral demand (as I apply that 
kind of experience to the gist of the quoted comment) is attacked and yet the kind of 
objectivity to which it points is compatible with a number of different views. Its 
author, John Kekes, calls the idea of choosing values 'romantic nonsense'.74 He 
summarises his basic position in these words:
Almost everyone is a moral agent and nobody has made such a 
choice. The fact is that people are bom into a tradition and shortly 
after birth their moral education begins. By adolescence, they are 
saturated with the moral views of their tradition. Of course a person 
can come to reject it, and if someone does come to reject it
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eventually, it is, short of suicide, for another tradition. One cannot 
stop being a moral evaluator. The idea that choice or commitment 
lies at the foundation of morality is mistaken, because it ignores the 
fundamental role that tradition and education play.75 
I draw from this kind of contention a point of especial importance. The experience 
of the moral system that Kekes describes (and the demands it puts upon one) is 
going to be occurring, it seems to me, with a rough but fairly constant sense of an 
objectivity feature. Such a phenomenology is likely to possess both kinds of an 
independent datum which I have distinguished, though experienced in more and 
less clear ways. That is to say, the moral demand will be given to the subject as 
independent of her direct control: it was not her who chose that society and its 
moral codes should be founded in such and such a way, and it is not her who gets 
to choose moral values under such conditions; and the demand experience will often 
possess also some apparent exterior placing with respect to its content since that 
place from which it has arisen is indeed located outwith her own geographical self. 
(And in both cases this exteriority may engender disharmonious relations with the 
subject's perceived self as the demands appear in her consciousness as impositions, 
nagging pressures upon her).
I do not mean to suggest that moral demands are felt, or felt in the main, as 
coming from society. But I do want to cover a possibility which seems to lie at the 
heart of the views of, for instance, Mackie and Blackburn. Broadly speaking, that 
view is that the demand experience has a social genesis, even though its content will 
not usually be referring to social loci. Those who put forward such a view 
sometimes also want to make the additional point that moral education, if it is to be 
effective, requires that the demand experience be inculcated in subjects as if arising 
from outwith their breast and also not simply as arising from social codes and 
expectations. About the question of whether the demand experience has to possess
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an incomingness - as an essential feature of it - 1 shall inquire further in this chapter. 
For the present I want to see whether any phenomenological headway can be made 
with such a view.
John Ladd talks in this respect of the need for a moral system, if it is to have 
'operational efficacy’,76 to be garnered with a veneer of ’legitimacy’77 in order to 
distinguish it from the many and various other demands which social life makes on 
individuals. One element of this he believes to be a perception by individuals of the 
demands having 'a foundation in reality’78 - that is, as having some existence 
and/or legitimacy over and above the fact of people's experiencing them. This, I 
think, the position of Kekes points toward. Society, its traditions and mores, are a 
very real presence in our experience. This kind of statement does not deny the 
problems of a metaphysically apt rendering of such a reality, but I ask the reader to 
note that they need not detain the analysis here. Minimally, the brute reality of 
others in human community presents a relatively straightforward metaphysic. But 
more important is the fact that we are dealing with a rough experiential sense of 
objectivity for which an equally rough sense of a social reality - or merely a reality 
of some sort, one that is outwith the subject - is adequately consonant.
I am not saying that moral demand experience is just one mode in which we 
explicitly feel ourselves under pressure from the gaze and frown of others (though 
that is sometimes the case, I believe). Rather, I am saying this. Some authors seem 
to think that there is a possible social understanding of our moral phenomenology. 
It might be that that one would not have to talk of moral values demanding from 
'out there' in Mackie's construal of that feeling, but that it could give some 
grounding to that rough sense of a morally-tinged reality which sometimes goes on 
and to that experience (also rough) of the objectivity-as-unwilled which goes on 
universally in varying heights with the moral demand. Moreover, I do not think that 
the offering-up of such a thought for reflective hearing will produce those
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experiences of unease or breakdown as it is viewed side by side with the immediate 
experience. Doubtless there are a small few who have reflected that moral demands 
really are only social impostitions on them and have then gone on to do what they 
pleased in the light of that But for most of us that sort of thought does not have that 
sort of impact and it is not a live option for us simply to switch our entire moral 
lives around and block off the moral demands we experience.79 Nor need a 
realization at a reflective level of the social origin of such direct experience be 
incompatible with strong commitment to a moral system allied with a steady and 
enlivened sense of the importance of moral demands upon one.80
In the previous few paragraphs, then, I have offered for consideration one 
way in which the direct phenomenology can be understood and how it could appear 
at the reflective level. Now it seems to me that much of the foregoing is not greatly 
different from what Wiggins in particular has to say, especially in his more recent 
work (D.Wiggins, 1991; see also P.Grice, 1991). There, too, he talks of the social 
origin of the moral consciousness in tandem with the appearance of objectivity 
which is discerned in direct experience. Similarly, Taylor's understanding of moral 
objectivity is based on a social foundation which grounds subjects' lives as 
inhabiting a world from which moral experience and language are ineliminable, an 
account based in turn on his notion of requirements for a functioning self 
(C.Taylor, 1977 & 1989). So the point which I have been trying to put at large 
comes back to the phenomenological description of the objectivity in the moral 
demand experience. WPT have provided, I believe, fair descriptive portrayal of 
immediate experience. It is in terms of the valuable and the worthwhile and the 
demands they make on one as independent of the subject At the reflective level they 
take this to be given further weight as a phenomenological argument by its 
endorsement as necessary to the experience and to the meaning it has in the moral 
life of the subject. I think that the latter condition is too stringent and that it is not
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always actually met in the lives of subjects. But to the extent that it is met, I think 
that the kinds of reflection which I have identified in this chapter, when directed on 
the experience as independent of the subject's direct volition, meets it in a minimal 
way. The question here, of course, is whether such a minimal sense of objectivity 
on the subject's part is sufficient for the production of the experience in a 
meaningful way. I think it is. And I say this precisely because it is that rough sense 
that is to be found in our moral experience.
I have intentionally omitted mention in this sub-section of the criticisms 
which I made in chapter 6 (section 4.ii) concerning social accounts of the 
phenomenology. Those criticisms are, of course, germane to the presentation just 
above, and I therefore ask the reader to bear them in mind. My purpose in this sub­
section, however, has been to show that if  a social account of some sort for the 
phenomenology were to be a successful one, then its success would be of a 
mitigated sort. I said earlier that the social account would seem to be compatible 
with the vague and indeterminate sense which we have as of some facet of reality 
impinging on us in the demand experience. Yet the phenomenological data show 
that that indeterminacy of the experience as regards its genesis includes, but goes 
beyond, the social account. The diversity, as well as the vagueness, of the 
experience as a whole renders it compatible with other background accounts which, 
like the social one, might not be directly given in the phenomena themselves. 
Demands linked to a social origin in the experience are, then, no more the universal 
stuff of the experience than are explicit demands of society on one.
3.ii - The rough contours of 'independence'
My descriptive phenomenological presentation thus rests on two features of 
the moral demand experience, both in immediacy and on reflection, that the WPT 
line either does not notice or to which it does not give great attention. They are the
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roughness of the objectivity feature at the immediate level, and the robustness of the 
reflective survey on possible accounts of it. In the light of the former, all that the 
latter reflection has to affirm is that the experience itself is not under the subject's 
control and that it has some element of an involvement of an independent reality 
going to constitute it. It is interesting to note how widely divergent a group of moral 
philosophers (with respect to their own metaethical views) seem to have produced 
thought which can be construed on these lines. Mackie, of course, I have quoted 
already on the possible necessity of an objectivity feature. Francis Hutcheson talks 
of the way in which the qualities he takes one's moral sense to discern seem to 
reside outwith one's own breast and how this is reflectively 'conceived' to be so.81 
Aristotle's account of our moral experience strikes me in a similar way as 
presentation of the direct phenomenology and as to the way in which it comes 
about. And a recent philosopher has argued that the form of our moral experience, 
discourse and practices of justification is as of independent moral facts, and that, 
the nature of these matters being socially functional, the question of the real being 
of such states of affairs idles out of relevance.82
Greater account by its author of the way in which alleged moral facts play a 
part in the moral consciousness would be needed in order to assess the latter kind of 
claim above as to its degree of phenomenological accuracy. But the point Elder is 
making is germane as a general contention in the area with which I am presently 
concerned. His view is that some overall image of the moral life as one involving 
the objectivity of its contents is required in order for it to be able to hold sway over 
the loyalties and commitments of subjects, and that its passage from one generation 
to the next goes on in such a way as to render the matter of the origin of that 
objectivity unqueried within the moral community (indeed, a sign of the successful 
functioning of this inheritable system is just that that kind of question rarely crops 
up). Note how similar a thesis this is to that which Platts makes out for the way in
Chapter Seven 311
which moral value acts and must appear to be constituted in order to motivate the 
reflective agent. Both philosophers, that is, see moral value as that which moves a 
subject in varying modes of attraction and repulsion in moral situations. To do this 
they believe it necessary that the moral demands and values have an appearance of 
objectivity. Otherwise, subjects’ attention lapses, their commitment drops away, 
and they will behave in whatsoever ways their fancy happens to take. This is the 
worry which Wiggins and Taylor have at the heart of their analysis.
I have to say that I am not convinced of the phenomenological validity of 
this kind of position: I do not think that the phenomenological path from 
considerations of non-objectivity to experiences of senselessness in one's moral 
practices is shown to be inevitable. My suspicion is wrought both by doubts about 
the determinacy of the matter being presented - so that it is often hard to grasp a 
specific point which such authors are trying to make - and about its truth as a claim 
from the reflective phenomenology when the stuff of moral commitment and its 
nature is brought before it. My doubts concern both the imprecision of the 
phenomenological description being put forward (such that it can be used equally to 
support alternative conclusions) and its probable invalidity when reconstructed in 
more determinate style for analysis. Concerning both, I have said already that the 
experience on reflection of a breakdown is not one which I find to be described 
adequately by those who employ its putative occurrence as a phenomenological 
argument. Besides, I have said also that I do not think it likely to be as destabilising 
as all that. Now I am saying that I find the description of a subject ceasing (or not 
initially acquiring) commitment to a moral way of life, unless it is seen as 
objectively required of her, to be an extraordinarily wide one. Firstly, if it is true 
then it is true as a very general claim and permits of a correspondingly wide number 
of understandings of that objectivity (as I pointed out earlier). Secondly, if the claim 
is made much more specific - say, that should it occur to a subject that there are no
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moral values ’out there’ in Platonic manner, she would feel anything to be permitted 
- then it is decidedly false. For our direct moral experience does not go in that kind 
of way and our reflective assay of it does not need the kind of thought to be held in 
order to make sense of the experience. And thirdly, the claim itself seems to rest on 
large background assumptions about human motivation; conceptual requirements of 
experience; the role of reflection in relation to direct experience; and needs of the 
self (both qua a self and qua a self that has moral experience). Not all of these 
matters may be clearcut - as Zimmerman argues - and none of the authors attempt to 
show the precise status of which ones singly or together make for the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of their argument following through. The next area I wish to 
address is in light of one of these matters, namely, the constitution of the self.
Section Four: The self and moral objectivity
Taylor (1977 & 1989) makes the claim that the ability to evaluate states of 
affairs and possible courses of action is necessary for the existence of a self.83 He 
bases this claim on a general conceptual analysis of the conditions for what he 
thinks we would recognise to be a properly functioning self. And this leads him 
tentatively to argue that moral evaluation is necessary thereby for a unified self 
through time.84 With this kind of analysis I shall not tarry for very long as it would 
seem to me to take my phenomenological description of a part of our moral 
experience away from its specified object, that of the moral demand. But it does 
bear on the discussion presented so far in this chapter, and on passages elsewhere 
throughout previous ones, where I have inquired into the notion of the necessity of 
objectivity to the moral demand experience. Since I take Taylor's form of argument 
to be running in the traditional line of a Kantian-type reflection on the bounds of a 
possible experience,85 then a phenomenological description of the experience we
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have and that which we are said necessarily to have seems to me quite proper and 
germane.
In the paragraph above I have deliberately mixed a number of different 
possible construals of Taylor's line. A salient point that I would ask the reader to 
bear in mind in the light of that paragraph concerns the exact claim(s) being made 
and its (their) validity. For I switched in the first two sentences from 'existence' to 
'proper functioning' of a self. Prima facie there is a considerable difference 
between those conditions necessary for a self - a unity of a distinct consciousness 
across time - and those which are thought to be necessary for one that is in good 
order, not subject to occasional fracture, and similar to that self with which we take 
it that we are equipped. I think that it is at this point - concerning the differences 
between a bare self and a more developed conception of one - that it would be best 
to follow the philosophical trend of talking of the latter in terms of 'personhood' in 
order to maintain which kind of subject matter is being discussed. To distinguish 
between the two in a single sentence: we should consider the possibility of a self 
that functions poorly or functions merely differently from our enlarged conception 
of one, but which nevertheless meets the minimal conditions for its existence.With 
respect to the possible condition of moral evaluation, then, we face the possible 
difference between no self at all or a dysfunctional, withered, or merely strange- 
looking one should that condition not be m et And there is also a further distinction 
which I wish to make within the condition of evaluation for which Taylor argues. It 
is between evaluation as a reflective ability to choose between different options 
facing a self, and moral evaluation itself. Again, I think it should be borne in mind 
that the requirement of the former may not include that of the latter. So a self that 
can evaluate, but does not do so in the light of moral considerations, may be a 
possible one. It might be a minimal version of a self, and its possibility might give 
one some unease, but it would simply be incorrect thereby to refuse to acknowledge
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it as a self. A different, or strange, or even an inherently unstable form of 
personhood would then be borne, but it would not also be correct to maintain that 
selfhood was not instantiated.
4.i - Taylor on the self and evaluation
Taylor's argument runs in this way. A 'simple weigher' who 'evaluates 
weakly' between desires and their fulfillment (that is, simply goes along with 
whichever one happens to gain the upper hand in his attentions) lacks 'depth' in 
comparison to a 'strong evaluator' who 'deploys a language of evaluative contrasts 
ranging over desires.'86 The latter is 'more articulate’ about his preferences in 
having the 'contrastive language' of, for example, the higher and the lower, the 
noble and the base; whereas the former must rely on just an 'inarticulate ''feel''' 
between alternatives to guide her.87 The form of this argument is essentially 
repeated in his talk of the necessity of evaluative 'frameworks' in Part One of 
Taylor's Sources of the Self. 'Motivations or desires don't only count in virtue of 
the attraction of the consummations,' he states,'but also in virtue of the kind of life 
and kind of subject that these desires properly belong to...Strong evaluation is not 
just a condition of articulacy about preferences, but also about the quality of life, the 
kind of beings we are or want to be. It is in this sense deeper [than the "simple 
weigher's" life].'88
Now Taylor admits that his simple weigher is able to reflect on her desires 
and therefore displays 'a necessary feature of what we call a self or a person.'89 
But he wants to support the stronger thesis that that self can really only make sense 
to us as it involves those evaluations of a moral kind which he mentions in his 
article (1977) and in his book (1989). He says that:
...the capacity for strong evaluation in particular is essential to our 
notion of the human subject;...without it an agent would lack a kind
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of depth we consider essential to humanity, without which we 
would find human community impossible (the capacity for which is 
another essential feature of human agency)...The question would 
revolve around whether one could draw a convincing portrait of a 
human subject to whom strong evaluation was quite foreign (is 
Camus' Mersenne such a case?) since in fact the human beings we 
are and live with are all strong evaluators.90
I believe that Taylor is giving issue here to a widespread intuition of a rough 
sort among many moral philosophers. There are numerous examples of the 
proponents of particular metaethical theories giving some consideration to the 
relation between their claims and the unity, unhampered functioning, and 
recognizable appearance of a self.91 More usually, one finds the claim consistently 
made that a moral aspect to one's life is necessary for personhood.92 These two 
claims, though intimately related, are not the same. To have a self need not be to 
have personhood. A being with a reflexive sense of identity through time would 
seem to require basic distinctions between itself and other items in the world, but 
not need also to evaluate (and certainly not to evaluate morally).931 think that where 
Taylor's claims may have their force, and where they may articulate a widely-held 
intuition, is in the sphere of personhood. It might be that our conception of a 
'person' not only calls for a being that makes evaluative distinctions, but also 
requires it to evaluate with moral ones. If it was then made out that moral evaluation 
necessarily has to include experience of an objectivity component, then the 
argument would have shown, in a slightly roundabout fashion, that objectivity in 
the moral experience was an essential component of personhood. I shall be asking 
in the discussion below if this presentation can be made out convincingly - or 
whether it can only show that if a being evaluates morally then it must do so via 
experiences of an objectivity component. To the notion of necessary conditions for
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a self I can only, within the confines of my direction of argument, say that a lot 
more Kantian excavation of the conditions of a possible experience would need to 
be undertaken in order to show how the specific form of moral evaluation enters 
into that notion. I do not think it does, and I do not find that the image of a self 
devoid of such experience erases the very concept, even though, for many other 
reasons, we might like to see it built into the concept.
4.ii - Moral subjects, moral demands and objectivity
Concerning the concept of personhood, however, Taylor may be on firmer 
ground. Here it is that I wish to use his analysis to direct matters onto the notion of 
objectivity as essential to the experience of moral demands and of the independent 
value, importance, worthwhileness of states of affairs. We recall that his argument, 
and that of others, has disposed of a certain notion of value as chosen. The 
converse of that is the presence of some feature such as of the independence of such 
matters before consciousness. Now Taylor's talk of the necessity of evaluation may 
have looked to have concealed this. For evaluation is something one does . But the 
force of his argument is that this can only go on in the light of some level of 
developed reflective articulacy that draws on evaluative notions of the independently 
worthwhile and valuable. The evaluative notions we employ are those which are 
independent of our own choosing. That is, it is the case that: both the notions 
themselves are independent of our choosing, and what those notions conceptualize 
is independent of our choosing. (And though the moral ones may not be logically 
independent of us insofar as they may refer to our activity and characters, such a 
fact need not be before consciousness and does not imply that they were chosen by 
us).
It is at this point that the force of the Taylor argument, and that of Nagel 
(1986a & 1986b) with which I have linked it in some of the footnotes, weighs into
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the debate. If these thoughts on evaluation and its moral aspect are true to our image 
of personhood, and if this necessarily involves some degree of independence of the 
subject - in virtue of these matters and the demands with which they present 
themselves to oneself not being and not possibly being chosen - then it will follow 
that the objectivity experience of moral demands does have a basic and deep 
grounding in the very essence of what we regard as personhood.94 And the 
Taylor/Nagel interpretation of that does not need to invoke 'queer' independent 
entities.95 It performs its account by adverting to the independence of reasons for 
and against evaluations and actions which are independent of the subject.
My response to this possibility is not especially sanguine. These thoughts 
may be correspondent with the personhood which many of us believe ourselves to 
have, but they are not essential features of the concept such that it would lose sense 
if they were to be removed. Moreover, I have to express a concern that 
'personhood' in philosophical debate seems to be notoriously prone to prior 
definition by the proponents of various views such that a particular feature of some 
persons which captures their interest is made into a general defining feature of the 
concept. I think that there are three things which, taken together, are needed to flesh 
out and present that image as one that has sufficient determinate content to be of 
philosophical yield. Since these are not all points being made in a phenomenological 
mode I shall limit my comments to those elements of them which do go on in that 
way. Briefly, then, I have the following two doubts to raise (the third point coming 
after these). Firstly, correspondent with what I said on the self, it is difficult to 
ascertain the precise nature of the claim that personhood and moral evaluation are in 
necessary relation. If it is said that a certain developed notion of personhood on 
which a degree of agreement might be reached by sociologists, psychologists, 
anthropologists and philosophers alike would involve a moral element then I think 
that few of us would object to such a convergent image as an ideal. And yet if the
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reverse contention to which that image gives rise is one whereby we refuse to call 
'persons' those who appear to live without moral concerns and evaluations, I find 
myself philosophically - and morally - unwilling to give my assent. This, I believe, 
shows that our intuitions would tend to wish to build into personhood a moral 
element, but that that is not an essential element of the very concept as we are able 
to operate with it. All that can be said on this issue, I believe, is that the putative 
social genesis and construction of personhood may be of such a nature as to permit 
a plausible story to be told showing its important connection with a moral form of 
life,96 and showing our current intuitions on the matter to be holding them as 
intrinsically linked.97 But the nature of this connection being claimed is still open 
to dispute. A reasonable picture of personhood might include an element of the 
moral consciousness; but the picture is not likely, I believe, except with a great deal 
of conceptual underlay that is open to debate, to shore up the link with a hard 
logical 'must'.
My second briefly-put suspicion follows on from this first one. If some 
connection between a moral form of life and the individual moral consciousness and 
personhood is one without which persons are not produced in society, then it need 
not follow that the moral affairs of such persons are conducted in a priori 
specifically identifiable ways, especially ones coalescent with those we generally 
observe. There may be near-universal contents of moral codes in all times and 
places,98 and there are some moral philosophers who refuse to enter into debate 
with possible rival views on certain moral issues.99 But the conceptual work being 
attempted becomes ever more strained and tendentious as one moves from the 
connection between personhood and evaluation to the person and a particular form 
of moral evaluation. That is to say, if the former argument shows anything it shows 
only that some moral form of life is necessary to personhood. In an analogous way 
this forms the substance of my third, and specifically phenomenological, doubt.
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I said above that the Taylor/Nagel line of argument contends that objectivity 
in moral affairs is that of the independence from the subject which reasons for and 
against evaluations and actions possess. As a matter of the phenomenological 
description of the moral consciousness, we should ask of the status of such 
reasons: do they hold one that way? And here we can answer straightforwardly in 
the affirmative. Reasons, and the demands put upon one as they are considered or 
as they strike one, do come to one as independent, unwilled. They seem, as my 
chapters 4 and 5 showed for demands generally, both to be independent of one’s 
direct volition as well as to be signalled vaguely as if from some exterior reality.
A distinction similar to that which Taylor employs is made by 
Sokolowski,100 who claims that we are beings for whom the nature of the good is 
a question that inevitably arises and which inevitably leads us to distinguish 
between the apparent and the real good. It seems to me that both of these veneers in 
which 'the good' gives itself to consciousness can share a phenomenological 
feature of independence in experience, but the latter receives reflective assent and 
the former not, on discerning the interference of personal factors & c. Hence this 
point both follows the Taylor approach as well as it tries to make it fit with the 
phenomenology of the matter.
The way in which I take this phenomenological point to be analogous to that 
second one two paragraphs above runs in this way. Just as I maintained there that 
any link between morality and personhood could allow of a rather different moral 
orientation than those with which we are normally acquainted, so also I think here 
that any link to objectivity requires only a rough experience of independence and 
need not give one any strong purchase on either moral entities 'out there' or even of 
a particular determinant going to make up that independence. And I say this only in 
virtue of the weight of my previous descriptive presentation of the matter as it is 
given in both direct and reflective modes. Given also the doubts which I have
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expressed in this chapter on the notion of a necessary linkage between morality and 
the self, then the claim to which I have been building up my argument is thus that 
the possibility of taking objectivity to be essential to the moral demand is of a very 
mitigated nature. For the truth of a putative conceptual link between personhood 
and morality, combined with that analysis which impugns moral value as chosen by 
the subject, would leave some objectivity component to moral value experience as 
necessary only in minimal form, it seems to me. That is the fundamental tenet of my 
thesis: that phenomenological description shows only a vague sense of objectivity 
as component to the moral demand experience and to the alleged experience of 
values of which demandingness is said to be a feature; and that this is all that is 
needed, if need there be, for the experience to be had and to make sense to the 
subject. For the objectivity component that is to be found in the experience - while it 
sometimes has a determinate cause and content - is of such a nature that only a 
general component of subject-independence is necessary for its place in the 
subject's experiential economy.
By way of concluding this section and leading up to the next and final one, I 
shall repeat my explicit contentions made so far in this chapter. They centre on the 
subject's reflective grasp on her experience of the moral demand and how any 
objectivity element features in the make-up of her self, either as a basic matter of a 
self s existence or as one of a more developed one of a self s make-up, what I have 
distinguished from the former by calling it 'personhood'. I have said that the claims 
of WPT are either false with respect to the reflective phenomenology or serve only 
to make weaker points than their authors would wish. And I then maintained that an 
attempted extension of this argument into necessary conditions of the developed self 
was questionable both insofar as it imported moral requirements into the matter and 
as, even if evaluation were to be shown to be an essential feature of personhood, it 
could not claim that specifically moral evaluation was a necessary feature. My belief
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in the light of all this is that if  a self has experience of moral demands then it must 
be as of ones possessing a minimal objectivity component. That minimal degree 
will simply be that afforded by the rough sense of something other to the subject 
standing to produce the demand and determine its content. This clearly allows some 
involvement of the subject herself in either the constitution of the demand 
experience or in the impingement it makes on her (since a minimal degree of 
independence does not require entire independence of the subject). And if moral 
concerns go deeply into the self - as opposed to being constitutive {inter alia) of it - 
then it is an interesting thing that an objectivity feature therefore also goes deeply as 
it accompanies the moral demand experience. That is the matter into which my final 
section inquires.
Section Five: Moral concerns and the core self
It will have become evident to the reader as my phenom enological 
presentation progressed from chapter 4 onwards that I put some store by the 
reception of the moral demand experience in consciousness and its relation to the 
importance of moral concerns to the self or a core self. In chapter 5 (section 3.vi) 
and in chapter 6 (section 3) I said that this had the appearance of a paradox. For 
moral demand experiences possess an objectivity feature - which I have explicated 
in terms of independence of subject choosing - and the reception of such matters 
into the inner perimeter of the core self would seem to require their significance and 
importance to me . Now I am able to address this state of affairs more fully, with 
the arguments of this chapter and the previous one having been arrayed.
There are two preliminary points of salient relevance to make here. One is 
that which formed much of the background to my descriptive phenomenology in 
chapters 4 and 5, namely, that the experience of moral demands need not be of 
demands on oneself, They can rather be demands that such and such (where this
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varies in specificity) be curtailed or expedited. So experience of moral demands 
may go deeply into myself and be important for me without necessarily also being 
demands on me.101 And the other is that ’paradox’ is too strong a term to employ 
of the relationship being addressed. Of this matter I have already made comment in 
the previous chapter. Here I will repeat that, unless that which is of central concern 
to the self is that which is chosen by it or under its ongoing control, it does not 
follow from the appearance of the moral demand as independent of the self and yet 
striking deeply into that it is an affair of a queer or paradoxical sort. And nor do I 
think that we do find phenomenological evidence for any notion that such deep 
contents are chosen or subject to a form of overall control. This does not discount 
the possible fact that a commitment of some sort to an object may be necessary for 
its being one of concern or interest, but it does do enough to remove the air of 
paradox displaying stark opposites in a relation of tension.
One more point before I continue. I have continually used the term 
'concerns’ of the self when talking of the moral demand experience finding a ready 
place in the core self. In using this I see myself as simply following the standard 
fashion in which the matter is addressed in moral philosophical literature. But, of 
course, I have had occasion in numerous places in this thesis to complain that that 
tradition may be working with a distorted or one-sided perspective on such matters. 
And so here again I want to sound a discordant note with respect to that tradition - 
though I shall continue to use the language of 'concerns’ in order better to locate my 
arguments within a general area. It seems to me that moral matters might be central 
to the self and yet not properly 'concerns' of it. They may be strong currents within 
one that tug and push one's attention, without which one cannot imagine what 
one's self would look like, and about which a certain fascination or amusement or 
beguiling aura might sometimes characterize their relation to one's core self. But 
they need not be thereby 'concerns' as that term relates a definite stance of the core
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self towards its contents. (And as to the matter of an experience’s 'coalescing' with 
or being at the 'core' of the self, I believe this to be something given to us either as 
that experience occurs or on reflection on it. In such an affair, elements that one 
takes to determine partly the make-up of one's individual self are either felt to be 
drawn upon or are discerned on later reflection to have been so and to be available 
for entering again into such relations with the contents of experience).
Where the work of this chapter bears on this matter is partly in virtue 
of my discussion of the phenomenological impossibility of seeing value as chosen 
by the subject and partly also of the essential component of some form of 
objectivity to the moral demand experience. Combining these two intimately related 
points, and adding to them the fact that most of us care deeply about certain general 
and some specific moral issues, we observe the phenomenon to which this section 
is directed. Much the same kind of experience of independence of the subject and 
coalescence with a core self seems to go on in religious experience. The response of 
faith to the call of god brings into relation both a deep concern or urge or longing of 
the self, as it is variously construed by religion, and the independent reality of a 
divine outreach to the human soul. To aesthetic experience also this is a particularly 
apt phenomenon on which to concentrate, especially with regard to the experience 
of the forerunners to, and the very act of, aesthetic creation. Here we find the 
orientation of the artist to her work wended with a sense of a call on her to produce 
in a more or less particular way.102
5.i - Depth of moral concerns
I want to put forward a caveat as regards this matter, both for the purpose 
of circumscribing the range of my phenomenological description and for pointing to 
an interesting facet of that phenomenology. The point is this. Not all experience of 
the moral demand strikes oneself as bringing into play deep concerns of the self. It
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goes on in an everyday manner, interrupted only occasionally by that heightened 
demand experience which may draw most evidently on the core self. This, then, is 
my restriction on the scope of the argument. An actual sense of one's core concerns 
being drawn into a moral situation may not be all that common except in especially 
powerful moments of the demand experience striking consciousness. But the 
obverse of this initial point widens the possible field of application of the 
phenomena at large here. In chapter 4 (end of section 3.i) I talked of the possible 
'coming apart' of the strike of the demand experience and its relation to a core self. 
This I think does go on in two ways. One, that of heightened demands which are 
experienced as peripheral or alien to the core self, I have already discussed at length 
in chapters 5 and 6. The other, which I now mention, is that of the demand being 
but lightly or barely experienced while nevertheless drawing on a fund of moral 
concern deep in the self.
Once again it may seem that a paradox is being put forward. It might be 
thought that core concerns of the self would be experienced as active and as the 
answering response of the self to the strong call of the not-self in the demand 
experience. This is an assumption belied by the actual phenomena that it addresses. 
If core concerns need to be felt as independently worthwhile and as making 
demands on one that are not simply self-imposed, then it does not follow that they 
need to be experienced as powerful, as striking one from definite external loci, and 
as always also bringing about, or coalescing with, the correspondingly strongly felt 
currents of the core self in interaction. Indeed, in chapter 4 1 was greatly concerned 
to emphasize, via example vi, the spontaneous nature of the reaction of such core 
elements to a moral situation. There I said that the example could only be included 
as one of experience of a moral demand insofar as later reflection by the subject 
surveyed it in that way. Chapter 5 continued with that thought as I employed the 
thought experiment of the pill that erased the demand pressure. And as for here, I
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want to exploit this prior work on the matter to explain how I take it that the core 
self might be said to be receptive to moral demands while neither side of the relation 
is experienced especially strongly or even all that explicitly. For I am regarding the 
concerns of the core self to be those which both show themselves forth in one's 
direct experience on occasion as well as (and most importantly) they hold 
themselves up on reflection as those with which one takes oneself most intimately 
to be identified and from which one would not wish to be loosed (on pain of some 
kind of loss of self). This seems to me an unobjectionable way of talking of a core 
self. And, it being the case that such concerns are often only discerned on 
reflection, and hence that reflective acknowledgement of a vague sort does go on of 
having been in a situation where a moral demand was not experienced all that 
strongly but nevertheless deeply, the relationship to which I have attested is given 
grounds. Witness, thus, the reflective pronouncements of the form, ’I couldn't 
have thought/acted otherwise' with respect to moral situations, where the 'couldn't' 
represents both the signalling of some quasi-extemal compulsion103 and the need 
to maintain continuity of the core self;104 and especially those ones where the 
subject's thought or action was undeliberated and apparently unforced, even though 
any other action or thought which might have suggested themselves would have 
met with explicit rejection. While direct experience may not, then, be presenting one 
with the phenomena of strong demand and felt responsive movement of core self, 
reflection on that experience does show how the two are seen to be interrelated.105 
Indeed, that which goes deeply with us, like friendship, love, and some moral 
concerns, is just that which most often issues in the automatic, unquestioned and 
everyday performance of acts and presence of dispositions which are experienced 
not strongly or as obligatory, but in the manner of a barely-analyzed way of 
living.106
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5.ii - Exteriority and the core self
A very good summary of much of what I have been saying is provided in a 
remark of Bernard Williams. In addressing the role of the emotions in our moral 
life, and in facing the Kantian criticism that emotions are not rationally chosen items 
of moral worth, he makes the following point:
...we should not dismiss too hastily the idea that some element of 
passivity, some sense in which moral impulses prompt us, and 
courses of action are impressed on us, may itself make a vital 
contribution to the notion of moral convictions; and I suspect it to be 
true of moral, as it certainly is of factual, convictions that we cannot 
take very seriously a profession of them if we are given to 
understand that the speaker has just decided to adopt them. The idea 
that people decide to adopt their moral principles seems to me a 
myth, a psychological shadow cast by a logical distinction; and if 
someone did claim to have done this, I think one would be justified 
in doubting either the truth of what he said or the reality of those 
moral principles. We see a man's genuine convictions as coming 
from somewhere deeper to him than that; and, by what is only an 
apparent paradox, what we see as coming from deeper in him, he - 
that is, the deciding "he" - may see as coming from outside him. So 
it is with the emotions.107 
In this quotation are contained analogous elements to those in my discussion which 
I have been aiming to make clear. The ones which especially stand out are these. 
Williams talks of the 'passivity' of moral 'impulses' as making a 'vital' contribution 
to a particular way of looking at moral agents; I too have talked of this matter with 
respect to the way in which the moral demand seems independent of oneself and as 
essentially so in virtue of its not being chosen by one. Williams attacks the idea that
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a subject could have 'just decided' to 'adopt' moral principles; I dealt with this idea 
and criticized it in section 2.iii above. And Williams at the end of his comment 
looks at the relation of the deep currents that lie within a person and the seeming 
externality of the appearance which these can sometimes make before his own 
consciousness; this being the area of interest with which chiefly I am concerned in 
this final section.
With my comments having been made in the previous few pages on the 
nature of this relation of core self and external demand, I want to point out that now 
it is not a 'paradox' with which we contend, but an interesting phenomenological 
state of affairs. Frankfurt does use the word 'paradox' of that spiritual phenomenon 
when, guided by the religious object, one feels most truly oneself as one is 
'escaping' from oneself and having relinquished any control over the occurent 
situation.108 This indeed is a strange affair that goes on at a level often inaccessible 
to many of us. Religious traditions of all kinds deliberately deploy the language of 
paradox in order circuitously to get near such states. But in the case of the moral 
demand's independence coalescing with the core self, I think that the matter is 
slightly different. I have, after all, reiterated my belief that the relation need not be 
given only through the heightened experiential moment (as these religious ones tend 
to be). The main reason for not finding it to be a paradox is based on my 
phenomenological analysis in this thesis as well as on comparative analysis with 
other areas of experience (particularly demand experience, of course) that also have 
reflective endorsement given by subjects to their constitution in consciousness as 
independent of self while being held close to its core.
The two points in the final sentence above are really one insofar as their 
basic impetus is concerned. My phenomenological analysis has shown a feature as 
of the moral demand's independence to be essential in the experience of it. So the 
question concerning the core self is not whether the relation between experience of
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independence (not-self) and nearness to that core is possible - since it is established 
as (a sometimes) phenomenological fact - but whether the relation is one necessary 
to the nature of the experience and to the nature of how core concerns of the self 
appear before one. If the independence feature of the moral demand is one strand of 
my argument then the other - that which I implied just above is really a development 
of the same argument - is that independence of subject which other commonly 
encountered areas of experience possess. As I said in chapter 6 (section 7), it 
appears to be a very deeply grounded phenomenon that our chief areas of concern - 
our loves, friendships, loyalties - are experienced as having just this independence 
feature when they make demands on us. I have tried to capture the sense109 of this 
independence by referring to the way in which we often feel ourselves to be chosen 
by a particular object rather than its having been chosen by us. A simple way of 
testing this thought is to construct suitable counter-questions, such as: Do patriots 
choose to love their country? Do friends choose one another? Are a person’s 
passions with regard to sports and hobbies felt by her as chosen? The answer is in 
the negative in each case: both as regards the unchosenness of the feeling and as to 
the demands which it puts upon people. And another way in which I hope to bring 
this phenomenological description closer to the reader’s own experience of these 
affairs is by talking of the sense we have of a project, relationship, or activity being 
worthwhile for one, being something of sufficient value to engage one’s energies. 
This, it seems to me, is a sense which requires some independence of the objects) 
to which those energies are directed, as well as some sense of the independence 
from one of the feelings and the demands they exert. And, if that is the case, then 
the general argument against the choosing of value or deliberate conferral of 
importance on a state of affairs which I have put in this chapter will be in operation. 
Hence the moral demand experience will be simply one type amongst a wider field 
of experiences, the constitution of which in direct experience involves an objectivity
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feature and the relation of which to concerns of the core self appear (on reflection 
especially) as a necessary one for the object of that experience to seem important or 
valuable or worthy of interest.
All of this paragraph above I have written in the light of my previous 
phenomenological analysis of experience and reflection on it. Now, in this 
paragraph, I shall continue to do that, but it will present the matter in a much less 
positive light than that in which it appears above. For I have countered the WPT 
line of argument with my own phenomenological assay of reflection that shows the 
purchase we have on our experience, the part it plays in our life and the meaning it 
has for us, to be sufficiently elastic to withstand a fair deal of generally sceptical- 
sounding thought. I will not stray too far into these analogous areas of experience, 
but I do think it a noteworthy matter to draw out the degree to which the reflection 
both is not unduly fettered by consideration of certain sceptical thoughts110 and 
requires only a minimal, rough sense of objectivity for the experience to be able to 
subsist in experience. As I have covered much of this ground in my discussion of 
the moral demand in this chapter I will ask the reader to refer back to it and to apply 
the thoughts found therein to the material of, say, friendship, patriotism and the so- 
called 'meaning of life'.
To the independence of these matters from our own choosing I believe we 
find ourselves giving a reflective assent. Taking friendship as an example, the 
precise elements which have about them some degree of independence are as 
follows: the friendship itself; feelings of liking for one's friend; the feeling of the 
value or worthwhileness of this particular friendship, and perhaps also of 
friendship in general; the demands which one experiences in virtue of that 
friendship. Each of these has some degree of independence from one, though 
obviously it is with the demands that it exerts on oneself that my primary interest 
lies.111 My belief is that we are not so involved with some objectivity element that it
Chapter Seven 330
cannot be held as a minimal condition alongside other ’subjective’ ones that 
themselves minimally are not willed. The notion that our desires and interests partly 
go to constitute the subject-matter of the reflection does not destabilize the entire 
experience and leave one with an uncertain vacuum in its place. Indeed, we find 
ourselves close to affirming the notion of 'choice' when some sense of our own 
commitment to a project or state of affairs is at large. This is, to be sure, not the 
same as a pure choice which creates the importance; but a sense of our personal 
commitment is undoubtedly of importance to the purpose we find in carrying out a 
project or holding to a set of beliefs. Unlike the kind of choice which Sartre 
maintains lies (or should lie) at the heart of a valuational stance, this commitment 
occurs in the light of that which has already struck one independently as being 
worthy of commitment. (And to that extent choice in the light of such experience is 
not the kind of pure Sartrean choice with which the WPT line contends). While 
Sartre's notion of choice seems to place the subject entirely on her own as regards 
the basis of her choice - it is her choice that creates the value - a commitment in the 
light of the independently valuable or worthwhile (& c.) allows interaction between 
factors independent of the subject and ones personal to her.
Section Six: Independence as threatening the self
The most cogent-looking form of counter-argument to the notion that the 
independent demandingness of moral states of affairs is essential for the 
constitution and operation of deep concerns of the self would be simply that which 
reverses the putative role played by that independence. Then it would be argued that 
independence of the moral demand is not merely irksome, but threatening to the 
self, and that it undermines the very kind of commitment and involvement in 
matters that a self must have in order to maintain harmonious relations with the 
demands it apprehends.
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A counter-argument of this sort is put by the likes of Williams (1976), 
Stocker (1976) and Railton (1988). They make it in the context of discussing the 
unduly onerous demands that an impartial morality (like some forms of 
utilitarianism and the categorical imperative) might make on an agent who has non- 
moral projects and passions of her own. Williams in particular thinks such a threat 
potentially to be so strong as to destabilise the self. What none of these writers 
really point out, it seems to me, is the phenomenological fact that such a tension, 
unease and possible fracturing of the self s integrity usually goes on not as the 
result of a purely external threat (analogous to that which harms the physical person 
of one), but in virtue of a conflict set up by the deepest impulses of the self.112 
They are, I believe, indeed correct to point out how harsh and burdensome the 
expectations placed upon the agent might be within certain moral systems. For that 
reason their objections are not addressed to the general experience of moral 
demands and the subject’s relation to them. I propose, therefore, to leave aside the 
question of the particular moral system being impugned by these writers and to see 
whether their arguments are latching onto a wider problem of the independence of 
moral demands from subjects and the possible trouble that could cause her.
As I said in chapter 5, then, it seems to me that the moral demand's 
independence can bring about a psychic fracture in the subject, as she is faced with 
conflicting demands (moral and non-moral) on her and the conflicting pressure of 
different concerns to which she is strongly wedded. But in saying this, and in 
remarking in the paragraph above on the nature of the conflict wrought, I have 
brought the debate into the realm of the discussion in this chapter. In chapter 5 my 
concern lay largely in illustration of the irking force of the moral demand as a 
phenomenological fact of direct experience without going too far into the horizon 
that girthed it. I confined my comments there to the subject's possible awareness of 
being dragged away from other, often mundane, interests by the assailing force of
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the moral demand. Here I want to say that that horizon, as it is revealed by the 
subject's own reflection, shows that the demand is not so much always a 
threatening, alien incursion but that it sets up a tension from within that which 
constitutes the interests, commitments and passions of the self - and which 
themselves can set up demands on one which will be felt as possessing an 
objectivity feature as independent of one's own control. Recalling that I have stated 
these matters to be no more the product of the subject's choice than the demand 
which places itself upon her, it seems to me that the subject is the site of a conflict 
between the contents of those commitments and passions - some of which will be 
moral concerns that are tugged into manifesting themselves by the incoming 
demand and others which involve ones of a non-moral sort. (Of course, from the 
fact that, corresponding to the demand, there may be some feeling whereby it 'gets 
to' the subject and opens the way for her to feel 'torn', it need not follow that that 
feeling is deep within her. My contention made earlier, along with footnote 112, is 
that the fracture or unease can represent a conflict within the concerns of the self - 
those concerns being made evident as central to the subject on reflection on them).
This conflict which is sometimes set up and which involves the various 
concerns of the self, and sometimes those which are core concerns, sheds more 
light on that relation of self and independent demand which I have addressed 
specifically with regard to the moral case in experience. If it is a paradox in the 
moral case so is it also in those other non-moral affairs of core self and its gradually 
more peripheral interests. And it is my belief, from phenomenological 
considerations of a general sort, that the degree to which most items of our 
experiential furniture, as it were, can be said to be chosen is really very small. As to 
those which seem to possess close relations to a core self - ones which I have tried 
to capture in using the expression 'concerns', though realizing that the matter is 
wider than that - it seems especially to be the case that these are experienced as
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having about them a veneer as of independence of the subject. This is so whether 
they are moral ones or not. Since I do not think that those concerns which are close 
to the core self are only the moral ones - and I certainly do not think that closeness 
to a core self constitutes their being moral - then I take it that independence of the 
very self to which such matters are held close is an affair of some breadth so far as 
the experiences which it typifies is concerned. That which appears independent of 
oneself - as unchosen and/or external to one - is also often that which enters into 
most intimate congress with the core self.
So the phenomenon to which we are directed is this. The moral demand 
experience is given to consciousness with an objectivity component, understood in 
the light of my foregoing comments. Such is the universal stuff of the experience. 
And sometimes also it enters into the orbit of the core self. I ask the reader now to 
turn her/his thoughts back to Mackie's presentation of this feature. To the matter of 
the accuracy of this putative report of value realms from 'out there' moving one on 
apprehension I think it can be said that he does not describe the phenomena as they 
actually stand in our experience. We certainly feel - sometimes powerfully and 
movingly, often lightly and indifferently - the impact of moral demands upon 
ourselves in the course of our lives. But in experiencing that, we do not take 
ourselves to be acted upon by the apprehension of values 'out there' which radiate 
their demandingness onto consciousness. We certainly feel the demand to be 
independent of oneself in some degree, qua the one who apprehends it, and 
independent of one’s volition. Yet there is not, over and above that sense and as 
determinate object of it, a specific picture of a moral reality figuring in our 
experiences and thoughts on it. If Mackie says what there isn't 'out there', I have 
attacked him (and other moral philosophers) in saying what there isn't in this area 
of our moral experience.
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That the moral demand experience is presented to one with this crude 
objectivity element - that is to say, as independent of the self, as outwith its control, 
and also as often having some degree of externality - is a fact attended also by the 
case that (often) such an experience strikes into the core self and does so precisely 
because it is received there as an affair in which the interest, concern, identity of the 
self is (inter alia) invested. It is important to note of this matter that the objectivity 
element of the experience can be called its 'not-self aspect in one fashion and yet its 
reception in the inner perimeter of the self clearly involves its coalescence with the 
core self. This occurs once the demand arises: the core self is not experienced as 
constituting the demand, though it undoubtedly is felt on reflection to affect the 
phenomenological tone of irksomeness or threat with which the experience can 
appear. Hence the not-self apparently interacts with the self in experience; though it 
is not the case that in either the direct or reflective mode a subject experiences such 
phenomena as if produced only by herself. The fact that she does not feel there to 
be particular values 'out there' producing her experience should be considered in 
tandem with the fact also that she does not feel that they are constituted by herself 
alone. To exploit another distinction with connected poles, I believe that the work 
of this chapter shows this: while a subject does not conceive of herself as entire 
producer of the demand experience she is not thereby unwilling to grant a certain 
degree of reflective credence to a certain putative degree of her involvement in the 
constitution of the experience. The closeness of moral demand experiences (for 
many of us) to a core self is linked by their appearance as of bearing an independent 
aura of mattering, worth, importance, significance, & c.; but that nearness is not so 
fragile that a perceived subjective element in the experience - something personal to 
the subject - will either dissolve the experience itself or render meaningless general 
thought on it. Nor is the independence in the actual experience so determinate and 
so absolute an affair that similar dissolution should occur on its appearing, or being
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thought of, in the way of a more rough and mitigated phenomenon. So that which 
comes from outwith the subject in her experience and that which finds inner 
habituation in her core self are not opposed. Nor are they, however, particularly 
strongly experienced in her life, at least as far as her general acquaintance with 
moral demands is concerned. For that which is experienced as independent of her, 
and that element of the core self which lies deeply within her, do not always strike 
themselves in her experience as matters exactly located and pressingly felt.
My contention that there is an essential link between a demand’s being 
experienced and its being experienced as independent of the subject is one that goes 
across the range of different kinds of demand. Even that which apparently wells 
from within and bursts upon one does so with a seeming will of its own. This is a 
point I wished to emphasize in my chapter 6 with the discussion of the links and 
differences between subjective/objective and self/not-self. What is of greater interest 
is the phenomenological exposition I have undertaken as a corrective matter to what 
I believe to be the unexamined and cursory presentations of the moral demand 
experience by others (exploiting as I went analogous glosses that have occurred 
with respect to the data of religious and aesthetic experience). The upshot of my 
discussion here is the final (re)statement of the heart of my thesis. And it is this. 
Moral demands do not present values 'out there' impinging on one: yet they are 
independent of one. Such independence as they have coalesces often with the core 
self: suggesting that there are values deeply held 'within' us. But they are not to be 
identified with volition from 'in there': they are not chosen by us. Moreover, for 
some people such states of affairs are not ’within’ them as matters close to the core 
self because they are not felt as being important, or at least as important enough to 
override other non-moral interests. That is the contingency of the moral demand's 
appearance in consciousness, even if its objectivity element, as independent of 
oneself, is essential. Moral demands generally do not appear as if purely from
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inside one. They do appear as coming from outside of one's control and as from 
the not-self; but not as emanating from value objects from 'out there'.
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Concluding comments to thesis
By way of presenting my conclusions to this thesis I should like to re-draw 
the reader's attention to my chapter 1. On pages 18-201 posed a series of questions 
which I felt were raised in considering the nature of moral demand experience and 
its putative relation to moral values. It is as a summary of answers to those 
questions that I put forward my conclusions.
Firstly, there has been throughout my phenomenological presentation a 
tendency to find our experience of moral demands to be somewhat at odds with the 
ways in which it is often portrayed in the literature. I believe that I have shown that 
Mackie's account of our experience, in terms of our taking it as if given by queer 
prescriptive values from 'out there', is incorrect. And interestingly also, I have 
argued that other moral philosophers who either share or diverge from Mackie's 
general metaethical positions often make the same assumptions about our 
experience and about the kinds of commitment which we allegedly make toward it.
Secondly, and being the product of that procedure just above, I have given 
space to the wide diversity of the moral demand experience as it impinges on us and 
remains or recedes from consciousness. In doing that I have come to present the 
demands as ones that are not always apprehended as specifically calls on the subject 
herself, but as a demandingness that she has encountered. And in virtue of the 
questions which that raised as to the subject's perceived sense of an experience's 
relation to her own self and its contents I went on to maintain that moral demands 
do often, but not universally, represent to us deep currents of the self. I believe, 
however, that that conclusion must be tempered in the light of my arguments that 
that particular band of experience is not a necessary one for possession either of a 
minimal selfhood or of a developed notion of personhood.
Thirdly, my descriptive account of this facet of our moral consciousness 
does show that its independence from the subject is an essential element to it. I have
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explicated that independence as consisting often in a minimal exteriority of the 
experience and universally in its being outwith the subject’s direct volition. As to 
the 'exteriority', I have maintained that that is not felt by us to be underpinned by 
special value objects ’out there'. This finding was further mitigated as I considered 
a subject's reflective stance on her experience, arguing that her grasp on the stuff of 
that experience, and the practices which may go with it, are not eroded by her 
consideration of the experience as partly wrought by her own constitution. A certain 
degree of independence from the subject is essential if the experience is to be had. 
Yet it is apparently not essential that all subjects should have that experience; or at 
least, it is not essential that they should hold it close to the concerns of the self if 
they do encounter that kind of experience. Moreover, for those of us who are party 
to that band of moral experience, it is not an affair about which we think - in 
immediacy or on later reflection - that it is or has to be engendered by a special 
value realm.
I believe that a phenomenological mode of presentation has been worthwhile 
and productive as a means by which to conduct debate in this general area. It has 
acted in particular as a kind of reformative procedure against some alleged 
presentations of 'our' experience; while also bringing my thesis round to look at 
certain undeveloped areas of moral philosophical interest. There has emerged from 
this a deep connection between the moral demand and its being experienced as 
independent of oneself in some degree. To that extent, the final resting-place of this 
thesis is with the self and its relation to its experience.
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APPENDIX 
Two phenomenologists of moral value
I intend in this appendix to cover briefly and with specific regard to the 
work of my thesis the thought of two philosophers generally credited with applying 
phenomenology to the area of value apprehension. They are Max Scheler and 
Nicolai Hartmann. The warrant for calling them phenomenologists may at times be 
rather tenuous with respect to the actual practice of their philosophical work, 
particularly with respect to the latter figure, but they are sufficiently widely held as 
phenomenologists of value for me to include some discussion of them.
The reason why I have left this discussion to an appendix and not 
incorporated it in the main body of the text is simple. I feel that the respective work 
of these two philosophers involves so much argument and invokes so many 
questions not germane to my concerns that inclusion of them in the main text would 
have been to clutter and obscure unnecessarily the thrust of my thought. 
Nevertheless, they bear some kind of acknowledgement and coverage, and so I 
have opted to discuss them in an appendix.
Both Scheler and Hartmann range over extremely wide areas of 
philosophical and specifically moral philosophical interest in their major works on 
value (M.Scheler, 1973 [originally 1913-16]; N.Hartmann, 1932). I shall only try 
to talk of those thoughts entertained by them which I see as having a direct bearing 
on moral demand experience and particularly its putative reference to a value realm. 
Many of the avenues of thought they follow, fascinating and often bemusing as 
they may be, I will not therefore attempt to pursue. My prime interest in the two, 
aside from their intrinsic merit for a thesis on moral phenomenology, is to argue 
that they display some of the main phenomenological errors of attempted 
description which I have identified in places throughout this thesis.
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Scheler and Hartmann talk often of ’values' generally, and I shall follow 
them in talking simply of 'values’ for the main, with the understanding that such 
considerations refer also to the sub-group of moral values.
Max Scheler
Scheler's main work on moral and other values (1973) is a compendious 
volume of the considered and the mercurial so far as the phenomenology it 
enshrines is concerned. His own method of phenomenology differs from that of 
Husserl,1 involving more direct attempts to get at the essences of phenomena than 
the complex, staged approaches of the latter.2
Scheler argues that values are given in (but decidedly not constituted by) 
emotion.3 These values, he thinks, are a priori and hierarchically arranged. By the 
former contention, he means to show (like Kant) that values do not depend on 
actual goods and experience for their validity; for instance, that the value of 
friendship remains even if no friendship is actually displayed in the world.4 And by 
the latter, he is maintaining that there are orders of rank among values that are 
discernible on inspection by the subject which are irrespective again of their 
concrete instantiation.5 (An example of his alleged finding here is that values 
pertaining to the 'holy' are higher in rank ordering than those which come within 
the bounds of, say, the aesthetic).
Scheler's view as to the status of the values with which we make contact in 
emotional acts of loving, hating and preferring6 includes a chief area which bears 
upon my area of interest. It concerns the independence of values from the subject 
herself and of the demands they seem to place upon her. Scheler is keen to point out 
that values do not depend on the relevant experiences in which we have awareness 
of them.7 Our apprehension of values and our feeling demanded to make them 
concrete in the world constitute neither the values themselves not the claims they 
make on us. Values would remain even if no value consciousness did.8
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As to the independence of values from the experiencing subject, Scheler 
reiterates at a number of points this belief. While he believes that they are given to 
us in feeling, he says that:
...I do not mean to imply in the least that values are created, made, 
or destroyed by love and hate. Values cannot be created or 
destroyed. They exist independently of the organization of all beings 
endowed with spirit.9 
And he makes his contention also in these words:
...the claim that values are given in a "feeling of something" does 
not imply that values exist only insofar as they are felt or can be 
felt. For it is a phenomenological fact that in feeling a value, the 
value is given as distinct from its being felt.. Just as we are 
conscious at every moment of knowing many things without 
knowing them in actuality at the moment, and just as we are 
conscious as well of many things that can be known but are 
conscious of our not knowing them, so also do we feel many values 
that we know, which belong to the world of our values, and also an 
infinite number of values that exist without our having felt them in 
the past or our feeling them in the future.10 
Values are discovered by subjects, not brought into being by them.11 Our 
experience of values is constricted by a factor like the 'milieu' in which we live,12 
but the range of values itself lies outwith the experienced life of an individual or 
culture.
Scheler’s work is interesting, at times fascinating. My general worry with 
it, however, is that no clear reference back to the phenomenology of our putative 
value experience is put by him before the reader. His contentions are therefore hard 
to assess qua phenomenological descriptions; or they strike me in the main as false. 
The general notions which he claims to be found through our moral experience look 
too tied to a particular sub-class of that experience or to a questionable interpretation
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of that data. My specific worry occurs with respect to his abiding theme of the 
independence of values from the experiencing subject: it concerns both the nature of 
this independence and also the relationship which Scheler believes there to exist 
between such independent values and the experiences of 'oughtness', or what I 
have generally termed 'demandingness', which allegedly they put upon us from 
time to time. These concerns link up with the main corpus of my presentation in this 
thesis. For they naturally raise questions about the status of such values and their 
link to the experience of demands which have been salient throughout my work: 
that is to say, how they stand within the experience itself and how they might be 
conceived by us as objects of experience.
I doubt if the fruits of his phenomenology claimed by Scheler can be 
sustained when one applies the method to our experience of moral demands as 
object. He himself was aware of the 'phenomenological controversy' that might 
ensue on different alleged descriptive results being presented by investigators into 
the same area of experience.13 And I believe that his own claims for the 
phenomenology are not borne out when one repeats the procedure with respect to 
the object data. Firstly, I do not think that a 'value hierarchy' of the sort which 
Scheler claims that we perceive is given in our immediate experience. There are 
times when one demand or another which we apprehend seems more important and 
when one course of action or another seems more recommended, but as to actually 
experiencing a hierarchical structure of values impinging on one, I do not think this 
is given by him either adequate phenomenological description or sufficient evidence 
to present definitively to one its general occurrence. His phenomenology generally 
tends to present a ready-made case before the reader. This would not be such a bad 
thing (and Scheler himself sincerely felt it to be a legitimate method) if it were not 
for the fact that the results it claims are so far from certain.14
Scheler does not make any determinate claim for the ontological status of 
values.15 He does not think that they are Platonic entities, and is uncommitted on 
the issue of whether they are to be regarded as particulars or universals. He does,
Appendix 343
however, hold fast to the opinion that they cannot be reduced to other things or 
states, such as naturalistic properties or the experiences in which they are 
manifested to us.16 The way in which values have an independence of us is left, in 
the light of the above, rather uncertain. Scheler certainly seems to be presenting an 
alleged value phenomenology similar to that which Mackie puts forward in his 
Ethics - and while I believe equally that both philosophers mis-represent this 
experience, Scheler is inclined also to go much further towards accepting the 
apparent ontological commitment than is the sceptical Mackie. Given my much 
emphasized belief that that kind of phenomenological description is false or typical 
only of a specially heightened area of a wider general class, then it will be apparent 
that I think too that Scheler’s granting of a special independent status to such 
objects of our experience should be questioned and tempered.
My concern about the kind of object with which Scheler takes himself to be 
dealing is conjoined also with one directed to the approach Scheler takes in his 
phenomenology as a whole. He gives space both to the presentation of the 
experience of demandingness and also to thought on its occurrence and relations to 
a value realm.17 He maintains that the feeling of being called or demanded with 
respect to the instantiation of a particular value is brought about by apprehension of 
a value; that this value has a being of its own independent of the experiencing 
subject herself; and that that independence is such that it cannot be claimed that 
subjects infer or construct values from these kinds of feeling.18 With these claims I 
think Scheler inverts the basic experienced relationship of which we are generally 
aware: which is of demandingness, rather than of values which demand.
I believe that Scheler allows his interest in a realm of values to over-run his 
description of the phenomenology of demand experience. For the relationship 
which he perceives between demands and values seems to me to be reversed in 
comparison to the true nature of our experience. Our experience of moral demands 
starts with just that: demands. The bringing before consciousness of a pressure, a 
call upon one's attention, is the original experience, rather than that of a value or
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values which appear to send forth the demand. The kind of independence of 
ourselves which we take values to have is not as of some special realm from which 
demands emanate. Moral values, to be sure, are not directly subject to one's will. 
Their 'being', however, is not founded - in our experience - in a particular special 
realm from which they put upon us varying forces of demand.
Where Scheler may have derived this relationship is from the pertinent fact 
that often we barely experience moral demands; or sense only that some value has 
been breached or that it could be implemented, though feeling no demand that that 
be so. Hence it may seem that values are experienced as the primary phenomenon, 
with demands issuing from them subsequently (if they do at all in some cases). 
This, of course, says nothing at all about the ontological status of values, but it 
does address the course of a particular region of our experience. But it might be 
that, if it were thought accurately to reflect our experience then it could be taken as 
part of the phenomenological evidence for the primacy and irreducibility of values 
and for their being some kind of ontological species 'out there'. And I think that, 
from the fact that sometimes we say that we have experienced a value but not a 
demand, it cannot be inferred that there is a value realm of a special sort with which 
we interact. While Scheler does not go all that distance towards locating values in 
such a fashion, I think that he goes far enough beyond the actual phenomenology of 
our experience of moral demands and values to misrepresent the matter.
Nicolai Hartmann
Hartmann's notions of the a priority of value and its independence from the 
perceiver19 are essentially the same as those to which Scheler adheres. Like Scheler 
he also holds to a claim of ranking between values based on the putative 
phenomenology.20 He differs from the other philosopher in regard to the warrant 
with which he is included as a phenomenologist in discussion of that school;21 
while going also much further than Scheler towards holding values to be Platonic 
entities displaying a special mode of being.
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Values are held by Hartmann to be a priori 22 and grasped by the 
experiencing subject in emotion.23 The nature of values is 'super-temporal, super- 
historical'.24 They themselves do not alter, but 'consciousness of them shifts', and 
the limitation of our value experience at any one time is like a 'little circle [which] 
''wanders about” on the ideal plane of values.'25 As emphasizing the independence 
of values from the experience of them, and their independence from the subject's 
direct choosing, such talk is comprehensible. Hartmann sums up his point by 
saying:
...values have actually an existence in themselves, independent of all 
imagination and longing. It means that the consciousness of them 
does not determine values, but that values determine the 
consciousness of them.26 
And it is at this point, where the independence discerned by the subject within value 
experience is linked to the independence of value existence, that Hartmann's 
thought takes an ontological turn. It is one which Scheler eschews, though he is 
obviously attracted to it, and which I have argued should be resisted in the light of 
the actual phenomenology.
Hartmann claims that values are ideal essences27 discovered through the 
phenomenology. By this claim he means that values have being; that the being they 
have is ideal, not actual; and that they share in phenomenological terms with 
'redness' and 'squareness' as essences.28 He explains himself in this way:
Values have no self-existence that is real. As principles of action 
they may participate in determining reality, they may even to a great 
degree be themselves Actualized” - but for this veiy reason their 
essence, their mode of Being, remains merely an ideal 
mode...[V]alues as such, in comparison with the actual, always 
have the character of an "Idea”...The mode of Being peculiar to 
values is evidently that of an ideal self-existence...[V]alues are
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originally patterns of an ethically ideal sphere, of a realm with its 
own structures, its own laws and order.29 
Such a view is also put by an interpreter of Hartmann's thought as being that:
"ideal objects" [like values] are just as much "something in 
themselves" as the "real" things, although their mode of being is 
radically different.30
It is this view which is responsible for the general labelling of Hartmann as a 
Platonist with respect to his value theory. The question which must arise for my 
discussion, then, is whether he can correctly ascribe such findings to an exploration 
of value experience and how he sees that in relation to experience of moral 
demands.
A contemporary supporter of Hartmann represents his view in these terms: 
[his] value Platonism is the view that there exist entities (loosely 
called "values") which are "really real" (i.e., have objective 
existence independent of being experienced or known) and which 
are discovered rather than created by human individuals...31 
Furthermore, this writer herself believes such a view to be founded in the 
phenomenology of our value experience.32 As for myself, however, I am struck by 
the manifest lack of correlation between Hartmann's phenomenological exposition 
and his value ontology. In his presentation he makes little attempt to show exactly 
how our experience contains directly or points toward such special entities; his 
consideration of how determinate the contours of our experience are puts over this 
area what looks to me like a preconceived template. Nor is his thought directed only 
to that especially heightened level of the moral demand in experience through which 
I have maintained a value realm might sometimes seem apparent. Hartmann's claim 
is that all our experience in this class is of this nature, relating to a special realm of 
value-objects which interact with us to produce the sensation of being tugged or 
demanded by them.
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As with my appraisal of Scheler, I find two problems with Hartmann's 
work that bear concern in the context of this thesis. One is with its curious lack of 
concrete fit with our experience in this area: it looks as if Hartmann has determined 
the results of his analysis beforehand and will skip through the experience without 
heed to contrary data. This kind of problem I believe to be, as with Scheler, that of 
the paucity of actual phenomenological description on which Hartmann's 
conclusions are based and by which a reader, sympathetic or otherwise, might 
assess his work.33 The other trouble into which I think he falls is , 
straightforwardly, that his phenomenological details and the system he builds on 
them are false. Our experience of moral values (and of others like aesthetic and 
religious ones too) is not of that order; nor is it even as determinate and accessible at 
the peak levels of our demand experience in that fashion which Hartmann makes 
out as a general thesis and through which it is sometimes taken by moral 
philosophers that we are in contact with an objective, prescriptive value realm. One 
must therefore wonder whether Hartmann has not allowed a prior interest in a 
Platonic basis for values to channel the course of his research. Spiegelberg objects, 
in this light, to the one-sidedness and unreliability of Hartmann's phenomenological 
procedure and putative results.34 If there is warrant for upholding a Platonic theory 
of value entities, it is not given through phenomenological investigation. And if it is 
not given in that fashion, I am inclined to think its warrant barely tenable. Hence the 
concern of one commentator that:
[Hartmann's method] hypostasizes "values", setting them so far 
away from the phenomena that they can never be brought into 
significant metaphysical correlation again.35
On the specific matter of the relation between the experience of a moral 
demand and its possible issue from a value entity, Hartmann is also in accord with 
Scheler in maintaining that its course runs from value to demand experience. He 
argues that the ideal being of value includes an ideal 'ought-to-be' which is 
'transformed into the Ought-To-Do of the subject' as it strikes upon and is taken up
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by one’s moral consciousness.36 The human subject is the essential link between 
the sphere of values and the concrete world.37 While man is free - ’values do not 
coerce the subject’ - it is nevertheless the case that values do 'impose...a claim upon 
him.'38 He thinks this something of a paradox: necessity attaches to moral value, 
but there is an 'absence of compulsion on the part of the Ought'39 since man is free 
to actualize value or not on discerning it. Concerning the phenomenological 
description of the demand experience, Hartmann thinks it ’relatively 
comprehensible and definable' while value itself is not.40
It seems to me that Hartmann adheres to a cluster of related views on the 
phenomenologically presented nature of moral demand experience. Amongst them 
are ones to the effect that: values do not in and of themselves motivate on 
apprehension of them; values do have some kind of 'oughtness' adhering to them 
which is perceivable without corresponding inclination to act on the part of the 
experiencing subject; and values precede demand experience and are responsible for 
it.41 With the first of these claims I am in basic agreement and believe that it is 
given due evidence by the phenomenological data. As to the second, however, I 
cannot really see how it has validity as a phenomenological description: 'ideal' 
oughtness simply seems to mean that one should be moved by value apprehension, 
even if one is not, and that is not underpinned by the experience (though it may be a 
fair postulate of normative ethics in general). The problem with such a thesis, or 
putative description, lies with the incorrect phenomenology, as I see it, of 
Hartmann; having 'found' a value realm, he then 'discovers' that it has a special 
property of oughtness inhering in it, even if is not always one realized in the 
consciousness of the perceiver. And on the matter of values giving the demand 
experience to one, the truth of a claim to such a relation is not dependent on there 
being a special Platonic realm of values from which the demand issues.
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My attitude towards the work of both Scheler and Hartmann is, then, one of 
quite basic disagreement. Their respective phenomenologies are not, I believe, 
congruent with the data provided by description of our experience of moral 
demands. This might be accounted for by their having granted undue attention to a 
particular heightened swathe of the experience. Of such a band I have claimed 
throughout this thesis that it is a narrow one; that it is a correspondingly 
unrepresentative one of the overall run of the experience type; and that, even at the 
heightened level, there is not access into a value realm taking place. But one 
naturally wonders why such undue attention should have been paid by these two 
philosophers and by others in contemporary moral philosophy to the notion of a 
special disclosure of a value reality in the demand experience. In this respect, I 
would conjecture that a certain bewitchment with the heightened form of the 
experience may be responsible. Scheler and Hartmann themselves have been 
criticized by other phenomenologists for just this kind of narrowness of vision.42 
Furthermore, I suspect that they have allowed their own attempts to describe the 
phenomenology to be driven by the impetus of prior commitment to the notion of a 
special mode of being to value. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that they should 
have felt that they had 'discovered'just that kind of thing.
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1 A.N.Whitehead, 1951, p.696.
2 W.D.Ross, 1930, p.89.
3 J.L.Mackie, 1977, sec.7.
4 Ibid., p.22.
5 J.Kekes, 1986, p.84. I am taking 'axiology' to be the general theory of value, 
including the exploration of what in the way of value there is or is not in the world. 
See J.N.Findlay, 1970, for a good review of the content and application of such an 
analysis. And also H.O.Eaton, 1933a and 1933b.
6 H.O.Eaton, 1933a, p.28.
7 J.L.Mackie, 1977, p.35.
8 Ibid., pp.32/3.
9 Ibid., p.35, and also p.239 (the final page) where he suggests that 'the 
objectification of moral values and obligations is not only a natural but also a useful 
fiction.'
By 'metaphysics' here I mean the study of the ultimate properties of the 
universe and the necessary features of that discourse which refers to them.
10 Taking the use from J.Butler, 1913, Sermon xi, paragraphs 20-21.
11 See chapter 3 for further explanation on this matter.
12 D.O.Brink, 1989, pp.7-8 gives similar examples of our ways of talking about 
our moral practices.
13 J.L.Mackie, 1980, p.34.
14 E.H.Cadwallader, 1980, p.239.
15 R.Price, A Review of the Principle Questions of Morals, in D.D.Raphael, 1969, 
Vol.II, p. 194. Though this point also goes for any analysis of value and not just the 
kind Mackie has in mind. The 'right' from Price's quoted contention is underpinned 
for Mackie by our apparent interaction with moral values 'out there'.
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161 am not proposing a rigid fact/value distinction here, only making an illustrative 
point about the way in which moral discourse and thought on it seems relevantly 
similar to other areas of discourse, whatever the separation between them might 
consist in.
17 F.A.01afson, 1956, p. 163.
18 The possibility of the separation of these two phenomena - that is, apprehension 
of a moral value and feeling a demand upon one - will be discussed at various 
points in chapters 4 ,5 , and 6 .1 will also consider a third possibility, that of feeling 
a demand force without its being perceived as a demand on oneself.
19 Cf. the quotation from Ross at the head of this chapter.
20 J.L.Mackie, 1977, p.35. Though one could ask whether the language should not 
be reformed in the light of Mackie's criticisms of its apparent reference to a special 
(but illusory) objective kind of moral reality. Such a suggestion is made by 
S.Blackbum, 1985, pp. 1-3.
21 J.L.Mackie, 1977, pp. 15-18.
22 See the previous quotation from Mackie, 1980, and also Mackie, 1977, pp. 113 
& 239.
23 R.M.Hare, 1981, especially pp.78-79, and Hare, 1985.
24 Kant employs this term and explains his use of it (including the distinction with 
'constitutive* uses of concepts) in the Paralogisms and the Antinomies of the first 
Critique. He thinks that certain concepts may be 'necessary for practical 
employment' and thus have 'practical utility'; in particular, that a concept such as 
that of a Cartesian soul may be vital for our 'consciousness of the moral law' 
(A365/B431). For a good summary of this notion and the distinction in Kant refer 
to T.E.Wilkerson, 1976, pp. 154-158. And for an instance of this Kantian notion 
applied to the belief in a value-realm, see L.J.Russell, 1927.
25 J.L.Mackie, 1977, p.239.
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26 This is a standard interpretation of Kant’s Critical project, given by, for instance, 
P.Strawson, 1959 & 1975.
27 On this notion a good discussion is given in Chapter 1 of J.Kekes, 1989.
28 J.L.Mackie, 1977, p. 15.
29 Ibid., p. 17.
30 Ibid., pp.30 & 42-46. But, of course, that need not get rid of objective values, 
however they are understood. It just makes the experience a relational matter, with 
some part of the subject’s nature (other than her actual having of the experience) 
necessary to its arising.
31 These are listed on p.49, ibid.
32 See secs. 8 & 9 of his first chapter. Arguments on the lines of the one from 
queemess are given also in J.L.Mackie, 1980, pp.22, 53, 55, 134, 146.
33 J.L.Mackie, 1977, p.49.
34 Ibid., p.38.
35 Ibid., p.40.
36 R.T.Gamer, 1990, p.143.
37 P.Strawson, 1949, p.33. In this article he, like Mackie later, does take it that 
moral language has certain metaphysical implications with respect to a moral reality. 
And though he - like Mackie - thinks these implications to be false, he does not 
think the language should be reformed in favour of some form of reductive analysis 
closer to the actual nature of the moral response, for the language as it is used has a 
more felicitous communicative efficacy than proposed alternatives.
38 W.James, 1903, p. 194.
39 Ibid., p. 195.
40 R.M.Hare, 1972a.
41 R.M.Hare, 1985.
42 R.M.Hare, 1972a.
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43 Hare himself is inclined to permit a role for intuition in moral philosophy as a 
matter of expediency in moral education (this is the position he develops at length in 
R.M.Hare, 1981). But he does not think that such intuitions are taken by subjects 
to be reflecting a moral reality, stating that philosophers 'have thought that moral 
words connoted such objective, but at the same time prescriptive properties, and 
that the properties existed in rerum natura to make some of our moral judgements 
true,' but that, 'ordinary people, innocent of any philosophy, are [not] the whole 
time committing the same error' (ibid., pp.78-79).
His attitude towards intuitionism in moral philosophy is hostile - see Hare, 
1952, p. 165; 1971; 1972b, p.46.
44 Mackie emphasizes this in both 1977 (especially p.41) & 1980. Simon 
Blackburn also makes the claim for his somewhat similarly-inspired ethical theory 
in 1985 & 1987.
45 For instance, in talking of the various character traits we find admirable or 
otherwise, Hume maintains that,
The quick sensibility, which, on this head, is so universal among 
mankind, gives a philosopher sufficient assurance, that he can never 
be considerably mistaken in framing the catalogue, or incur any 
danger of misplacing the objects of his contemplation: he need only 
enter into his own breast for a moment, and consider whether or not 
he should desire such or such an imputation would proceed from a 
friend or enemy.
(1975, p. 174).
He says similar things on pp.216, 230, & 254 (cf. Kant, 1969, p. 12: 'It need 
hardly be mentioned that the sight of a being adorned with no feature of a pure and 
good will, yet enjoying uninterrupted prosperity, can never give pleasure to a 
rational impartial observer.').
46 G.Marcel, Sketch of a Metaphysic of Hope , in G.Marcel, 1951, p.29, first line.
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47 I say 'modes' of experience rather than 'content' of experience for it is the 
general features of it which I am looking for, and within those features a plurality of 
experience might prove to be possible.
48 For elaboration of this point see chapters 4 &5 ahead, and also M.Mandelbaum, 
1955, ch.2, sec.2.
49 Though a general axiological theory, in not restricting itself just to moral values, 
might wish to make such claims. For example, M.Scheler, 1973, and N.Hartmann, 
1932, do this, the latter placing moral values 'on the back of the realization of other 
values. J.N.Findlay, 1970, covers this matter well. (And there is also a worry that I 
will canvass in forthcoming chapters, that the reflective reasons for taking there to 
be moral values 'out there' - if indeed such are the contents of our direct experience 
- from the experience of the demands they apparently exert on us, may additionally 
apply to other kinds of experienced demands and lead to a rather absurdly over- 
populated image of the 'out there'). In forthcoming chapters I shall also inquire into 
the similarities between the moral demand and aesthetic and religious demands, 
especially as to whether they are taken in experience by us to be issuing from 
special value realms.
50 R.Gamer, 1990, p. 143. William James, 1903, also takes this view.
51 E.H.Cadwallader, 1980, p.235.
52 C.GJung, 1964, pp.446-448.
53 Many of the moral theorists of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
contained in Raphael's selection (1969) evince this quite strongly. The belief of 
those who held to some form of intuitionism is thus summed up as, '...the view 
that normal human beings have an immediate awareness of moral values' 
(W.D.Hudson, 1967, p.l).
54 J.S.Mill, 1972, p.43.
55 Ibid., p. 43.
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56 He thinks that the idea of justice arises from law (pp.48-9), and that the 
particular feeling involved 'is a spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments, both 
in the highest degree natural, and which either are or resemble instincts; the impulse 
of self-defence, and the feeling of sympathy' (p.53; see also pp.55-56).
57 H.A.Prichard, 1912, p.21.
58 D.O.Brink, 1989, p.37.
59 W.G.Maclagan, 1961, p.54.
60 Ibid., p.52.
61 For extended discussion of this distinction see W.K.Frankena, 1958; F.Snare, 
1974 & 1975; D.O.Brink, 1989, ch.3.
62 K.Graham, 1987, p.22.
63 See again F.Snare, 1974, and D.O.Brink, 1989, ch.3.
64 This is the point made by R.T.Gamer, 1990 - and implicitly by W.K.Frankena, 
1958 (who does not, of course, address the ontological aspects in such terms).
65 J.C.MacKenzie (1984, pp.474-5) makes the point that a wedge between 
knowledge and action is engendered by all sides in the debate about the nature of 
moral values - in the light of that problem he thus thinks that it hardly matters which 
side is followed since practical scepticism arises simply in different places.
In the chapters to follow I shall also address the question of whether a 
subject can perceive a demandingness without it being a demand on herself.
66 By 'moral situation' here I simply mean the occasion on which a moral response 
was appropriated for the subject, with the additional implicit recognition that the 
norm of appropriateness may be present for the public understanding of that kind of 
occasion.
67 M.Midgeley, 1981, Essay 7, p. 126.
68 A.K.Rogers, 1930, p. 16. But he goes on to say,
...once set it before the mind as an object of contemplation, and it 
tends to lose something of its natural compulsion. A feeling is then
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likely to appear a rather specially flimsy bit of mental stuff; while as 
a source of values it rests in so many instances on patently trivial 
and unimpressive grounds that it is not hard to understand the low 
esteem in which it has commonly been held by those who aspire to 
philosophy.
(p. 16).
69 P.Foot, 1970, p. 134.
70 This is a reference back to the Kantian form of argument which footnotes 24 and 
26 mention.
71 P.Foot, 1970, p. 134.
72 F.Kraenzel, 1987, p.325.
73 This is Mackie’s understanding of the term’s usage in subjects' m oral 
understanding. It is also the classic Platonic view. Nicolai Hartmann, 1930, whom 
I discuss in a later excursis, takes an approach of this sort.
74 Such a position is that taken by proponents of natural law (which view is best 
summed up by one of its more noted followers in these words:
We both [upholders and opponents] understand by it certain 
propositions of immutable truth, which guide voluntary actions 
about the choice of good and the avoidance of evil, and which 
impose an obligation to outward acts...What we assert, and 
what...our adversaries no less clearly deny, is that some truths of 
this kind are necessarily supplied by the nature of things and men, 
that they are perceived and remembered by the mind so long as it 
remains sound, and that therefore they exist there 
from Richard Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae , in D.D.Raphael, Vol.I, 1969, 
p.79).
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Notable contemporary proponents of natural law and the objectivity of 
morals are G.E.M.Anscombe, 1958 & 1981; J.Finnis, 1980; H.B.Veatch, 1971; 
J.Wild, 1953.
75 An example of which is the universalizability criterion of Kant and Hare (though, 
of course, what is being universalized is quite different in each case).
76 Nagel believes that,
We try to arrive at normative judgements, with motivational 
contents, from an impersonal standpoint. We cannot use a 
nonnormative criterion of objectivity, for if values are objective, 
they must be objective in their own right and not through reducibility 
to some other kind of objective fact. They have to be objective 
values, not objective something else...The claim is that there are 
reasons for action, that we have to discover them instead of deriving 
them from our preexisting motives - and that in this way we can 
acquire new motives superior to the old. We simply aim to reorder 
our motives in a direction that will make them more acceptable from 
an external standpoint. Instead of bringing our thoughts into accord 
with an external reality, we try to bring an external view into the 
determination of our conduct...
(T.Nagel, 1986, p. 138).
And in more simple fashion, Aiken maintains that,
In [the workaday] world the problem of moral objectivity is mainly a 
problem of piecemeal mutual adjustment of acknowledged 
commitments within a loose framework of precepts and 
practices...The only principle of objectivity in morals is...essentially 
a principle of reconsideration. What it demands, when a question 
about the objectivity of a particular judgement or principle arises, is 
that we consider whether such a judgement or principle, as it stands,
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can be consistently upheld in the face of whatever other moral 
considerations might be thought, in conscience, to defeat it. 
(H.D.Aiken, 1965, pp.96/7).
77 That is to say, some element is being discerned as integral to moral experience 
and judgement generally, and to that of the moral demand in particular, in virtue of 
which they are not amenable to the personal choosing of the subject herself.
78 W.D.Falk, 1965, p.63.
79 S.Hook, 1929, p. 185. Though he goes on to attack the notion that there are 
moral values of that nature.
80 See, for instance, D.O.Brink, 1989, ch.7.
81 R.M.Hare, 1972a, p.35.
82 This is a position especially associated with Wittgensteinian approaches to moral 
philosophy - such as those instanced by S.Lovibond, 1983; S.Hurley, 1985.
83 For example, McGinn points out that there is a difference between seeing that a 
predicate 'would not be ascribable to things in the world unless there were 
conscious beings with certain psychological reactions’ and believing that ’the mind 
is in error in taking [that predicate] to be a property of things in the world’ 
(C.McGinn, 1983, p. 148, footnote 31).
84 G. Say re-McCord, 1986, p. 10.
85 D.Wiggins in particular has done much to suggest developments of the notion of 
objectivity in morals in the previously cited paper and in 1987a; 1987d; 1991.
86 This is the basis of the analysis of religion given in L.Feuerbach, 1957. It is part 
of the method employed by Freud, both in theory and in clinical practice, by which 
the assailing force of neurosis is begun to be dealt with as its recognition by the 
subject as repressed desire in the unconscious is brought on by therapy.
87 See chapter 3 ahead for explanation of my understanding of this term.
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88 A.J.Ayer, 1971, p. 161. But in later chapters I shall be keen to show that even 
this kind of experience has some objective feel, insofar as it seems often to 'hit’ 
subjects as if from outside of them.
89 B.Russell, quoted by Mackie, 1977, p.34.
90 D.Hume, 1975, Appendix I, p.287.
91 That is, in the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation and extended 
sympathy through imagination. What Hume is not saying is that the moral 
experience is purely an individual matter, or that it can be raised simply by the 
individual choosing to feel a certain way about a moral concern.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
1 M.Hammond, J. Howarth & R.Keat, 1991, p.l.
2 H.Spiegelberg, 1975, p.75.
3 ’In one sentence: phenomenology attempts to explain the nature of reflection and 
the nature of perception within an intentional theory of the mind.' (R.Grossmann, 
1984, p.87).
4 Marvin Farber comments that:
In its broadest sense the term ’’phenomenology” may apply to any 
type of descriptive philosophy of experience, with appropriate 
qualification.
(M.Farber, 1984, p.27).
5 See R.Grossmann, 1984, ch.8.
6 A point made well by P.Pettitt, 1972.
7 M.Farber, 1984, p.34/5.
8 See his Encyclopedia Britannica article, pp.22-23 (in E.Husserl, 1981). He also 
talks of the distinction between direct and reflective experience in 1970a, pp.814- 
815.
9 This notion originates in Husserl's thought from its use and development by 
Brentano, who states that,
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Schoolmen 
of the Middle Ages called the intentional (also mental) inexistence 
of an object, and what we would call - although using not quite 
unambiguous words - relation to a content, direction upon an object 
(which is not to be taken as something real) or immanent object. 
Every such phenomenon contains within itself something as an 
object, although not all contain objects in the same way. In a 
presentation something is affirmed or denied, in hate something is 
hated, in desire something is desired, etc.
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(F.Brentano, 1973, Vol.I, p.124).
Husserl himself tries to eschew the 'psychologism' of this conception as he 
sees it (which he deals with at length in 1970a - and see also E.Pivcevic, 1970, 
ch.3), not wishing to see the conscious datum as a specifically inner, and therefore 
psychological, fact. But his employment of the notion and the impetus behind his 
interest in it is much the same as Brentano's. Husserl says:
How are we to understand the fact that the "in itself' of the 
objectivity can be thought by us and moreover "apprehended" in 
cognition and thus in the end yet become "subjective"; what does it 
mean that the object exists "in itself" and is at the same time "given" 
in knowledge; how does the ideality of the general expressed in a 
concept or a law enter the stream of real mental experiences and 
become part of the knowledge of the thinking subject; what does the 
cognitive adequatio rei ac intellectus mean in the various cases, 
according as the cognitive apprehension is directed to an individual 
object or something general, a fact or a law, etc.
(E.Husserl, 1970a, Investigation II. See also Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica 
article, p.23, in E.Husserl, 1981. In 1970a, Investigation V, ch .l, Husserl 
discusses his conception of consciousness, and in ch.2 he picks out intentionality 
as the criterial feature. This matter is dealt with also by H.Spiegelberg, 1976, 
pp.39-42 on Brentano and intentionality, and pp. 107-111 on Husserl's use of it).
Husserl comes to think of this directedness of consciousness as being in 
virtue of acts carried out by a 'transcendental ego' (the notion is worked in Husserl, 
1931, and receives its fullest use in Husserl, 1960). As the final part of this chapter 
claims, I think there are great difficulties with this notion of a meaning-bestowing 
transcendental ego. One worry expressed in the following quotation concerns the 
method of analysis of phenomenology in this vein as contrasted with that of
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linguistic philosophy (a worry that the remainder of this chapter implicitly 
addresses):
Are you sure we can find and observe such things as mental acts in 
ourselves? What are they? Husserl thought of them somehow as 
arrows of consciousness directed at objects. But this is a metaphor, 
and the question is: how can we give an unmetaphorical account of 
what is meant? According to Husserl, by looking at something 
internally given. According to the analytic philosopher, by analysing 
certain uses of language. This is a real difference...
(E.Tugendhat, 1972 [Discussion section], p.294).
10 Excepting some apparently objectless mood states.
11 See R.Grossmann, 1984, pp.51-56, 144-146.
12 This is a general term used to describe the encounter by the investigator with 
particular data (see H.Spiegelberg, 1976, pp. 117/8; pp.659-666). There is also 
something which Husserl calls 'essential' or 'eidetic' intuition which I discuss in 
point iv of the next section. For his thought on the varieties of intentionality and 
what intuition amounts to, refer to Husserl, 1970a, Investigation VI.
13 Using these terms in their Kantian sense. T.E.Wilkerson, 1976, p.23, states 
that,
Kant's expression for awareness of experiences is "inner sense", 
and for awareness of external objects "outer sense".
For further unpacking of the distinction in the light of the metaphysics of 'inner' 
self and 'outer' world see also ibid., pp.67,82. Husserl himself discusses the 
notions of inner and outer phenomena, and the physical and psychical, in 1970a, 
Appendix.
14 J.L.Austin, 1961, p. 130.
15 This is a point made explicitly by Hare in 1973, p. 15.
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16 Though Austin is, of course, talking about the words people use rather than the 
people who use them, the experience to which I am referring seems to me to be 
close to the point he is making.
17 A process described in detail by Husserl in 1960, p.34.
18 The classic exposition of this theory of meaning is given by Hobbes, 1968,1 iv. 
And the classic criticism of it is given by Wittgenstein, 1953. Charles Taylor, 1959, 
specifically directs criticism from phenomenology to empiricist theories of 
perception.
19 H.Reiner, 1983, Supplementary Essay - On the Adaptation of the 
Phenomenological Method to, and its Refinement as a Method of Ethics, p.257/8. 
(My discussion of this matter of ’essences' is coming up in the next section).
20 H.Spiegelberg, 1976, p.666/7.
21 E.Husserl, 1960, p. 151, his italics. (Although Husserl takes this to be conferred 
by some special sense-constituting acts of the transcendental ego).
22 Spiegelberg suggests various lines in: 1970, p. 18; 1975, pp. 193-194; 1976, 
ch.XIV.
23 D.Caims, 1939, pp.237-238. (He later translated the English language edition of 
Husserl's Cartesian Meditations).
24 In particular, those which come under the notion of 'transcendental' 
phenomenology.
25 Spiegelberg brings this out well in 1976, pp.684-688.
26 This idea of non-interference from prior theoretical commitments does not, of 
course, mean that one can claim the original data to be itself free of theory-laden 
components - only that one describes it trying not to impose any interpretation not 
apparently already present to one in the data (P.A.Schilpp, 1935, p.253 comments 
that 'there is no such thing as givenness which is its own untouched and 
unqualified and ununderstood and uninterpreted self'; C.Taylor, 1959, pp. 102-104 
also criticizes such a claim).
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27 See C.Hartshome, 1939.
28 E.Husserl, 1960, p.70. In 1931 he calls these 'free fancies'.
29 A useful account of this is given in E.S.Casey, 1977.
30 D.Hume, 1975, Sec.III, Part I, p. 190. Henri Bergson and Herbert Mead 
perform much the same kind of move in considering the coherence of a Robinson 
Crusoe figure possessing a notion of self and a rudimentary conceptual apparatus 
(H.Bergson, 1935, p.7; H.H.Mead, 1964, p.39).
31 In 1960, secs. 34 & 35 of Meditation IV; 1964, p.45 with the example of 
redness; 1970a, Investigation II, p.223 (again with the example of redness) & 
Investigation VI, ch.6, sec.52.
32 This sureness is termed by Husserl 'apodictic certainty’ and he gives some space 
to its meaning and role within phenomenology in 1960, secs. 5,6,24, especially 
pp. 14-16 & 57-58.
33 The ideal being of essences is discussed by Husserl in 1931, pp.55-59; 1960, 
pp.70-71; 1970a, Investigation II, chs. 1-3 & Investigation VI, ch.6, sec.52.
34 This is discussed by Scheler, 1970, pp.48-53.
35 P.Pettitt, 1972, p.249. He attacks the notion further, maintaining that 'Husserl's 
eidetic experience is at best non-existent, and at worst absurd.'
36 E.Tugendhat, 1972, p.257. A general commentary on the criticism which this 
part of Husserl's system has attracted is given by J.Patocka, 1977.
One general and salient worry about the notion of discovering essences (and 
one which extends generally to phenomenological description) is that its publicity 
can be obscured by the somewhat occult nature of the process. Hence M.S.Frings 
(the translator of Scheler's major ethical work into English) says of Scheler's form 
of essential intuition:
...[his] stand [is] that all a phenomenologist can ultimately do is to 
"point” to what he is after. To be a pointer in this sense, however, 
means to be silent, and not infrequently Scheler argues that language
Notes to Chapter Two 365
as a means of demonstrating an essence is insufficient and 
misleading, and that all one can finally say is: "Look, there it is." 
(M.S.Frings, 1970, p.40).
And Husserl himself manifests this awkwardness when he says that, 
'"Seeing" does not lend itself to demonstration or deduction.' (E.Husserl, 1964, 
p.31).
My quotation from Reiner above should serve to allay any fears that the 
reader has as to the availability of phenomenological data for public discussion.
37 I am not trying to 'sanitize' Husserl's phenomenology beyond recognition, but 
to retain what I take to be the workable parts of it for this study while leaving aside 
those other parts which seem to me to lead one into methodological difficulties. One 
philosopher who also tries to do this is Gilbert Ryle in his paper Phenomenology, 
1932 (for example, he states his belief that 'an important part of philosophy 
consists in the analytical investigation of types of mental functioning', and these are 
'proper cases of what Husserl describes as the phenomenological method,' p.70).
C.Taylor, 1959, p. 108 also tries to compare analytic with phenomenological 
philosophy, arguing that the exploration of essences is 'very similar' to the analytic 
study of concepts. And M.Hammond et al., 1991, Ch.2, Sec.4 detail what they 
take to be similarities between linguistic philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology.
38 In 1931, secs.27, 44, 47, 63, 69; and in 1960, sec.44.
39 For further exposition refer to H.Kuhn, 1940 and C.A.van Peursen, 1977.
40 See E.Husserl, 1960, sec. 19.
41 E.Husserl, 1931, p.102. See also 1960, pp.45-46.
42 On pp. 14-15 of 1960, Husserl discusses this matter and its leading on to the 
eidos. He makes the point also on p. 15 that this horizon may extend indefinitely for 
investigation.
M.Scheler, 1973, addresses the coincidence of the implicit horizon with that 
which is given to analysis on p.51.
Notes to Chapter Two 366
43 H.Spiegelberg states that:
...largely under the stimulation of William James, Husserl had 
always been aware of the significance of "fringes", or, as he mostly 
called them, "horizons" for the phenomena as essential features of 
their make-up...[H]e came to see that even these horizons were not 
merely open areas of decreasing clarity, but parts of the 
comprehensive horizon of a world as their encompassing frame of 
reference, without which any account of even a single perception 
would be incomplete.
Now this world in the sense of an all-encompassing horizon 
was clearly not the world in the sense of objective science, a 
cosmology, for instance. It was the world as experienced by a living 
subject in his particular perspective...
(H.Spiegelberg, 1976, p. 161).
44 See E.Husserl, 1960, Meditation V etpassim , and 1970b, Part III, sec.A.
45 H.Spiegelberg, 1976, p. 160. And A.Schutz claims that:
Phenomenological philosophy claims to be a philosophy of man in 
his life-world and to be able to explain the meaning of this life-world 
in a rigorously scientific manner,
(A.Schutz, 1940, p. 166).
46 In E.Husserl, 1960, he talks of ’different surrounding worlds of culture, as 
concrete life-worlds in which the relatively or absolutely separate communities live 
their passive and active lives’ (p. 133), while in 1970b he prefers to concentrate on 
the life-world as having ’in all its relative features, a general structure . This general 
structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative.'
47 See D.Carr, 1970 & 1987, Sec.II, 10 &11.
48 J.Ladd, 1957, p.l65ff.
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49 Ibid., p. 166. There is an obvious affinity here with the later Wittgenstein as his 
thought is recorded in On Certainty , 1969. And on the relation between basic 
views of the universe and moral systems, particularly as there is a theological link 
between them, refer to the essays in R.W.Lovin & F.E.Reynolds (eds.), 1985.
50 Husserl gives considerable space to consideration of this part of his method - for 
instance, in 1931, chs.l & 4 of the Second Section, and in 1960, pp.20-21.
51 See 1960, Meditation IV. This concentration seems to have gone on alongside a 
heightened interest in Kant on the part of Husserl. Between 1901 and 1907 he re­
read Kant extensively (E.Pivcevic, 1970, p.75ff). A similarity in philosophical 
position between Husserl’s transcendental ego and Kant's noumenal self would 
seem evident.
52 E.Husserl, 1960, pp.25-26 deals especially with this.
53 Husserl's attack on 'psychologism' occurs throughout 1970a. The attack 
continues at length also in 1970b, Part III, sec.B. For the historical background to 
it, as well as the conceptual impetus behind it, see E.Pivcevic, 1970, ch.3, and 
H.Spiegelberg, 1976, pp. 149-152.
54 Husserl is at pains to point this out in pp. 13-14 of his Introduction to the English 
language edition of Ideas , 1931, and also in 1960, pp.25-26.
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1 B.Tapper, 1930, p.519.
2 D.S.Miller, 1950, p.42.
3 W.Earle,1976, p.520/1.
4 A fellow doctoral student recently commented to me that he felt, on viewing 
certain striking natural vistas, that he was ’an intruder, a voyeur', that the natural 
beauty 'had been there all along', and that he 'merely peeped around the curtain at 
it,'
5 C.I.Lewis, 1946, p.457. (His spelling of 'aesthetic' altered).
6 Ibid., pp.445-465.
7 The way in which I believe that this can be called 'reflective' phenomenology will 
be explained in the next sub-section.
8 C.I.Lewis, 1946, p.465.
9 For extensive investigation into this kind of religious experience, see D.Hay, 
1987, ch.9.
10 W.G.Lycan, 1986, p.88. Moral intuition, and the nature of a moral sense, are 
discussed more fully by me as issues concerning them arise, particularly towards 
the end of chapter 4.
11 H.Lewis, 1980, p.28.
12 Bernard Williams, for instance, states that:
There could be a way of doing moral philosophy that started from 
the ways in which we experience our ethical life. Such a philosophy 
would reflect on what we believe, feel, take for granted; the ways in 
which we confront obligations and recognize responsibility; the 
sentiments of guilt and shame. It would involve a phenomenology 
of the ethical life.
(B.Williams, 1985, p.93).
13 See the example of love and lust which I employ later.
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14 Take, for instance, the direction of thought on a feeling that rose in the 'heat of 
the moment' - one's anger at a particular instant, or even the tendency towards that 
emotion in specific interpersonal situations, may be seen on thought on it to include 
a 'tinge' or element of, say, jealously or repressed desire.
15 This debate is not exclusively concerned with characterizing moral experience ; it 
also addresses the nature of moral judgement and the logical form of moral 
thinking. Here, though, my concern is exclusively with the experiential side of the 
debate. As to that matter, there are passages which suggest that Aristotle took both 
(moral) experience and its general grounds in a particularist fashion (for instance, 
Nichomachean Ethics , Book IV, v. 1126b 2-4, Book VI, viii. 1142a 22-30, xi. 
1143a2-1143b5).
16 Good contemporary examples of this position are J.Dancy, 1983 and
D.McNaughton, 1988.
17 R.M.Hare being the chief proponent.
18 This is an approach discussed at length by Hare in his book, 1981 and in his 
papers of 1973 and 1982. See also M.Singer, 1958.
19 Use of this expression itself is generally restricted in moral philosophical 
literature to the kind of reflective moves that are made out in the next sub-section 
(that of D.Wiggins, 1987b is a much used example).
20 This is a position set out explicitly in R.Swinbume, 1979, pp.254-260. He 
suggests that:
...it is a principle of rationality that (in the absence of special 
considerations) if it seems (epistemically) to a subject that x is 
present, then probably x is present; what one seems to perceive is 
probably so.
(p.254).
21 Swinburne covers these in pp.260-271.
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22 In this context the beliefs are directly formed, that is to say, non-inferential; 
though the formation of belief may also later take place on the basis of taking the 
original experience to be reflecting the real object contained therein, and hence will 
be inferential. It is the counter-move to this direct phenomenological argument that 
employs an inferential method, essentially maintaining that to take seriously the 
belief formed in the immediacy of experience is not viable.
23 D.O.Brink, 1989, comments that:
Our commitment to moral realism is sometimes defended on 
phenomenological grounds. Various writers have noted that certain 
phenomenological aspects of moral life reflect our belief in, or 
commitment to, the objectivity of ethics...Moral judgements are 
typically expressed in language employing the declarative mood; we 
engage in moral argument and deliberation; we regard people as 
capable both of making moral mistakes and of correcting their moral 
views; we often feel constrained by what we take to be moral 
requirements that are in some sense imposed from without and 
independent of us. These phenomena are held to demonstrate the 
realist or cognitivist character of commonsense morality; morality 
seems to concern matters of fact that people can and sometimes do 
recognize and debate about I think that these phenomenological 
claims are correct and important, and are confirmed by, various 
philosophical presuppositions of inquiry in general, and moral 
inquiry in particular.
(p.24).
24 By moral realism I understand a theory which starts from the semantic thesis of 
cognitivism. This holds that moral judgements are not relevantly different 
semantically, in terms of the meaning they have, from paradigm cases of fact- 
stating ones. Moral realism, then, is the thesis that cognitivism is true, and that
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there are some true moral statements. Giving it its formulation in Tarski truth- 
conditional fashion, the characterization that 
’x is good' is true iff x is good 
clearly leads to the question of what it is on the right hand side of the biconditional 
that makes true the moral judgement. Hence moral realism naturally gives rise to the 
kind of considerations to which I have directed concern so far. Good examples of 
this position are given in the Spindel Conference papers (ed. N.Gillespie, 1986) 
and by D.O.Brink, 1989.
25 R.Swinbume, 1979, makes play in ch. 13 of a distinction between 'epistemic' 
and ’comparative’ uses of experiential verbs, the first saying what the subject is 
inclined to believe on the basis of the experience, the latter simply in terms of her 
use of the particular verb as a ’seeming’, without any attendant belief in the object 
as a result (this distinction he gets from ch.4 of R.M.Chisholm, 1957).
26 For instance, the quotation from Hook in my chapter 1, having stated that, ’In a 
sense values also exercise a compulsion upon us', continues with the contention 
that,
But it is of an entirely different order of compulsion from that of 
sticks and stones, ropes or handcuffs...[E]thical compulsion 
follows after a fundamental Stellungnahme, after a primary 
assertion or act of will.
(S.Hook, 1929, p. 185).
27 J.L.Mackie, 1977 & 1980; S.Blackbum, 1985 & 1987; C.L.Elder, 1987 (in 
which he argues that the moral experience and beliefs that Mackie talks of are 
socially functional inherited ones and that the question of the 'reality' behind them 
can be ordinarily ignored).
28 Mackie himself does not think that we are subject to a simple subjective 
reification in the case of prescriptive values. He notes, for instance, that, 'What is 
objectified [projected] is not just a feeling that happens to be there’, and talks of 'a
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practice' and 'approval tendency' which support one another and both of which are
necessary for production of the kind of moral experience which he takes it that we
seem to have. (J.L.Mackie, 1980, pp. 147-148).
29 H.Spiegelberg, 1964, p.327. And M.Hammond et al, 1991, p.2 add that:
One important class of such experiences of things is perception - 
seeing, hearing, touching, and so on. But it is by no means the only 
one. There are also phenomena such as believing, remembering, 
wishing, deciding and imagining things; feeling apprehensive, 
excited, or angry at things; judging and evaluating things; the 
experiences involved in one's bodily actions, such as lifting or 
pulling things; and many others.
30 Cf. J.L.Austin, 1961 and R.M.Hare, 1973.
31 I.Kant, 1978.
32 A commentator who has specifically addressed this area states that:
...it seems plain that literature does more than remind us of truths, 
though it certainly does that. We often say, "Yes, that's exactly what 
self-deception is like", when we are reading perhaps "Persuasion" 
or "Anna Karenina". But it also creates new truths for us to see, 
new possibilities of feeling and seeing and valuing. Our concept of 
self-deception is (partly) formed or enlarged by these works, 
because they allow us to admit to consciousness elements we had 
overlooked or repressed, and to look at them in a given shape.
(B.Cowell, 1988, p.226).
33 For a good recent discussion of this matter, see F.Berenson, 1991.
34 H.Bergson, 1935, pp. 13-18.
35 H.A.Prichard, 1912, p.27.
36 Refer in particular to the selections in D.D.Raphael, 1969 from Francis
Hutcheson, Richard Price and Thomas Reid.
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37 Part of the point which I will be making in future chapters is that, though the 
phenomenologies of the honourable, shameful, or funny do have components at a 
direct level of being as if properties 'out there' when they seem to make demands 
on us, there is not a corresponding tendency for subjects to take there to be such 
things 'out there' as Mackie believes there is for us in the moral case. In future 
chapters I will also ask what kind of comparison class with the moral demand is 
relevant.
38 F.Hutcheson, 1969, Vol.II, p.269. (’We are not to suppose that this moral 
sense, more than the other senses, supposes any innate ideas, knowledge, or 
practical proposition: we mean by it only a determination of our minds to receive the 
simple ideas of approbation or condemnation from actions observed, antecedent to 
any opinions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves from them...').
39 That sense of too much or too little, of appropriateness, for instance, seems often 
to operate in this fashion also. Cf. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics , Book IV, v. 
1126b 2-4:
...it is not easy to define by rule how, and how far, a person may go 
wrong before he incurs blame; because this depends upon particular 
circumstances, and the decision lies with our perception.
40 That is, the various uses of 'sense' which I have portrayed are operative as one 
explores the horizon of the experience and the feel the subject has with respect to its 
use and its placing in her conceptual scheme that describes the experiential flow 
with which she is presented. This will involve the use of imaginative variation; will 
locate essential features of the experience; and will require exploration of the life- 
world which is underlying those senses as well as being itself amenable to that 
greater kind of reflection of the third kind above by the subject herself once it is 
made explicit to her.
41 R.Ackerman, 1969, p.76.
42 S.Lovibond, 1990, p.214.
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43 R.Eldridge, 1989, pp.30-31.
44 This is not to confuse the form of argument as being levelled against the possible 
ontogenetic fact that love indeed arises from lust, either in the natural histoiy of the 
human race or in the life of a developing individual (Freud’s thought on this matter 
is summed up by him on pp. 141-142 of Group Psychology and the Ego , 1985). 
The point I am making is that the two phenomena are experienced as just that - two, 
not one - and that they ’mean’ differently for people.
45 No doubt lust takes one in this way too. But we generally do not find those 
features of some apparent independent call on one from without borne up as well on 
reflection as such elements in the experience of love.
46 That sense is involved here in that the subject appears to perceive the experience 
as located on the band self/not-self. She has some sense (though not always) of 
where the experience comes from and how it ’strikes home', as it were. Further 
reflection on the precise discrimination between the two can then go on as well as 
that higher form of reflection on taking the upshot of this feel to be constitutive of 
the phenomena, together with thought on whether that feel should be supported in 
the light of its jarring or cohering with other parts of her experience and belief 
systems.
47 H.Frankfurt conducts a subtle evocation of this (to which I refer again in chapter 
7) in 1988, pp.89-91.
48 Although this is also sometimes described by those who have been in the midst 
of such experiences as the sense (perception) of a 'real' or ’enlarged' self.
49 L.Hertzberg, 1990.
50 Ibid., p. 115.
51 W.R.Boyce-Gibson, 1933, p.25.
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1 J.N.Findlay, 1978, p. 195/6.
2 In an interesting article devoted to phenomenological analysis of the differences 
between retribution and vengeance, Dunlop throws further light on the kind of 
approach one undertakes in this subject area. He states that the essences of these 
phenomena will be discerned not through an easy progress, but effectively by way 
of the cumulative consideration of examples, entertaining similarities, differences 
and borderline cases. He says that,
...it is important for what follows to see that retribution is essentially 
different from vengeance. In the end this can only be "seen", and 
never verbally proved, but various sorts of arguments can be used to 
help the reader to attain this insight. The best way of doing this is 
done by calling to mind situations or occasions when people are 
acting retributively, or feel they ought to take retribution of 
someone, and contrasting these with occasions or situations when 
people are acting vindictively, or feel they ought to avenge 
themselves. It can also be done by recalling the different sorts of 
things one would want to say in these different situations, and so 
on. But underlying this sort of procedure is an assumption that 
retribution and vengeance are "given" as distinct phenomena in the 
"things themselves". Another way of putting this is to say that any 
being whatsoever that shares man's rational and animal natures is 
bound in the end to "confront" these "things" as separable items in 
the furniture of the world.
And he sums up his project in these words:
..my argument cannot have any clear "linear" or deductive form.
The general aim is to appeal to moral experience, and thus "get the 
reader to see what can in the end only be seen", in Scheler's words.
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To this end the subject matter is approached from various angles; 
examples are produced in the attempt to illuminate experience from 
different points of view. What I try to do is produce a coherent and 
self-justifying picture that is not internally contradictory and that 
should impress itself on the unbiased contemplator of experience as 
broadly speaking right or correct, despite an undeniable fuzziness in 
some of the details.
(F.N.Dunlop, 1985, pp. 185/6 & 188 respectively).
The manner in which this and the following chapters address the particular 
area of interest goes on in a similar vein, although each sub-section tends to follow 
on from the previous one in a fashion linked by the emergence of experiential 
contents which invite further analysis and discussion.
3 I should register the preliminary point here, of which I make much more in the 
chapters to follow, that I am not conflating two phenomenological facts that should 
be kept distinct; that is, between the experience arising outwith one’s conscious 
control; and its being experienced as threatening or assaulting.
4 1 realise that this will be based upon some initial and ongoing interest such people 
have in their collecting project, and that it does not only force itself upon them, but 
would point out that these examples simply describe the strength of demand 
irrespective of considerations of how it comes about and maintains itself. Further 
discussion of reflection by the subject on the force and sometimes alien presence it 
maintains in consciousness is given in the next chapter. Chapters 6 and 7 look at the 
notion of the ’closeness’ of the demand experience to the self.
5 As to the conjunction of this demand with practices and feelings of a taboo sort 
concerning 'proper' dress, which borders or overlaps with the moral demand, that 
is a further matter, I believe, of the particular cultural life-world in which the 
demand has its understood setting. With respect to this particular example and its 
nature as a moral demand, together with other ones of a similar sort - such as
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standards of speech and deportment - Wilson notes that in contemporary Western 
society, 'Various areas of social life have become steadily "de-moralized", ceased, 
that is, to be matters in which social value is invested' (B.Wilson, 1988, pp.38/9).
6 An identical point is made by Hughes in these words:
If there is an air crash and a hundred people are killed, I will 
probably think vaguely that there may be a need for tighter 
regulations or something and forget the matter in a minute; if 
someone I know is killed, I say the matter is brought home to me, 
meaning that the impression on my emotions is stronger and not so 
soon forgettable...
(M.W.Hughes, 1973, p.86).
7 Cf. Wittgenstein's oft-quoted comments on a belief in the other's suffering and 
the immediacy of one's response which is summed up by,
My attitude toward him is an attitude toward a soul. I am not of the 
opinion that he has a soul.
(L.Wittgenstein, 1953, Part II, Section iv).
8 I would ask the reader to think here especially of acts of heroism in war or in 
emergencies like a fire where the actor him/herself often replies afterwards to people 
that the act was performed without thought at the time - 'It just seemed the thing to 
do* - and often also without any awareness of its quite special, uniquely individual 
nature - 'Anyone else would have done the same'.
9 H.Bergson, 1935, pp. 10-11.
10 Lynd notes that an apparently minor loss of face can raise up in one a heavy 
burden of shame, the demands this exerts on one having over time a severely 
debilitating effect on the self - while relatively serious infringements of social codes 
which engender guilt can be more efficaciously handled through the social 
institutions of punishment, redress, &c. (H.M.Lynd, 1971).
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111 would add here that it may not be that in the described case one always feels a 
strong demand concerning the other so much as that one experiences the person 
very vividly, perhaps as having an ’aura' about her.
12 This example has been specifically addressed to that experience of the demand 
for respect and reverence which ensues with feelings of awe and wonder at the 
natural scene. I am not forgetting, therefore, that a response of indifference, or the 
mere conscious recording of a slight demand, can also be the possible case - only 
leaving these on the side in order to concentrate on one particular manifestation of 
demand experience.
13 H.Spiegelberg, 1975, devotes an interesting section to the ways in which 
attention to the differing perspectives available to one from a view or work of art 
can enrich the initial experience of encounter.
14 C.Taylor, 1991, p.246.
15 A somewhat similar point is made by Pincoffs in his article 'Quandary Ethics' 
(E.Pincoffs, 1971). It is his claim that moral philosophy has concentrated unduly 
on the tensions set up for the agent in circumstances of moral dilemmas, those areas 
of our moral lives in which seemingly incompatible but (roughly equally) 
demanding alternatives press upon one for resolution by action. (He is not so 
concerned as I am here to point out the ordinary unforcefulness of much moral 
demand experience, rather to try to bring moral philosophy back to an aretaic, 
character-centred view of the moral agent and the kind of demands which 
subsequently have sway over her and for her).
16 By this term 'weighted' I mean that we are generally able, as subjects of 
experience, to compare and contrast different ones and classes of experience as to 
their relative degrees of strength and duration.
17 It is, I suppose, conceivable that such a demand might be so given in immediacy 
if one followed a particular way of life with whose attitudes and world-view one 
was utterly imbued and which did indeed take some such action as demanded of
Notes to Chapter Four 379
one under certain circumstances. This presumably would be the mindset of Jimmy 
Jones and his followers in Jamestown, Guyana, who committed mass suicide in 
accordance with the demands they experienced to be laid on them by certain 
religious convictions. But the point of using the analogy is that subject experience 
does not ordinarily identify that demand in such a manner, and does identify other 
ones as moral. And, as I maintained at the head of section 1, ordinary subject 
experience is being granted empirical descriptive authority at the present in order 
that the appearances be determined with presentational accuracy. (I give further 
thought on the nature of an experienced demand as a moral one in section 5 of this 
chapter).
18 Reiner, who is broadly to be placed in the phenomenological tradition in his 
ethical philosophy, thinks that value itself cannot be described, properly speaking, 
but only highlighted and marked off from other phenomena. He states his view 
that,
A precise description of the phenomenon of value (though 
desirable) is impossible, value being a primitive phenomenon (like 
"green", "colour", and "sound", which cannot really be described 
either). Instead of describing in the strict sense, two things can be 
done. First, the situation in which the primitive phenomena are 
experienced can be characterized. And, secondly, primitive 
phenomena can be compared with similar or related phenomena by 
bringing out resemblances and differences. The result is a 
circumscriptive exhibition rather than a description of phenomena. 
My approach with regard to demand experience is thus much on these lines as a 
comparative one, though I do not see at this stage any need to hold that the object of 
study - demands and their relation to value disclosure - are constituted in such 
primitive or difficult-to-describe fashion as Reiner takes them.
19 W.H.Davis, 1979, p.117.
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20 J.E.Ledden, 1950, p.361.
21 J.N.Findlay, 1970, p .ll .
22 C.L.Stevenson, 1963, p. 13.
23 A.Sesonske claims, in this respect, that:
...a major share of the felt normative force of judgements of 
evaluation derives from the attraction and appeal of the goal judged 
to be good.
(A.Sesonske, 1957, p.66).
24 Kolnai points out that while we turn to beauty rather than to ugliness for a 
characterization of aesthetic experience, we attend 'primarily’ to moral evil rather 
than to goodness: 'our primal moral experience is indignation at wrong’ he states 
(A.Kolnai, 1977, p.206).
25 This is a matter well expressed by S.Strasser, 1977, pp. 119-120, where he 
discusses a felt pressure or unease on one and how one then has to discover its 
object or a way of ridding oneself of it. A somewhat similar point is made by 
M.Scheler, 1973, pp. 17, 18, 35. And Husserl himself has a brief note (which he 
does not follow up) in his Logical Investigations where he discusses the 
demanderless nature of some demands:
The original sense of "shall" or "should", which relates to a certain 
wish or will, a certain demand or command, is plainly too narrow, 
e.g., You shall listen to me, x shall come to me. As we speak in a 
wider sense of a demand, where there is no one who demands, and 
perhaps no one on whom a demand is made, so we frequently speak 
of a "shall" or a "should" which is indepedent of anyone's wishing 
or willing. If we say "A soldier should be brave", this does not 
mean that we or anyone else are wishing or willing, commanding or 
requiring this...
(E.Husserl, 1970a, p.82).
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26 Such experiential features are especially prominent in the works of G.E.Moore 
(1959) and W.D.Ross (1930 & 1939).
27 From my considerations here on a lack of specified object, it does not follow that 
the properties of rightness, oughtness, & c. are not present; my argument is that 
they simply are absent as special properties when the phenomena are described, and 
that a lack of directed object to the demand experience also goes against traditional 
ways in which these properties have been conceived. (Hence one may feel that one 
ought to help someone, but be unsure what help would consist in, and not be taking 
oneself to be apprehending a special quality of 'oughtness').
28 My point here is similar to, but not the same as, that made by Foot with respect 
to the objects which moral judgement can logically take and the relation between 
that judgement and an inner feeling (P.Foot, 1954; 1958; 1959 - one of the very 
few criticisms of her position is made by J.Harrison in the paper which follows her 
1954 one in the Aristotelian Society volume). It is my contention that the moral 
demand is a non-inferential affair in direct experience and that what distinguishes it 
from others with similar strike and tone is precisely its nature as being moral. 
Hence the demand is not rendered a moral one by the aggregated presence of certain 
factors like height, strength, and immediate importance of the demand in 
consciousness. Foot's point is that some kind of special inner sensation is not 
logically sufficient to make of its object a moral state of affairs - and that the logical 
link is crucially forged in particular by the relation of a state of affairs to human 
benefit and harm.
29 Williams' appraisal of the cognitive and emotive constitution of the sadist 
marshalls a similar consideration (B.Williams, 1985, p.91). His view is criticized 
and the picture of the wicked person re-interpreted by D.McNaughton, 1988, ch.9.
In addition, I would draw attention to another alternative phenomenology 
that has been thought to have gone on behind some of the most evil acts of history. 
Far from being moved under the allure of the evil of their deeds, Arendt believes
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that many Nazis simply got on with perpetrating the Holocaust in a kind of dull, 
thoughtless and mundane fashion. She states her conviction thus:
Some years ago, reporting the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem, I 
spoke of the "banality of evil” and meant with this no theory or 
doctrine but something quite factual, the phenomenon of evil on a 
gigantic scale, which could not be traced to any particularity of 
wickedness, pathology, or ideological conviction in the doer, whose 
only personal distinction was a perhaps extraordinary shallowness. 
(H.Arendt, 1971, p.419).
30 One should not forget how much of this experience and its objects is of a sexual 
nature, involving both attraction and the sense of its 'forbiddenness'. Indeed, much 
'criminal' behaviour in general seems to be under the thrall of a heightened 
phenomenology very close to that of a sexual kind.
31 This is, of course, a complex phenomenon recognised in religious tradition - one 
of the most famous formulations of it being that of St. Paul in Romans ch.7. An 
alternative baptismal confession of the Catholic Church is the rejection of the 
'glamour' of evil.
32 See I.Kant, 1949, Part I, Book I, Ch.III, The Incentives of Pure Practical 
Reason', and also p.221.
33 See J.Butler, 1913, p.45.
34 A .Kolnai, 1977, p.206.
35 E.Durkheim, 1974, pp. 35-40.
36 William James comments that,
We inveterately think that something which we call the "validity" of 
the claim is what gives to it its obligatory character, and that this 
validity is something outside of the claim's existence as a matter of 
fact. It rains down upon the claim, we think, from some sublime 
dimension of being, which the moral law inhabits...
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(W.James, 1903, p.195).
It is, of course, part of my argument that this is not a particularly accurate report of 
what we are claiming for our moral experience.
37 H.Bergson, 1935, pp.23/4. He talks later (pp.37/8) of the ways in which there 
is an interaction of guiding force between the two types, each lending its particular 
level of understanding to the other over time.
38 See Kant, 1949, pp. 180-184 in particular.
39 J.Butler, 1913, Sermons I - III.
40 For example, the blessed sacrament and certain iconic images to Catholic and 
Orthodox Christians; the Koran and holy places of pilgrimage for Muslims; shrines 
for Hindus.
41 There logically remains the possibility that such features might manifest 
themselves on reflection, though I shall argue in subsequent sections and chapters 
that this is no more the case than it is in the immediate context.
421 am thus following here one of the usages of the term given in the O.E.D. which 
I believe is philosophically neutral, viz., The immediate apprehension of an object 
by the mind without the intervention of any reasoning process....Direct or 
immediate insight.'
43 M.Buber, 1958, p.75. With respect to the later chapters of this thesis on a more 
reflective mode of thought on our direct experience, I observe that of this specific 
example E.Fackenheim (1970, pp.42-3) notes that while this may be a correct 
description of immediate experience, for a secular Jew the wonder and awe which 
abide for Israel at this event may fade on reflection and the 'appearance' call for a 
different explanation. He also talks (pp.47-9) of a form of immediacy of experience 
after reflection on God's saving presence for those who follow after the historical 
event (for example, contemporary Jews at the Passover).
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H.Lewis writes interestingly in the same vein that religious experience is 
indeed of this non-inferential type as well as giving it due accord as a kind of 
experience rather than an experience of a specially delineated object, viz.,
Religious experience, in essentials, is not incipient metaphysics, 
however important it may be for metaphysical reflection. Its peculiar 
significance derives from its being a distinctive experience which 
people undergo, as they may have a moral or aesthetic experience. 
This does not mean that it is always easy to recognize or delimit, as 
in the case, for example, of some forms of pain. But it would be 
quite wrong to identify it with features of experience which all can 
recognize, or with neutral occurrences to which some further 
religious significance may be ascribed. Religious experience is 
essentially religious, a distinct ingredient, to my mind a vital one, in 
an essentially religious awareness, and identifiable as such. 
(H.Lewis, 1980, p.20).
44 A phenomenon with which we are sometimes familiar, and which may suggest a 
value-citing which locates it in the object even when not experienced, is that which 
goes on when we are persuaded by another, or by an ’expert’, that a particular 
object is beautiful or a fine composition or worth attending to, even though the 
relevant experience is lacking. The phenomenology of this assent, being one that 
will sometimes include the experience, varies widely from the gradual dawning on 
one of the validity of the other’s observations through to the sudden flash of insight 
following a perhaps sceptical audience on one's part to the other. What I wish to 
note is that the experience does not always or, indeed, hardly ever, follow as the 
pinnacle or signal of this assent in an experienced cumulative manner. (And as to 
this use of valuational language that can apparently locate value in an object as if it 
has a special sort of existence, I address that in chapter 6, section 6).
45 H.A.Prichard, 1912, p.27.
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46 There is a way in which one can ’work out* that a moral demand is laid upon 
one, though it does not seem to involve an experiential sense and is therefore not 
entirely germane to this phenomenology. It is by reasoning through what one 
should do in the light of the information given to one by a particular situation, one's 
commitments, the expectations and beliefs of others, &c. in something like a 
complex syllogistic style - though no particular experience of the demand seems to 
register itself generally at the culmination of such reasoning. If an experience does 
end up in consciousness of the moral demand, it does not seem to one at the time 
that oneself is responsible by volition or inference from what went before for its 
arising.
47 Findlay continues in the passage partly quoted earlier in these words:
Philosophers may dilate on the absurdity of attributing values to 
things instead of connecting them with our own reactions, but the 
fact remains that our own reactions are not the locus where they 
often appear to be: they seem to inform, to pervade, to be modally 
attached to objects or states of affairs.
(1977, p. 11).
48 W.H.Davis, 1979, pp. 116/7. (Cf. the line taken by Reiner, quoted in footnote 
18).
49 This is, then, a different matter from the normative point that a person should be 
experiencing a moral demand and involves no reference to the notions, for instance, 
of competence and the impartial spectator.
50 Cf. S.Lovibond, 1990, on the way in which one tries to train one's pleasures in 
the light of a conception of their proper ordering. For her this will often involve the 
attempt to deny that one does find something pleasurable, or at least the 
involvement of a higher level of the self refusing to acknowledge such pleasure, in 
order that the immediate experience itself be trimmed, trained, and re-directed.
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This point obviously militates against the large claim made by Davis (1979, 
p.l 16) that, '...a strong feeling that I ought not to do something makes it true that I 
ought not to do it. The feeling is the reality. There is no such thing as an illusory 
ought.' Such a claim is close to the phenomenology of forcefulness with which we 
are sometimes assailed by the moral demand, but is not generally valid - it is a 
common enough experiential phenomenon that, correspondent with the incoming 
demand, we wonder just whether we really are demanded in such a way.
51 P.Foot, 1981b and also C.D.Macniven, 1972.
521 am giving this example at present merely as one of how phenomenological 
alterations can take place with respect to a re-encounterable moral demand, and not 
as part of a more general metaethical theory on the logical domain of moral 
experience (suggestions bearing more explicitly on that matter are made in the next 
point).
53 As an example of what I am saying here, see this comment by Urmson on the 
apparent immediacy of the aesthetic reaction and its connection with criteria by 
which it might be discerned as aesthetic:
...I acknowledge that if we experience an emotional thrill when we 
look at a picture or hear a piece of music we do not normally have to 
examine our grounds and reasons to know that we are reacting 
aesthetically in a favourable way. But I do want to maintain that it is 
the nature of the grounds that makes our appreciation aesthetic and 
that if on examination of our grounds we find, as sometimes 
happens, that our reasons are appropriate rather to moral evaluation 
or are erotic, or what you will, we will, if we are honest, recognize 
that our reaction was not after all aesthetic.
(J.O.Urmson, 1957, p.91).
54 The thrust of Aristotle’s view in the Nichomachean Ethics sees moral perception 
as educated intuition. See also W.V.O.Quine, 1978.
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55 See A.Naess, 1973 and N.Smith, 1990 on this matter.
56 A.C.Ewing, 1941, pp.99/100.
57 For instance, he quotes from his pupil E.D.Starbuck on the influence of 
expectation on religious conversion, particularly on the 'rules' that seemed to 
determine conversion among revivalists:
A rule received by common consent has a very great, though to 
many persons an insensible influence, in forming their notions of 
the process of their own experience...Veiy often their experience at 
first appears like a confused chaos, but then those parts are selected 
which bear the nearest resemblance to such particular steps as are 
insisted on; and these are dwelt upon in their thoughts, and spoken 
of from time to time, till they grow more conspicuous in their view, 
and other parts which are neglected grow more and more obscure. 
Thus what they have experienced is insensibly strained, so as to 
bring it to an exact conformity to the scheme already established in 
their minds.
(W.James, 1960, p.204).
And a more recent investigator of religious experience makes the descriptive point 
that,
The precise moment of genuine religious awareness, operating 
within the functions it claims for its own operation, may not always 
be easily delimited. It may be sharp as in sudden conversion, but 
even in these cases there is often a period of subtle maturing in 
which truly religious elements come to their open and more explicit 
formulation. More commonly, although religious awareness and 
sensitivity may be clear and explicit, it has its own ebb and flow, it 
merges itself in other concentrations of attention, much as aesthetic 
awareness is not always easily delimited and isolated from the
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observations and attentiveness which it takes up into itself. It is for 
these reasons that some may even fail to detect the moment of live 
religious awareness or allow it in retrospection to be lost in the 
media which it embraces.
(E.T.Long, 1980, p.27).
58 D.Hay, 1987, p. 166: '...the criteria which people seem to use in judging 
whether the occasion was religious...[are] given-ness, reality, total involvement, 
effect on behaviour. Where one or other of these criteria was absent, the experience 
was not usually called religious.'
59 J.B.Brough, 1988, maintains that phenomenology can help analysis get one 
away from the search for some universal Platonic property shared by all works of 
art and take us to looking at the kind of attitudes brought to art by public, artists, 
collectors, and critics, together with the socio-historic life-world which is layered 
about the understanding of what passes for art in our culture. To summarize his 
view in his own words:
An essential presentational dimension of works of art is 
artifactuality. But things other than works of art also present 
themselves as artifacts. What are the presentational differences 
between artifacts which present themselves as works of art and 
those which do not?...In Husserlian terms, the answer is that the 
work of art appears with a unique horizon...[It] appears within the 
context of a particular institution. The horizon, or the institution, is 
what Arthur Danto has called the "artworld".
(p.35).
60 J.Kekes, 1986, p.87.
61 J.L.Mackie, 1980, p. 145.
62 R.B.Brandt, 1979, pp. 17, 20-21.
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63 Hudson notes that, '...whether conceived as sense or reason, the moral faculty 
was believed by the [classical] intuitionists to fulfill all three functions: perception, 
approbation, and motivation.' (W.D.Hudson, 1967, p.9).
64 The standard and powerful criticism of intuitionism is well summed up in these 
words from Hare:
Intuition is supposed to be a way of knowing, or determining 
definitively and objectively, the truth or falsity of a given moral 
judgement. But suppose that two people differ on a moral question, 
and that both, as may well happen, claim to intuit the correctness of 
their own views. There is then no way left of settling the question, 
since each can accuse the other of being defective in intution, and 
there is nothing about the intuitions themselves to settle which it is. 
(R.M.Hare, 1972, p.46).
On a similar tack, Snare has stated his belief that:
...I think that for many purposes our rough, intuitive, common 
sense notions are sufficient to tell us that the empirical diversity 
alleged by some anthropologists, at least, is quite sufficient to 
undermine serious claims about a moral sense or moral secondary 
qualities.
(F.Snare, 1980, p.354/5).
65 Nielsen passes a grimly ironic comment on intuitionism. In the course of 
repeating Hare's role-reversal test on a fanatical Nazi, so that it becomes clear that 
there are no differences relevant to this difference in treatment except the properties 
of Jewishness or non-Jewishness, he adds,
Perhaps Jewishness is a non-natural, intuitable, toti-resultant quality 
supervening on all Jews and only Jews.
(K.Nielsen, 1968, p. 19).
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66 In the same article from which I have quoted him earlier on intuitionism, Kekes 
circumscribes his view of the matter in stating that,
[With moral intuitions] we are not aware of having made an 
inference, we are not entertaining a hypothesis, so we are not in 
need of evidence beyond what we already have. It is not 
unreasonable, therefore, to talk about self-evidence. But the idea of 
self-evidence carries with it a historical load connoting certainty, 
indubitability, and the impossibility of error. And these, moral 
intuitions do not have. Although we unquestioningly accept our 
intuitions, they may be mistaken, we may come to see that they are 
and correct them.
(J.Kekes, 1986, p.87).
67 See R.Ackerman, 1969; B.Brody, 1979; W.H.Shaw, 1980 (’By ’’intuitions", 
philosophers today are simply referring to sincerely-held moral judgements and not 
the sort of thing Moore was talking about,’ p. 129); J.Kekes, 1989, pp.90-95.
681 realize that, from the fact that experience is not inferential, it does not follow 
that there are not features (perhaps ascertainable on reflection by the individual 
subject herself) which can account for its being experienced as moral. That is not 
my argument; what is my argument is that there are not felt to be, within the 
immediacy of the direct experience itself, special features from which its being a 
moral demand experience is inferred.
69 Of course, there might logically be a sense of knowledge-being-acquired, or of 
moral truth, without that having to be tied to an assumed apprehension of a value 
realm. My point is just that, to the extent that they are often seen as going together, 
the phenomenological evidence is lacking.
70 See the next chapter for discussion of the nature of this interaction, be it in causal 
fashion or otherwise.
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D.O.Brink (1989) is an example of a philosopher who upholds that 
metaethical theory - moral realism - which is often thought to be given some kind 
of support by phenomenological considerations. Having briefly canvassed such a 
relation (p.24), he continues (p.25), however, by maintaining that that theory can 
still be held even in the absence of the phenomenology or with a clashing one, viz., 
...I want to avoid a possible misunderstanding about the nature of 
my argument and its appeal to commonsense morality and moral 
thought. I do not claim that moral realism is a common belief. I am 
willing to admit that, about moral realism, common belief is silent, 
divided, or even antagonistic. My concern, however, is not with 
unreflective and untutored metaphysical or metaethical views. My 
appeal to commonsense moral thinking is not a prediction about the 
likely results of a Gallop poll on the issue of moral realism. Rather, 
my concern is with the philosophical implications or presuppositions 
of moral thought and practice. (Compare the way in which 
philosophers of science take the practices of working scientists as an 
important methodological constraint but largely discount scientists' 
philosophical views about the status of their research). I claim that 
cognitivism seems to be presupposed by common normative 
practices of moral judgement, argument, and deliberation, and that 
reflection on the nature of moral theorizing seems to suport a realist 
view about these moral facts and truths. This claim may be false, but 
this is not shown by an appeal to common metaethical views (or lack 
thereof).
71 J.McDowell (1981,1985) supports a form of moral realism and sees our alleged 
value intuition in terms of an analogy with secondary properties; while S.Blackbum 
(1981,1985 & 1987), whose metaethic is a development of Humean projectivism, 
also takes the phenomenology to be as of values 'out there'.
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72 One of the very few explicit disavowals of this kind of phenomenology is 
recorded by Sellars. He says of Moore's non-natural intuited property of goodness 
that,
It is just an historical fact that most American thinkers of my 
generation, Perry, Pratt, Rogers, Dewey, and myself, for example, 
were unable to intuit Moore's quality; and they raised the old 
questions about self-evidence and what to do when opinion varies. 
(R.W.Sellars, 1968, p.3).
73 See Chapter 9 of D.Hay, 1987. On p. 152 he notes that only 27% of those 
reporting religious experience in a national survey in 1986 talked of the awareness 
of a god.
74 J.L.Austin, 1961, p. 131, calls for more 'field work in philosophy' based on 
our actual experience and linguistic expression of it. He laments that,
How much it is to be wished that similar field work will soon be 
undertaken in, say, aesthetics; if only we could forget for a while 
about the beautiful and get down instead to the dainty and the 
dumpy.
75 For the varieties of expression we employ with respect to aesthetic objects and 
the categories employed in testing aesthetic discrimination by investigators see 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, section 2.6, of G.M.Paul's PhD thesis Aspects of 
Aesthetic Judgement:An Empirical Study with Special Reference to Ugliness, 1981, 
Glasgow University Library thesis no. 6467 ( the prime scales used are Interesting- 
Uninteresting; Pleasing-Displeasing; Beautiful-Ugly).
76 W.G.Maclagan, 1961, p.75. (Though on p.54 - quoted in Chapter 1 of this 
thesis - he states that he believes an 'objective "order of values'" is assumed 
through ordinary moral experience).
77 See the quotation from D.S.Miller, 1950, p.44 in chapter 6 (notes 47 and 48), 
and the discussion that goes around it.
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78 Urmson makes a similar call to that which I have made in this chapter with 
respect to the need to take experience as it is given to subjects and not to centre 
description only on the peak matter. He comments that:
...I think that it is tempting...within the field of the aesthetic to 
concentrate unduly upon the most sublime and intense of our 
experiences; but I am convinced that it is important to ensure that our 
account of the aesthetic should be as applicable to toleration as to our 
most significant experiences.
(J.O.Urmson, 1957, p.76).
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE
1 S.Weil, 1952, p.40 (her italics).
2 HJ.McCloskey, 1969, p. 110.
3 H.A.Prichard, 1912, p.21.
4 C.G.Jung, 1964, p.443.
5 Indeed, they may even pull one so wholly and cleanly into a new tack that there is 
no point at which one's old hankerings are sufficiently clamorous as to make the 
new tug irksome.
6 As well as putting obstacles before one's plans in this hindering fashion, the 
demand to do something - akin to a temptation - can also appear as an irritation, 
even if, at some level of self-awareness, one would like to do the thing concerned.
7 And the same goes for ones for forbearance - the demand not to murder, for 
instance, being felt neither as very irksome nor even as especially present at all 
times (a point reflecting that made in chapter 4, section 4).
8 One way in which this might be done, though an incidental and instrumental one, 
is by actually trying to alleviate the plight of the famine victims. But this would be 
like pursuing a particular course of action (complying with the law, say) with no 
interest in the action other than its role in getting rid of a pressure on consciousness 
(say, a feeling of an act's forbiddenness that irks one).
9 Some commentators see conscience in this way. May, for instance, states his 
belief that,
...conscience, unlike the virtues, seems to be grounded in a concern 
for the self, for the self s inner harmony, rather than directed 
toward the proper end of human action...[I see] conscience as an 
egoistic concern which nonetheless leads to restraints on 
selfishness.
(L.May, 1983, p.61).
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And Ci follows a similar line, seeing the phenomenon essentially in terms of getting 
rid of unease. He quotes Hannah Arendt’s contention that it 'is not primarily 
interested in the world where the wrong is committed or in the consequences that 
the wrong will have for the future course of the world', but 'trembles for the 
individual self and its integrity.' (J.Ci, 1991, p.49).
The overall claim being made by these authors is that the operation of 
conscience prevents the individual from committing those acts (or perhaps pricks 
him to perform those which he would not do) the imprint of which would otherwise 
return to haunt him and disturb his inner equilibrium.
Hare, who is, of course, disinclined generally to bother himself with the 
contours of moral experience, also has made this kind of comment and given his 
thoughts on its genesis in these words,
It is easy to see how, if we have been brought up from our earliest 
years in obedience to a principle, the thought of not obeying it 
becomes abhorrent to us. If we fail to obey it, we suffer remorse; 
when we do obey it, we feel at ease with ourselves. These feelings 
are reinforced by all those factors which psychologists have listed; 
and the total result is what is generally called a feeling of obligation. 
It is a fact that we have this feeling of obligation - different people 
in different degrees, and with different contents.
(R.M.Hare, 1952, p. 165).
10 This phenomenon I am describing is not the same thing as what has come to be 
called, in the light of much publicized calls for charitable aid, 'compassion fatigue’ 
on the part of large sections of the public. This is apparently something which has 
come about through the jading of the television viewer's emotional and moral 
response to the plight of the various third world populations who are in need of 
immediate as well as long term aid. I am talking of a wider experiential route which
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the demand takes, involving an easing or eradication of pressure on consciousness - 
in whatever manner might be responsible for it.
11 Presumably someone acquiring a Kantian holy will would experience a decrease 
in irk, indeed in demandingness itself, of the possibilities before her.
12 H.M.Lynd, 1971, p. 164.
13 For further comment on this link, see A.O'Hear, 1977.
14 Reiner has talked of this facet of moral experience, and, in virtue of the deftness 
and adeptness of his phenomenological description, I shall quote him at length on 
the matter
The voice of a bad conscience usually comes unbeckoned; it 
emerges from below or behind the conscious mind and knocks, so 
to speak, disquietingly at the door. Indeed the arrival of a bad 
conscience can be far more than a sudden knock at the door. It can 
be an invasion of the conscious mind, an assault almost on the 
previously quiet succession of one's thoughts and the whole routine 
of one's existence. In such a case the appearance of conscience 
from out of the dark background is likely to seem slightly eerie.
And this eeriness increases as its disquieting attacks on the serenity 
of the usual course of one's existence are repeated and accumulate. 
The voice of conscience can become a thorn that will accompany 
one, never allowing one a respite, during a whole period of one's 
life; so that in time one comes to fear constantly its repeated 
appearances, which can thus exhaust an existence and deprive it of 
all peace till one finally manages to extinguish the sense of guilt 
one's bad conscience contains.
(H.Reiner, 1983, p. 120).
15 See, for example, the role of the furies in Aeschylus' Orestia and their eventual 
domiciling as personifications of rationally considered justice at the end of the play.
Notes to Chapter Five 397
16 Indeed, one might stigmatise as ’neurotic' precisely that demand experience that 
keeps arising and goading one when one knows one is already doing all one 
reasonably can; for example, a parent's response to a child’s illness, where one 
might say to him, 'Look, you've already done everything you can do.'
17 Which is not to say that, if it were the case that I regarded the pill as unthinkable 
with respect to the jump demand, that would make the experience there a moral one.
18 This is a rather controversial sounding point. What I am suggesting is that our 
response to the famine-via-the-media case, and other presented examples of what 
are generally taken to be urgent or important moral issues, often provoke from 
oneself the socially expected and acceptable semblance of a response even though 
the actual experience and feeling is lacking (rather like, that is, cooing and smiling 
over another's baby for whom one has no real interest). This seems to me 
particularly germane in the case of the illness and bereavement of others not 
intimately related to one but nevertheless acquainted in some way, where one is 
obliged to make the relevant concerned and sympathetic noises even though one is 
largely untouched by the matter (indeed, one may even feel obliged to go in for that 
sort of behaviour).
19 A friend of mine remarked recently that if he were to be reincarnated his greatest 
wish would be to return without a conscience.
20 M.Low-Beer, 1991, p.220.
21 I should emphasize that these are points arising from the descriptive 
phenomenology, and not normative contentions as to what one ought to be thinking 
or feeling.
22 This is a point particularly strongly associated with Bernard Williams (1976) and 
one which I go on to analyze more fully in the next two chapters.
23 JJ.C.Smart & B.Williams, 1973.
24 By 'care for others' here I mean, of course, care for the unknown and barely 
acquainted other, since it is a well known fact that virtually everyone cares about
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someone close to them. But I do not want to assume, as a piece of unexamined 
baggage, that moral demands are necessarily those that involve ’care’ for others. 
Moreover, with respect to the point which I am making here, I would like to say 
something which bears more strongly on the contents of the two chapters to follow. 
And it is that, concerning the pill, it may not so much be the type of content of the 
demand (i.e., caring for others) that leads one to eschew the pill, but the 
supposition that there is something inauthentic, meaningless, solipsistic even about 
treating all demands as to be eliminated by pills. For in that case it may be that one 
wouldn’t have any enduring projects and maybe wouldn’t even have a self. This 
point can be made irrespective of the content of demands: it applies whether the 
demands are to care for others, to care for the ’environment', to observe the 
Sabbath, or to watch hedgehogs by moonlight. That is to say, respecting a demand 
as not to be eliminated by the pill would not be ’the mark o f specifically moral 
demands, though it may be that they do have that kind of pull on us generally.
25 See again B.Williams, 1976, and O.Flanagan, 1991.
26 J.Huertas-Jourda, 1970, p. 165.
27 In this respect, Emmett says that,
...terms like "calling”, and indeed "destiny", can underpin the 
single-minded pursuit of an end. An absolute quality can also be 
attached to the notion of duty, though this is more likely to take the 
form of a categorical imperative in an autonomous morality than a 
religious or metaphysical demand. Morality may be seen as an 
"ultimate concern", and so may the pursuit of an end or a creative 
venture. The word "call" can be used of both, suggesting that here is 
not just a matter of choice.
(D.Emmet, 1979, p. 147).
Here also she does not try to pin down a particular caller or demander or weaver of 
destiny to which one feels oneself to be related.
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28 Sometimes, admittedly, it does have just th a t Traditionally, this has been 
associated with a specific supernatural being, a tempter of some sort: Luther, for 
example, took himself to be throwing his inkwell at the devil and not in mere pique 
at an irritation that happened to be in his head. But it can have a cause that is sensed 
as such by the subject: the collusion of a certain vertiginous fear at the cliff-edge 
with a particularly poignant guilty memory from childhood, for example.
29 As to this cause, it is not itself a straightforward manner of being an inner 
sensation of humiliation or embarrasment that is perceived to bring it about. The 
focus of the cause to which the demand is referred is far more diffuse and complex 
than that. It involves the outer reality of the public understanding and social modes 
under which the event occurred as well as the possible intentions and sympathies of 
others towards one. This presents the demand in such a way that it is appearing 
both as an inner phenomenon as well as an outer, other one.
30 Lest the term ’apprehension' sound as if I am making of the connection with 
outemess a tautology by smuggling it in, by this term I mean simply the noting of it 
in consciousness - which does not have to include only those entering from 
outwith it.
31 R.B.Ehman, 1968, p. 175.
32 B .Williams, 1985, p.208.
33 This does not, of course, rule out the possibility that some such inference, 
having been made at some time, underlies the continuing direct experience. Nor that 
reflective appraisal of the experience might not arrive at such a conclusion. For the 
time being, this is a point which I am making in the context of the direct data of the 
moral demand in our experience.
34This is the example used by G.Harman (1977, ch.l).
35 Bergmann talks of various qualities, such as danger, 'pleasurableness’, and 
moral value, that appear to us as external ones that impinge on one. He says that,
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These qualities are outside, in the public world, and they themselves 
affect us, and they do so not mediately but quite directly, very much 
as if they were forces. Their influence does not stop before a "self 
that surveys the scene from the calm of an "inner fortress". 
(F.Bergmann, 1973, p.254).
361 discuss her view of the self at the point of the heightened moral experience in 
the next chapter, its implications being more extensively drawn out in chapter 7.
37 Specifically theological accounts of this particular debate can be found in J. 
Fletcher, 1966, and LJ.Binkley, 1975.
38 For example, Maclagan, 1961, believes that,
...the moral law is a law without a lawgiver: and to the objection that 
this is absurd the answer is that it is just a way of saying that to call 
it "law" at all is only inadequate metaphor for something that is sui 
generis.
(p.73).
And William James (1903) holds that demands arise from specific people in specific 
circumstances so that talk of divine demands should be very carefully 
circumscribed:
If we must talk impersonally, to be sure we can say that the 
"universe" requires, exacts, or makes obligatory such or such an 
action, whenever it expresses itself through the desires of such or 
such a creature. But it is better not to talk about the universe in this 
personified way unless we believe in a divine consciousness which 
actually exists.
(p. 195/6).
39 Not only is Abraham left in the thrall of a god who would ask such a thing of 
him as the sacrifice of his son - surely food for thought - but all relations between
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himself and Isaac cease after that point. The Old Testament story writer simply 
draws a veil over any further contact they may have had.
As to Job, his apparent reward for holding firm is not the return of his 
family and possessions, but a whole surrogate clan which god gives to him in their 
place. So he is left with a 'reward' of very dubious worth - and also, we are told, 
god 'blesses' Job with twice his years more in which to live out this new life and 
reflect on just what it is that has happened to him.
40 The sort of experience which I am addressing here is that of the strength and 
constraining power of the peak demand and the need for the subject to give this due 
expression. Somewhat analogously Foot says that,
People talk about the "binding force" of morality, but it is not clear 
what this means if not that we feel ourselves unable to escape. 
(P.Foot, 1972, p. 162).
41 I use the term 'understandably' here because the mass of moral demand 
experience - as pointed out in the previous chapter - is of a rather deflating thrust 
with respect to the heightened qualities studied in this one and the possible value 
realm figured thereby. Hence it is 'understandable' that the particularly striking 
form of the experience should receive especial attention on the part of the subject.
42 E.Durkheim, 1974, p.25. And Mill also talks of the 'halo' by which 'custom' 
rings around certain of the moral demands which one apprehends (J.S.Mill, 1972,
p.28).
43 M.G.Singer, 1987, p.300.
44 S.R.L.Clark, 1989, p. 188.
45 One philosopher who writes in a phenomenological vein, Sokolowski (1985), 
expresses this situation and its significance for the subject in terms of her 
deliberation about possible courses of action and how her future self will appear 
and the state of affairs which she has actualized will be borne before the survey of 
the future self that is projected forward. He quotes Alfred Shutz's claim that, 'the
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deliberating agent is tensed in the future perfect. These future perfects are his 
situation as it can be resolved: they are ways in which the situation possibly will 
have been.' (p. 160). Sokolowski goes on to describe this moment in these words: 
At the moment of deliberation, when the future perfect is my 
concern, the present also takes on a perfect tense: what I am 
becomes condensed and ready to enter into what I will do. What I 
am becomes what I have been. It becomes suddenly discrete, 
completed in everything except what I am about to do now; it 
becomes ready to be recapitulated and renewed. The present perfect 
and the future perfect confront one another in the elliptical double 
focus of the situation, and if I can manage to peform my act, if the 
situation does not disintegrate for me before I act, the present and 
future perfects coalesce as the indeterminacy of the future is resolved 
and I, who am all that I was, do what is to be done.
(p.161).
Despite the rather cumbersome mode of expression employed in it, this attempted 
phenomenological description does do some justice to those special moments of the 
peak experience when one's self is engrossed by the moral situation before one. 
(Again, however, I would draw attention to the fact that such an experience is 
relatively rare and by no means describes or accounts for the vastly greater mass of 
the experience).
46 E.H.Cadwallader, 1980, p.238/9:
To experience something as objective is to experience it as 
nonsubjective. To experience something as nonsubjective is to 
experience it as originating from ("or caused by") something outside 
one's own consciousness...By "being independent of 
consciousness" I follow tradition in meaning "not subject to one's
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willful control, or the result of arbitrary whim, irrational desire, 
etc."
47 M.Singer, 1987, p.301.
48 G.A.Cohen has made the point in lectures on Marx at Oxford (Hilary term, 
1985) that there is a difference between a mirage and a simple illusion that sums up 
the difference in the approaches of Marx and Feuerbach to the notion of false 
consciousness. For the latter, the matter is like that of an illusion, requiring 
corrective thinking for its resolution. Whereas for Marx, it is nearer to that of the 
mirage, requiring both dealing with in objective social reality as well as in thought 
(for the inverted thought reflects inverted social relations). Analogously, the point 
in the main text here is that there are objective correlates to the valuational sense, 
even if they are not to be sought in a value realm of a special sort.
49 R.T.Gamer, 1990 points out in a footnote that Mackie's error theory need not 
require wholescale revision of certain ways of thinking about and talking about our 
moral experience. He states his belief that:
An error theoiy, by the way, is not necessarily a falsity theory. It is 
easy enough to propose some coherentist or inter-subjectivist 
account of ’truth’ that allows us to say that moral judgements are 
sometimes true, even if those who make them imply something that 
we must admit is an error.
(R.T.Gamer, 1990, p. 139, footnote 7).
50 H.Frankfurt, 1976, gives examples of certain passions and some apparently 
objectless emotional states such as gloom or elation which seem external to us - and 
though he acknowledges that this can lead to dishonesty in denying that they are 
ours, there is an ordinary and accepted sense in which we do think of them as 
external.
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T.Penelhum, 1979, also talks of some seemingly external thoughts or 
desires being symptomatic of deeper processes in the subject and discusses the 
criteria and extent of the notion and sense of externality for them.
51 Hence this leaves open the possibility of values from 'out there' interacting with 
us while we are nevertheless unaware of such a relation. And since this is an 
experiential matter being explored, the arguments I marshall are of quite a different 
nature from those employed, for instance, by Harman, 1977, on the explanatory 
necessity of using value properties to account for one's experience.
521 do not mean here the case where these authority-figures intentionally tell or 
cajole or pressurise one to act.
53 See D.Goldstick, 1988, for further thoughts on the nature of one's causal 
interaction with moral values.
54 G.Harman, 1977, thinks such explanatory devices are not necessary. Good 
examples of opposed views - that the best explanation of our experience and 
judgement does make reference to them - are given by R.Werner, 1983 and 
N.Sturgeon, 1985.
55 In an interesting and careful article, G. Say re-McCord (1987) has criticized 
certain arguments in favour of the testability of realistic moral theories and the 
explanatory role they play, while yet maintaining that,
...certain regularities - for instance, honesty's engendering trust, or 
justice's commanding allegiance, or kindness' encouraging 
friendship - are real regularities that are identifiable and inexplicable 
except by appeal to moral properties. Indeed, many moral virtues 
(such as honesty, justice, kindness) and vices (such as greed, 
lechery, sadism) figure in this way in our best explanations of many 
natural regularities. Moral explanations allow us to isolate what it is 
about a person, or an action, or an institution, that leads to its having 
the effects it does. And these explanations rely on moral concepts
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that identify characteristics common to people, actions, and 
institutions that are uncapturable with finer-grained or differently 
structured categories.
(p.449).
While R.Miller, 1985, reviews ways in which moral facts fit in with current 
philosophy of science and the grounds for asserting something to be best 
explanatory hypothesis, arguing that,
...everyone believes that there are nasty people (just people, morally 
obtuse ones). And if there are nasty people, their nastiness, alas, has 
a causal impact on their conduct. These and similar causal 
attributions justify our belief in moral properties...
(p.554).
56 I do not mean that these experiences - the moral demand’s arrival in  
consciousness and the wincing - are the same thing, or that the latter is criterial of or 
even always expressing the former. What I am doing here is using the latter 
reaction as an analogy for the swiftness of the arising of the experience of the 
demand.
57 For good accounts of these concepts refer to C.Geertz, 1973, ch.l &
B.Williams, 1985.
58 J.McDowell, 1985, p. 110.
59 R.Bambrough, 1979, p.3.
601 realise that the phenomenological point that certain classes of experience are 
similar gives rise to the further analytical question as to whether they are relevantly 
similar. At the least, what I am saying here is that features of the moral demand 
singled out in the literature either are not universal throughout the experience class 
or are shared with other ones and will thus not serve uniquely to pick out this one. 
An additional and stronger claim to the effect, say, that this shows one something 
important about the genesis and sensefulness to the subject of the moral demand
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with respect to other ones will only begin to be addressed by me as the reflective 
issue of the experience is investigated in the next two chapters.
61 Charles Taylor puts this well in saying that,
...there are experiences in which we are carried away in rapture and 
may believe ourselves spoken to by angels; or less exaltedly, in 
which we sense for a minute the incredible fulness and intense 
meaning of life; or in which we feel a great surge of power and 
mastery over the difficulties that usually drag us down. But there is 
always an issue of what to make of these instants, how much 
illusion or mere "tripping" is involved in them, how genuinely they 
reflect real growth or goodness. We can only answer this kind of 
question by seeing how they fit into our surrounding life, that is, 
what part they play in a narrative of this life. We have to move
......................forward,and back to make.a real assessment.'  .....................................
(C.Taylor, 1989, p.48 - and he adds that in this kind of case we are aware that, and 
assess partly in the light of, the part that our 'striving' to be there plays in the 
experience's occurrence and meaningfulness).
62 S.Clarke, A Discourse of Natural Religion (orig.1706), in D.D.Raphael, Vol.I, 
1969; J.Balguy, The Foundation of Moral Goodness (orig. 1728/9), ibid,
63 M.Mandelbaum, 1955, pp.69-71 et passim.
64 Though the sense of 'harmony1, of 'nothing amiss' would also be terms which 
capture what we feel in these instances.
651 have been treating this explicitly as experiential phenomenon thus far, though I 
will go on in the next chapter to analyze the meaning of claims that there are moral 
values or moral fittingness relations which one has failed to recognize or intuit in 
order to explicate the dimension of the not-self involved in such a form of words.
66 William Kneale, for instance, points out that, 'So long as we regard an issue as 
one of morals, we cannot say "Let's agree to differ". And it is natural to suppose
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that we cannot do so because we are not concerned with taste only, but with truth.' 
(1950, p. 151). But he goes on to add that a subjectivist can allow this and say that 
it only goes to show the degree of commitment or preparedness to compromise or 
need for unanimity which typifies the moral attitude.
67 Witness this description by Freud of the Rat Man's behaviour when his lady was 
readying to depart from him:
On the day of her departure he knocked his foot against a stone lying 
in the road, and was obliged to put it out of the way by the side of 
the road, because the idea struck him that her carriage might be 
driving along the same road in a few hours' time and might come to 
grief against the stone. But a few minutes later it occurred to him 
that this was absurd, and he was obliged to go back and replace the 
stone in its original position in the middle of the road. 
v v v v v v v (Quotedby R.Wollheim, 1973j p.435/6. Freud's italics).' * » * * *
68 One philosopher maintains that, 'Phenomenology and metaphysics go together. 
When men lose interest in the primordial data of everyday experience, metaphysics 
dies.' (J.Wild, 1953, p. 190). This is all very well, I think, so long as one's 
analysis of the experience is not misled into quick conclusions about the latter from 
a too rapid glance at the data or in virtue of one being dazzled by the phenomena of 
the peak experience.
A similar, though not identical, claim is made by the author of an article 
who calls for greater attention to be given to the actual contours of our moral 
experience than is ordinarily given by moral philosophy. He maintains that:
Moral philosophy's customary focus on action-guiding rules and 
principles, on choice and decision, on universality and impartiality, 
and on obligation and right action have masked the importance of 
moral perception to a full and adequate definition of moral agency. 
(L.Blum, 1991, p.701).
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NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX
1 J.N.Findlay, 1970, p.10/11.
2 A.-T.Tymieniecka, 1983a, p. 13.
3 P.Heath, 1975, p. 166.
4 See H.F.Nissenbaum, 1985, chs. 1-3 for interesting discussion on the object-
directedness of experience, her area being that of emotion.
5 T.L.S.Sprigge, 1988, p. 144.
6 And Sprigge adds to his description a contention that I feel deserves quoting in
full:
To talk of the pleasurableness which is an inherent part of the 
objects around us as objectified pleasure [with Santayana in The 
Sense of Beauty ] suggests that it was originally experienced as a 
sensation within the subject and then somehow projected onto the
..............................................seen objects which produced* that sensation. But certainly we do not , , , ,
at present perform any such act of projection. There is nothing on 
which we could even try to project the pleasure other than that which 
is already its locus, the objects seen around us. Nor is it reasonable 
to think that an act of projection occurred in infancy. It is more 
reasonable to think that infantile experience begins with no clear 
division between self and not-self, but that gradually the contents of 
consciousness are sorted out into what is experienced as the self, 
mainly one's own body, and what is experienced as not-self, mainly 
the experienced surround of one's own body. Pleasure and pain 
belong equally on both sides of the division.
(Ibid., p. 144).
His ontogenetic point about the contents of experience is also discussed by
G.H.Mead, 1934 and by T.Mischel, 1977.
7 F.Bergmann, 1973, p.253.
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8 Ibid., p.253/4.
9 KJ.Gergen, 1977, p. 140.
10 H.Reiner, 1983, pp. 121-123, makes a similar point, particularly with respect to 
the apparent independence of certain experiential phenomena from the control of the 
self. This is a matter to which I shall have cause to return in the next chapter.
11 G.H.Mead, 1934, gives an example on pp.169-170 of this notion of nearness 
and famess to the core self.
12 G.Harman, 1977, ch.l.
13 There is a wide range in which this kind of sense of the forbidden works on our 
part, moving from the moral to what look to be sub-moral contexts. That is, from 
the possible sense of a prohibition on something as wicked and evil, one moves 
through to that feeling, with which I am sure we are all acquainted from childhood, 
of the 'naughty', of an act of which we used to feel and say (and perhaps still do) 
‘You'll get in trouble for this,' where this'Utterance'is' not* jiist'by the way of a 
prudential admonition.
14 E.Durkheim, 1974, sometimes describes the experience in such a way that he 
takes the latter to be felt virtually like the former.
15 H.Spiegelberg, 1975, p.206.
16 In one of his short stories Isaac Bashevis Singer has a character say,
I became convinced of one thing one night - thoughts and emotions 
can literally materialize and become entities of some substance.
(I.B.Singer, 1984, p.470).
171 mean by the term ’mid-way’ to grasp for a metaphor, as opposed to a precise 
location on the experiential band. This allows that later reflection might shift 
perception of the demand experience (or elements of it) toward one pole or the other 
from the roughly sensed position it originally held for the subject 
18 A somewhat similar point is made with respect to general moral experience by 
R.Sokolowski (1985), who tries to use one of Husserl's earlier notions in support
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of his presentation of moral experience as being neither of entirely outer objects nor 
as of an inner valuational response to an inert external reality. The idea which he 
takes from Husserl is that of ’categoriality' which Husserl discusses in 1970a, 
Investigation VI, chapter 6. In this area Husserl seems to be grappling with the 
problems of presenting phenomenologically the way in which certain experiences 
appear as given to one, but not as entirely independent of one’s thinking activity in 
their nature. I have chosen not to follow this course in the main text because it has 
seemed to me that it would cause more problems than it would solve, and would 
especially lead me away from the meat of the discussion and into methodological 
wrangling of an unhelpful sort.
191 do not intend here to present an exclusive elucidation of the self as identifying it 
only in terms of concerns. After all, one can identify with something which one 
finds admittedly trivial (the overwhelming passion for memorising football 
statistics, for instance). What I do mean to do is indicate ways in which experiences 
are held by the self as coalescent or clashing with its central interests and terms of 
identity, or merely as indifferent. Such a presentation thus involves any elements 
which are close to the self and with which it finds its identity forged, and not just 
concerns. In the presentation to come I shall often refer simply to the ’concerns’ or 
'interests’ of the core self for ease of exposition, though the reader should bear in 
mind the fact that I acknowledge the make-up of the core self to be larger than that 
reference.
20 H.Reiner, 1983, pp. 133/4, makes interesting comments on this notion and on 
that of values as appearing as objects to the self, even though of importance to it, 
and as not having been called up from within its own resources.
21 S.Weil, 1952, pp.40-41; p.114; and the section titled 'Necessity and 
Obedience'. (Relatedly to my points in the main text, she also talks on p. 109 of the 
power of desire as a thing which the self has to endure passively while it attempts to 
turn its attention to the good). There is a fruitful comparison here also with Kant on
Notes to Chapter Six 411
the moral law striking down self-conceit, an affair which he seems to take to be 
intimately connected with the reverence felt for that law (I.Kant, 1949, pp. ISO- 
182).
22 There is also the possibility here, of course, that the experience could be felt as 
important and as mattering to the core self precisely because that experience strikes 
at it in such an unwelcome fashion, and in representing such an alien and irking 
force naturally calls for attention, even if only to determine how to rid oneself of it.
23 I refer again here to the classic exposition of G.H.Mead, 1934.
241 mean by such ’facts' something like that very general need of almost all people 
to live with others, to get on amicably with them, and to bear one’s actions and 
beliefs before them. As Hume says (1975, p.283), even a ’selfish knave' who is 
wishing to exploit the moral abidance of others will need to have the esteem of 
someone else and is essentially involved in a self-defeating project.
25 In this respect, one writer on the related area of moral realism has made a similar 
point. W. Tolhurst maintains that:
There is no clear reason to suppose that the moral realist must posit 
the existence of controversial abstract entities of a moral sort. If 
entities of this sort must be posited, it will be on the basis of 
metaphysical considerations which are independent of the question 
of objectivity. Moral realism may require the existence of the things 
judged to be good and right, e.g., persons and actions, but this does 
not distinguish it from anti-realism. If talk of non-moral facts and 
properties can be analyzed in ways which avoid ontological 
commitment to these entities, then there is every reason to suppose 
that similar analyses can be used to avoid commitment to moral facts 
and properties (subjective or objective).
(W.Tolhurst, 1986, p.44).
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And see also M.G.Singer, 1988, p. 145, on the matter of the social context of moral 
value and demands.
26 Though in this regard I do not think that we should underestimate the extent to 
which much of our moral experience is of the order 'What will others think of me? 
or 'I won't get away with this' or 'I'd better do this as it's expected of me.'
27 W.H.Urban, 1909, ch.XIV, sec.II.2.(a). Quotation from p.388.
28 Ibid., p.388. While as to 'inner' objectivity, he talks of there being a 'demand 
which is acknowledged as objective and as a norm for the control of the fleeting 
subjective experiences, [which] is not [experienced as] outer', going on to add that:
It is an inner demand that represents organised and permanent 
dispositions as over against temporary desires and feelings. Any 
form of will which has become ineradicable, any expectation, 
demand, or assumption which is incontestable, acquires a normative 
objectivity which, in contrast to the desires and feelings which it 
controls, makes it an existent which must be taken into account. It 
is, accordingly, merely this persistence, continuity, or control which 
is acknowledged when the predicate of existence has the meaning of 
inner reality.
(Ibid., p.388/9).
29 For an interesting practical discussion on this issue in the context of education, 
see D.C.Phillips, 1989.
301 mean that the familiarity of the social life-world in which moral situations arise 
may account for the spontaneity of response and the only semi-conscious 
registration of demands. For a discussion of the social significance of the moral 
sense in that vein of what I have called 'formal' phenomenology, refer to A.- 
T.Tymieniecka, 1986, pp.34-37.
31 See, for instance, C.L.Elder, 1987.
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32 In one of her novels Simone de Beauvoir expresses this feeling as it regards the 
ultimate importance of persons making demands upon others. She puts this in a 
way which does seem also to leave the final avowal hanging, such that one can see 
how easily it could take on an experiential hue of a religious or (other) 
metaphysically interesting sort. Here is the passage, which is referring to Marcel’s 
behaviour toward his girlfriend, Denise:
"After all, he only asks to be left alone," said Helene. "All 
the same, Denise can't really expect him to act against his 
conscience."
"His conscience ought to tell him that Denise exists," said Madame 
Blomart..."It's all very well having moral anguish, but it's really too 
convenient if we limit it simply to what suits us."
"But why should other people have rights over us?" Helene asked. 
"It's something I've been unable to understand."
"It's not a question of rights," said Jean, "they are there."
"Yes," said Madame Blomart. "One must be blind not to see them." 
(S.de Beauvoir, 1964, pp. 137/8).
33 This would mean both that it could account for the often close proximity of moral 
demands to the core self, and also that the threatening or alien or merely other
nature to one of the social not-self would correlate with those other possible
relations of the experience to the core self.
34 Bergson, for instance, goes so far as to say in this respect that,
...generally speaking, moral distress is a throwing-out of gear of the 
relations between society and the individual self.
(H.Bergson, 1935, p.8).
35 S.Blackburn, 1987, p.364.
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36 Relatedly, Hare has argued that for much of our moral experience it does not 
matter either way how we try to characterize it on the lines of inner and outer 
operations. He says that:
[The] activity which I have called "thinking something to be wrong" 
is called by the objectivist "a moral intuition". By the subjectivist it 
is called "an attitude of disapproval". But in so far as we can identify 
anything in our experience to which these two people would be 
alluding by means of these two expressions, it is the same thing - 
namely, the experience which we all have when we think that 
something is wrong.
(R.M.Hare, 1972, p.41).
37 F.Bergmann, 1973, p.261, states that:
...we often say such things as "the music really was very sad (or 
gay, or exciting) though I was unfortunately too tired to respond to 
it. I had no feelings at all during the concert." We simply could not 
say this if calling a piece of music sad were a circuitous way of 
reporting an introspection.
A similar point is made by J.McDowell, 1985, p. 119 on that of our relation to 
fearfulness and danger.
38 A view held, for instance, by N.Hartmann, 1932, Vol.I, pp.88-9. For extended 
discussion of his views on this particular matter see E.H.Cadwallader, 1984b, 
pp.91-95, and also my appendix in this thesis.
Another erstwhile phenomenologist who holds this notion about our 
experience and reports on it is H.Reiner, 1983, p.269 (Supplementary Essay: Is 
Value Ethics Out of Date?, pp.263-269).
39 This is well summed up in the words of Teale:
There are few who cannot remember occasions when duty went 
unperceived, or if perceived, reluctantly or never fulfilled. For most
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of us it is fitful appreciation of and faltering application to duty, 
rather than unfailing perception of and ready response to duty with 
which we are the more familiar...
(A.ETeale, 1957, p. 19).
40 Quoted by T.K.Abbott, 1879, pp.331-2.
41 J.Ladd, 1957, p.169.
42 J.McDowell, 1983, p.l.
43 B.Tapper, 1930, pp.519/520. (He later, p.521, throws doubt on these notions 
via a record of how he takes our own reflections on the matter to go).
44 Weil puts this point in apt terms as:
The beautiful in nature is a union of the sensible impression and the 
sense of necessity.
(S.Weil, 1952, p. 135).
45 I should like to note in example 3. that it is not so much with a 'concern' or 
'interest' that the core self is identified but in this case with a fascination, a 
sensation of awe and wonder - hence my earlier disclaimers from identifying the 
core self only in terms of concerns.
46 R.Wemer, 1983, p.653. (He refers to moral 'facts' which we perceive, but his 
argument is of a form sufficient to stand as representative of the one which I wish 
to address to the moral demand experience).
47 D.S.Miller, 1950, p.42.
48 Miller continues by saying of the notion of moral value in the object that:
[It] must on the same ground be extended to other cases which they 
[objectivist moral philosophers] would not for a moment extend it. 
Not only to beauty, to which many of them do extend it, but to 
humour, for example. Our notion of a good jest or a bad jest, of a 
ludicrous incident or a "delicious" remark, has precisely the same 
objectivity and subjectivity. The comic quality appears as simply
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attaching to the object-matter, but can be psychologized as the 
reaction of the person amused. So with the good or the bad in the 
taste of the food, so with the horrible, the terrible, the eerie, the 
sepulchral, the foul, the vile, and many other phases of perceived 
things. These phases have their being in feeling but they do not label 
themselves as feeling or as subsisting in the mind. That is an 
afterthought.
(Ibid., p.44).
49 Treatise, I.iii. 14.
50 With respect to my description in terms both of an experience’s constitution by 
the self and its perceived proximity to the interests and concerns of the self, it 
should be clear that that which has been projected by us need not be felt in 
immediacy, or even on later reflection, to have originated in that fashion. Moreover, 
that which arises ’from within' may come to take on an alien and threatening not- 
self guise once it has been projected or reified without - as is the alleged case of our 
religious temper in Feuerbach's classic analysis, 1957.
51 This is an argument put forward especially by D.Wiggins, 1991.
52 To that extent, Miller is taking our experience in the same way as Mackie, as 
erroneously referring to value objects of a special sort: which is a representation 
against which I have argued elsewhere.
53 Sartre, for instance, held that moral values were absolute without thereby 
thinking that they were in any way part of the nature of the universe in Mackie's 
sense. He explicitly comments on this as a part of a dialogue with de Beauvoir on 
the upshot of an absence of one kind of metaphysical basis for values, a divine 
demander:
S: In the moral field I've retained one single thing to do with the 
existence of God, and that is Good and Evil as absolutes. The usual 
consequence of atheism is the suppresion of Good and Evil. It's a
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certain relativism - for example, its regarding morals as being 
variable according to the point on the earth’s surface at which they 
are seen.
dB: Or as Dostoievski says, "If God does not exist, everything is 
allowed." You don't think that, do you?
S: In one way I see clearly what he means, and abstractly it’s true; 
but in another I clearly see that killing a man is wrong. Is directly, 
absolutely wrong; is wrong for another man...It might be said that I 
look upon man's morals and moral activity as an absolute in the 
midst of the relative.
(S.de Beauvoir, 1985, p.439).
54 Hare asks, in this respect, the following question:
Think of one world into whose fabric values are objectively built; 
and think of another in which those values have been annihilated. 
And remember that in both worlds the people in them go on being 
concerned about the same things - there is no difference in the 
subjective "concern" which people have for things, only in their 
"objective" value. Now, I ask, what is the difference between the 
states of affairs in these two worlds? Can any other answer be given 
except "None whatever?"
(R.M.Hare, 1972, p,47).
A similar thought experiment is put by E.H.Cadwallader, 1971, concerning our 
reflection on a world in which there are no good things, or in which we try to 
conceive ourselves as able to get by without using such an evaluative notion.
Hare's contention, of course, begs the question: it might be that the idea of 
people having such "concern" outwith an objective value backdrop is really not 
conceivable; or it might be that people need to think that there is such a backdrop to 
have that concern, even if no such objective underpinning really exists.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN
1 G.R.Lucas, 1987, p. 131.
2 D.A.Lloyd Thomas, 1990, p.425.
3 H.Frankfurt, 1988, p.89.
4 On the logical connections of the experience of guilt with its putative object, see 
G.E.M. Anscombe, 1958 and A. O'Hear, 1977.
5 J.L.Mackie, 1978, p353.
6 J.L.Mackie, 1980, p.75.
7 On this matter see S.Lukes, 1985 and K.Nielsen, 1987.
8 Page numbers here refer to the slightly amended reprint to be found in the 
collected volume D.Wiggins, 1987.
9 D.Wiggins, 1987b, p.98.
10 Ibid., p.99.
11 Ibid., p. 105.
>2 Ibid., p.98.
13 See A.J.Ayer, 1971; S.Blackbum, 1985, 1987; R.M.Hare, 1952; J.L.Mackie, 
1977; C.L.Stevenson, 1963.
14 M.Platts, 1980, p.76/7.
15 Ibid., p.77.
16 The actual terms in which Platts puts this consists in arguing both for 
cognitivism in moral philosophy - the position that desires require appropriate 
beliefs about the independent desirability of their objects (ibid., p.80) - as well as 
the further notion that those beliefs are capable of being true (which is moral 
realism).
17 Ibid., p.79.
18 C.Taylor, 1989, p.3.
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19 Ibid., p.5.
20 Ibid., p.5.
21 He puts his belief in these words:
The whole way in which we think, reason, argue, and question 
ourselves about morality supposes that our moral reactions have 
these two sides: that they are not only "gut reactions” but also 
implicit acknowledgements of claims concerning these objects. 
(Ibid., p.7).
22 Ibid., p.9. And he even claims, on the same page, that those who hold to 
subjectivist explanations nevertheless still require, at some deeper level, to think of 
their own moral reactions in certain objectivist ways.
23 Ibid., p.27.
24 Ibid., p.60.
25 Ibid., p.74.
26 Ibid., p.99.
27 Other ones of relevant interest are given by R.Attfield, 1969 and by D.Lyons, 
1976 (both on the upshot of taking seriously a relativist view of morality).
281 explain later that I believe the two claims to be the same, though I distinguish 
them here for the purposes of clarifying the discussion.
29 On this matter of ’sensefulness' and the satisfaction or unease with which the 
subject surveys the concepts she uses to represent her experience I refer the reader 
back to section 5 of my chapter 3.
30 I use the expression ’show to be false' since these arguments can do this with 
regard to other ones that are couched in phenomenological terms and which do not 
accurately describe the relevant data.
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311 am not claiming here that presention of a rough outline of a relation is the same 
thing as showing there to be a rough relation. But I am saying that the WFT line 
gives only a rough outline of what kind of objectivity component is 'required* for 
the requisite experience to be had and reflectively endorsed - and, furthermore, that 
my own belief is that only a rough relation is at the root of the experience when 
such a rough outline is explored further.
32 See A.MacIntyre, 1981 for elaboration of such a feeling on his part and the 
consequent moral confusion which he believes it to have wrought for us all.
33 D.Hume, 1978, p.96.
34 Williams states his belief that Mackie's thesis (1977) on the subjective basis of 
morality, if held generally, could lead to problems with our notions of morality. His 
point is summed up in these words:
It certainly cannot follow from Mackie's view that when we have 
come to realise what moral experience really is, we shall start to 
acquire our moral attitudes by self-consciously deciding on them, 
either individually or collectively. It is not clear that there could be 
such a process, and if there were, there is no reason at all to think, 
in the light of Mackie's theory itself, that it would be effective. 
(B.Williams, 1985, p.212/213).
Williams also criticizes what he calls 'government house utilitarianism' - 
that is, the need to hide from ordinary folk the true source of their moral experience 
- in JJ.C.Smart & B.Williams, 1973.
35 See A.Baier, 1985, Essay 9, p. 165.
36 For instance, one writer on the ontological commitments of moral realism 
expresses his attitude in this way:
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A teacher of mine once remarked that the question of moral realism 
seemed to him to be the question whether the universe cares what 
we do. Since we have long since given up believing that the cosmos 
pays us any mind, he thought we should long since have given up 
moral realism. I can only say that if this were what moral realism 
involved, it should -with relief rather than sorrow - be let go. 
However,...moral values or imperatives might be objective without 
being cosmic. They need be grounded on nothing more 
transcendental than facts about man and his environment, facts about 
what sorts of things matter to us, and how the ways we live affect 
these things.
(P.Railton, 1986, p.200/201).
See also, for instance, A.Baier, Essay 11, pp.222/3.
37 HJ.McCloskey, 1969 (p.7), believes that,
A possible and reasonable reaction to an acceptance of the truth of a 
relativist, or a subjectivist metatheory could be a rejection of moral 
standards as unimportant...[SJome, although by no means all, meta- 
ethical theories are such that a reasonable response to them is 
indifference to morality and to normative ethics.
38 S.Blackbum, 1985, p.6. And he admits on p. 11 that:
There is still that nagging feeling that on this metaphysic ’There are 
no obligations really", 
though he does believe that his own metatheory can deal adequately with such a 
worry. He also adds (p.9) that the thought that our moral consciousness has a 
certain foundation need not lead to a particular moral stance:
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Rationality in itself does not force one sensibility or another on us 
just because we have some belief about the origin of that sensibility. 
McDowell, 1985, p .119, criticizes Blackburn for being unable - as 
McDowell sees it - to provide adequate explanation of our sensibility in the light of 
the ways in which we naturally view its operation and objects.
39 S.Blackburn, 1985, p.6/7.
40 See W.C.Kneale, 1955, pp.98-99 for discussion of different meanings of 
'invention1 with respect particularly to our moral codes.
41 See GJ.Wamock, 1978 for general criticism of the view of value as chosen and 
for his assessment of the sources of such a contention. He sums up his own attitude 
in stating that:
Those who say that values are chosen surely do not say it because 
that, on reflection, is what just naturally seems to be true...Are they 
not, on the contrary, nearly paradigmatically, what we do not 
choose ?
(pp. 28-29).
42 J.S.Mill, 1972, p.30.
43 D.Zimmerman, 1985, p.81.
44 Ibid., p.91.
45 Ibid., p.93
46 In reply to his own questions, which I have quoted in the main body of the text, 
Zimmerman states that (p.93):
The answers to these questions depend on how the nonrealist about 
values conceives of the states of the subject that constitute certain 
states of affairs as values. If he considers the genesis of value to be 
a matter of radical decision, on the model of existentialists and some
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noncognitivists, then I think there is a lot to Platts' depiction of the 
dilemma that follows the abandonment of realism.
47 Ibid., p.95.
48 For some different examples of the ways in which this thought has been 
expressed, see: L,Armour, 1988, p. 179; E.J.Bond, 1973, p.81 & 1988, p.57;
C.B.Daniels, 1975, p.75; R.T.Gamer, 1990, p. 138; H.J.McClintock, 1963, 
p.535; M.Weston, 1975, pp.32, 53ff, 87-93.
49 This is said in the light of the generally held notion that that indeed is how moral 
education proceeds; that is to say, minimally, the teaching will instill something in 
the subject (be it new desires or respect for the moral law or whatever) which has 
not originated from within herself and may appear initially and also often further on 
as an outside force.
50 On the matter of value as intrinsic and as it being 'out there', see M.Picard, 
1939.
51 And Blackburn (1987, p.371) also points out that it is incorrect to think of our 
reasoning in these matters as being about our moral sensibility in practical affairs. 
He sees the sensibility as doing the job of giving one the feel for these moral 
matters, as reacting to the 'perceived features of things' rather than as being directed 
to the review of the operation of the sensibility itself.
52 Cf. Freud's account of the difficulties of fully ridding a patient of a neurosis 
even after its origin had been revealed to the patient himself:
If knowledge about the unconscious were as important for the 
patient as people inexperienced in psycho-analysis imagine, listening 
to lectures or reading books would be enough to cure him. Such 
measures, however, have as much influence on the symptons of
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nervous illness as a distribution of menu-cards in a time of famine 
has upon hunger.
(Quoted by R.Wollheim, 1973, p. 151).
53 Reporting people’s accounts of their religious experience, Hay notes that:
The phrase "it was more real than me talking to you now" is 
representative of the view of many of those we spoke to. This 
feeling, that the experience was more "real" than everyday reality, is 
very curious, given that it is normally brief in duration and 
unpredictable...[T]hese experiences usually have an affect [also] in 
altering people's outlook on life.
(D.Hay, 1987, p. 165).
54 R.Price, in D.D.Raphael, 1969, Vol.II, p.144/5.
55 See, for instance, Midgeley’s contentions on this matter in her essay 'The 
Objection to Systematic Humbug', 1981, especially p.86.
56 In his conversatons with Simone de Beauvoir, Sartre responds to the question in 
this fashion:
dB: You said that one could be free in any situation. When did you 
stop believing that ?
S: Quite early. There is an artless theory of freedom: one is free, one 
always chooses what one does, one is free with regard to the Other, 
the Other is free with regard to one. This theory is to be found in the 
very simple philosophical books, and I kept it as a convenient way 
of defining my freedom; but it did not correspond to what I really 
meant to say. What I meant was that one is responsible for oneself 
even if one's acts are provoked by something extemal...Every 
action includes a proportion of habit, of received ideas, of symbols;
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and then again there is something that comes from our remotest 
depths and that is related to our primary freedom.
(S. de Beauvoir, 1985, p.352).
57 R.B.Perry, 1933, pp. 133 & 138 (his italics).
58 Though Sartre does operate with a form of universalizability criterion on the 
basis of the choices one makes (J.-P. Sartre, 1973, pp.29-33; S.H.Lee, 1986).
59 J.-P. Sartre, 1973, pp.47/48.
60 Ibid., p.51. Cf. Kant, 1969, pp.67ff on autonomy and heteronomy:
In every case in which an object of the will must be assumed as 
prescribing the rule which is to determine the will, the rule is 
nothing else but heteronomy.
(p.71).
61 Taylor maintains that if the dilemma were brought about by the operation of 
radical choice on the part of the young man, then:
the nature of the predicament would dissolve, for that would mean 
that the young man would do away with the dilemma at any 
moment by simply declaring one of the rival claims dead and 
inoperative. Indeed, if serious moral claims were erected by radical 
choice, the young man could have a grievous dilemma about 
whether to go and get an ice cream cone, and then again he might 
decide not to.
(C.Taylor, 1977, p.119).
62 Ibid., p. 122.
63 A.D.Smith, 1985, p. 102.
64 Ibid., p. 102.
*5 R.Cudworth, in D.D.Raphael (ed.), 1969, Vol.I, pp.106-109 & p . l l l :
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...it is so far from being true, that all moral good and evil, just and 
unjust, (if they be any thing) are made by mere will and arbitrary 
commands (as many conceive), that it is not possible that any 
command of God or man should oblige otherwise than by virtue of 
that which is naturally just. And though particular promises and 
commands be made by will, yet it is not will but nature that obligeth 
to the doing of things promised and commanded, or makes them 
such things as ought to be done. For mere will cannot change the 
moral nature of our actions, nor the nature of intellectual beings.
66 C.Taylor, 1977, p. 120.
67 He states that:
How could we value the upshot of an arbitrary choice ? For we 
should be clear that for the Existentialist the choice or decision 
involved here must be arbitrary. It would fail to be arbitrary only if 
we were guided by relevant considerations; but since we are dealing 
with matters of value, such considerations would be relevant only if 
already embodying prior recognition of values, which is contrary to 
the claim that values themselves arise in the very act of choosing. 
Since the choice is arbitrary, the agent knows that the question of 
value does not exist.
(A.D.Smith, 1985, p.102).
68 C.Guignon, 1986, p.82. A similar criticism is put by M.Midgeley, 1981, p.8.
69 For a further attack on the notion of value as chosen, see E.Shils, 1988, p.51.
70 Cf. J.Harrison, 1954, p. 116, who contends that:
Moral discernment consists in making oneself sensitive to 
distinctions which impinge on one from without, and he is most
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sensitive who is most sensitive to these distinctions, not he who is 
most determined and vigorous in exhorting or commanding others.
71 A.D.Smith, 1985, p.107.
72 E.J.Bond, 1983, pp.60-61 (and see pp.55-56 on his idea of value as being 
pursued by reflective desire).
73 Ibid., p.61. See also his chapter 5 for further thoughts on the status of value and 
its relation to desire.
74 J.Kekes, 1984, p.4.
75 Ibid., p.4.
76 J.Ladd, 1957, p.14/15 (and see also ch. XVIII, sec.2).
77 Ibid., ch.V, sec.4.
78 Ibid., p. 102.
79 C.Taylor, 1989, believes this matter of living within 'horizons' provided by our 
moral frameworks to be 'integral' to 'human personhood' (p.27; and see also 
p.99).
D.CkBrink, 1989, thinks, on a different tack, that we as moral subjects 
ordinarily 'begin' as realists about moral claims, and generally only jettison such an 
implicit view as the result of thought on the 'apparently* queer nature of moral 
ontology or 'apparently' poor methodology of ethical thinking (p.23).
80 Cf. the commitment of atheists to moral issues, despite the inability of believers 
to make sense of such stances outwith belief in a divinely created (and/or ordered) 
universe. An example of just this kind of matter is provided by the following letter 
to a national newspaper. In reply to a contention by Lord Rees-Mogg that atheists 
either are incapable of caring morally for others or are in fact evil, the correspondent 
writes:
Notes to Chapter Seven 428
To be an atheist means that you do not accept the existence of any 
higher being or eternal life. It does not mean that you have little 
regard for human life. Indeed, my belief that we live for such a short 
space of time makes me value that time all the more.
(Letter from D. Woolmer to The Independent, September 9,1991).
Mackie also comments that:
A man could hold strong moral views, and indeed ones whose 
content was thoroughly conventional, while believing that they were 
simply attitudes and policies with regard to conduct that he and other 
people held.
(J.L.Mackie, 1977, p. 16).
81 He states his belief that:
The quality approved by our moral sense is conceived to reside in 
the person approved, and to be a perfection and dignity in him: 
approbation of another's virtue is not conceived as making the 
approver happy, or virtuous, or worthy, though it is attended with 
some small pleasure...The admired quality is conceived as the 
perfection of the agent, and such an one as is distinct from the 
pleasure either in the agent or the approver...The perception of the 
approver, though attended with pleasure, plainly represents 
something quite distinct from this pleasure; even as the perception of 
external forms is attended with pleasure, and yet represents 
something distinct from this pleasure.
(F.Hutcheson, in D.D.Raphael [ed.], 1969, Vol.I, p.270).
C.L.Elder, 1987.
83 C.Taylor, 1977, p. 112.
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84 Ibid., pp. 113-115. It should be noted that Nietzsche, for instance, held there to 
be links of a fundamental nature between moral responsibility and the self: this 
being, of course, part of a quite different project from that which Taylor might wish 
to establish (see R. Schacht, 1983, pp. 136-138).
85 As put forward in the interpretation of P.Strawson (1959 & 1975).
R.B.Perry (1931, p.457) addresses directly the issue of value as a 
fundamental constituent of a possible experience in these words:
Consider, for example, the view that value is a category. He who 
defends this view should be prepared first to exhibit the concept, as 
he might exhibit the concept of relation, causation, or substance; and 
then prove its categorial status. He may do so by showing that the 
concept in question belongs to the alphabet of thought, - is one of 
those terms in terms of which one must think if one is to think at all. 
Or he may do so by showing that value as specified belongs to the 
structure of being or object in general, so that any particular being or 
object must embody it.
86 C.Taylor, 1977, p.112.
87 Ibid., p. 113.
88 Ibid., p.114-115.
89 Ibid., p.112.
90 Ibid., p. 117.
91 For example: J.Rawls, 1973, ch.VIII, sec.85; D.Parfitt, 1984, ch. 15; O.Letwin, 
1987; G.Sher, 1987, ch.9.
R.B.Brandt (1986, p.243) asks, for instance, of human nature and the self, 
that, in the light of advances in ethical theory through further understanding of 
practical reason and motivation, then:
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If it is shown that human nature is such that something isn't and 
can't be desired at all, what would be the point of raising the 
question whether it is good or fittingly desired ?
While G.Held, 1990, has recently produced a femininst critique of much of 
ethical theory in virtue of her belief that it is committed to a one-sided view of the 
self from a male actor's perspective.
And there is also discussion of the maintenance of the self through moral 
situations as one follows consistent lines of evaluative response which is given in 
P.A.Schilpp, 1937, p.61/2; R.Sokolowski, 1985, pp. 160-162.
92 See the following comments as instances of this:
...the sphere of personhood has personal values woven into its very 
nature; an appreciation of good and evil is not an optional extra for 
persons.
(A.D.Smith, 1985, p. 114).
...the idea of a system of values is part of the idea of a person. 
(G.Nerlich, 1989, p.20).
And see also S.Scheffler, 1979.
931 follow, in this respect, the classic exposition given by Strawson, 1959.
94 A dilute and basic version of such a thesis is given by W.D.Falk, 1965, pp.63- 
64, where he talks of the essential need to which morality answers as being 'for the 
sake of sane and ordered individual being' since one's 'stake in self-preservation' 
ordinarily 'requires that one should be able to bear before oneself the survey of 
one’s actions.'
95 Nagel states that:
The belief in objectivity clearly implies a commitment to some kind 
of realism - not realism about a world of values with which we
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causally interact, but realism about the existence of reasons or values 
which we can discover by certain processes of thought.
(T.Nagel, 1986a, p.359).
See also R.Bambrough, 1979, ch.5.
96 On this matter see A.S.Cua, 1978.
97 Refer again to G.H.Mead, 1934 & 1964.
98 As Kekes believes (J.Kekes, 1989).
99 As instanced most forcefully by G.E.M.Anscombe, 1958, p. 17.
100 Sokolowski talks of the ’moral ontological difference’ between the desirable 
(the apparent good) and the (real) good with which we operate, seeing that as both 
distinctive of human beings and generative of any moral principles. He states this 
thesis in these terms:
It is the sense that there is an issue of truth in what we do. Unless 
we are - or have become - morally brutish, the issue is always there 
for us, and our character shows how we have cultivated it. (p. 148). 
Furthermore, he claims that,
It is not because we are [divinely] commanded to be concerned, or 
because we commit ourselves to being morally concerned, that we 
are moral agents; we first of all are moral agents, just as we are First 
of all thoughtful beings. The difference between the desirable and 
the good is there for us as a difference before there are commands, 
promises, and responsibilities of any sort...We do not have to 
’’acquire” this difference; it is not possessed as a piece of knowledge 
that could be detached from us; ”we” as agents could simply not be 
without this difference.
(p. 157).
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101 To take an example from my own breast: I experience a demand that the wilds 
of Antarctica be preserved inviolate, though there is nothing I feel able to do to 
answer this demand and nothing that I especially feel that I should be doing.
102 Marcel talks of the ’creative vow' of aesthetic creation in these words which 
mirror the moral and religious examples:
The [vow] only takes shape after the artist has as it were been 
possessed by some form of reality which is revealed less by sight 
than by a sort of inward touch: but reality thus apprehended appears 
to him at the same time (and this is a paradox and a mystery) as 
independent in relation to his personal will and as nevertheless 
subject to the act by which he makes it pass into existence. The 
[creative vow] is no other than the fiat by which I decide to put all 
my energies at the service of this possibility which is already 
imposing itself upon me, but only upon me, as a reality, so that I 
may transform it into a reality for all, that is to say into an 
established work. This means that the [vow], far from being 
reduced to a mere wish, has the character of an engagement and a 
decision. But this engagement or this decision is not made simply 
within my own being, something transcendent is involved, however 
indistinct my consciousness of it may as yet be.
(G.Marcel, 1951, ch.5, p.109).
103 L.Hertzberg, 1990, p.l 15 believes that
...to accept an action as morally necessary or impossible for 
someone is to express an understanding of his life and character. 
This is not merely a matter of psychological incapacities on the part of the agent, 
Hertzberg maintains, such that one could demand of him that he try harder, for,
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...the sort of understanding relevant here must itself be expressive 
of ethical concerns.
And Dilman has a most interesting way of putting matters, combining those themes 
of independence of the moral demand from one and its representing deep concerns 
of the self which I have been running. I think he is worth quoting at some length 
here. He says:
Obviously the [moral] reactions must be part of a coherent outlook, 
one that informs a man's life and convictions - even if this outlook 
has not been made articulate by the man himself. Otherwise the 
conviction which any one of them carries for the person will not 
amount to anything more than a transitory feeling of conviction, it 
will not be something that goes deep with him. This is what the 
distinction between "what is merely subjective" and what is not 
amounts to here. I did not say "objective", for this is a dangerous 
word to use in this connection. It separates the object of the reaction 
from the sense it has for the subject in a way that is foreign to our 
conception of what it means to make a moral judgement. Certainly it 
is the moral values in which he believes which give the object of this 
reaction its sense, and these in turn exist independently of him. On 
the other hand, unless he makes them his own, so that they speak 
through him when he speaks for himself, this object will stand 
devoid of the sense he sees in it. Indeed, in such a case, the reaction 
is either not genuine or it is not what it purports to be. The term 
"objective" thus leaves the subject out of the moral beliefs he holds 
and makes their object into something that stands outside his life.
He goes on to say:
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[A theorist is] right, then, [to want] to emphasize the independent 
reality of the aspect under which we see the object of our moral 
reactions, but suggests the wrong account of it in making 
"objectivity" a requirement of this independence. The reality of this 
aspect, the good or evil to which the subject responds, is to be 
found in the significance it has in the life he shares with others, in 
the practices that have grown around it, in the language in which it is 
given expression, and in the art and literature in which it is brought 
into focus and reflected on. This is what gives the aspect a reality 
independent of those who affirm it in their individual lives. 
(I.Dilman, 1990, pp. 195-196).
While Frankfurt believes that:
...the inability to forbear is not a simple matter of deficient capacity 
on the part of the agent...[but also] resemble[s] [being] driven by 
irresistible passion or the like - in that the agent experiences himself 
as having no choice but to accede to the force by which he is 
constrained even if he thinks it might be better not to do so.
One loses, Frankfurt thinks, 'the will1 to forbear; one is prevented ’making use of 
[ones'] own capacities', and even if he could do differently a man cannot'bring 
himself to overcome that force.'
(H.Frankfurt, 1988, p.86).
104 Frankfurt also has a comment to make on this putative affair:
Especially with respect to those we love and with respect to our 
ideals, we are liable to be bound by necessities which have less to 
do with our adherence to the principles of morality than with 
integrity or consistency of a more personal kind. These necessities
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constrain us from betraying the things we care about most and with 
which, accordingly, we are most closely identified. In a sense which 
a strictly ethical analysis cannot make clear, what they keep us from 
violating are not our duties or our obligations but ourselves.
(Ibid., p.91).
105 Subject, of course, to the proviso that there are selves without core moral 
concerns.
106 As to this unquestioned and unreflected-on facet of our spontaneous moral and 
loving reactions, a number of philosophers do make the point that the role in our 
lives of things like, say, love and friendship may be breached by too much thought 
on them (F.White, 1975; S.Hampshire, 1982, pp. 147/8; J.L.Mackie, 1978, p.353; 
T.Nagel, 1986b, p. 155).
107 B.Williams, 1973, p.227.
108 H.Frankfurt, 1988, p.89.
109 In all the construals of that term which I put forward in section 5 of chapter 3.
110 'Sceptical', that is, with respect to the WPT line.
1111 should emphasize again here that it is not of the explicit and conscious 
demands that another (in this case, one's friend) directs to oneself that I am talking. 
1121 use the phrase 'deepest impulses of the self in line with my considerations in 
chapter 4 concerning what kinds of experience, and specifically demand experience, 
a subject feels she can or cannot envisage removed from her experiential life. So a 
'deep impulse’ of the subject's self might be felt as being brought forth in 
immediacy and/or it could be regarded as such by her on thinking on a possible self 
shorn of this feature (in that latter respect, the way of finding out what is and is not 
a deep impulse rests on a negative method: it is what the subject feels that she 
cannot conceive of herself without).
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NOTES TO APPENDIX
1 Scheler's main difference from Husserl consists in his belief that the essences of 
phenomena can be intuited directly (1973, pp.51, 65,74). One commentator puts 
the matter this way:
...Scheler's phenomenology differs from Husserl's in being - at one 
level, anyway - an amateur's pursuit. Anybody can do it, and indeed 
everybody does, without training and without trying and without 
even knowing that they are doing it. Nothing is heard here of the 
painful processes whereby "essences" are supposedly to be wrung 
from phenomena. Schelerian values are simply intuited "eidetically" 
in a more or less distinctive fashion, by a process analogous to 
sense-perception, and one in which reason plays no part.
(P.Heath, 1975, p. 165).
2 Husserl himself was reportedly not too keen on Scheler's rather individual use of 
phenomenological method and is said to have called the results which Scheler came 
up with 'fool's gold' (H.Spiegelberg, 1976, p.236).
3 M.Scheler, 1973, p. 13/14, 35,
4 Ibid., p.46 and cf. Kant, 1968, p.28.
5 M.Scheler, 1973, pp.87/8 and 90-100.
6 Cf. F.Brentano, 1969, Appendix, pp. 111-113.
7 Scheler, 1973, pp. 13, 46, 186, 244.
8 Ibid., p.261.
9 Ibid., p.261 (and see p.266). The point is also put on Scheler’s behalf by 
W.H.Werkmeister, 1970, Vol.II, pp.300-301.
10 Scheler, 1973, p.244 (and see p.249). This assertion is discussed well by 
M.E.Clarke, 1932, pp.422/3 and by A.Schutz, 1958b, pp.487 & 490/1.
11 M.Scheler, 1973, p. 157.
12 Ibid., p.l42ff.
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13 See H.Spiegelberg, 1976, p.243.
14 Spiegelberg, ibid., p.236, cites Moritz Geiger's worry, on Scheler's joining the 
phenomenological circle at Munich, that Scheler, while acknowledged as a potent 
phenomenologist, tended to produce results that were 'seized without proper 
examination.'
15 This matter is brought out by Spiegelberg, ibid., pp.252/3 and by I.Moosa, 
1991.
16 See M.S.Frings, 1965, p.112.
17 M.Scheler, op cit., pp. 186, 192, 214, 232-238.
18 He puts the matter in these words:
...the ought is not abstracted from a factual being or happening, say, 
from a feeling in inner perception or a consciousness of "necessity"; 
it is an autonomous mode of the givenness of contents that do not 
have to be comprehended first in the modes of the givenness of 
extant being in order to be comprehended as something that ought 
to be or ought to be done...[V]alues do not consist in an ought-to- 
be, as a kind of false subjectivism maintains. Values are not 
"necessitiations" exercised by a so-called transcendental ego or 
subject on an empirical ego; neither are they "voices", "calls", or 
"demands" which are addressed to "empirical man" from outside. 
Such hypotheses are constructed interpretations of simple matters of 
fact which favour a questionable metaphysics. Rather, all norms, 
imperatives, demands, etc. - if they are not to be understood as 
arbitrary orders - have their foundation in an autonomous being , the 
being of values.
(Ibid., pp. 186/7).
19 One commentator on Hartmann calls the 'crux' of his system the claim that, in 
value experience, 'it is the apprehension of something which is and remains
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independent of the act of apprehension' (W.H.Werkmeister, Introduction to 
E.H.Cadwallader, 1984b, p.xi).
20 He points out that 'higher' values (such as the demands of universal justice) are 
often experienced as more strongly impinging on one than 'lower1 ones (such as the 
demand to refrain from stealing in a particular instance), 1932, Vol.II, p.52. There 
is, he believes, a difference in phenomenological strength of experience between 
breaking a moral value and upholding one ('Evidence of strength is found in the 
seriousness of offence against a value, while height is known by the 
meritoriousness of fulfillment', ibid., Vol.II, p.451, and cf. my descriptions of the 
strength of demand experience in my chapters 4 and 5).
21 This is a matter discussed by Spiegelberg in his historical survey of the 
phenomenological school (1976, pp.358/9.
22 'Appraisement of value precedes experience,' he says (N.Hartmann, 1932, 
Vol.I, p. 187; see also pp. 104 and 170).
23 Ibid., pp. 176/7.
24 Ibid., p.88.
25 Ibid., p.88.
26 Ibid., p.93. And cf. A.Meinong, 1972, secs. 4 and 5.
27 Hartmann, op.cit, Vol.I, pp. 184/5 ('Values emanate neither from the things (or 
real relationships) nor from the percipients,' p. 185).
28 See F.Kraenzel, 1984.
29 N.Hartmann, op.cit., p.220/221. A similar thesis is held by D.Von Hildebrand, 
1991, pp. 122-124.
30 W.H.Werkmeister, in E.H.Cadwallader, 1984b, p.xi.
31 E.H.Cadwallader, 1984b, p .l.
32 See E.H.Cadwallader, 1980, 1984a, 1984b.
33 H.Spiegelberg complains that Hartmann's work is often unreliable as a piece of 
phenomenology and that it is uncertain at times when he is actually making
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phenomenologically based claims (H.Spiegelberg, 1976, pp.358/9; 379; 385; 
387/8). A similar fear about the basis of Hartmann’s ’results’ is also expressed by 
J.N.Findlay, 1970, p.68.
34 He argues that Hartmann suffers from a tendency to present the ’ready-made 
results', the 'frozen products' of his investigations, which have the 'finality...of 
dogmatic pronouncements' (1976, p.389).
35 R.Hazelton, 1939, p.630.
36 N.Hartmann, 1932, Vol.I, p.259.
37 Ibid., Vol.I, p.257. Hartmann sees the human subject as bridging the ideal 
sphere and the actual:
He is in metaphysical connection with the world of values, he 
senses their ideal self-existence. And he possesses spontaneous self­
activity, the capacity to direct events. The subject is the only real 
entity in which the positive Ought-To-Be can be transformed into a 
real tendency.
(Ibid., Vol.I, p.257).
38 Ibid., Vol.I, p.266.
39 Ibid., Vol.II, p.82.
40 Ibid., Vol.I, p.272 & 302ff. ('Single valuational materials are capable of being 
described, the consciousness of them can be defined in its actional character 
(sometimes specifically), but the valuational essence as such, which is behind, 
remains floating in a certain incomprehensibility.' Ibid., Vol.I, p.272).
41 Hence his contention that, '...behind moral conflict...there always stands the 
opposition of value in some form...' (Ibid., Vol.II, p.47).
42 See, for example, A.-T.Tymieniecka, 1986a, p.40 and D.Laskey, 1986, p.323.
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